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Abstract 
Nicholas Otieno Ondoro 
The Police Reform Process in Kenya, 2008-2014: A Case Study of 
Security Sector Reform in Societies Emerging From Crisis 
Key words: Kenya, Police Reform, Security Sector Reform, Power-
sharing, Grand-coalition, Transition, Agenda Setting, Devolution, Policing, 
Post-conflict security building 
Security sector reform has in the recent past been a critical component of 
peace agreements in countries emerging from armed conflicts or political 
crisis. In Kenya, the Commission of Inquiry into the 2007/08 Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) established that Kenya’s security sector, particularly the 
police, bore the greatest responsibility for the violence. Subsequently, the 
police emerged as one of the major institutions for reforms. ‘How have 
security sector reforms, particularly police reforms, in Kenya developed 
since 2007 and how, and to what extent, have they been shaped by 
Kenya’s wider political transitions and SSR process during this period?’ 
The research aimed at investigating how the police reform process in 
Kenya has developed since 2007, and how the process has been shaped 
by Kenya’s wider political transitions and security sector reform processes 
in general. Using mixed methods research, we found that despite some 
progress, there is wider public perception that the reforms are yet to 
address reform priorities at the national level and still fall short of 
expectations of ordinary Kenyans. We argue that political power-sharing 
after the 2007 post-election violence facilitated police reform, while at the 
same time frustrated its implementation especially in instances where 
reform seemed to dis-empower political elites. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
The central aim of this study is to investigate security sector reform 
(SSR), particularly police reform, in transitional post-conflict societies. 
Specifically, it explores police reform in Kenya since 2007 in relation to 
the underlying processes, examines the contribution of local actors to the 
reform process and investigates the challenges and responses to 
deficiencies associated with SSR. It also explores the influence of power-
sharing politics on Kenya’s police reform process and investigates the 
extent to which the police reform that emerged after the 2007 post-
election violence in Kenya is responsive to policing and security needs of 
the Kenyan population. 
Kenya has undergone a series of political transitions from a single party 
state to a multi-party democracy. During the course of the transition, the 
security sector has evolved alongside the existing political landscape. 
However, political agenda setting for major changes in the security sector, 
specifically police reform became more pronounced with the victory of the 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the 2002 general elections. The 
NARC government inherited a security sector that was perceived to be 
characterized by inefficiency, lack of respect for human rights, people 
unfriendly and one whose culture was to support the regime in power 
(Hornsby, 2012)  
In 2003, the new government, with the support of the donor community 
established the first ever Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) effort at 
reforming its governance, justice, law and order sectors (GoK, 2003) 
popularly known as GJLOS. Under this initiative, there was increased 
investment in reform within security agencies through capacity building, 
improvement in operational logistics and welfare of personnel. Community 
policing was also introduced to make provision of security responsive to 
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community needs (Groenewald and Peake, 2004). These reforms were 
however limited because the existing legislative and policy framework did 
not provide for institutional reforms within the security sector. 
The 2007 general election was a turning point in Kenya’s security reform 
initiative. The ensuing post-election violence exposed glaring weaknesses 
in Kenya’s state security systems as the agencies failed to institutionally 
anticipate, prepare for and contain the violence, and in some cases 
contributed to violence and violations of human rights (Waki Commission, 
2008). Observers for example, IISS (2009) and ICTJ-Kenya (2010) 
pointed to a plethora of issues responsible for the failure to institutionally 
respond to the violence. They argued that failure to embrace institutional 
reforms including judicial, police and civil service left the Kenyan state 
with reduced ability to tackle root causes of violence. Since then, no 
aspect of Kenya’s security sector has been under scrutiny as much as the 
police. 
The National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process (KNDRP) resulted in 
the National Accord. Agenda four of the process outlined priorities that the 
government needed to undertake in order to restore peace and stability in 
Kenya. Envisaged in these reforms were constitutional, legislative and 
institutional reforms, including reforms of the judiciary and the police 
(Abdullahi, 2011). The National Taskforce on Police Reforms was formed 
in May 2009. The Taskforce submitted its report to the government in 
November 2009 with about 200 recommendations divided into four broad 
areas namely: police accountability, professionalism, operational and 
administrative reforms, and institutional policy and legislative reforms 
(GoK, 2009). 
Linking the Kenyan case to the global challenges facing SSR (Andersen, 
2011, Nathan, 2004), this study posits that SSR in Kenya face some very 
difficult challenges due to multiplicity of factors. The study thus proceeds 
to investigate the processes, outcomes and weaknesses of police reforms 
adopted in Kenya within the broad framework of SSR. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
Some existing literature on reforms in Kenya for example, Manby (2008), 
indicate that police reform in Kenya faces complex challenges making 
realization of its objectives difficult. This, coupled with lack of evidence 
that the process is responsive to policing and public security needs inform 
the overarching question in this study, thus: ‘How have security sector 
reforms, particularly police reforms, in Kenya developed since 2007 and 
how, and to what extent, have they been shaped by Kenya’s wider 
political transitions and SSR process during this period?’ 
To address the question, the thesis focuses on police reform within the 
wider SSR. This is informed by the fact that the police reform forms the 
thrust of SSR discourse in Kenya and that police are the most visible 
security actors amongst the Kenyan public. The study primarily examines 
the aims of  and approach towards police reform that emerged after the 
2007 electoral violence in Kenya, and critically examines the subsequent 
police reform processes in the context of wider political and security 
sector reform and disputes. On the basis of initial assessment, the 
analysis proceeds from a sceptical and critical perspective, and therefore 
focuses on understanding weaknesses and constraints at least as much 
as progress in police reform in Kenya.  
From the overarching question, the following secondary questions were 
addressed in the thesis: 
i. What were the security sector reform priorities in Kenya before and 
after the 2007-2008 post-election violence? 
ii. What is the contribution of local actors to police reform and wider 
SSR processes in Kenya? 
iii. How have stakeholders responded to challenges and deficiencies 
of SSR in Kenya? 
iv. To what extent has power-sharing politics influenced police reform 
and wider SSR in Kenya? 
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v. To what extent is SSR in Kenya responsive to policing and security 
needs of the Kenyan population? 
1.3 A Brief Overview of Literature 
This PhD thesis is built on three thematic literature areas,1 namely: SSR 
processes in transitional and post-conflict societies; political aspects of 
police and SSR in transitional societies; and the efficacy of police and 
SSR in transitional post-conflict settings. 
Under the first theme, the study used Kenya’s police reform experience in 
contributing to the literature of SSR in the wider transitional and post-
conflict contexts. It explored the contribution of the local actors to police 
and wider security sector reform processes which have been dominated 
by the donor-recipient framing. The challenges facing SSR processes in 
transitional and post-conflict contexts were also explored alongside efforts 
undertaken by stakeholders to address such deficiencies. These relate to 
the first three secondary research questions respectively. 
Existing literature affirms the role of power-sharing as means to ending 
conflicts (Lijphart, 2008, Curtis, 2013) especially in Africa and 
underscores the challenges posed by power-sharing in post-conflict 
environments (Tull and Mehler, 2005, Stodiek, 2008). Similarly, the 
inclusion of security sector reform component in power-sharing 
agreements also continues to receive considerable attention (Hutchful, 
2009, Chitiyo, 2009). However, very little literature explores the 
interrelationship between power-sharing and security sector reform. 
Noyes (2013) attempted to fill this gap, albeit inadequately. While he 
compares the Kenyan and Zimbabwe’s experience, his analysis is only 
limited to the degree to which SSR was part of the power-sharing 
agreements in the two countries, thus failing to provide a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of power-sharing arrangements. The 
fourth secondary research question of this thesis seeks to fill this gap. 
                                            
1
 These three literature areas are elaborately discussed in Chapter 2. 
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While a lot of attention and resources continue to be devoted to SSR 
processes in transitional and post-conflict countries, some scholars see 
little tangible outcomes and argue that SSR initiatives are yet to cascade 
down to community level (Egnell and Haldén, 2009, Scheye and Peake, 
2005). This thesis contributes to growing body of evidence to show the 
impacts of SSR initiative amongst the public, particularly in terms of 
responsiveness to policing and community safety needs. This relates to 
the fifth secondary research question.  
Based on above literature areas, the thesis targets three academic 
audiences and security sector reform policy community. The research 
directly contributes to the debates amongst the academic community 
interested in police reform in Kenya which has become a focus after the 
2007 post-election violence. Apart from Kenya, the research also 
contributes to academic debates amongst those interested in police 
reform and wider SSR in countries in political transition and those 
interested primarily in security sector aspects of political transition in 
transitional/developing countries. Finally, it contributes to the policy 
community by providing a framework in which future policies on post-
conflict security sector reform might borrow from. 
The thesis recognises the fact that existing literature does not out-rightly 
consider Kenya as a typical image of a post-conflict country. 
Nevertheless, the post-conflict framework has been accepted internally 
with many institutions (ICPC, 2011, ICTJ-Kenya, 2010) and many 
scholars  working within it. For the purpose of this thesis, the post-conflict 
framework is adopted since Kenya has some elements and agendas, for 
example power-sharing, similar to typical post-conflict contexts2. 
                                            
2
 The post-conflict debate is revisited in Chapter 2. 
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1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Case Study Approach 
This research is a single case study approach that focuses on security 
sector reform process, specifically post 2007 police reform in Kenya. As 
pointed out by Denscombe (2010, p.55), a single case study ‘explores the 
key issues affecting those in a case study setting (e.g. problems or 
opportunities’) in this case, exploring progress, as much as disputes and 
outcomes in the implementation of police reform process within the wider 
security sector reform processes in Kenya after the 2007 post-election 
violence. 
While the focus is on police reform in Kenya, the holistic nature of 
analysis of security sector reform processes allows us to analyse the 
police reform processes within the context of the wider security sector 
reform processes. Thus, the single case study approach here may be 
referred to as holistic (Robson, 2011), in which a single case of police 
reform in Kenya remains at the level of the whole, rather than seek to 
analyse each of the different institutions of the security sector. 
1.4.2 Mixed Methods  
The single case study approach in this research ‘allows the researcher to 
use a variety of sources, a variety of data and a variety of research 
methods as part of the investigation’ (Denscombe, 2010, p.54). For this 
reason, it adopts a mixed methods design, also called multi-strategy 
design (Robson, 2011), combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methods.  
Though mixed in approach, this research is more qualitative than 
quantitative, since ‘priority is given to the qualitative aspects of the study’ 
(Robson, 2011, p.165), that is, substantial data is collected using 
qualitative methods. In this respect, chapters three, four and five relied on 
qualitative data, while chapter six invariably combined both the qualitative 
and quantitative data, This choice is guided by what Bryman (2012, 
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p.632) calls priority and sequence decisions. A priority decision relates to 
‘how far is a qualitative or quantitative method the principal data gathering 
tool or do they have equal weight?’, while sequence decision relates to 
‘which methods precedes which?’3 The choice of mixed methods 
approach was useful as it helped to comprehensively respond to the 
research questions.4 
1.5 Sources of Data 
For the purpose of comprehensive analysis, both secondary and primary 
data sources described below are used in this study.  
1.5.1 Documentary sources 
Secondary data is drawn from documentation (both official and unofficial) 
and other sources including newspaper articles, surveys and reports, 
working papers and news commentaries. Many established research 
organisations periodically undertake surveys to determine attitudes of the 
public towards police reform to determine whether the reform meets 
public expectations.5 This study uses such surveys as part of quantitative 
analysis.  
More so, the Kenyan media and the civil society groups, both local and 
international, continue to take active role in police/SSR discourse in 
Kenya thus providing invaluable data source for secondary analysis. This 
research heavily borrows from reports from such groups. 
1.5.2 Primary sources 
The choice of primary data sources was based on the question, ‘Who are 
the main actors in Kenya’s police/SSR processes? Whilst multiple actors 
come into mind, five categories of actors were identified for analytical 
purposes. These included: police officers, members of parliament, civil 
                                            
3
 Sequence decision is explained in Section 1.8 of this chapter. 
4
 See Section 7.3.4 
5
 We however rely on IPSOS as the most leading public opinion poll agency in Kenya. 
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society representatives, public officers responsible for police and justice 
reform and members of the public.  
Police officers were included deliberately as the thrust of Kenya’s security 
sector reform discourse majorly revolves around the police and that their 
handling of the 2007 postelection violence aggravated the situation.6 
Members of parliament, representing both sides during the lifespan of the 
coalition government, shed light on power-sharing and provided insights 
into the political aspects of Kenya’s police and justice sector reform. 
Civil society groups’ representatives were important in providing 
information relating to oversight and ownership of SSR. This category of 
respondents included representatives of various civil society groups 
including; Usalama Reforms Forum, Kenya Police Reforms Working 
Group, PeaceNet, Communities Initiative Action Group Kenya and the 
International Centre for Policy and Conflict  
Public officers responsible for both police and justice reform were critical 
for providing in-depth information not available in the public domain in 
relation to the implementation of the reform process within the police and 
the wider security sector. 
Members of the public, who are the direct beneficiaries of improved 
policing and access to justice, provided information relating to the 
responsiveness of the reform to policing and public security needs at 
community level. This related to Chapter six of the thesis. Whilst we 
research acknowledged the diverse nature of the Kenyan public, the 
emphasis was not on the diversity but on the perception of the wider 
public on the police reform process.  In this research, various 
terminologies, including; ‘ordinary Kenyans’, ‘ordinary public’, ‘Kenyan 
citizen’  and ‘Kenyan population’ are synonymously used to refer to the 
members of the public.  
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 For police role in the 2007 post-election violence, see Waki Commission (2008). 
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1.6 Data Collection Methods 
1.6.1 Secondary Data 
Secondary data in this research focused on analysis of data drawn from 
secondary sources (explained in Section 1.5 above). As construed in this 
research, ‘secondary analysis is the analysis of data by researchers who 
will probably not have been involved in the collection of those data’ 
(Bryman, 2012, p.312).  
The choice of secondary sources as a source of data lies in the inherent 
advantages it offers within the context of this research. Some of the 
advantages of secondary analysis informing this choice included the 
‘prospect for having access to good quality data for a tiny fraction of 
resources’, and that it offered ‘more time for data analysis’ and ‘re-
analysis which may offer new interpretations’ (Bryman, 2012). 
These advantages - analysed against the Kenyan situation - revealed that 
while little academic research had been done in relation to police reform 
during the period under consideration, the range of possibilities in terms of 
data analysis was enormous. 
1.6.2 Primary Data 
Unlike secondary analysis where the focus was on analysis of data 
relating to police and justice reform processes as collected by other 
persons and institutions, the responsibility to collect and analyse primary 
data in this case was with the researcher. Both qualitative and quantitative 
data collection methods of primary data collection applied in this research. 
Based on Bryman (2012), qualitative interviewing and the questionnaire 
methods were used respectively. 
1.6.2.1. Qualitative Interviewing 
Collection of qualitative data in this study revolves around qualitative 
interviewing. Qualitative interview as used here borrows from Bryman 
(2012) to highlight the difference with the structured interview associated 
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with the survey method. Two qualitative interview methods; individual 
interview, commonly one-to-one and face-to-face, and focus group 
method, which is interviews in group settings, were used. These are 
explained below: 
1.6.2.1.1. Individual Interview Method 
At the formative stages of the design of this research, exploratory 
interviews with stakeholders were conducted for the purpose of providing 
a better and a nuanced understanding of the issues around police and 
justice reform process in Kenya, and to determine what range of 
responses to expect during the actual fieldwork. This helped to clear 
uncertainties and doubts over what to collect given the fact that there is so 
much material, albeit non-academic, on police/SSR processes in Kenya. 
The exploratory interviews with stakeholders were therefore deemed as a 
step towards providing a focused direction of the research.  
Once the research focus had been obtained through exploratory 
interviews, semi-structured interviews were conducted with target groups7 
including; police officers, members of parliament and civil society 
representatives. This was with the view to collecting data relating to 
challenges in the implementation of police reform; local ownership of 
police reform, oversight of police and responsiveness of SSR to 
community security needs and political aspects of police reform 
respectively. Additionally, in-depth interviews with the managers of police 
and justice reform in Kenya were conducted to provide expert opinion and 
insights not available in the public domain (Robson, 2011).  
1.6.2.1.2. Focus Group Method 
Focus group interview is important in ‘examining the ways in which people 
in conjunction with one another construe the general topics in which the 
researcher is interested’ (Bryman, 2012, p.503), in this case an in-depth 
exploration of people’s understanding of security and security sector 
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chapter. 
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reform at the community level in Kenya. It also provided an opportunity to 
countercheck the responses and give insights into data relating to 
awareness, perceptions and impact of police and justice reform collected 
through analysis of secondary sources and the questionnaire. 
We conducted three focus group discussions with members of the public 
drawn from Kisumu. The first group (FGD1) comprised the youth given 
the fact that the youth were significantly involved in the 2007 post-election 
violence in the form of confrontation with the police. The second group 
(FGD2) involved community leaders, for the purpose of exploring the level 
of police community relationship at the local level. The third group (FGD3) 
involved women only for the purpose of introducing gender dimension in 
the study.  
1.6.2.2. Questionnaire Method 
The fifth secondary research question in this study sought to explore the 
extent to which police reform is responsive to policing and security needs 
of the Kenyan population at community level. To achieve this, a semi-
structured a face-to-face questionnaire, alongside qualitative interviewing 
described above was used. The questionnaire method was used to 
determine the public’s level of awareness of the on-going processes, their 
perceptions towards the progress made in police reform and the impact 
the processes have on their security.  
A number of instruments used in assessing the impact of SSR on local 
communities including (OECD DAC, 2007) and ISSAT (2010) provided 
guidance on how to determine public perception towards security sector 
reforms, while studies for example, Vinck et al. (2008) and Smith-Höhn 
(2011) provided empirical examples of the use of SSR perceptions based 
questionnaire in Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia and Sierra 
Leone respectively. These instruments were modified to suit Kenya’s 
situation in relation to the post-2007 police reform process.8 
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1.7 Sampling Procedure 
The case study approach and the complexity of involvement of multiple 
actors in the police and justice reform processes in Kenya made it 
extremely difficult to develop a sampling frame hence the choice of a non-
probabilistic technique, in this case purposive sampling. This choice was 
guided by desire to reach an array of respondents as possible ‘so that 
many different perspectives and ranges of activity are the focus of 
attention’ (Bryman, 2012, p.416). 
Two levels of purposive sampling, sampling of context and sampling of 
participants9, described by Bryman (2012, p.417) were applied in this 
research. The former refers to sites selected for the study; in this case 
Nairobi and Kisumu counties, while in the case of the latter, no a priori 
decisions were made regarding number of participants. Kisumu and 
Nairobi counties were selected for urban/rural contextual comparison of 
the on-going police and justice reform processes. The counties were 
deliberately selected due to the level police involvement in the 2007 
postelection violence in the counties. 
The choice not to make a priori decisions about the sample size was 
guided by Mason (2011) who argues that sample size in flexible designs 
is dictated by the social process under scrutiny. Considering the complex 
nature of police reform process and the multiplicity of the actors involved, 
it was not possible to obtain a representative sample. Additionally, the 
focus was on an in-depth understanding of the reform process. Bryman 
(2012) reinforces this arguing that in a sequential approach, the 
researcher starts with an initial sample and gradually adds to the sample 
as befits the research questions. Based on these two sources, a total of 
144 participants (see Table 1 below) were purposefully selected for the 
study. 
As guided by Bryman (2012) and Robson (2011), the key-informants, 
police officers, civil society organisations representatives and members of 
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parliament were specifically selected by the researcher based on the 
researcher’s own judgement on their suitability in the study. Participants 
for focus group discussions and members of the public were however 
recruited by the researcher and a research assistant whose experience in 
research and networks in Kisumu provided access to such respondents. 
Table 1: Distribution of respondents 
Methods Target Group Number of participants 
Qualitative 
method 
Key Informants 9 
Police Officers 8 
Civil society representatives 7 
Members of Parliament 4 
Focus Group 
discussions 
Youth 10 
Women 10 
Community 
leaders 
10 
Quantitative 
Method 
Questionnaire respondents 86 
 Total 144 
1.8 Data Collection Process and Analysis  
Data collection was done in two phases. Phase one involved secondary 
analysis and quantitative data collection, through administration of the 
questionnaire, while phase two was qualitative phase involving individual 
interviews and focus group interviews respectively. This approach is 
consistent with quantitative-qualitative sequence suggested by Bryman 
(2012) and sequential transformative design suggested by Robson 
(2011). In both cases, data collection at the qualitative phase provides 
insights into data collected during the first phase of data collection. 
Analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data was done using Nvivo 
and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software 
respectively. The procedure for quantitative analysis was mainly 
applicable to Chapter 6 and is described in Section 6.2. 
Data from individual interviews and focus groups were analysed using 
Nvivo, which is a Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS). As argued by Fielding and Lee (1998), qualitative researchers 
want tools that support analysis but leave the researcher firmly in charge. 
Nvivo was the most suitable for facilitating the analysis in this case for a 
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number of reasons; first, the researcher having attended two seminars on 
use of NVIVO gained sufficient knowledge to use the software in this 
research. Secondly, the advantages inherent in the software made it 
attractive. Its versatile nature allows for wide ranging data manipulation 
including the possibility of developing models describing the research 
project.10 It also has the capacity to provide an audit trail, for example 
decisions about how coding was done. Such a trail bolsters the 
transparency and integrity of this research.11 
The first phase of processing and analysis of primary qualitative data 
involved transcription of audio recorded interviews for uploading into 
Nvivo software. Since the duration of the focus group discussions was 
relatively long, the recordings were exported into Nvivo as audio files. 
The second phase involved coding of themes that emerged from the 
transcripts and audio materials. The categorisation into codes took two 
forms; those that emerged from the respondents’ statements and those 
that the researcher identified as significant to the focus of inquiry. 
Respondents’ statements were conceptualised as their views and 
perceptions regarding the police reform process and were categorised 
according to predetermined themes. Themes generated by Nvivo did not 
substantially differ from those predetermined by the researcher and 
therefore were used to enrich the analysis and further develop insights 
into the police reform process. This allowed for the development of both 
descriptive and explanatory categories (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). These 
were then refined by exploring various relationships and integrating the 
codes into a coherent explanatory model.12 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 aims to provide the base upon which this thesis is built. It 
provides background information related to this research. Specifically, it 
gives the introduction, explains the research background, research 
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 See Figure 2: Post 2008 Police Implementation Process. 
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 See Appendix ix: Nvivo Project Summary Report.  
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 See Figure 2: Post 2008 Police Implementation Process. 
15 
questions and introduces the methodology employed in the research. The 
chapter is a critical foundation upon which the research is understood. 
The objective of Chapter 2 is to provide an analysis of the existing 
literature related to the research question. It thus gives the framework 
upon which concepts in this research are understood, as well as providing 
the overall theoretical underpinning of the research. The chapter reviews 
the literature on SSR processes in transitional post-conflict environments 
in general and Kenya in particular and engages with the debates in the 
three literature areas for which the thesis draws and contributes 
knowledge. The trajectory of SSR in Kenya prior to the 2007/2008 post-
election violence is also interrogated to provide a nuanced understanding 
of issues, priorities and challenges of police/SSR processes that emerged 
after the post electoral violence in Kenya. The chapter then concludes by 
providing a justification for the overall research strategy used in the thesis. 
Chapter 3 aims to provide an understanding of the setting of the security 
sector reform agenda in the aftermath of the 2007/08 post-election 
violence in Kenya. An analysis of agenda setting theories are examined to 
establish the best framework for understanding how the post 2007 police 
reform agenda, within the wider security sector reform in Kenya was 
constructed. Using Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon, 2002), 
the chapter provides an in-depth interrogation of how the police and 
justice reform agenda was constructed with the view to providing the 
basis of analysis of the implementation process. Key documents, for 
example the National Accord and the Constitution, providing the 
framework for police and justice reform in Kenya are examined for the 
purpose of exploring the disputes and challenges of reform. 
Chapter 4 aims to present and analyse data in relation to security sector 
reform processes, particularly police reform process in Kenya. It examines 
police/SSR dynamics in Kenya in relation to the underlying processes, 
examines the contribution of local actors to the reform process and 
investigates the challenges and responses to deficiencies associated with 
SSR. 
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Chapter 5 aims at demonstrating the interrelationship between power-
sharing politics and security sector reform in Kenya. It focuses on the 
theme of political aspects of police and SSR in transitional post-conflict by 
exploring the linkage between power-sharing politics and SSR, 
interrogating the extent to which, and how, the two are interrelated in 
Kenya since 2008.  
Chapter 6 seeks to determine contributions of security sector reform to 
policing and community security needs. It explores the efficacy of Kenya’s 
police reforms from the immediate 2007 post-election violence period to 
the present; in relation to police-community relations.  
Chapter 7 presents the findings and conclusions in relation to the overall 
research questions, and also highlights the thesis’ contribution to 
knowledge. It summarises the findings of chapters three, four, five and six 
against the reviewed literature in chapter two and connects these with the 
primary research question in chapter one.  
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CHAPTER TWO: SSR IN TRANSITIONAL 
POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS 
SSR IN TRANSITIONAL POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the literature related to the research question and 
provides a justification for, and an elaboration of, the overall research 
strategy. The analysis takes a critical approach, beginning with an exposé 
of the existing debates and arguments in the literature areas for which this 
research draws and contributes knowledge. This is then followed by the 
identification of gaps in the arguments and subsequent statement of the 
researcher’s entry point and position in the discourses. The chapter 
therefore focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of this research and 
provides justification for research approach and methods employed in this 
study. The chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section serves 
as the introduction to the chapter and provides an outline of the chapter. It 
gives a brief description of what each section entails. 
The second section aims at providing conceptual clarity of the key 
concepts that define this research. This is necessary for the purpose of 
providing the structure in which the research question is situated. Thus, 
contested key concepts including; security, the security sector, security 
sector reform, transitional societies and the nature of post-conflict 
societies are clarified. 
The third section examines literature on security sector reform in general, 
and police reform in particular in transitional developing countries. It 
addresses the nature of SSR and in particular the police reform context. 
The section argues that whilst multiple reform contexts characterise 
security sector reform, post-conflict situations seem dominant in existing 
literature, yet evidence indicates the security sector reform is also 
undertaken by stable countries on an on-going basis. The section also 
discusses some critique of the security sector reform debates.  
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The fourth section presents and discusses existing literature on strategic 
and operationalisation challenges facing successful implementation of 
SSR, particularly police and justice reform in transitional societies. It 
focuses on the factors relating to the drivers and challenges for achieving 
progress on security sector reform, as well as lessons learned from 
different security sector reform contexts. 
The fifth section provides the bulk of literature around which the study 
revolves. It presents the priorities and processes of implementing SSR in 
post-conflict countries; the politics of SSR including political transitions 
and power-sharing; justice reform in transitional post-conflict societies, 
ethnic dimension of police reform and peace processes and political 
power-sharing in multi-ethnic contexts.  
Section six presents the state of security and security sector in Kenya, 
particularly in the run-up to the general elections of 2007 in the country. It 
assesses Kenya’s case within the context of reviewed literature in the 
previous sections of this chapter and sets the stage for the arguments in 
Chapter 3. The section gives a trajectory of reform initiatives up to the 
time period 2007/2008 during the post-election violence. 
Section seven elaborates a justification of the overall research strategy. It 
substantiates the research strategy employed, and explains the 
underlying paradigm of inquiry and the theoretical framework as much as 
specific methodological issues.  
2.2 Conceptual Issues 
This research relates to SSR, and in particular police reform, in 
developing transitional and post-conflict societies. However, the concepts 
security, security sector reform, post-conflict situations and transitional 
countries, forming the core of this thesis still remain contested. Arguments 
relating to these concepts are as diverse as there are scholars and 
institutional actors in these areas. Some of these arguments are 
presented below.  
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2.2.1 Problematising Security 
The post-Cold War period has witnessed significant debates on security. 
It means different things to different people (Luckham, 2009). These 
debates stem from three roots: discontent with neorealist foundations that 
have characterised the field, the need to respond to post-Cold War 
security order and the desire to be relevant to contemporary concerns 
(Krause and Williams, 1996). 
The understanding of security has undergone ‘deepening and broadening’ 
(Bellamy, 2003, p.104). Discussions intended to deepen the security 
agenda seek to either bring down the understanding of security to the 
level of the individual or human security or up to the level of international 
or global security (Buzan, 1991, Krause and Williams, 1996). Attempts to 
broaden the neorealist understanding of security seek to expand the 
concept to include a wider range of issues including; economic, 
environmental, human rights issues and migration (Krause and Williams, 
1996). Buzan (2007) refers to these issues as dimensions which include; 
military, political, societal, economic and environmental dimensions of 
security. These discussions argue that the neorealist approaches, with the 
state as the referent object of security, have failed to provide answers to 
security problems, including failure to predict the end of Cold War and 
account for other security challenges including intra state conflict. 
Deepening and broadening of security however attracts resistance from 
proponents of neorealist perspectives. These proponents argue that 
broadening security away from traditional focus could make the field 
practically irrelevant (Krause and Williams, 1996). For this reason they 
argue that ‘it is important to guard against the temptation to make the 
concept of security so broad that it comes to mean all things to all people 
because this is certain to render the concept analytically useless’ (Ayoob, 
1997, p.125). Others prefer to retain the state-centric approach while at 
the same time advocating for multilateral forms of interstate security 
cooperation using terminologies as common, cooperative, collective and 
comprehensive as modifiers to ‘security’ (Krause and Williams, 1996). 
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The debate on the new thinking on security is critical to SSR and police 
reform for a number of reasons. It recognises; the fact that the safety of 
citizens ranks in as much as the defence of the state, gives greater 
emphasis on the role of civilian actors in the security policy of the country 
and acknowledges police reform and SSR as part of the broader 
strategies and initiatives for achieving security objectives (Hänggi and 
Scherrer, 2010, p.33, Chadwick, 2012, p.19). For analytical purposes, this 
thesis does not guard against multiple understanding of security. Rather, 
it recognises that for the purpose of an in-depth understanding of Kenya’s 
police reform under the wider security sector reform, combining neorealist 
perspectives, with the state as the referent object of security and a more 
constructionist deepeners and wideners approach, that focusses on 
communities, provide the best platform for analyzing what is happening in 
Kenya. 
2.2.2 The Security Sector  
Understanding who provides security and justice is central to security 
sector reform (IDS, 2012). Thus, what constitutes the security sector is 
the point of departure in conceptualising security sector reform. Scholars 
and institutional actors alike adopt different perspectives in approaching 
the security sector. Hänggi (2004) for example approaches security sector 
from both security and governance perspectives. He argues that security 
sector may be conceptualised in narrow or broad terms. From the security 
perspective, the security sector comprises all those state institutions 
legally mandated to ensure safety of the state and its citizens. This is a 
state-centric approach and includes the armed forces, the police, 
paramilitary forces, the intelligence and secret services, border and 
customs guards as well as judicial and penal institutions. Where non-state 
actors are involved in provision of security, security sector is viewed from 
its broad dimension to include actors such as guerrilla and liberation 
armies, non-state paramilitary organisations as well as private military and 
security companies. Thus, the security sector from a broad perspective 
would include statutory and non-statutory security forces. 
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In terms of governance, the narrow focus of the security sector remains 
the control of those institutions with the exclusive monopoly of legitimate 
instruments of coercive power, which reflects a common feature of the 
modern developed nation-state. This includes the civilian authorities 
involved in the management and control of the security forces as well as 
the defence and internal ministries and parliamentary committees. Given 
the complexity of emerging security challenges and an increasing interest 
in the management and control of security, justice and law enforcement 
institutions, civil society groups have as well become important segments 
of the security sector in broad terms. For analytical purposes, all these 
may not be investigated in a single study. Whilst this PhD acknowledges a 
broad understanding of the security sector, its focus is on those 
institutions that are legally mandated in the provision of security. 
Beyond the conceptualisation of the security sector at the national level, 
security challenges transcend the national borders, thus making 
conceptualisation of the security sector within defined borders limiting. It is 
thus reasonable to think of security sector from sub-regional, regional and 
trans-regional security sectors. This is currently manifest through the 
workings of respective state and regional security sector actors and 
transnational non-state actors such as international non-governmental 
organisations (INGO) and transnational private security forces. Hänggi 
(2004) summarises various interpretations as indicated in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Interpretations of 'Security Sector' 
Perspective A
13
 B
14
 C
15
 D
16
 Focus 
Narrow Security forces Groups with a 
mandate to wield 
instruments of 
violence 
Core security 
actors 
Organisations  
authorised to use 
force 
State-
centric 
Civilian 
management 
and oversight 
bodies 
Institutions with a 
role in managing 
and monitoring 
Security 
management and 
Oversight bodies 
Civil management 
and oversight 
bodies 
 
Broader 
 Judiciary, penal 
system, human 
rights 
ombudsmen 
Justice and law 
enforcement 
institutions 
Justice and law 
enforcement 
institutions 
  Non-statutory 
security forces 
Non-statutory 
security forces 
Human 
centric 
   Non-statutory civil 
society groups 
Adapted from Hänggi (2004) 
On his part, Williams (2000) offers three possible approaches to the 
security sector especially within the African context. These include; the 
maximalist approach, the minimalist approach and the pragmatic 
approach. The first approach includes all institutions, both statutory and 
non-statutory, that have the provision of security as their focus within the 
human security paradigm. This category would include all the security 
forces, government departments providing social services and non-state 
actors such as guerrilla forces and paramilitary organisations attached to 
particular political parties. Minimalist approach sees the security sector as 
being composed of those statutory forces that have traditionally 
possessed the responsibility for ensuring the physical security of the state 
— the armed forces, the police, paramilitary organisations and, where 
they exist, militia organisations, while the pragmatic approach considers 
the security sector as being constituted out of the traditional statutory 
instruments of state-centred security. It also includes such institutions as 
guerrilla forces and indigenous organisations that have played a positive 
role in contributing to the physical security of communities. 
The conceptualisations of the security sector above reflect the new 
thinking about security explained in Section 2.2.1. Security cannot only be 
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 Hendrickson (1999, p.29). 
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 Hendrickson & Karkoszka (2002, p.179). 
16
 Edmunds (2002, p.3-4). 
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limited to the state. It has permeated health, environment and 
development communities to mention a few. In the words of Luckham 
(2009), from the point of view of development community, security issues 
are far too important to be left to security specialists alone (Luckham, 
2009, p.2). He argues that for development to take place, political stability 
is important and that when states fracture or fail, the first priority is ending 
political violence and restoring minimum conditions of security.  
The plural nature of understanding security thus posits a challenge to this 
study. Should we limit ourselves to the state as the referent object of 
security, and if yes how does the study locate within the constructionist 
approaches that seek to deepen and widen security and by extension the 
security sector? Against the above backdrop, this study adopts a broad 
approach in its conceptualisation of the security sector. This approach is 
consistent with Williams (2000) pragmatic approach. The thesis considers 
the interactions of the different actors involved in the shaping of security 
environment, thus focuses on the police reform within the broader SSR 
agenda in Kenya.  
2.2.3 Security Sector Reform 
Since the emergence of SSR concept in the 1990’s, scholars and 
practitioners alike have engaged in lots of work with view to shedding light 
on the concept. For almost a decade and a half, it is still considered 
relatively new (Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012) and still remains debatable. 
Ambiguities arise due to multiple interpretations advanced by scholars 
and policy institutions dealing with the reform of the security sector. This 
multiple interpretations of what security sector entails stems from the fact 
that the understanding of security and by extension the security sector is 
understood from different points of view. 
While differences exist in the understanding of SSR, consensus abounds 
to the effect that SSR involves a raft of issues and activities related to 
reforms of the public sector charged with the responsibility of providing 
internal and external security (Hänggi, 2004), though these are often 
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characterised by differences in scope and depth. Some of the influential 
agencies that have shaped the course of SSR debates include UK 
government, the United Nations and the OECD-DAC.17 
The UK government views SSR as concerned with security related policy, 
legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within democratic norms 
and principles (DfID, 2002). The United Nations Security Council believes 
SSR is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability. It emphasizes 
that establishing effective, professional and accountable security sectors 
is the cornerstone of peace and sustainable development (UNSC, 2011). 
Evolving from the DfID/UK framing, OECD DAC (2007) provides a more 
robust view as security system reform, describing it as the transformation 
of the security system, including all the actors, their roles, responsibilities 
and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in 
consistence with the democratic norms and principles of good governance 
that contributes to a well-functioning security framework. Whatever the 
definition, SSR seeks to make provision of security more effective and 
efficient under democratic control.  
What constitutes SSR thus suggests a complex process whose 
investigation equally becomes complex. The very nature of SSR has 
meant that most studies have focused on effective provision of security as 
the ultimate aim of SSR. In police reform context, this has meant making 
service delivery of the police effective and accountable under the 
democratic oversight. As argued by Luckham and Kirk (2013), these 
studies tend to tell the story of reform and political obstacles to reform 
from the viewpoint of reformers themselves rather than end users. This 
study fills this gap. We assess police reform from multifaceted points of 
view; that of both the providers of security and the public who are the end-
users and are supposed to benefit from police reform in Kenya. 
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in Section 2.3. 
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2.2.4 Transitional Societies 
An analysis of transitional countries is critical to the understanding of the 
security sector reform processes of countries in transition. This is 
significant for two reasons. First, countries in transition consciously reform 
security institutions (Caparini and Marenin, 2004, EGF, 2013) and 
secondly, debates on the security sector reform directly link to wider 
political transitions. 
Literature on countries in transition offer varied types of transitions and 
legacies. These range from; from war to peace (Colletta et al., 1996, 
Francis, 2014); authoritarianism rule to democracy (O’Donnell et al., 
1986), military to civilian rule (Cawthra and Luckham, 2003) single party 
regimes to multi-party politics (Amutabi, 2009); from economic crisis to 
revitalisation (Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya, 2004),socialism to 
capitalism (Bezemer, 2006) and from economic crisis to economic 
liberalism (de Melo et al., 2001). For Francis (2012), transition societies 
are those that face one or more of the ‘triple transition’18 challenges and 
they could be conflict-prone, war-torn and post-conflict war communities. 
The scholarly work cited above account for the complex process of 
transition involving the interplay of both the structural pressures and other 
agents such as independent social groups and moderates to force 
change. According to Bratton (1994), these changes proceed in three 
transition stages, namely: pre-transition; liberalisation, political transition 
and consolidation respectively.19 Bratton’s conceptualisation however is 
not impeccable. It suggests that transition is a unidirectional process with 
the end-state being democracy. It assumes, in the words of Caparini and 
Marenin (2004), that democracy is ‘the stated goal and end-state that 
societies in transition or development are struggling toward’. This 
argument seems to preclude cases of regimes characterised with stability 
yet remain authoritarian. 
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 For a thorough description of the processes at the stages see; Bratton (1994, p.10-11). 
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Structural pressures such as socioeconomic development, economic 
crisis and favourable international environment are considered as drivers 
of democratisation (Hawkins, 2001). However, evidence exists to the 
effect that even when these pressures exist, they may not necessarily 
produce transition but entrench authoritarianism, with the security sector 
actors, including the police, being used as agents of repression. In other 
cases hybrid form of authoritarianism and democracy emerge for example 
in Cambodia and Central America (Richmond, 2012). In analysing 
(non)transition in Cuba in the year 1991, Darren Hawkins argued that 
‘these pressures, even when they collectively act, are not sufficient to 
produce change’ (Hawkins, 2001, p.441), while Escribà-Folch (2012) 
provided evidence using cases of Togo and Chile as countries that failed 
to undergo transitions despite the international community imposing 
sanctions. Zimbabwe under President Mugabe may also be included 
amongst countries whose transition is in doubt even in the face of 
international pressures in the recent times. 
What might cause ‘non-transition’ in such circumstances? One plausible 
reason is the fact that modern democratic transition arguments were 
‘developed with authoritarian regimes in mind’ (Hawkins, 2001) and so fail 
to explain non-transition in totalitarian regimes such as Cuba under Fidel 
Castro. This position is reiterated by EGF (2013, p.1) that Western 
understanding of transition ‘had been largely influenced by authoritarian 
transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe since the 1960s’ thus 
complicating the understanding of transitions in newly independent states, 
like Ukraine and South Sudan, that still grapple with not only political and 
economic reform simultaneously but also building institutions and a state 
while forging a unified nation-state. 
Even where countries have conducted democratic elections, periods of 
disorder still exist suggesting the infinite nature transitions. To address 
this challenge, cases of non-transitions need be considered alongside 
successful transitions. Literature on societies in transition heavily relies on 
democratic transition as a normative element of transition process. This is 
in line with the normative claim of ‘civil-democratic oversight and control’ 
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(Friedrich, 2004) in the SSR processes. This justifies casting our analysis 
under democratic transition paradigm. However, the problem with this 
approach is the burden to clarify the contextual and value laden the terms 
‘‘authoritarian rule’ and ‘democracy’ which are laden with evaluative and 
context-dependent connotations;’ (Friedrich, 2004). Thus, casting this 
research strictly within the democratic framework, in the face of 
conceptual difficulties associated with democracy, would not allow for an 
in-depth exploration of what is happening in Kenya.  
2.2.5 The Nature of ‘Post-Conflict’ Societies 
Divergent postures assumed by scholars in the understanding of post-
conflict societies suggest lack of shared understanding of the concept 
‘post-conflict’. The prominence of the term, in both academic and policy 
circles, has seen it acquire a life of its own, with its associated concepts 
such as peacebuilding, statebuilding, reconstruction, recovery and 
security sector reform amongst others attracting lots of attention. 
Some scholars, for example, Smith-Höhn (2011), Kurtenbach and Wulf 
(2012) and Reisinger (2009) extensively explore the concept before 
positioning their arguments within the wider post-conflict settings. Smith-
Höhn (2011) for example explores the rebuilding the security sector in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia, while Kurtenbach and Wulf (2012) 
address violence and security concerns in post-conflict settings. Reisinger 
(2009), in providing a framework for the analysis of post-conflict 
situations, particularly takes issue with the liberal template 
conceptualisation of post-conflict situations merely as a transition 
paradigm20 with an endpoint in state-building. Her critique of the transition 
paradigm seems to converge with Caparini and Marenin (2004) critique of 
democratisation process as a linear process. She argues this is simplistic 
and fails to appreciate the complex dynamics unfolding between different 
actors engaged in a post-conflict environment. 
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 The view that post-conflict situations are processes of transition from war-torn situation 
towards consolidated statehood. 
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On the contrary, while writing about post-conflict settings, some scholars 
focus more on the associated concepts such as reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. Hamre and Sullivan (2002) and Tschirgi (2004) for 
example give emphasis of the associated concepts of reconstruction and 
peacebuilding respectively within the context of post-conflict settings. 
While such studies may provide thorough analysis of the associated 
concepts, they are feeble in providing the analytical lenses that form the 
base of their studies. 
The overriding theme suggested in the above studies, whether explicitly 
or implicitly, is that post-conflict refers to the situation when a war or 
violent conflict has ended (Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012) or the period 
when a conflict is either interrupted or (temporarily) halted by means of a 
peace agreement, the victory or defeat of a conflict party or the 
intervention of an external actor (Smith-Höhn, 2011). Thus, existing 
literature largely link the concept of post-conflict to the period of cessation 
of full-blown violent conflict involving different protagonists. More so, the 
literature seems to view the concept in terms of a mental dichotomy that 
transforms ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ into synonyms of ‘war’ and ‘peace’, 
where ‘conflict’ signifies situations structured by violence carried out by 
organized actors according to a dominant conflict narrative, while ‘post‐
conflict’ implicitly signals the end of violence and the return to a peaceful 
normality (Lambach, 2007). 
To resolve this simplistic dichotomised characterization, Lambach (2007) 
argues that the best way to conceptualise the term post-conflict is to view 
the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘post‐conflict’ situations as social constructs, the 
kind of behaviour that is to be expected and allowed in a given set of 
circumstances. To him therefore, the central aspect of ‘post‐conflict’ 
situation must be a narrative of peace, where conflict can be considered 
over when violence is no longer explained in terms of the dominant 
narrative of previous conflict. Reisinger (2009) on the other hand prefers 
an analysis that views post-conflict situations as distinct spaces that follow 
their own intrinsic logic. Space, in this context, is understood as a ‘field of 
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power relations’ where multiple ‘sovereigns’ negotiate rule across multiple 
spaces of political authority’. 
The above arguments raise fundamental questions about a ‘post-conflict’ 
country that require further conceptual clarification. More significantly, 
Kenya’s case, whether transitional or post-conflict, becomes of interest 
since this thesis draws literature from security sector and police reform 
from post-conflict contexts. Thus, to ask the question, ‘is Kenya a post-
conflict country?’ invites the need to interrogate the usage of the concept 
in both academic and policy circles. 
Based on existent literature on post-conflict settings, referring to Kenya as 
post-conflict raises some challenges. This is due to the fact that most 
post-conflict studies all over the world focus on countries that have 
experienced large scale wars spreading over a long period. Under this 
rubric, countries such as Afghanistan, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Congo and South Sudan amongst others are mentioned. To mention 
Kenya under this rubric is to undermine Kenya, given that the country has 
never experienced war to the scale and magnitude of the above 
mentioned countries.  
Van de Goor and Van Veen (2010) however consider Kenya ‘less post-
conflict’ alongside Nigeria and South Africa in explaining the importance 
of improving the performance of the security sector in developmental and 
conflict prevention point of view. However, it is worth noting that Kenya 
exhibits characteristics common to what existent literature refers to as 
post-conflict: ‘a high level of violence, distrust between the police and the 
population, systematic human rights violations by the police, including 
torture, beatings, disappearances, unlawful interference in private life and 
restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly and association’ 
(O’Neill, 2004). 
Lambach (2007) and Reisinger (2009) conceptualisations best explain the 
Kenyan case. In the former’s framework, Kenya could be considered post-
conflict to the extent that the 2007/2008 general election related conflict 
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was over with the signing of the National Accord that created a power-
sharing government.21 Any violence afterwards not explained in terms of 
the post-election violence is considered criminal violence. In the latter’s 
conceptualisation, intricate power games characterised the cessation of 
the 2007 postelection violence and continue to be active in terms of their 
influence of security sector reform in Kenya during the period for which 
this study focuses.  
For the purpose of this study therefore, post-conflict framework - though 
deeply contested as shown in the literature - is used primarily for three 
reasons: first, it does not significantly depart from transitional SSR, 
whether post-authoritarian transitional or democratic transitional; 
secondly, it is broad enough to cater for consociational power-sharing 
literature that defines Kenya’s political transitions in the period covered by 
this study and finally that the concept has been institutionalised within 
Kenyan context, with many scholars (Brown, 2011, Noyes, 2013) and 
practitioners (ICTJ-Kenya, 2010, ICPC, 2011) working within it. Brown 
(2011, p.3), for example suggests that it would be more accurate to refer 
to “post-conflict” or “post-atrocity” justice than transitional justice within the 
Kenyan context. They consider the violence experienced in the country a 
turning point in the nation’s history hence the gradual institutionalisation of 
the concept post-conflict with reference to Kenyan context. 
The contradictions regarding the nature of transition and post-conflict 
settings impacting on this PhD are resolved through the thesis title; ‘The 
Police Reform Process in Kenya, 2008-2014: A Case Study of Security 
Sector Reform in Societies Emerging from Crisis. This title achieves two 
things with regards to these contradictions. First, the term ‘crisis’ is wide 
enough to enable us navigate through various forms of transitions, without 
the compulsion of belabouring other contexts of non-transitions, which 
though important in the understanding of transitions, make less 
contribution to this study. Secondly, though Kenya is not typical case of 
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 The National Accord acknowledged the fact that neither side of the parties to the 
election dispute could effectively govern the country hence giving way to the coalition 
government. See Chapter 3 for further clarification. 
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post-conflict, the title enables us to draw and contribute to literature on 
post-conflict security sector and police reform contexts. This, as we shall 
demonstrate shortly, in Section 2.3.3 and further developed in Section 2.5 
forms the bulk of literature on security sector reforms. 
2.3 Security Sector Reform in Context 
Almost all countries require security sector reforms either on an on-going 
or periodic basis. Developed democracies and internally and externally 
secure states face pressure to reform their security sectors in the wake 
the security challenges of the 21st Century. On the other hand, countries 
prone to war engage in security sector reform to prevent relapse into fresh 
violence. These arguments are further expounded by Bryden and Hänggi 
(2004), who emphasise that states reform their security sectors according 
to specific security, political and socio-economic situation as well as in 
response to new security challenges resulting from globalisation as well 
as post-9/11 developments (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004, p.vii). 
The above argument presupposes the existence of different reform 
contexts. For analytical purposes, we sample a few reform contexts 
existing in the literature. Forman (2002) suggests four contexts; failed 
states, post-civil war states, liberalising former authoritarian states and 
relatively established civilian governments. For Hendrickson and 
Karkoszka (2002), among the countries undertaking security sector 
reform are those that are (a) emerging from war, (b) shifting from 
communist to pluralist systems, (c) authoritarian regimes and (d) 
functioning democracies. Bryden and Hänggi (2004) suggest three 
contexts thus; developmental context, post-authoritarian context and post-
conflict context. Excluding Forman’s failed state category, all other 
contexts, including Hendrickson and Karkoszka’s contexts, could fit within 
Bryden and Hänggi’s classification which we now proceed to discuss.  
2.3.1 The Development Context 
The developmental context of security sector reform (Bryden and Hänggi, 
2004),also referred to as the development approach to security sector 
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reform (Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, 2012) or security as development 
(Francis, 2012) is mainly associated with the development community. 
From the development point of view, SSR describes measures aimed at 
creating an effective and accountable security sector that contributes 
positively to sustainable peace and development (Mayer-Rieckh and 
Duthie, 2012). 
Despite the articulation of the nexus between security and development  
in the early 1980’s through the 1980 Brandt Report on International 
Development and the 1982 Palme Report on Disarmament and Security, 
it was not until after the Cold War ended that security was re-presented as 
a development problem (Luckham, 2007).This renewed interest in 
security-development nexus significantly shaped the SSR discourse. 
During the Cold War, security was defined from military point of view, 
which meant protecting the state from any external aggression. Thus, aid 
to the security sector of allied developing countries was to the extent that 
security forces of such states were supplied with weapons and training. 
This however disregarded the negative impact, be they political or 
economic, of the military assistance to such regions especially in terms of 
fomenting conflict. Thus, scholars started questioning such assistance to 
the ‘third world’ regimes that constituted a threat to the security of their 
citizens.  
This perception therefore led to development theorists and critical security 
analysts beginning to address security-sector issues primarily through 
general critiques of the distribution of military aid and excessive defence 
expenditure. Security issues became ‘too important to be left to security 
specialists alone’ (Luckham, 2009, p.2). Bloated military sectors of such 
regimes were judged to have a negative impact on overall economic 
development (Cooper and Pugh, 2002). The underlying argument then 
was that a reduction in military expenditure in terms of reducing force 
levels and budgets, is both a ‘good thing’ in itself and, once effected, 
releases valuable resources for the on-going development of the country 
concerned (Williams, 2000).  
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However, in other instances, ill-conceived military restructuring bedevils 
political stability. Williams (2000) for example maintains that ill-conceived 
SSR is partly responsible for the many coup d’états in Africa in the 1990’s 
and argues that in some cases, disarmament in some states leaves the 
state with limited capacity to defend itself, as with the case of Eritrea 
against her neighbour Ethiopia.  
The above arguments portray the nature and characteristic of security 
sector assistance during the Cold-War period as being mainly concerned 
with civil-military relations. Security assistance was highly politicised and 
based on ideological contours of the period. Military assistance was much 
concerned with the technical assistance and the overarching emphasis 
was on state security under strict management of highly skilled 
practitioners who had limited interactions with non-state actors. 
The emergence of the civil society in the post-Cold-War period, and 
increasing interest in governance and accountability issues by bilateral 
donors, development agencies and international financial institutions 
introduced a paradigm shift in the understanding of development 
approach to security sector assistance. The concept of security widened 
with military restructuring being seen in terms of holistic defence 
management, while police reforms broadened to include the entire 
criminal justice system. This therefore gave rise to more engagement with 
security sector reform. 
The boldest articulation and the push for security sector reform agenda 
into the international development scene came with the Department for 
International Development (DfID) Policy Paper on security sector reform. 
The paper by Clare Short, the then British Secretary of State for 
International Development in March 1999 at Kings College, London, 
(Short, 2000) acknowledged that a reformed security sector can help to 
provide a safe and secure environment for poor people and communities. 
This in turn promotes sustainable development. Where the security sector 
is unreformed, ill-disciplined and repressive it can be a major source of 
insecurity, perpetrating violence itself rather than protecting people from it. 
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With these proclamations, the SSR debates gained momentum. Clare 
Short (1997-2003), played a key role in promoting SSR concept during its 
formative stages and subsequent funding, dissemination and 
development. Her pronouncements were later to be reinforced in both 
policy and academic circles. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
for example, in its ground breaking publication, Handbook on Security 
Sector Reform (OECD DAC, 2007), provided perhaps the best platform to 
articulate the developmental context of DfID security sector reform 
agenda. The dominant theme reigning in the book is that a coherent 
security sector is a function of economic progress. Benefits of greater 
security to the poor are repeatedly affirmed (Ryan, 2011).  
In her speech to the Security Sector Reform and Military Expenditure 
Symposium in London, Short (2000) argued that whilst the underlying 
causes of conflicts remain complex and unique to different contexts, a 
common theme was the role of the security sector, which in most cases is 
negative and fuels conflict. Elements within the security sector can be a 
major source of insecurity and human rights abuse, with the potential of 
aggravating the social and political tensions within a society. These 
sentiments were later to be echoed by the World Bank President on the 
need to bring security and development together to break the cycles of 
fragility and violence affecting more than one billion people living 
countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence 
(Zoellick, 2008).  
In academic circles, the push for security sector reform as a precondition 
for sustainable development received overwhelming attention. 
Hendrickson (1999) for example, highlighted the role of the security sector 
in the public life of the world poorest countries. Ball (2001) proposed 
mainstreaming of security-sector reform as a development issue based on 
their comparative advantage of both the IMF and the World Bank.  
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In Africa, Policing in Africa (Francis, 2012) perhaps remains one of the 
boldest articulation of the link between policing (and police reform) and 
development in the post-Cold War period.22 Francis (2012) argues that 
the end of Cold War and neo-liberal globalisation sweeping across the 
continent had a profound impact on policing in Africa. There was 
reduction in donor support which affected resourcing and capacity 
building for police forces and policing institutions in weak state. This 
coupled with the impact of structural adjusted programmes left African 
police forces with limited capacities to ensure peace and public security 
that would spur development. Police reform therefore became a major 
issue amongst actors in development community. 
Linking security-development debate to the Kenyan context, Kenya’s 
Vision 203023 acknowledges security as a critical ingredient for 
development. For this reason, there has been increased investment in 
reforms in security agencies through capacity building, improvement in 
operational logistics and improvement of welfare of personnel. However 
as will be discussed in subsequent sections of this thesis, these initiatives 
did not translate into improved provision of security and policing. 
The involvement of the security agencies, particularly the police in post-
election violence of 2007 was a costly affair for the country thus 
confirming the stated position at the beginning of the SSR debates, that of 
the security agencies being a source of insecurity and creating conditions 
not suitable for development to take place.24 The post-election crisis 
resulted in substantial damage to Kenya’s social, infrastructural, 
institutional, and economic systems. During the period 2002-2007, 
Kenya’s real GDP had reached an all-time average of 5.4% (Kitiabi, 
2011). This was reduced to a low of -0.4% in 2008 (Global Finance, 
2015). Kenya’s key sectors including trade, tourism, agriculture and 
service industry suffered decline with the impact felt by the local people.25 
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 See; Ksoll, Macchiavello, & Morjaria (2009); Mueller (2008). 
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2.3.2 Post Authoritarian Context 
Post authoritarian security sector reform closely links to countries in 
transition. Though diverse, a review of experiences of these countries; 
from those that moved from military to civilian rule in Latin America, the 
former communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (see for 
example EGF (2013), Caparini and Marenin (2004) and Hawkins (2001); 
as well as states in Africa which have moved from authoritarian forms of 
rule or civil war to fledgling democracies (Bratton, 1994, Colletta et al., 
1996), hold vital lessons for security sector reform. 
A common feature in societies transiting from authoritarianism to 
democracies is that the switch is always greeted with lots of optimism, 
with the focus on rebuilding state institutions, especially where the 
institutions have been completely eroded by the authoritarian regime. 
There is growing demand for greater accountability and transparency 
within the security institutions of the state (Forman, 2002) to free the 
people from the persistent ‘undemocratic practices including pervasive 
corruption, uncontrolled security forces and the use of intimidation and 
even violence against government opponents’ (EGF, 2013, p.2). These 
demands are however overwhelming in the short run owing to the 
inherent weaknesses of the state.  
Pressure from citizens in transitional societies is often aimed at increasing 
the powers of the police, urging more wide-scale crackdowns on crime 
(Shaw, 2002). To illustrate this point, the handling of the public transport 
sector in Kenya demonstrates the clamour for which the members of the 
public expect dividends in post-authoritarian reform context. The NARC 
government leveraged on the public legitimacy after the 2002 election 
victory to reign in on insecurity and disorder that had existed under Moi 
regime. Of particular interest is disorder in the public transport industry 
under Moi’s authoritarian regime. In 2003, the then transport minister 
John Michuki reigned on the criminal gangs and rogue police officers that 
controlled the public transport sector. He introduced what became known 
as ‘Michuki rules’ that sought to limit the number of seats in vehicles and 
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made seatbelts and speed governors mandatory (Hornsby, 2012).There 
were protests by the players in the industry, but the public mood favoured 
the minister. 
The zeal and vigour with which insanity in the public transport sector was 
fought applied to the fight against rampant insecurity. Michuki acted tough 
on criminal gangs and gave orders that were loosely translated as shoot 
to kill. It is in this latter role that police was accused of human rights 
violation (Alston, 2010) despite the public supporting his tough approach. 
He was considered a top performer in the cabinet.  
However, as we argue in subsequent chapters in this study, the immense 
influence Michuki had on the police led to gross human rights violations 
including curtailing the freedom of the press, which are basic principles in 
a democracy. In this process, there is the tendency to revert to aspects of 
authoritarian policing under the pretext of fighting crime. When the police 
raided Standard Newspaper over the Anglo Leasing scandal story that 
was perceived to have portrayed Kibaki’s administration negatively, 
Michuki responded, ‘If you rattle a snake, you must be prepared to be 
bitten by it’ (Osewe, 2010). Thus, it ended that Michuki was one of those 
opposed to reforms that would introduce accountability in the police 
force.26 
The arguments above point to the challenges of police reform in 
authoritarian contexts. Whilst the police acquire some legitimacy under a 
new democratically elected government, elite influence on the police, and 
lack of accountability mechanism provide opportunity for the police to 
revert to older ways of doing things. Again, in the immediate post 
authoritarian contexts, the complexity created by the closed nature under 
the authoritarian regime makes it even harder to get support for reform 
from amongst the police themselves. There is lack of local expertise in 
managing the reform process or developing policies that will provide 
oversight of the sector. Thus, reforming state security institutions, 
including the police in terms of putting them under democratic governance 
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that ensures accountability and openness presents a big challenge in 
post-authoritarian context. 
2.3.3 Post-conflict Context 
While security sector reform literature recognises the various contexts 
upon which SSR occur, security sector reform in transitional and post-
conflict settings seem to be more dominant. This, in our view, is informed 
by the trajectory of SSR discourse evolving to a large extent from donor 
assistance to countries emerging from conflict. Subsequently, there has 
been a huge corpus of literature on SSR in post-conflict settings.27 
The complexities of post-conflict settings reflect on the various 
terminologies for the activities relating to the reconfiguration of the 
security architecture popularly known as SSR. Hänggi (2004) refers to 
security sector reform in post-conflict settings as security sector 
reconstruction. ‘Reconstruction’ of the security sector here pertains to the 
necessity of rebuilding domestic public security institutions, and 
particularly to re-establish a legitimate monopoly of violence. The term 
reconstruction is necessary where security forces are dysfunctional, either 
because they were de facto dissolved, too small, or suffered from a loss 
of credibility (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, 2004).  
Cooper and Pugh (2002) on the other hand prefer to use the term 
transformation, to reflect the view that there is a substantial deficit in 
current security-sector governance in post-conflict societies that 
necessitates going beyond reformism. Concerned more with few success 
stories in SSR in Africa, pieces in Bryden and Olonisakin (2010) edited 
volume elaborate on transformation and emphasise reconceptualization of 
security sector engagement and approach to implementation (Zyck, 
2011). Sedra (2010) takes a futuristic approach outlining preferences for 
future reform priorities, with more focus on people-centred approaches, 
which is also considered as a priority by Luckham and Kirk (2013). 
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Though diverse, language use in security sector engagement in the cited 
studies seem to find convergence with OECD DAC (2007). None of the 
studies fundamentally challenges the principles and approaches outlined 
in in OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (Zyck, 2011). 
The post-conflict situation is often complex for security sector reform. It is 
characterised by weak local governance, completely dysfunctional police 
institutions, widespread corruption, impunity and lack of oversight 
mechanisms (Loh, 2010). The security sector in such situations is often 
characterised by politicisation, ethnicisation, and corruption of the security 
services, excessive military spending, lack of professionalism, poor 
oversight and inefficient allocation of resources (Brzoska and Heinemann-
Grüder, 2004). This nature and character of post-conflict settings present 
both challenges and opportunities for reforming the security sector of the 
countries involved. Transitional and post-conflict settings are therefore a 
major focus in this thesis owing to opportunities and challenges that the 
settings present in reforming the security sectors, notably the police and 
justice sectors. 
While acknowledging the difficulty in attempting to generalise on the 
nature and the required steps of security sector reform, Wulf (2004) 
argues that the context in which the security sector is to be reformed is 
vital, particularly in post-conflict situations where there can be strong 
incentives to reform on the part of various relevant partners, as opposed 
to situations of war and violent conflicts that lack broad-based will for 
reform. Call and Stanley (2001) share the same sentiments noting that 
post-conflict situations offer a chance to break the tenacity of police 
institutions to change by reducing institutional inertia and creating space 
for domestic and international actors to place major reforms on the 
agenda. Van de Goor and Van Veen (2010) on the other hand argue that 
regular developing countries stand a better chance of SSR as their 
political systems offer opportunity for political dialogue on security sector 
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challenges than do post-conflict countries.28 Kibaki’s first term in office in 
this context offered the best chance to stimulate police reform in Kenya. 
Reflecting on the diametrically opposed arguments between Wulf (2004) 
and Van de Goor and Van Veen (2010), it is worth noting that Wulf’s scale 
of potential for security sector reform29 suggests that SSR in different 
contexts can be measured on a scale, which indeed is to oversimplify the 
contexts for SSR. Additionally, while there is a possibility for real dialogue 
on security sector reform challenges in regular developing countries (Van 
de Goor and Van Veen, 2010), experience indicates that some ‘regular’ 
’countries are reluctant to reform their security systems. 
The difference in perspectives on opportunities for SSR maintained by 
Call and Stanley (2001) and (Wulf, 2004) on the one hand, and Van de 
Goor and Van Veen (2010) on the other is indicative of the process 
transformation in the field of SSR. The former reflect early generation 
SSR literature involving lots of generalisations, while the latter reflects a 
furtherance of the debate by questioning these generalisations.  
Though not typically post-conflict, our location of Kenya’s police reform 
within transitional and post-conflict contexts is inspired by two reasons. 
First, there are similarities in terms of benign factors that stimulate 
reforms, whether in transitional or post-conflict contexts. These include 
factors such as societal crisis, conflict or even willingness of the political 
leadership and acceptance of reform amongst the public may stimulate 
reform.30 These factors influence Kenya’s police reform process in varying 
proportions. Secondly, the ubiquitous literature on post-conflict security 
sector reform provides a rich secondary source of data that directly links 
to Kenya. To ignore these sources would do injustice to the analysis of 
police reform process in Kenya.  A detailed discussion of security sector 
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development priorities, for example Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya before the outbreak of 
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reform in transitional and post-conflict countries is presented in Section 
2.5 of this chapter. 
2.3.4 Critiquing Security Sector Reform 
Despite the exponential growth in the attention and resources devoted to 
security sector reform, some scholars for example Scheye and Peake 
(2005), argue that positive tangible outcomes remain hard to find. They 
argue SSR initiatives are yet to reach out to wider constituencies, non-
traditional actors in this area, who can support and translate the more 
sophisticated concepts of national security at local level so that 
meaningful reform will reach members of society not only its leaders. 
Indeed, the field of SSR is replete with lots of literature that view SSR 
from ‘donor recipient’ dichotomy. Early literature on SSR conceived of 
western norm as the yardstick for which SSR in the developing world 
should achieve. Quoting Chalmers (2001)31, Bellamy (2003, p.106) 
observes that ‘SSR is concerned with moving a state’s armed forces—its 
practices, doctrines and management structures—towards Western 
norms of behaviour’. Chalmers also identifies the norms as ones 
constructed by, and consistent with, the guiding norms of defence 
management in Western Europe (Chalmers, 2000). Whilst this view 
reflects the situation during the formative stages of the SSR debate, the 
evolution of SSR debate is increasingly being dominated by scholars from 
all over the world. This thesis is part of this evolution and contribution. 
Donais (2009) on his part argues that the normative assumptions 
underpinning the SSR process in post-conflict countries, such as 
democratization, civilian control, the independence of the judiciary and a 
strong civil society role are idealistic and no country has fully succeeded 
in implementing. Most of these ideals are not consistent with the priorities 
and immediate needs of post-conflict countries. They suggest that the 
ideals should at best be considered as goals that post-conflict countries 
should work towards. Bellamy (2003) shares similar views noting that the 
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normative claims at the heart of SSR derive from democratic peace 
thesis,32 which is in itself is in doubt and problematic in post-conflict 
countries. He identifies three generic criticisms associated with this 
foundation thus; that the democratic peace thesis does not actually exist, 
that SSR is an agenda imposed by the West and democratic ideals do not 
take root if they are imposed (through aid conditionality for instance) and 
that SSR and the promotion of liberal democracy may foster instability 
particularly if the reform process is not indigenously owned and 
internalized. 
While many police reform packages in countries emerging from crisis 
include the above principles, the processes are largely subject of criticism. 
Neild (2006) for example argues that most of these principles reflect a 
Western approach largely ignoring the realities in post-conflict situations, 
while Hills (2009) argues that the reform that emerges in such contexts is 
often a ‘grafting’ of aspects of international policing models on to the pre-
existing national model, which is, generally, an inherited colonial model of 
policing. Yet, Luckham and Kirk (2013) decry the overbearing bias of 
these studies on obstacles of reforms from practitioners’ point of view and 
disregarding the end-users who should benefit from reform particularly in 
hybrid political contexts. This argument thus brings to question ownership 
of reforms in transitional post-conflict contexts which is elaborately 
developed in Section 2.5.1. 
2.4 Operationalising Security Sector Reform: Strategic and Practical 
Challenges for Success in Transitional Countries 
The challenges facing SSR and particularly police reform in transitional 
countries are enormous. The complex nature of post-conflict situations 
and conceptual challenges make it difficult to come up with a unified 
approach to the implementation of police reform. At the conceptual level, 
what constitutes security and in essence security sector reform remains 
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 Democratic peace thesis is the idea that democracies tend not to wage war on each 
other. Advocates argue that structural constraints (for example legislatures, the rule of 
law and electorates) and normative constraints (for example compromises and 
legitimacy) on decision makers make it impossible to make rash decisions to wage wars. 
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problematic in terms of designing the content and substance of the reform 
agenda. 
SSR is an intricate and complex endeavour even to the very rich and 
highly resourced organisations. ‘The same applies to many national 
governments engaged in their own reform programmes with national 
budgets straining under the effects of tight monetary policies’ (Scheye and 
Peake, 2005, p.306). Similarly, police reform is an expensive undertaking 
that cannot be singlehandedly financed by countries emerging from crises 
or post-conflict. In this sense, the holistic approach advocated for in the 
literature and emphasis on multi-sectorial reform programme remains 
unrealistic.  
As a political process, police reform is bound to change the balance of 
power amongst different actors. It is therefore more likely to be resisted by 
those who benefit from the old order, especially those who see police 
reform as a direct threat, a zero-sum game where they stand to lose and 
others gain. While local political elites may be the most obvious local 
owners, they can also be the most problematic (Donais, 2009). Scheye 
and Peake (2005) argue that while reform appears indisputable to 
outsiders, those within the institutions may not perceive it as such. This 
argument perhaps is built on widely perceived notion that security sector 
institutions throughout the world tend to be conservative, tradition bound 
organisations distrustful of reform initiatives and resistant to change 
(Brzoska, 2003). Ryan (2011) however faults the ‘often mistaken’ 
argument that the police are conservative, noting that ‘the modern police 
organisation is in fact inherently dynamic’ (Ryan, 2011, p.1). Whatever the 
case, police reform undoubtedly faces persistent institutional resistance 
especially in post-conflict situations where the police sector is highly 
politicised and ethnicised.  
Police reform is also a multifaceted process involving multiple actors. 
Getting the various parties to agree on a common ground is always 
daunting to those involved in the implementation of reform programmes. 
In particular, beneficiaries of the politicised and ethnicised systems are 
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more often likely to sabotage the reform process. Where the police 
themselves perceive that reform is likely to lead to weak policing and they 
are more likely to lose their jobs, they become rigid to change. 
Since post-conflict situations are characterised by lack of expertise in the 
management of reform, indigenising security sector reform becomes a 
problem. Lack of expertise has meant that reform in transitional societies 
have had close links with foreign funding organisations and the law 
enforcement agencies of foreign governments assisting in the reform 
process. These interventions have not been uncritically accepted in the 
recipient countries. There is some consensus amongst policy makers on 
the receiving end that many assistance programmes are not designed 
with the recipient country in mind and that assistance such as training is 
often offered simply because it was available, rather than because it is 
relevant to the needs of transitional societies (Shaw, 2002). 
Yet, another SSR and police reform challenge in post-conflict situations is 
the formation of powerful anti–reform alliances between political partners 
during the period preceding elections. ‘The interests of these partnerships 
run diametrically counter to the recreation and/or strengthening of the 
criminal justice institutions and often exert powerful, malignant, and 
subterranean influences that may perpetuate strife by other means as the 
establishment of a sturdy rule of law may threaten and erode their ability 
to manipulate or exercise power and control’ (Scheye and Peake, 2005, 
p.304). Where such an alliance wins in a competitively held elections and 
gains support amongst civil society groups, the reform process is 
technically at risk of grounding to a halt. 
From the forgoing literature, the challenges facing police reform in post-
conflict transitional societies are invariably innumerable. It however 
remains unclear how, in the midst of all these challenges, post-conflict 
countries weave through these challenges in reforming their police 
sectors. This PhD takes Kenya as a case study, exploring how these 
challenges inhibit progress and how the challenges are addressed by 
stakeholders. Ultimately, the study hopes that the choices and priorities 
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could be replicated in post-conflict countries in similar circumstance as 
Kenya. 
2.5 SSR in Transitional Post-Conflict Societies 
This section develops from Section 2.3.3 of this chapter. It explores in 
depth, the dynamics of SSR and more so police reform in developing 
transitional post-conflict countries. The literature so far explored indicates 
that ‘priorities for SSR depend on the specific context’ (Greene, 2003, 
p.5), with post-conflict situations forming very unique circumstances for 
SSR. This section discusses police/SSR in post-conflict situation under 
the five areas thus; the issues, priorities and challenges of implementing 
SSR in post-conflict countries; political transitions and power-sharing, 
justice reform in transitional post-conflict societies, ethnic dimensions of 
police reform and finally peace processes and power-sharing processes 
in multi-ethnic contexts. 
2.5.1 Issues, Priorities and Challenges of Implementing SSR in 
Post-Conflict Countries 
This section is limited to the first three research questions guiding this 
study. It focuses on reform priorities and processes and the contributions 
of local actors on police reform, as much as exploring the literature on 
how the challenges and deficiencies are addressed within the broader 
SSR programmes and initiatives.  
The paradigm shift in the understanding of security and security sector 
reform in post-Cold War period, hitherto understood in terms of civil-
military at the height of the West–East divide, was a watershed in the 
trajectory of security sector reform. It introduced an expansion of the SSR 
concept beyond the narrow confines of defence boundaries. Proponents 
of this new paradigm maintain that security, which comes through an 
effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order alongside 
the extension of good governance (Cooper and Pugh, 2002) is a priority 
to social development and human-rights protection. Security sector reform 
is thus expressed in terms of the dominant narrative of its holistic 
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approach (Wulf, 2004, OECD DAC, 2007) integrating all those partial 
reforms such as defence reform, police reform, intelligence reform and 
justice reform, that in the past were generally seen and conducted as 
separate efforts (Hänggi, 2004).  
2.5.1.1 Reform Priorities in Transitional Post-conflict Countries 
Proponents of holistic approach to SSR for example, Ball and 
Hendrickson (2005) emphasize democratisation and wider societal 
transformation and consider police reform as a component of the wider 
SSR. They argue that police reform integrates with the reform of all 
security institutions, state and non-state. On the other hand, traditional 
policing community scholars for example Hills (2000) and Holm and Eide 
(2000) emphasise more on the police as an institution-their focus is 
narrow, with the objective being to promote professional efficiency and 
capability of the police. Other scholars for example Ryan (2011) adopt a 
middle ground approach, arguing that very subtle differences between 
police reform and security sector reform exist and consider the police as 
an agent of transformation, ‘a source of trust from which a chain of 
security will grow’ (Ryan, 2011, p.139). For Ryan (2011) therefore, police 
reform is a foundational entry point of SSR. 
Based on the above observation, would reform in countries for example, 
Ethiopia and China which have been accused of poor human rights 
records, fit the realm of democratisation and societal transformation? The 
answer to the question is debatable, but such reform reflects more of 
social accountability of the state in improving provision of security and 
access to justice, rather than democratisation. Again, this suggests 
competing perspectives in SSR/police reform literature involving the 
traditional SSR community and the police reform communities focusing on 
holistic and narrow police professional reform respectively. This thesis 
considers police reform in Kenya as a component of the wider SSR 
initiatives in Kenya. 
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In supporting reform in post-conflict countries, international actors rely 
heavily on OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting 
Security and Justice (2007). The ground breaking text on reform provides 
four objectives for security system transformation including; establishment 
of effective governance, oversight and accountability, improved delivery of 
security and justice services, development of local ownership of the 
reform process and sustainability of justice and security service delivery 
(OECD DAC, 2007). Building on these blocks, the UK comes closest to 
the OECD-DAC’s vision of SSR especially in Africa where it remains the 
leading donor of SSR programmes. These elements are discernible in 
police and justice programmes in Malawi, Nigeria and Kenya; and support 
for Defence Review in Uganda which seek to improve oversight, 
transparency and accountability within the Ugandan Ministry of Defence 
and Armed Forces (Bendix and Stanley, 2008). 
Transitional post-conflict countries undertaking reform have embraced 
OECD DAC (2007) ideals though in some cases nuanced under different 
terminologies such as professionalization of the police, civilian policing 
(the key component of which was the demilitarisation of policing, as in the 
case of Latin America), democratic policing (to indicate that the police are 
now at the service of citizens, rather than of a regime) and the shift in 
name from ‘police force’ to ‘police service’. The uniqueness of every 
single case naturally highlights the need to prioritise reform initiatives 
depending on the reform context.  
While the reform initiatives remain more or less similar, context specific 
programmes require certain levels of ‘trade-offs’ between the short and 
the long-run. For example, in the immediate post-conflict period, security 
of the people is more important and it might therefore be necessary to 
focus on ‘capacity and commitment of the police and judiciary to support 
law, order and access to justice for communities and citizens’ (Greene, 
2003, p.5). In Kenya, four key areas of police reform priorities capture the 
aspirations of the country’s police reform priorities namely: police 
professionalism, police accountability, operational/administrative reforms, 
and institutional policy/legislative reforms (GoK, 2009).  
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Police professionalization, more often promoted strongly by the police 
themselves, underscores non-partisan, high-tech, information driven 
policing (Neild, 2006). In its largest sense, it argues that the police accept 
the need for effectiveness and justice, that they acquire the skills on how 
to reconcile both demands in the varying conditions of their work, and 
they apply such skills consistently (Caparini and Marenin, 2004). Critics 
however fault professionalization of policing without addressing human 
rights abuses by the police. They argue that there are instances where 
professional police have enforced repressive legal systems (Neild, 2006) 
and that a revolutionary transformation for most police in post-conflict or 
crisis situations must be that which works to serve the people and protect 
their human rights. 
SSR seeks to promote the principles of accountability, transparency and  
participatory democratic decision-making processes into the institutions of 
the security sector (Ball and Brzoska, 2002). In the views of Bellamy 
(2003), accountability principle demands that far from responding to 
government direction, the police must respond to security needs of the 
public at large - ‘Representatives of security and justice institutions must 
be liable for their actions and should be called to account for malpractice’ 
(OECD DAC, 2007, p.112). In a post-conflict context, multiple indicators33 
for success determine the path of reforms.  
Effective and efficient provision of state and human security within a 
framework of democratic governance is core in police reform achieved by 
operational and administrative reforms. The principle hinges on the 
structure of police organisation specifically designed to meet the security 
needs of the public. Inspired by W. Richard Scott’s Institutions and 
Organizations (2001), Lidén (2012) uses three pillars, namely; the 
regulative, normative and culture-cognitive pillars as the basis for 
community policing in Kenya. Perhaps the best model for reforming the 
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 These may include but not limited to; increased parliamentary debate of security and 
justice issues and strengthened procedures for oversight, increased percentage of 
population in target areas have confidence in security and justice providers, transparent 
process established for development of national budget for security and justice 
institutions  and Security and justice institutions are more representative of different 
social groups (OECD DAC, 2007). 
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police is the Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF) developed by (OECD 
DAC, 2007). The framework identifies the individual and the organisation 
as fundamental dimensions of the organisation and focuses on capacity 
and integrity as reform areas. Capacity entails the resources available to 
implement mandate while integrity relates to the means by which the 
resources are exploited to fulfil the mandate in accordance with the tenets 
of professionalism, good governance and human rights standards. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Capacity and Integrity Framework: Assessing and Planning  
 
Source: OECD DAC (2007, p.60) 
Post-conflict police systems are often characterised by weak oversight 
structures with interference from the political elite. In order to reclaim the 
independent role of the police, SSR considers the development of 
oversight mechanisms, both internally and externally, as important. Thus, 
reform programmes prioritise putting the police under civilian oversight, 
building capacities of both civilian leadership and strengthening 
policymaking capacities of legislators and government officials. Expertise 
also needs to be built in civil-society organisations, the media, and 
academic circles to develop external institutions that can conduct 
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research, monitor and advocate democratic public security policies 
(Caparini and Marenin, 2004). 
A holistic approach to police reform provides the best bet to transforming 
the police as an actor in the security sector. Reform in one area should 
not take precedence over another, as in Afghanistan where a recent 
assessment suggested ‘that governance and accountability issues have 
been displaced by a focus on increasing the operational capability of 
security forces’ (OECD DAC, 2007, p.64). How Kenya manages to weave 
these ideals and priorities into its police reform programmes, and how, 
and to what extent these experiences provide lessons on police reform 
experiences in post-conflict situations remain of epistemological interest in 
this study. 
2.5.1.2 Contribution of Local Actors to Police Reform and Wider 
SSR Processes  
This study also explores the contributions of local actors to police reform 
and wider SSR processes. In order to achieve this, a clear understanding 
of ‘local ownership’ parlance often used in police reform/SSR literature is 
essential. Deriving from the international development community 
(Donais, 2008), at the heart of the concept of local ownership in SSR 
discourse are issues to do with decisions, control, implementation and 
evaluation of the reform process. Often nuanced as ‘domestic 
constituencies’ (Greene, 2003) ‘people-centred’, ‘locally-owned’, (OECD 
DAC, 2007), SSR agenda seems to clarify ‘local ownership’ as a 
participatory framework through which views of stakeholders are 
articulated and expressed. Based on this participatory framework, this 
thesis explores the question: what is the contribution of local actors to 
police reform and wider SSR processes in post-conflict societies, 
particularly Kenya?  
Existing literature for example Nathan (2008), Donais (2008) underscore 
the centrality of local ownership in any effective SSR process. There is 
agreement that the contribution of local ownership is too important to be 
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ignored and that the success of any SSR process depends on how the 
process is internalised and indigenously owned. Despite this agreement, 
the dominant narrative in the framing of local ownership in SSR literature 
appears to take the ‘donor-recipient’ relationship with roots from the 
developmental community which focuses on involving the actors in 
recipient countries in the implementation of donor aid. Under this framing, 
local ownership suggests a diametrically form of control of the reform 
process with ‘foreigners’ on the one side and the ‘locals’ on the others 
(Donais, 2008) and presumes that SSR is an entirely a donor driven 
agenda. Whilst it is prudent to explore competing interests amongst the 
donor community in SSR, it is worth noting that SSR is in itself intrinsic to 
the host communities whose interests invariably drive the agenda.  
The above argument however does not preclude donor community local 
ownership agenda, but argues for deeper insights and interrogation of the 
competing local institutional and political agendas that influence the 
direction of SSR processes. For instance, periodic SSR processes in the 
developed world have nothing to do with donor-recipient framing, yet still 
remain affected by local ownership debate, in this case not as much as 
foreigners on the one side and locals on the other, but more by the 
institutional and political interests. 
In the context of police reform, this could involve the interests of top 
management and lower level management or better still, the broader 
political interests in the control of police institution. In the case of the 
United Kingdom for example, an effective safety and security strategy is 
that which: contributes to the improvement of core functions of the state 
police such as patrolling, ‘receiving charges from the public, detection, 
and preparing prosecutions; capable to mobilize a wide range of 
stakeholders (including non-state security providers) and integrates the 
police into the wider system of justice creating links between the system 
and civil society’ (Loh, 2010, p.12). This strategy has nothing to do with 
the donor-recipient approach dominant in the SSR literature. To explore 
ownership in this context would therefore mean exploring how the 
strategy navigates through the involvement of local communities and the 
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wider criminal justice system. Using the donor-recipient framing would 
serve to exclude or at least diminish the contributions of ‘local 
constituencies’ yet they substantially affect the manner in which SSR 
process is pursued. 
The divergence in arguments from the two distinct SSR local ownership 
literatures; the aid-recipient type ownership and institutional/political 
ownership reform agenda, invites more questions than solutions towards 
long-term dividends for police reform and SSR initiatives. By its very 
nature, operationalising local ownership remains a challenge and 
determining the contributions of the ‘local owners’ to the reform process is 
still difficult. Questions still abound on ‘what ownership actually entails, 
and to whom precisely we are referring when we talk about locals’ 
(Donais, 2008, p.1). This is even more problematic in the Kenyan context 
owing to the constellation of different local agendas that shape police 
/SSR ownership discourse in Kenya. 
Proponents of the donor-recipient relationship in SSR base their 
arguments on the normative principles of SSR including democratic 
norms, human rights and rule of law. These principles however may not 
necessarily be in conformity with the aspirations and interests of the 
‘locals’. Whether the attainment of the normative claims threshold is 
achievable is in doubt especially in post-conflict and post-authoritarian 
contexts where control of the security sector remains the intent of 
competing local elite. Such situations have been witnessed for example in 
Burundi, Kenya and Bosnia where ‘tensions have been particularly 
apparent in police reform questions, as political elites on all sides of the 
country’s ethnic divide strive to maintain control of policing for political 
purposes’ (Donais, 2008, p.6). 
To deal with the tensions arising from the donor-recipient dichotomy, 
scholars offer varied solutions. Scheye and Peake (2005) for example 
suggest breaking the reform into smaller manageable parts, for example 
identifying who is the beneficiary for what type of practical achievable 
reform; what level of success can be expected; which domestic 
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constituencies need to be involved for each type and phase of reform; and 
finally, what methods of persuasive pressure, if any, may need to be 
applied to achieve that desired level of participation given the expected 
reconfiguration of ‘owners’. Hansen (2008) on the other hand suggests 
that local ownership has to be brought about incrementally in a process 
that balances security concerns with the need for genuine ownership. 
These arguments though suggest ways of mitigating the tensions, do not 
depart from the donor-recipient model that dominates the literature and do 
not sufficiently offer guidance in dealing with the transitional situations as 
Kenya. 
Yet, a probably more proactive approach is offered by Donais (2008). 
Rather than view ownership in binary foreign-local terms, it is sensible to 
consider it as a legitimate exercise of political authority, in terms of both 
content and direction of reform, which emerges out of negotiations 
amongst the local and international actors. The negotiation process takes 
note of the liberal values while at the same time taking cognisance of the 
local contexts in which the reform takes place. This argument though 
introduces the element of negotiated settlements is founded on donor-
recipient relationship which this thesis challenges. How might the 
competing institutional and political balance be achieved amongst the 
local stakeholders in the reform? This study focuses more on these 
dynamics through which negotiated settlements amongst the locals affect 
the police/SSR processes.  
This framework suits this research for in so doing it helps untangle the 
local discourse in Kenya which greatly affects police reform. For example, 
the police as local stakeholders in the reform process can only be 
professionalised and brought under democratic control if the police 
themselves are committed and involved in the reform process. Therefore, 
to what extent are the police rank and file involved in Kenya’s police 
reform and how does this affect the reform process? The same applies to 
the civilian authorities, civil society groups and local communities who are 
beneficiaries of police reform.  
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2.5.1.3 Responding to Challenges of SSR/Police Reform in 
Transitional Post-conflict Countries 
The complex and political nature of SSR in post-conflict invites multiple 
competing responses from stakeholders, both local and international. 
Whilst these responses are enumerated in the literature, often missing is 
how these responses impact on police and broader SSR process. In 
exploring existing literature related to the third secondary research 
question, this section explores various debates in different transitional 
contexts, particularly focussing on the extent to which stakeholder 
responses to challenges and deficiencies of police reform affect the 
overall implementation of SSR.34 
Literature reveals that donor assistance to SSR in post-conflict situations 
at the formative stages was characterised by more emphasis on the 
liberal template, that long-term development or democratization 
programmes cannot succeed without the provision of stable security by 
legitimate and democratically accountable security forces (Bellamy, 
2003), disregarding (or at least with little regard) the social-political and 
institutional contexts in which reform were applied. Thus, very little 
fundamental reform was achieved owing to unrealistic assumptions about 
how the state was to relate to the security sectors of respective post-
conflict countries. To address this problem, donors have increasingly 
realised that the greatest potential for security sector reform exists where 
it is supported from outside but driven by strong internal dynamics 
(Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002). As such, successful examples 
reform cases such as Sierra Leone exhibit a clear national vision for 
reform and political will at the highest levels of the government.35 
The post-Cold War period saw the emergence of strong and vibrant civil 
society groups offering oversight roles and pressuring respective 
authorities to reform their police and justice sectors. Most of the groups 
are externally funded, thereby suggesting an alternative means for the 
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 See Section 2.4 for operational challenges and deficiencies of SSR in post-conflict 
situations. 
35
 See; Onoma (2014). 
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donors to push their agenda without being directly involved in police 
reform discourse. DfID for example identifies support for civilian 
organizations that might act as watchdogs over the security sector as one 
of the five areas36 of support to countries undertaking SSR (Bellamy, 
2003). 
As already indicated in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.3, post-conflict settings 
may offer opportunities to restructure security sector institutions while at 
the same time ‘present hostile environments for the implementation of 
ambitious reform plan’ (Neild, 2006, p.38). The rising insecurity in such 
contexts often invites public clamour for ‘iron hand’ responses to 
increasing violence that include demand for militarised approach to 
dealing with criminals and tough legal measures. Such responses from 
members of the public may not provide for space for oversight and 
accountability issues which form the heart of police reforms. Such 
demands often make the police to revert to extra judicial measures to deal 
with crime. The result is increasing tensions between members of the 
public and civil rights groups. Where the police fail to crack down on 
crime, vigilantes have sprung up to fill the security void. How various 
stakeholders’ address the challenges of reform remain of interest to this 
study hence the question, how have stakeholders responded to 
challenges and deficiencies of SSR in Kenya? 
2.5.2  Political Transitions and Power-sharing: The Politics of Police 
Reform and SSR 
2.5.2.1 Politics and Security 
Politics and security are like the two sides of a coin. Scholars and 
practitioners alike agree that the two affect each other in equal measure. 
The success or failure to reform the security and police sectors depends 
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 The five areas of support included supporting the establishment of structures of proper 
civilian control over the military; training members of the military in international 
humanitarian law and human rights; strengthening national parliamentary oversight of 
the security apparatus; supporting civilian organizations that might act as watchdogs 
over the security sector and supporting the demobilization and reintegration of ex-
combatants. 
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on the political goodwill. The security sector is also crucial to political 
power, both in the ‘macro’ sense of regime stability and in the ‘micro’ 
sense of exercising day-to-day political control.37 Security sector reform is 
therefore closely tied to domestic processes of political and social change 
(Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002). For Nathan (2008) and Wulf (2011), 
SSR is profoundly political, and therefore faces resistance or lack of 
political will (Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, 2012). Despite the above strong 
link between politics and security sector reform, there still exists a gap in 
the articulation of this link in the literature. 
Although post-conflict situations provide opportunities for far-reaching 
police reforms, literature reveals little attention was given to police reform 
at the formative stages. For example, in a study of twelve cases of police 
reforms in peace agreements, Call and Stanley (2001) found that in only 
eight cases was any reform really implemented. And only in the cases of 
El Salvador, Namibia, and South Africa were most of the provisions and 
international expectations regarding police reform realized in practice. In 
two cases (Cambodia and Nicaragua), police reforms occurred, although 
they were omitted from peace accords. These reform processes, 
however, tended to be less extensive than those written into peace 
agreements. This scenario has gradually changed as evidenced by recent 
peace agreements, for example the Global Political Agreement of 
Zimbabwe (2008) and the Peace Accord of Kenya (2008) which have 
strong SSR components including the reform of the police. 
In a review of cases of police reforms in Africa, namely; Angola, DRC, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Namibia Nigeria amongst others, (Rauch and Van 
der Spuy, 2006) discovered that each case provided proof of the intimate 
connections between police and politics. They argue that police reform is 
deeply a political endeavour - political interests are fundamental to the 
process of reform. Nevertheless, security reforms remain one of the most 
important mechanisms for preventing political violence and common crime 
in many post-war settings (Call and Stanley, 2001).  
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 This debate is further developed in Chapter 4 in relation to Kenya. 
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Effective police and justice reform supports a positive climate even when 
broader political arrangements are uncertain or less than democratic. On 
the other hand, an ill-considered security sector restructuring programme 
has the potential of interfering with political stability. Williams (2000) for 
example argues that there are compelling examples of countries for 
example, the Central African Republic in the mid-1990s, the frequent 
mutinies in the former Zaïre and the 1997 coup in Sierra Leone where an 
ill-considered security sector restructuring programme has actually 
bedevilled political stability.  
The above discussion suggests a growing corpus of literature explaining 
the relationship between politics and SSR, specifically police reforms in 
post-conflict countries. While the literature provides sufficient evidence 
and lessons that police reform is an important ingredient for long term 
peace in post-conflict countries, the influence of power-sharing dynamics 
on police reforms in transitional post-conflict countries remain scanty. 
There is limited literature that explores the constraints, as much as 
opportunities for police reforms in countries that have adopted power-
sharing agreements. This PhD fills this gap in its Chapter 5, by exploring 
the Kenyan case in presenting how power-sharing shapes the SSR and 
police reform process in transitional post-conflict environments.  
2.5.2.2 Understanding Post-Conflict Power-sharing 
Power-sharing agreements have in the recent years become popular tools 
of resolving conflicts in transitional post-election crisis societies. Spears 
(2000) defines power-sharing as a situation whereby government posts 
are distributed across the most powerful political parties or groupings. 
Rothchild and Roeder (2005) however distinguish between power-sharing 
institutions and policies to imply formal arrangements in the former and 
polices that can be formal or informal in the later.  
Whilst different understanding of power-sharing abound, 
consociationalism remains the most cited form. Advocated by Lijphart 
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(2008),38 consociationalism argues that political culture and social 
structure are empirically related to political stability and that societies 
divided by sharp cultural or ethnic, racial and religious differences or are 
deeply fragmented because of these differences would experience 
political instability. However, there are instances where such differences 
do not necessary lead to instability-the societies are divided yet stable. It 
is these that Lijphart calls ‘consociational democracies’ (Lijphart, 2008). 
In a consociational democracy therefore, leaders of rival sub-cultures may 
engage in competitive behavior and further aggravate mutual tensions 
and political instability. But they may also make deliberate efforts to 
counteract the immobilizing and un-stabilizing effects of cultural 
fragmentation (Lijphart, 2008). In this respect, a variety of institutional 
arrangements with deliberate efforts by the elites to stabilize the system 
are required (Spears, 2000). Lijphart thus proposes consociational 
solutions that emphasize the importance of sharing power among different 
segments in the society for purposes of stability. A grand-coalition 
government in which power is shared among different factions that form 
the coalition is the most typical consociational solution in fragmented 
societies (Kanyinga, 2009). 
Four structural features are shared by consociational systems – ‘grand-
coalition, cultural autonomy, proportionality and minority veto’ (Lijphart, 
2008, p.4). Though Lijphart’s model was used in describing power-sharing 
in stable but divided western democracies39 (Wolff, 2006, Rothchild and 
Roeder, 2005), it is of ‘particular interest in Africa, which has become the 
arena for several types of power-sharing experiences’ (Jarstad, 2009, 
p.42). Recent cases in Africa include Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008 where 
contested election results and ensuing violence led to elite power-sharing. 
Earlier examples include agreements struck in Rwanda (1993), Somalia 
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 Arend Lijphart’s ‘Consociational Democracy’ published in 1969 is often regarded as 
the ‘classic’ statement of consociational theory. For our purpose in this study, we refer to 
Lijphart (2008) which contains his articles and chapters from 1969 to 2004. See; Lijphart 
( 2008). 
39
 The often cited examples include ethnically homogeneous but divided countries such 
as Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands with no cases of civil war in the 
recent history. 
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(1997), Angola (2002), and the 2003 agreements in Burundi, Comoros, 
DRC and Liberia. 
The focus in this study is recent cases where an analysis of the impact of 
such agreements on SSR can be teased out. This begs the question; ‘to 
what extent has power sharing politics influenced police reform and wider 
SSR in post-conflict situations, specifically in Kenya?’ How does 
competitive behaviour and tensions amongst elites (Lijphart, 2008) in a 
power-sharing arrangement play out in reality within the context of SSR? 
Does power-sharing facilitate or constrain police/SSR processes in post-
conflict countries? Do the elites forming the power-sharing government 
accept loss of power through legitimate SSR processes? 
2.5.2.3 Post-conflict Power-sharing and SSR  
Recent post-conflict power-sharing arrangements include SSR as part of 
the agreement. In Zimbabwe for example, the Global Political Agreement 
(GPA) of 2008, which led to the creation of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU), makes explicit the recognition of the need to make the 
security sector part of the democratic process (Chitiyo, 2009), while 
Kenya’s National Accord recognizes institutional reforms, including 
judicial, police and civil service, as critical if the country were to remain a 
unified nation-state (Kanyinga, 2009). 
The cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrate that while power-sharing 
sets the stage for ambitious reforms of the security sector, the challenges 
posed by the political elite, ostensibly to control the security sector 
remains one of the greatest threats to SSR. The structures created by 
power-sharing arrangements; namely coalition government, cultural 
autonomy, veto power and proportional representation serve to affect the 
undertaking of police reforms. Rather than exploit the structure to expand 
inclusiveness of sectors otherwise isolated before the outbreak of conflict, 
the political class exploit the structures to gain full control of the security 
sector, thus threatening the goodwill for reforms at the formative stages of 
power-sharing arrangement. This serves to frustrate police reforms during 
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the life of the power-sharing agreement. Detailed discussion on the 
impact of power-sharing on police reforms in Kenya is presented in 
Chapter 5. 
2.5.3 Justice Reform in Transitional Post-conflict Societies  
The ‘police–justice reform approach’ adopted in this section is in line with 
a holistic approach to SSR advocated for in the literature. This is 
bolstered by the argument ‘the population interacts most with the police in 
terms of contact with the justice system’ (Loh, 2010, p.6) and that an 
effective justice system is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the police 
in the provision of order and security.  
In the recent years, international aid to security sector  reform, especially 
DfID funded programming, to post-conflict countries has incredibly 
assumed the format of Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) 
combining ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) and ‘safety, security and access 
to justice (SSAJ)’ (Ball et al., 2007). Security and Justice Sector Reform is 
often used to emphasize the fact that security and justice work occurs 
under the same umbrella and underscores ‘the importance of a coherent 
strategic approach to reforming the security and justice sector’ (Ball et al., 
2007 p.7). 
At another level, closely linked to justice reform under the wider SSR is 
‘justice sensitive security sector reform’. This relates to ‘reform initiatives 
within SSR programmes to address the legacy of impunity for human 
rights violations and the ongoing human rights violations committed by 
elements within the security forces’ (Davis, 2009, p.7).Unlike standard 
SSR processes, justice sensitive security sector reform brings to the fore 
the past, especially human rights abuses by ‘calling attention to the 
systemic causes of abuses and mobilizing support behind systemic 
reform efforts that address such causes, and by helping SSR programs to 
effectively address the legacies of such abuses’ (Mayer-Rieckh and 
Duthie, 2012, p.2). Efforts such as vetting are undertaken to ensure that 
police officers involved in human rights abuses do not hold public office 
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and that victims and other marginalised groups are empowered to 
guarantee their security and access to justice. 
Despite these recognitions, literature on justice reform in post-conflict 
situations paint a gloomy picture. In their commissioned study to 
determine the quality and effectiveness of UK assistance to Security and 
Justice Sector Reform in Africa, Ball et al. (2007) found that ‘UK SJSR 
interventions have been partially effective40 within different programmes 
(with the possible exception of Sierra Leone) (Ball et al., 2007, p.xi-xii). 
They attribute this state of affairs to ‘the tension within DFID between the 
security and justice functions of policing and political environment in the 
host countries that in most cases is ‘not conducive to the pursuit and 
achievement of the desired outcomes’ (Ball et al., 2007). Whilst the former 
is essentially a donor problem, the latter reflects the challenges often 
associated with post-conflict situations which hardly support justice reform 
and often reflect priority choice for security functions of policing rather 
than the justice functions of policing. 
Davis (2009), in a study to recommend ways in which the EU may 
incorporate justice-sensitive reform initiatives within SSR programmes in 
the DRC, found that SSR initiatives and power-sharing arrangements in 
the DRC often failed to include justice reform, or included it later,41 
deliberately for fear of bringing human rights abusers into accountability. 
In the study, women bear the greatest brunt of ‘human rights violations 
(such as arbitrary killing, illegal detention and extortion) at the hands of 
security agents’ (Davis, 2009, p.21) yet obstacles for women seeking 
justice remain high. Where individuals are found guilty, they either 
‘escape’ and or ‘remain at large’. This situation therefore denies segments 
of the society opportunity to fully participate in country specific SSR 
initiatives.  
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 ‘Partial effectiveness’ means that programmes generate some useful outcomes but 
cannot produce a multiplier effect Ball et al., (2007). 
41
 The Security Sector Roundtable of 2007, bringing together Congolese and 
international stakeholders on SSR for example only tabled army and police reform. 
Justice system reform was added later in February 2008. 
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How does police reform integrate with justice reform in post-conflict 
countries? While the two invariably need to proceed together, and that 
SSR framework strongly anticipates close coordination between police 
and justice reform, literature suggests that this is not always the case. In 
the case of Kenya, reforms in the judiciary picked up faster as opposed to 
the police which was bogged by lots of controversies. This study 
investigates police reform and explores the extent to which justice reform 
proceeded alongside police reform in Kenya. 
2.5.4 Ethnic Dimension of Police Reform 
The establishment of multi-ethnic police service remains one of the key 
objectives of SSR especially in multi-ethnic societies in which ethnic 
tensions abound. Where the police services are dominated by a particular 
ethnic group, there is a tendency to resist reform amongst the police 
officers representing the dominating ethnic group. In such cases, failure to 
address ethnic imbalance often leads to parallel chain of command based 
on ethnic affiliations. Police reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
examples in which ‘parallel chains of command and loyalties based on 
membership in specific ethnic groups can persist in reformed police units, 
seriously undermining their performance (Stodiek, 2008, p.6). Ethnic 
agenda and allegiance to ethnic political affiliations dominate the 
performance rather than professionalism and impartial service delivery to 
the public.  
The case of Liberia is similar. One of the key drivers of the conflict 
witnessed in the country was ethnicisation of the security forces by 
Samuel Doe (1985-1990). During his reign, ‘he placed many of his fellow 
Krahns in key military positions’ (Ebo, 2005, p.15), a move that eventually 
led to widespread discontent amongst Liberians and subsequent armed 
rebellion. The successive regime led by Charles Taylor (1997-2003) 
followed suit, by creating a security apparatus that was loyal to him and 
dedicated to maintaining his survival. Liberia’s case and many others 
demonstrate the negative impact of ethnic influence of the security sector 
that reform needs to address. 
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Proponents of peacebuilding framework of police reform argue that ‘multi-
ethnic police services can help to overcome the legacy of ethno-political 
conflicts’ (Stodiek, 2008).They argue that police reform should be able to 
address ethnic imbalances in the police forces in post-conflict countries by 
deliberately increasing the numbers of the erstwhile marginalized groups. 
But again, raising the numbers of officers from minority groups comes 
with its own challenges. There is often no guarantee that the initiative will 
be accepted across the board. Thus, a deliberate move to involve the 
locals for ‘buy in’ and confidence in police reform is necessary. For this 
reason ‘comprehensive and long-lasting confidence-building programmes 
such as “community policing “are necessary (Stodiek, 2008, p.8). 
A review of literature on the impacts of ethnicity on police reform reveals 
that establishment of multi-ethnic security systems remain a challenge. 
Yet in the words of Stodiek (2008) ‘very little empirical research has been 
conducted on these issues so far’. Kenya is no exception. How is police 
reform addressing the problem of ethnicity in Kenya’s police service? 
Literature on ethnicity and security system in Kenya reveals a systematic 
exploitation of ethnic dominance and nepotism by the ruling elite.42 As 
evidenced in the literature; this leads to discontent from the minorities and 
is partly to blame for the conflicts witnessed in a number of countries. 
Whilst it is not within the scope of this thesis to comprehensively explore 
ethnicity and SSR, Kenya’s case is of interest owing to the links between 
Kenya’s police service and the ruling elite. This helps unpack and explain 
the response of the police to the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya.  
2.5.5 Peace Processes and Political Power-sharing in Multi-Ethnic 
Contexts 
The Agenda for Peace43 (Boutros-Ghali and United Nations, 1992) gave 
impetus to peacebuilding agenda as a distinct field in the international 
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 See Section 2.6 of this chapter for details on systematic ethnicisation of the security 
sector by Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes respectively. 
43
 An Agenda for Peace defines post-conflict peacebuilding as ‘action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict’. See Boutros-Ghali & United Nations (1992). 
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arena. It rekindled interests amongst peacebuilding community to pursue 
new ideas that go beyond traditional approaches that had hitherto mainly 
focussed on conflict prevention, or negative peace44 (Chandler, 2009), 
alongside ‘liberal peacebuilding’ frameworks that were so prevalent as a 
way of understanding peacebuilding in the 1990s (Curtis, 2013).  
Proponents of liberal peace thesis argue there is no real alternative or 
modification to liberal peacebuilding (Richmond, 2012), while critics often 
concentrate on its problems.45 The critics argue that liberal peace 
intervention has not significantly helped societies transition towards 
sustainable peace, but contributed to hybrid regimes combining both 
democracy and authoritarianism. More profoundly, critics argue liberal 
peace is overly ambitious in ‘introducing liberal, democratic institutions 
into complex, damaged and deeply-divided societies’ (Donais, 2012). 
These institutions do not work as the local structures are impervious to 
change (De Waal, 2009, p.99-113) or that local or indigenous 
peacebuilding may be inscribed with values that conflict with international 
programmes but may have greater grassroots legitimacy (Mac Ginty, 
2008). 
The argument critics present is that liberal peacebuilding is not 
appropriate in complex conflict ridden societies, especially where multi-
ethnic difference catalyse conflict.46 It represents, in the language of 
United Nations, ‘horizontal integration’ which fails to penetrate beyond the 
state institutions and the elite level actors. Thus, critics propose the 
‘vertically integrated’ peacebuilding (Donais, 2012) in which 
peacebuilding, though may be internationally driven and funded, is 
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Negative peace as used here refers to absence of violence. Positive peace includes 
positive content including constructive resolution of conflict and the creation of social 
systems that serve the needs of the whole population. For elaborate distinction, see 
Galtung (1996). 
45
 For elaborate criticism of liberal peace, see;  Paris (2004). 
46
 Arend Lijphart is probably the most influential scholar that has shaped alternative 
forms of democracy in ethnically and religiously divided societies. His ‘consociational 
democracy (1969)’ remains by far the most influential piece on peace processes and 
political power-sharing. See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of political power-sharing 
specific to Kenyan context. 
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aligned with both the government priorities and the community level 
needs. 
Recent peace processes suggest a range of vertically integrated 
peacebuilding alternatives, especially in multi-ethnic contexts in which 
elements such as ‘‘local ownership’, ‘local alternatives’, ‘local 
peacebuilding’, ‘meaningful participation’, ‘indigenous peacebuilding’, or 
‘post-liberal peacebuilding’ (Curtis, 2013). Key in these processes is the 
inclusion of key local stakeholders. 
Notably known for its ethnic division and antagonism, the peace 
processes in Burundi perhaps best illuminates a local response to liberal 
peace in the form of power-sharing. Ethnicity no longer remains the most 
salient feature around which conflict is generated in Burundi (Curtis, 2013) 
as the peace processes acknowledged ethnic balancing.47 The peace 
processes involved power-sharing across the elites from the historically 
disadvantaged majority Hutu and the dominant minority Tutsi and other 
completely marginalised groups. 
However, despite power-sharing peace processes emphasizing ethnic 
diversity including in the security sector, the nature of the state hardly 
changes. For example, in Burundi, ‘the 2003 Global Ceasefire Agreement 
reconfirmed ethnic parity in the national defence forces, the national 
police and the intelligence services’ yet the ruling CNDD-FDD48 ‘continues 
to consolidate its control of the country, including through the use of 
violence’ (Curtis, 2013, p.16-17). This is not unique to Burundi peace 
process alone but is evident in other contexts.49 In Kenya for example, 
‘Kikuyu and Meru continued to dominate domestic security, heading 
security ministry (via George Saitoti), the police force, NSIS and CID’ 
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 Following local and international pressure following military reprisals 1988, President 
Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi (1987-93) attempted a power-sharing formula by naming equal 
number of Hutu and Tutsi ministers in his 1988 reshuffle while Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu 
,(1993) formed an ethnically balanced government to placate the dominant Tutsi who 
had hitherto controlled the economy and the military. Subsequent peace agreements 
under the Arusha Peace Process (1998-2000), the 2003 Global Ceasefire Agreement 
and the 2005 Constitution emphasised on the need for ethnic balancing.  
48
 This is a former rebel organisation which transformed into a multi-ethnic political party 
and won democratic elections in 2005 and 2010. 
49
 See for example Brown (2011); Magaloni( 2008); Tull & Mehler (2005). 
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(Hornsby, 2012, p.775) while in Zimbabwe ‘security sector, the judiciary, 
and land policy remain a ZANU-PF preserve’ (Chitiyo, 2009, p.20), 
associated with President Mugabe. The literature on peace processes 
and power-sharing thus suggest that while ethnic diversity has occupied 
central location in the peace processes in multi-ethnic contexts, through 
inclusion of formerly marginalised ethnic groups in respective countries 
security sector, fundamental changes are hardly achieved in the short run 
because of vested political interests. 
2.6 State of Security and Security Sector in Kenya 
This section explores known literature on security sector reform dynamics 
and processes in Kenya before the post-election violence in the year 
2007. It explores the reform that emerged from the perspective of both the 
state and various social groups and the subsequent conflict thereafter. It 
provides an account on how the state’s handling of the discourses on 
reforms set the stage for the reform initiatives and strategies adopted after 
the electoral violence witnessed in Kenya during the period 2007/8. More 
so, to fully appreciate the security sector reform discourse and process 
that emerged during the immediate post-electoral violence, understanding 
the preceding context of the 2007 general election is of utmost 
significance.  
While appreciating the various contexts upon which security sector 
reforms take place, the uniqueness of reform cases come to bear in the 
Kenyan context, with the reform process exhibiting characteristics 
associated with the reform contexts described by Bryden and Hänggi 
(2004) in Section 2.3. The section is divided into two sub-sections. 
2.6.1 Security and Security Sector under Moi Regime - 1978 to 2002 
President Moi took over from Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978), when Kenyatta 
died in August 1978. Moi was vice president for twelve years (1966–
1978). President Moi’s grip on Kenya’s police force started way before he 
became the president. At Independence, in 1964, he was appointed 
Minister for Home Affairs and was in charge of the police. On appointment 
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as the vice president, he retained Home Affairs Ministry. Cumulatively, 
Moi ‘was exposed to the structure and functions of the police force for 
fourteen years before he became president (Adar and Munyae, 2001, 
p.6). This exposure to Kenya’s security apparatus provides the foundation 
for which the state of security and security sector in Kenya is presently 
understood. 
During the prolonged Moi regime (1978-2002), the Kenya police force was 
infamous for all the wrong reasons. ‘Throughout the 1980s to 1990s the 
security forces, particularly the police, were used to suppress any criticism 
of his regime’ (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.2) and were instrumental in 
cases of human rights violations, including politically motivated 
disappearances and targeted killing of many perceived opponents (Omeje 
and Githigaro, 2012, p.65). Cronyism and ethnicity pervaded the entire 
police spectrum while corruption was the order of the day. The police 
detained without trial opposition groups while anti-Moi media houses were 
under police surveillance.  
Moi’s first cabinet reshuffle was meant to gain control of the security 
forces and the civil service which were dominated by the Kiambu Mafia50 
(Adar and Munyae, 2001). In the reshuffle, Moi decided ‘to remove control 
of the police and the provincial administration from Mbiyu Koinange’ 
(Hornsby, 2012, p.331), and other senior police officers whose loyalty was 
doubtful. The purge also involved senior military officers from the Kikuyu 
community who were retired to pave way for loyalists and members of 
Moi’s Kalenjin community51. Thus, the changes in the security sector that 
emerged during the formative stages of Moi rule was that of de-
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  An elite group from President Kenyatta’s home which dominated the political realm 
during Kenyatta’s reign and whose objective was to undermine Moi’s leadership. 
51
 An example in this case is that of meteoric rise of Lt-Col John Sawe in 1979 who was 
promoted to deputy army commander, creating a curious situation whereby a colonel 
commanded brigadiers. By the end of the year, the brigadiers under Sawe were retired 
and Sawe promoted to brigadier to head the army.  (Hornsby, 2012, pp., p.335-336). 
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kikuyunisation to kalenjinisation52- in this case, using the ethnic card to 
secure Moi’s hold on to power. 
To further ensure his grip on power, Moi systematically disregarded 
separation of power doctrine enshrined in Kenya’s constitution by 
deliberately usurping the functions of the other institutions of governance 
including legislature and the judiciary (Adar and Munyae, 2001). This 
marked the beginning of Moi’s authoritarian rule. Through a Constitution 
of Kenya Amendment Act, Number 7 of 1982, Moi introduced Section 2(A) 
transforming the country into a de-jure one-party state, reinstated the 
Chief’s Authority Act, the Public Order Act, the Preservation of Public 
Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Codes which suspended 
individual rights guaranteed by the constitution. The right to obtain 
information from the Office of the President privilege by parliament was 
also revoked. Additionally, the provincial administrators who are civil 
servants were directed to get involved in the internal affairs of ruling party 
KANU. They were to review and clear party meetings throughout the 
country and to isolate dissenters. These developments legitimised internal 
security organs, notably the police and the provincial administration to be 
involved in the worst of all human rights abuses under Moi regime.  
In the Judiciary, cases in which the executive had interest had to be in 
favour of Moi. Judges who did not favour the wish of the president were 
either transferred or resigned owing to the 1986 and 1988 constitutional 
amendment that provided for the removal of the security and tenure of the 
Attorney General, the Controller and Auditor General, the judges of the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal (Adar and Munyae, 2001). 
The advent of multi-party politics perhaps signifies the beginning of 
reforms in Kenya’s public and security system involving the police. Due to 
internal and external pressure for openness and competitiveness in 
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 De-kikuyuinisation and Kalenjinisation as used in this context refer to Moi’s deliberate 
move to restructure the civil service and the state-owned enterprises, removing members 
of Kikuyu community who previously dominated these sectors during Kenyatta's regime 
and replacing them with members of his Kalenjin community respectively (Adar & 
Munyae, 2001). 
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politics, Moi grudgingly gave in to demands and repealed section 2(A) of 
the constitution thus giving way to multiparty elections in 1992. Moi 
argued that multiparty politics would ‘cause chaos in the country because 
Kenya was not "cohesive enough"’ (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.6). This 
move had an impact on the security landscape in the country. It ‘brought 
with it the dissolution of the state monopoly of violence by heralding the 
emergence of ethnic militias’ (Omeje and Githigaro, 2012, p.66). 
Independent investigations during the time revealed that the police 
worked alongside and mobilised militia as forms of extra-state violence in 
areas where KANU faced opposition.  
Whilst pressure on Moi yielded some positive results through the 
introduction of political pluralism and setting of presidential term limit, 
literature on reforms during Moi’s regime provide evidence that they were 
not sufficient to guarantee security to the Kenyan people. Every reform 
initiative was countered by deliberate effort to consolidate control of the 
security sector by the regime. 
2.6.2 Kibaki’s Reform Agenda and the Security Sector - 2002 to 
2007 
The year 2002 was a watershed in Kenya’s reform trajectory. With Moi not 
eligible to run after twenty four years in office, Kenyans overwhelmingly 
elected Mwai Kibaki, defeating former president Moi’s preferred candidate 
Uhuru Kenyatta. During his inauguration, Kibaki announced that the ‘era 
of roadside policy declarations is gone’ and assured Kenyans he would 
‘bring back the culture of due process, accountability and transparency in 
public office’ (GoK, 2002). With this declaration, there was ‘hope and 
great expectation in the security sector that KPF would among other 
things be reformed and professionalized to be able to deliver efficient and 
productive policing’ (Omeje and Githigaro, 2012, p.65). 
The government initiated the donor funded sector wide reform initiative 
under GJLOS, which was the most ‘extensive SSR process that targeted 
the Kenya Police in particular’ (ICTJ-Kenya, 2010, p.1). A taskforce on 
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police reform was set up in 2004, and parliament changed the law so that 
only confessions made in court were admissible, to reduce the use of 
torture to extract confessions (Hornsby, 2012, p.714). The goal of the 
police reform process was to transform the institution into an effective, 
efficient, human rights-compliant, people-oriented, and accountable 
institution (ICTJ-Kenya, 2010). The reform prioritised the improvement of 
policing and security as fundamental prerequisites of economic growth. 
This was also articulated in Kenya’s Economic Recovery and Wealth 
Creation Strategy (2003), and later Vision 203053 which considered 
security as a foundation of the pillars of the vision. As a result, there was 
a relative increase in police funding to improve their terms of service and 
operational capacity. Community policing which sought to include the 
public in local policing was also given prominence. 
Whilst there seemed to be some accountability in the security sector 
compared to Moi’s tenure, the NARC dream did not last long. Internal 
problems due to perception that Kibaki did not honour a pre-election MoU 
with Raila Odinga impacted negatively on the reform process.54 ‘Some 
appeared to believe that their preferment owed as much to Odinga as 
Kibaki’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.712), while Kibaki systematically consolidated 
power through a political elite from Gema communities, more often 
described as the ‘Mount Kenya Mafia’ (Hornsby, 2012).  
The sacking of the then police chief perhaps signalled earlier attempts by 
Kibaki to consolidate control of the police. After serving for only a year, 
Edwin Nyaseda, perceived to be a close ally of Raila Odinga, was sacked 
after ‘he provided state security for Odinga during a mixed official and 
political visit to the Coast’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.712). By 2006, the Gema 
communities took control of the entire internal security; the permanent 
secretary for internal security, the CID director, GSU commandant , 
Presidential Escort and NSIS heads, previously held by the Kalenjin, – all 
Kalenjin in 2002-were all Kikuyu, Embu and Meru’ (Hornsby, 2012, 
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 This is Kenya’s economic blueprint for economic development. 
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 In the run-up to 2002 election, various parties under the banner National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) entered into a memorandum of understanding in which the position of 
executive prime minister would be created for Raila Odinga.  
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p.713). Notably, during Kibaki’s entire tenure, all the four CID directors 
were from Kikuyu community. The military too underwent reshuffles with 
the overall effect ‘to retire or side-line the most senior Kalenjin and Luo 
and increase Kikuyu (and Kamba) representation’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.713). 
The judiciary too underwent what became known as ‘radical surgery’. The 
then Chief Justice Bernard Chunga, a Luo, resigned and was replaced by 
Evan Gicheru, a Kikuyu. In October 2003, the state suspended from office 
23 judges and 82 magistrates, nearly half of the judiciary, following 
investigations by Aaron Ringera (Meru) that made shocking allegations of 
illegal and unethical behaviour (Hornsby, 2012, p.705). While judicial 
reform was one of the most notable achievements of the NARC 
government during the formative stages, ‘there were allegations of 
politicisation and tribalism in the appointment of NARC-era judges as well 
(Hornsby, 2012, p.705). The above developments in relation to SSR that 
emerged during Kibaki’s’ first term indicate a systematic de-
kalenjinisation55 of the security sector and the entrenchment of members 
of Gema community in public service. By the year 2007, ethnic 
composition of Kenya’s public institutions supported the allegations of 
tribalism with key institutions notably finance and security dominated by 
members of president Kibaki’s Gema communities.56 
Whilst Kibaki’s first term succeeded in exposing blatant disregard for the 
rule of law during the Moi regime, evidence from the literature indicates 
that nothing much changed. The security system failed to address the 
security challenges and was also accused of complicity in crime, and in 
particular the 2007 post-election violence, thus raising questions about 
commitment to reforms (Manby, 2008). 
The trajectory of reform processes in Kenya prior to the 2007 general 
election reveal different reform contexts discussed in Section 2.3. The 
period under Moi was characterised by authoritarianism in which the 
police and the judiciary were used to silence those critical of Moi’s 
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 See; (Hornsby, 2012). 
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 See Chapter 3 for elaborate discussions on ethnicity during Kibaki’s first term. 
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government. During this period, ‘the image and reputation of the police 
was at its lowest ebb in the post-independence history’ (Omeje and 
Githigaro, 2012, p.65). President Kibaki’s first term mimics developmental 
context with the realisation that security was vital for development hence 
inclusion of security as a pillar of Vision 2030. In fact, ‘Kenya’s economy 
is yet to recover from the slump that followed the disputed 2007 elections, 
with economic growth dropping from 7.1 per cent in 2007 to 1.5 per cent 
in 2008’ (Karambu, 2012). There was increased investment in reforms in 
security agencies through capacity building, improvement in operational 
logistics and improvement of welfare of personnel. 
While the reform processes that emerged during the period 2003-2007 
were fairly impressive, vested political interests undermined the police 
and justice system, thus facilitating the on-set of the post-election conflict 
in Kenya (ICPC, 2011). These developments raise questions about the 
responsiveness of the reform processes to policing and public security 
needs and whether the reform processes that emerged during Kibaki’s 
first term were founded on solid base that would guarantee security and 
safety of Kenyan citizens. Again, how did the political dalliance with the 
security sector during Moi and Kibaki’s first term affect the police reform 
processes that emerged in the immediate post 2007 election violence 
period to date? These questions are addressed in Chapter 3. 
2.7 Justification for Overall Research Strategy 
The literature reviewed so far suggests a number of implications for 
choice of methodology and methods outlined in chapter one. First, the 
discussions reveal that the concepts underlying this study are existentially 
contested. Primarily the meaning of security, security sector reform and 
post-conflict, which are key concepts in this research, remain in dispute, 
and so impact on the overall assessment of police reform under the wider 
SSR processes. How these concepts are thus defined determine the 
priority choices for SSR in different situations. In our discussions of these 
concepts in Chapter two, we have offered operational definitions of these 
key concepts. 
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Secondly, SSR is a complex process involving multiple actors, each 
pursuing different interests, either in the short or long-run. How these 
actors interact to shape SSR is critical, in terms of the direction of reform. 
In other words, whose agenda prevails in a politically charged police and 
SSR processes? This question thus informed the people selected to 
participate in the study. 
Thirdly, whilst SSR takes place in different contexts, the process of police 
and security sector reform in post-conflict situations seem dominant and 
more complex. Post-conflict situations, though offering a window of 
opportunity for police and SSR, equally present the most difficult and 
challenging environments for police and justice sectors reform. These 
three key lessons, and a lot more embedded concerns, about police and 
SSR processes in transitional post-conflict situations naturally point 
towards two observations: that as an object of study for this research, 
police and SSR in post-conflict situations is complex; and that knowledge 
of such a complex process requires a critical approach to the social 
phenomena of security. With this in mind, this section justifies the 
research approach as well as methods in the context of reviewed 
literature in the previous sections of this chapter.57 
2.7.1 Research Strategy 
The research strategy for this study is engendered in the thesis outline 
presented in chapter one. This is reflected in chapters three, four and five 
of this study. The chapters provide substantive analyses of the data 
collected in relation to the research question. This study contributes 
knowledge to wider SSR literature in transitional and post-conflict 
contexts. Therefore, a thorough understanding of existing literature in this 
area was important. For this reason, chapter two of the study is designed 
to anchor Kenya’s SSR, particularly police and justice reform, into the 
wider SSR debates. Specifically, three literature areas; security sector 
reform processes in transitional post-conflict contexts; political aspects of 
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 The section primarily concerns with the providing a justification for the methodology 
and methods already presented in chapter one. 
74 
SSR; and efficacy of security sector reforms to policing and community 
needs form literature themes  
Having located the Kenyan case within the broader SSR literatures and 
debates, it was necessary to provide a detailed analysis of post-2007 
aftermath in terms of how the post-conflict security sector reform agenda 
was set in Kenya. This strategy is informed by the fact that the way 
agendas get set is critical to the implementation process (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier, 2003, Sutton, 1999). To achieve this strategy, chapter three 
explores the literature on agenda setting theory to provide an appropriate 
framework for discussing how Kenya’s security sector reform agenda was 
set. For the purpose of analysis in this chapter, John Kingdom’s policy 
streams model (Kingdon, 2002) is used to explain how the security sector 
reform agenda was constructed in the post-2007 Kenya. 58 
Having analysed, in detail, the post-2007 security sector reform agenda, 
examining the progress in the implementation of police reform agenda, in 
terms of emerging debates, disputes and progress was critical. Whilst this 
was possible by simply describing the implementation process, our best 
option for achieving this strategy was to understand why and how different 
actors involved in the reform process, behaved in a particular manner in 
relation to the implementation process. This strategy helped clarify why 
certain police reform priorities turned out as such in their implementation. 
For this reason, chapter four examines in detail the development of the 
police and justice reform agenda since the 2007 to the present, 
scrutinising the objectives of the actors involved and contrasting the 
factual situation on the ground with the officially approved police/SSR 
agenda as espoused in the Report of the National Taskforce on Police 
Reform (GoK, 2009). 59 
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 Kingdom argues that agenda setting is influenced by participants and the processes 
by which agenda items and alternatives are generated. The interactions of processes 
(streams) including; problems, policies and politics creates a window of opportunity 
through which change emerges. These debates are further clarified in Chapter 3. 
59
 The taskforce was formed in May 2009 to provide direction for police reforms. Its 
report provides an outline of recommendations of police reform in four broad areas 
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As argued by a number of scholars (Nathan, 2008, Wulf, 2011), police 
reform and SSR processes are extremely political. How these might 
manifest in Kenya was interesting especially given the fact that while 
power-sharing has become a critical tool in resolving conflicts, little has 
been done in relation to the interactions between the politics of power-
sharing and security sector reform in transitional and post-conflict 
contexts. The strategy here is to explore how police and justice reform 
processes in Kenya might have been facilitated or constrained by the 
power-sharing agreement in Kenya since 2008. Chapter five reflects this 
strategy by assessing this interrelationship based on Arend Lijphart’s 
framework of ‘Consociationalism’ (Lijphart, 2008), exploring the extent to 
which elements of consociation affect police and justice reform processes 
during the lifespan of power-sharing government in Kenya. 
Literature review also largely reveals that as a normative concept, SSR 
seeks to improve efficiency in provision security amongst members of the 
public. As such, having analysed how the security sector reform agenda 
was set in Kenya and explored its progress in implementation process, it 
was important to assess the outcomes of these reform initiatives. The 
strategy here is to present findings relating to the extent to which police 
reform responds to policing and security needs of the Kenyan population, 
as much as providing impact lessons for police reforms in post-conflict 
settings. Whilst multiple interpretations of security and security sector 
reform priorities were anticipated, our focus was however limited to those 
aspects that were key to the focus of our inquiry - those that related to the 
post 2007 police reform process.  
Having understood how the post 2007 reform agenda was constructed, 
analysed the implementation processes involved and demonstrated the 
interrelationship between power-sharing politics and security sector 
reform process in Kenya, it was then necessary to state the thesis 
contribution to knowledge. Chapter seven fulfils this strategy by 
summarising the findings of the substantive research chapters against the 
                                                                                                                      
namely; police accountability, professionalism, operational and administrative reforms, 
and institutional policy and legislative reforms. 
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primary research question and reviewed literature. This is concluded by 
recommendations of areas for further research. 
2.7.2 Paradigm of Inquiry 
This research examines complex phenomena that attract multiple 
interpretations from scholars and practitioners. These directly link to 
questions relating to ontology and epistemology, and determine the 
research approaches employed in this study.  
Ontological questions invite us to consider the nature of social 
phenomena - ‘are they relatively inert and beyond our influence or are 
they much a product of social interaction?’ (Bryman, 2012, p.6). Put 
differently, are SSR processes ‘objects’ out there - external to the 
researcher - to be studied or are they products of social constructions 
involving multiple players, including the researcher? Two ontological 
positions, objectivism and constructionism explain these questions. 
Objectivism ‘asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have 
existence independent of social actors’ (Bryman, 2012, p.712) while 
constructionism holds that ‘reality is socially constructed, that is, the 
phenomena of the social and cultural world and their meanings are 
created in human social interaction’ (Robson, 2011, p.533). 
Epistemology on the other hand is concerned with knowledge and entails 
understanding and making sense of the world, that is, how we know we 
know (Crotty, 2010). As with ontology, two epistemological extremes -
positivism and social constructivism- permeate social science. These are 
reflected in the paradigms (Corbetta, 2003, Guba and Lincoln, 2005) or 
world views (Creswell, 2007). Positivists argue that objective knowledge is 
gained through direct experience and observation. They therefore 
propose scientific methods of inquiry which guard against any subjective 
endeavour. On the other hand, social constructivists hold the view that our 
understanding of social phenomena is socially constructed, and allow for 
multiple interpretations of the social phenomena. Under this precept 
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therefore, security and security sector reform which is the object of study 
in this research is socially constructed. 
This research is based on a pragmatic paradigm that seeks to make the 
best out of the two paradigmatic extremes and best for answering the 
research question in this thesis.60 This perspective is critical as it 
preserves the useful knowledge from both sides, while at the same time 
offering a distinct alternative approach to social sciences (Danermark et 
al., 2002). The flexibility of pragmatic paradigm is its ability to be used 
across different research communities.61 Though biased more towards 
social constructivism, the pragmatic approach used here underscores the 
mixed-method approach, also called critical methodological pluralism 
(Danermark et al., 2002), This position implies three things for this study: 
that the idea of the society on what constitutes security and SSR is 
important in as much as, or more than the material structure of the state 
as referent object of security. Secondly, the interest of the public informs 
their identity and thus determines their reaction to SSR and finally that 
security and reforms are negotiated constructs influenced by the 
interactions between the public and the state.  
2.7.3 Theoretical Framework 
Two options, post-conflict peacebuilding and liberal democracy were 
considered in selecting suitable analytical framework for the primary 
research question in this study. The two options primarily came into 
consideration as SSR literature, especially formative ones; and earlier 
reform initiatives favoured the two approaches. In the case of the former 
for example, it is documented that by the year 2005, ‘thirteen out of 17 
post-conflict peacebuilding missions worldwide included a police 
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 The concern under the pragmatic paradigm is ‘what works’ and solutions to problems. 
Using this worldview involves the use of multiple methods of data collection to best 
answer the research questions, employment of both quantitative and qualitative sources 
of data collection, focuses on practical implications of the research and emphasizes the 
importance of conducting research that best addresses the research problem. For more 
details see Creswell (2007, p.22-23). 
61
 For detailed discussions on how case study researches and ethnographers mix 
quantitative and qualitative data under pragmatic paradigm, see Yin (2008) and 
LeCompte & Schensul (2010).  
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component, tasked with creating, reforming, training and/or monitoring 
domestic police forces’ (Stodiek, 2008, p.6). 
However, initial assessment of the Kenyan situation, within the wider 
debates of political transitions,62 revealed some deficits in using 
democracy and peacebuilding as framework for analysing successful SSR 
processes. For example, while liberal democracy embodies the broad 
conceptual dimensions of SSR, notably democratic oversight, control of 
the security forces, local ownership of SSR process and therefore suitable 
for analysing SSR processes within the context of political transitions 
(Friedrich, 2004), it is limited when applied to the complex nature of police 
reform process in Kenya. The issues involved in Kenya go beyond 
democracy criteria.63 Additionally, evidence as with SSR processes in 
Ethiopia, Cuba and China, suggests that there are instances where SSR 
processes do not necessary link with democratisation agenda. Explaining 
these SSR processes against democracy and peacebuilding frameworks 
would therefore be self-defeatist.  
Against the backdrop of the above deficits, three assumptions informed 
the decision not to adopt liberal democracy and peacebuilding. First, while 
a plethora of articles and reports on SSR abound, there is a lack of clear 
and systematic framework for assessing police/SSR processes in post-
conflict societies. Secondly, police reform in Kenya is complex and 
multifaceted, involving many actors under the wider SSR and public 
reform. Liberal democracy and peacebuilding approaches that are 
dominant in the SSR literature would thus limit the options for analysing 
police/SSR in Kenya. Finally, very little academic literature on police 
reform in Kenya exists under the time frame (2008 - 2014) considered 
here.  
Though developed as a strategy for overcoming challenges of research in 
situations of conflict, the ‘composite approach’ (Barakat et al., 2002) 
presents the ideal framework for critically analysing what is going on in 
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 See Section 2.2.4. 
63
See Section 2.3.4 for the deficits of liberal democracy as a framework for analysis of 
SSR. 
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terms of police reform processes in Kenya. The approach involves ‘the 
use of multiple sources and methods in response to changing conditions’, 
while at the same time ‘integrating various theories on local 
circumstances and their applicability to a particular case’ (Barakat et al., 
2002, p.996). Composite approach is consistent with the mixed methods 
employed in this research. It not only provides an opportunity for in-depth 
and focused understanding of the key issues involved in police reform 
process in Kenya, but also provides for triangulation on understanding 
police and wider SSR processes.  
2.7.4  Mixed methods 
The rationale for adopting mixed methods in this study is for the purpose 
of ‘providing a more complete picture’ and help in ‘developing the 
analysis’ (Denscombe, 2010, p.152) of police/SSR processes in Kenya. 
The qualitative approach allows for greater insights into the security 
sector reform processes in Kenya while quantitative approach provides 
opportunity to ‘enhance the rigour of the research’ (Robson, 2011, p.158) 
and provide an empirical grounding upon which the reform context is 
understood in Kenya.  
Qualitative methods have been chosen primarily for their suitability in 
providing an opportunity to ‘understand phenomena in their setting’ 
(Robson, 2011, p.19). Since SSR literature supports the recognition of the 
context in which police reform takes place and acknowledges multiple 
interpretations of the concepts of security and security sector, qualitative 
methods remain important in describing police/SSR processes as 
constructed within the social contexts of actors involved. 
The quantitative methods in this research seek to provide perceptions 
based approach (Zyck, 2011) to determining the responsiveness of SSR 
in relation to the fifth research question, that is, how the citizenry 
articulates its preferences and the capability of the reforms to meet their 
demands equitably (Krause and Williams, 1996). It also helps address the 
dearth of empirically grounded studies in SSR (Egnell and Haldén, 2009) 
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while at the same time providing the base upon which qualitative methods 
derive. This provides for triangulation- ‘strategy involving the use of 
multiple sources to enhance the rigour of the research’ (Robson, 2011, 
p.158).  
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examined three literature areas upon which this research is 
situated and provided a justification for methodology and the overall 
research strategy for analysing the issues related to the research 
question. While there were multiple options through which this could be 
achieved, the research strategy applied not only serves as a way to 
organise the discussion, but also worked for the researcher. The section 
has also discussed the pre-2007 reform agenda as the basis for 
discussing the reform agenda that emerged after the 2007 post-election 
violence in the Chapter 3. 
81 
CHAPTER THREE: SETTING THE POLICE 
REFORM AGENDA IN KENYA 
SETTING THE POLICE REFORM AGENDA IN KENYA 
3.1 Introduction 
An agenda setting process is often complex and is usually contested due 
to competing interests (Eustis, 2000). Despite the complexity and 
contestations, scholars and policy practitioners concur that the ways 
agendas are set remain critical to the development and implementation 
process of any programme. This is more so in the immediate post-conflict 
situations where ‘achievement of successful policy outcomes can be seen 
as being even more crucial in such states given the potential to revert to 
violence as a result of policy and associated failures’ (Thakur and Best, 
2008, p.2). In a power-sharing context with a strong SSR agenda, the 
implementation of the SSR agenda is more likely to be fairly progressive, 
albeit with contestations (Noyes, 2013), than where SSR agenda is weak 
in content in the agreement.64 Thus there would be no doubt that 
competing interests and contestations witnessed during the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process paved way for the security 
sector reforms. These contestations would also be reflected in the 
implementation of the police and justice reform processes in Kenya.  
An investigation of security sector reform process in Kenya raises 
fundamental questions on how the post-2007 police reform agenda was 
constructed, how agenda setting impacted and influenced the choices, 
priorities and the path of the police reform package. For example, within 
the context of the primary research question, ‘how have security sector 
reforms, particularly police reforms, in Kenya developed since 2007 and 
how, and to what extent, have they been shaped by Kenya’s wider 
political transitions and SSR process during this period?, a number of 
questions can be developed, thus; To what extent, and how did the post-
election violence influence the security sector reform agenda process? 
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 The security sector reform agenda in Kenya was more explicit and stronger in Kenya’s 
National Accord as compared to the content of security reform in the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) of Zimbabwe. This explains the relative progress made in Kenya as 
opposed to Zimbabwe. For more details, see; Noyes (2013). 
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Whose agenda prevailed in the post 2007 reform process? What is the 
contribution of various actors notably the political elites, international 
community, interest lobby groups, media and public opinion in the setting 
of the reform agenda process that emerged after the 2007 post-election 
violence? Why did reform of the police and judiciary become top agenda 
issues in Kenya’s post 2007 transitions? These questions are best 
answered by exploring literature on agenda theories with a view to 
selecting the best framework for analysing what transpired in the setting 
of SSR agenda in Kenya after the 2007/08 post-election violence. 
3.2 Agenda Setting Theories 
Over the years, several theories and frameworks have been proposed to 
improve our understanding of how agenda are set. These are significantly 
traced to the American tradition, including particularly the works of 
Schattenschneider (1960), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Cobb et al. 
(1976). 
Some of the theories and frameworks that have emerged out of these 
classic works include Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 
1998) that posits that agenda setting process is a competitive undertaking 
in which actors form coalitions based on the beliefs they hold and 
advocate for different positions within a policy subsystem (Thakur and 
Best, 2008). ACF is not only concerned with agenda formation but also 
‘deals with the entire policy process rather than just agenda-setting’ 
(Eustis, 2000, p.17). 
Issue Attention Cycle (Downs, 1972) examines agenda setting in terms of 
citizens’ attention to problems in different five stages. The pre-problem 
phase exists when a problem exists yet people have not given much 
thought to it. As a result of some dramatic event, for example post-
election violence in the case of Kenya, the problem gets into the second 
phase where the public suddenly becomes aware of and alarmed by the 
problem. This alarm creates enthusiasm (the third phase) to solve the 
problem, in which the public pressures authorities to act. The fourth phase 
is the realisation that the cost of addressing the problem could be too high 
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thus leading to gradual loss of interest in the issue. Finally, in the fifth 
phase, post-problem phase, an issue that had been the subject of public 
interest ‘moves into a prolonged limbo’ (Downs, 1972, p.39-41)65  
Baumgartner and Jones (1991) examined the interactions of the policy 
image and venues for policy action66 of the United States civilian nuclear 
policy. In their analysis, they developed Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, 
arguing that long periods of policy stability could be changed dramatically 
through a short period of critical mobilisation. Their analysis underscores 
the significance of multiple and competing venues overturning what 
appears to be ‘powerful system of limited participation’ (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1991).  
In his ground-breaking work, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies67, 
John Kingdon, focused on problems in the health and transport sectors in 
the federal government in the US over the period 1976 to 1979. Kingdon’s 
analysis developed what became known as Multiple Streams Theory 
(Kingdon, 2002) which focussed on three streams; problems, policies and 
politics in the setting of agenda.68 Other contributions to agenda setting 
literature include Institutional and Analysis Development (IAD) framework 
(Ostrom, 2008), Problem Definition (Stone, 1997), and Issue Definition 
(Cobb and Elder, 1971). 
Based on the above theories and frameworks, a number of studies have 
emerged. Building on the works of Kingdon (2002) and Baumgartner and 
Jones (1991), Eustis (2000) tested the applicability of agenda setting 
theories, in assessing the 1996 Telecommunications Act in the United 
States of America. Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) on their part 
examined the effects of news framing, agenda setting and priming on the 
mass media industry. Yet a more relevant work to Africa and particularly 
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 For further clarification of the phases, see; Downs (1972, p.39-41). 
66
 Policy images refer to the interaction of beliefs and values of a particular policy, while 
the venues for policy action refer to the existing set of political institutions. For further 
clarification on this, see Baumgartner & Jones (1991). 
67
 Kingdon’s, Agendas Alternatives and Public Policies first appeared in the 1984. For 
the purpose of this study, reference is made to the second edition of the book published 
in 2002. 
68
 Multiple Streams’ Theory is developed in subsequent sections of this chapter. For 
thorough discussions on the other theories see, Eustis (2000). 
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to post-conflict situation is the work of Thakur and Best (2008) which 
explored agenda setting within the telecommunication sector in post-
conflict Liberia. Fundamental to these perspectives is the constructivist 
approach they employ, in which they ‘focus on the dynamics by which 
new ideas, new policy proposals, and new understandings of problems 
meet resistance from the prevailing political arrangements but sometimes 
break through to create dramatic policy changes’ Baumgartner et al. 
(2006, p.1). This chapter, while acknowledging several elements of 
agenda-setting theories, analyses the setting of post-2007 security sector 
reform agenda in Kenya using Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model 
(Kingdon, 2002).  
3.3 John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory 
Kingdon (2002) considered agenda in relation to government to mean ‘list 
of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside 
of government closely associated with those officials, are paying attention 
to at any given time.’ He goes on to argue that apart from the subjects 
and problems on the agenda, there are a set of alternatives to the 
problems that might require serious consideration. As such, the distinction 
between agenda and alternatives, though not distinctly very sharply 
drawn, remains analytically important. 
John Kingdon builds his agenda setting theory on two categories, namely; 
‘the participants who are active, and the processes by which agenda 
items and alternatives come to prominence’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.15). He 
further categorises participants into two, thus; participants on the inside of 
government and participants outside of government69 while the processes 
include three streams of processes namely; problems, policies and 
politics. 
Each of the participants variably affects the setting of the agenda 
depending on; (1) the participant influence agenda setting in terms of the 
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 See Kingdon (2002, p.21-70) Inside of government participants (administration) 
include the president, presidential staff, political appointees and civil servants while 
participants outside government include interest groups, academics researchers, media, 
political parties and the public. 
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importance of each participant,(2) the ways each participant is 
important(e.g. whether each affects agendas, alternatives or both),and (3) 
the resources available to each participant’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.21). The 
three streams on the other hand, are independent of one another and 
each develops on its own dynamics and rules, but converge at certain 
critical times to create ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.20) out of which 
policy changes emerge.  
In Kingdon’s conceptualisation, windows of opportunity are opened either 
by compelling problems or the happenings in the political stream or 
interactions of both. In other words, ‘solutions become joined to problems, 
and both of them are joined to favourable political forces’ (Kingdon, 2002, 
p.20). However, this coupling or packaging (of problems, solutions, and 
politics) does not just happen (Porter and Hicks, 1995) but is the result of 
sustained effort of the stakeholders including policy makers. 
While other theories would sufficiently explain the SSR processes in 
Kenya, this research employs Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory for a 
number of reasons. It is one of the often cited agenda setting theories 
(Eustis, 2000) alongside the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2009). Its pragmatic nature makes it fit within the overall 
research strategy in this thesis. It does, within this context, consider the 
interactions of various contributing factors to the process of agenda-
setting including the interests of the president, the prime minister, 
members of parliament, the media, interest group pressure (both local 
and international) and political parties amongst others.70 Additionally, it 
emphasises contextual issues that relate to timing and flow of policy 
making and implementation thus providing a bigger perspective. 
Kingdon’s approach thus provides a flexible germane framework through 
which the different factors that came into play in Kenya can be analysed. 
It allows the researcher to manage the situation of multiple agendas that 
emerged after the 2007 general election, whether the public agenda or 
government agenda and help analyse how the process moved forward. 
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 Note that these are participants within the Kenyan context and may be different from 
the US context in which Kingdon’s study was based. 
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Alongside Kingdon’s theory, other frameworks are mentioned for the 
purpose of providing a broader paradigm of inquiry. 
3.4 Electoral Violence and SSR 
Discussions linking electoral violence and SSR in Kenya are critical as the 
post 2007 security sector reform agenda considered by this study was 
triggered by a post-election violence. In short, (post)electoral violence, 
specifically the 2007/8 postelection violence provides the locus around 
which this thesis revolves. The 2007 general election was the fourth since 
the introduction of political liberalisation in the 1990’s. The first election 
under political pluralism was conducted in the year 1992. Five elections 
have since been undertaken, four of which have been held after every five 
years, between 1992 and 2007, while the fifth one, held in March 2013 
was slightly over five years.71 
A common denominator in Kenya’s electoral history is violence (Orwenjo, 
2014). The 1992, 1997 and 2007 are classical cases, the only difference 
being that police involvement in the latter brought security sector reform 
agenda to the table while the previous elections did not. Over 1,100 
people were killed and 350,000 driven from their homes in Rift Valley in 
1992 (Brown and Sriram, 2012) while in the 1997 elections attacks, 
though less, took place at the Coast before the elections and in Rift Valley 
afterwards. Investigations into the 1992 and 1997 electoral related 
violence generally pointed to state-induced violence meant to intimidate 
and disenfranchise people so they do not vote in places they were 
considered not historically indigenous.72 
On the contrary, the 2002 general elections heralded a new beginning, 
popularly known as the ‘Narc dream’73 with the exit of Moi from the 
presidency. This ‘new beginning’ was however short-lived, and culminated 
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 The 2013 elections were held on March 4, 2013, about three months beyond the 
traditional five year cycle in Kenya. This was due to delays in preparations for the 
elections. For an elaborate account of delays in the preparations for the 2013 general 
elections, see; Barkan (2013). 
72
 See for example; Nowrojee & Manby (1993); Kagwanja (1998); Anderson & Lochery 
(2008); Akiwumi (1999). 
73
 See GoK (2002); Hornsby (2012). 
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into the 2007/08 post-election violence with the police being significantly 
blamed for ineptitude, while the judiciary was perceived as not 
independent by the opposition.  
The 1992 and 1997 elections however are particularly important in this 
thesis with respect to analysing security sector reform agenda. Moi won 
these elections in a questionable manner. It is for these malpractices that 
scholars widely agree that Moi regime never fought and won a clean 
election (Otieno, 2002). Whilst the ruling party KANU offered some 
concessions, largely due to the developments both locally and globally, 
for example introducing political pluralism in the run up to 1992 elections, 
‘the leadership still made use of the law and the security forces to repress 
their critics’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.497). 
Despite the negative role of the security sector in the 1992 and 1997 
electoral violence, and the widespread lack of public confidence in the 
judiciary and the police during the period, security sector reform did not 
feature significantly as an agenda issue for the government until after the 
2007/08 post-election violence. The violence ignited the debate amongst 
the Kenyan public that ‘police reform is necessary and urgent’ (sic) (The 
World Bank, 2009). Why, and how did security sector reform become an 
agenda item after the 2007 general elections and not in the previous 
elections, which were largely characterised by state security sponsored 
violence?  
According to the Multiple Streams Theory, three processes - problem 
recognition, generation of policy proposals, and political events74 can 
serve as impetus or constraint in promoting items into higher agenda 
prominence (Kingdon, 2002). These, he argues, coupled with the actions 
of participants in order to bring change. These phenomena might help 
explain why security sector reform failed to rise to government agenda 
despite being a priority amongst members of the public. 
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 These make the three streams in Kingdon’s conceptualisation. 
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In the case of Moi, the ‘Change the Constitution’ debate in late 70’s,75 
attempts to undermine his rule by the political elite form Mt. Kenya region 
and the 1982 attempted coup by the Kenya Air Force (KAF) (Hornsby, 
2012, Branch, 2011) created a window of opportunity for him to entrench 
his rule in the security sector.76 He systematically altered the roster of 
participants,77 replacing them with appointees sympathetic to his cause, 
for the purpose of achieving the most favourable security sector policy 
venue for his agenda, while at the same time suppressing the agenda of 
those opposed to his rule.  
In Kingdon’s’ conception of participants, the administration78 plays 
significant role in agenda setting. Kingdon adds that ‘when the 
administration considers a given issue a top priority item, many other 
participants do too’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.21). Even within the administration, 
no other actor has quite the capacity to set the agenda as the president. 
Kingdon’s interviews confirmed that ‘the president can singlehandedly set 
the agendas, not only of people in the executive branch but also of 
Congress and outside of government’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.23). The 
president is pre-eminent in agenda setting because of the institutional 
resources at his disposal, e.g. the right to veto and the power to hire and 
fire, the organisational resource, i.e. as a unitary entity, decision making is 
fast in the executive and given the fact that the president commands 
public attention so his agenda proposal is likely to be adopted as a 
command.79 Further, he found out that ‘political appointees elevate issues 
from their own agencies, but they also arrive at some of their priorities 
from their interactions with the White House’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.29). This 
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 ‘Change the Constitution’ debate was started by the Kikuyu elite before Kenyatta’s 
death ostensibly to lock Moi out of Kenyatta succession. For these discussions see 
(Hornsby, 2012, pp., p.323-330). 
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 See the debates on ‘de-kikuyunisation’ to ‘kalenjinisation’ in ‘Security and security 
sector under Moi regime -1978 to 2002’ in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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 Altering rosters in this context means replacing political appointees in such institutions. 
For further clarification, see the debates on policy image and policy venue in F. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1991). 
78
 The administration as used in this context includes; the president, presidential staff, 
presidential political appointees and civil servants.  
79
 The arguments about the president’s predominance in agenda setting are eloquently 
addressed in Kingdon (2002, pp., p.26-29). 
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begs the question; what was Moi’s agenda within the police and the wider 
security sector, if the public agenda for reform was not prioritised?  
President Moi’s towering image over the security sector did not allow for 
independence of the police and the judiciary. He exercised presidential 
resources of veto and power to hire and fire at will. This was the only sure 
way in which he would deal with dissenting voices and gain foothold of the 
country. This argument is supported by the literature on agenda setting 
processes. First, agenda setting literature confirms the president’s 
predominant role in an agenda setting process (Kingdon, 2002). This is 
especially so under imperial and authoritarian presidency. Upon assuming 
the presidency, Moi ‘began to systematically institute an authoritarian and 
oppressive one-man state rule’ (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.2). Secondly, 
presidential appointees who by virtue of their position control the policy 
venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) would dare not consider agenda 
they knew would not get presidential support. Political appointees under 
Moi would dare not raise the debate about security sector reform as it was 
not in the interest of the president to entertain such debates. 
That police and justice reform, within the wider security sector reform 
agenda failed to be prioritised by Moi government highlights the lack of 
political will often considered a crucial element in the agenda setting 
process (Kingdon, 2002, Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). The agenda of 
self-preservation reigned dominant and remained averse to security 
sector reform under Moi. The judiciary surrendered to the whims of the 
executive, in what Abdullahi (2011) calls ‘lost decades of the Kenya’s 
judiciary’ and was understaffed by design, thus restricting access to 
justice to the Kenyan population. Over the years, the Kenyan public lost 
faith in the justice system and so the judiciary became a target of debate 
for reform under the wider institutional reform. 
The 2002 general elections were peaceful. In the words of (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1991), it was a single dramatic event (Kibaki’s election) that 
provided ‘a window of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 2002) for reform, and 
reignited the hope of reversing the ‘lost decades’ (Abdullahi, 2011). Kibaki 
established the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, appointed a 
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new Chief Justice and embarked on pursuing the reform agenda under 
Governance, Justice, Law and Order sectors (GJLO’s).80 Major General 
Hussein Ali was also poached from the military to steer the reforms in the 
police sector. 
The newly appointed Justice Minister and the Chief Justice focused on 
the president’s priorities that sought to address historical legacies of the 
Kenyatta and Moi regimes. There was an attempt to secure independence 
of the judiciary through severing links with the executive, and increasing 
the number of judges (Makoloo and Kichana, 2005, Islam, 2003) and 
more significantly the ‘radical surgery of the judiciary’ in which 26 judges 
of the High Court and the Court of Appeal retired from the judiciary on 
impropriety allegations (Abdullahi, 2011). Whilst these projected a positive 
image of the judiciary in the short run, the coupling of these processes 
were not sufficient enough to provide an agenda for which a total break 
with the past could be achieved. 81  In this view, scholars have argued that 
Kenya’s transition was not complete (Brown, 2011, Shilaho, 2013). Brown 
(2011, p.2) for example, described Kenya’s transition as ‘lacking the solid 
break with the past that has occurred in such places as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Sierra Leone’. 
Others, for example Abdullahi (2011), argue that the measures 
undertaken in the pre-2007 reform agenda in the justice system were 
principally as a result of temporal political goodwill on the part of the 
executive and were not the result of well thought out enduring policies. 
The judiciary failed to come to terms with the magnitude of the problem or 
admit how deeply its problems were entrenched. This failure to appreciate 
the magnitude of the problems undermined the feeble remedies proposed 
and implemented by the executive. Within Kingdon’s; politics, problems 
and policies streams therefore, it may be reasonable to argue that the 
coupling (Kingdon, 2002) of the three streams was not strong enough to 
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open up a window of opportunity for the setting up of genuine security 
sector reform agenda until after the 2007 post-election violence. 
3.5 Towards Normalcy: The Kenyan National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation Process 
The Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process (KNDRP) is 
critical to Kenya’s post-2007 police reform within the wider public reform 
agenda. As a first step towards returning Kenya towards normalcy,82 the 
intervention by the international community was swift and helped a great 
deal in putting pressure on the parties to the conflict to reach an amicable 
solution (Brown, 2009). The visit by John Kufuor, the African Union’s 
chairperson, during the period January 8-10, 2008 marked clear intentions 
that the international community would not to let Kenya’s post poll 
violence degenerate into unprecedented proportions. The Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation Process (KNDRP), under the guidance of the 
Panel of Eminent Personalities83 and four representatives each from 
Kibaki’s PNU and Odinga’s ODM, was formed to reconcile the sides in the 
electoral dispute. The negotiations began on 29 January, 2008 through 
the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee. By February 
1, 2008, the negotiation teams had agreed on agenda items to be 
discussed. Priority was given to immediate cessation of violence, 
addressing humanitarian crisis and overcoming the political crisis. 
Specifically, these entailed Agenda One to Three.84 
In the framing of KNDRP agendas, cessation of violence, addressing 
humanitarian crisis and overcoming the political crisis were given 
prominence before the long-term reform agenda, under which security 
sector reform belonged. The first two essentially relate to short term 
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human security challenges caused by the violence,85 while the latter 
sought to create a suitable atmosphere through which short-term human 
security challenges would be addressed and long term reforms 
undertaken. As such, Agenda 1 and 2 needed immediate government 
attention through a power-sharing arrangement (Agenda 3) and the long-
term institutional reforms (Agenda 4). 
Whilst this framing probably helped save lives and set the tone for long-
term security sector reform agenda as contained in Agenda 4, some 
scholars, for example Brown (2009), contend that it placed greater priority 
on peace rather than on justice or democracy and therefore compromised 
‘the political reform agenda and carries significant future risks for Kenya 
and other countries’ (Brown, 2009, p.1). Others for example Annan (2012) 
argue that it is this approach that saved the country and helped prevent 
the violence degenerating into the level of genocide like that witnessed in 
Rwanda. An analysis of the works of scholars holding views similar to 
Brown (2009), for example Le VAN (2011), Traill (2008) and Horowitz 
(2008) suggests that these are scholars critical of power-sharing as a 
quick means of resolving conflicts.86 Interestingly, while criticising the 
framing of the KNDRP agenda items, such studies barely offer 
alternatives to how the Kenyan immediate post-election crisis would have 
been quickly solved without damage. 
This study argues that power-sharing, far from being an Agenda 3 Item of 
the KNDRP and raising multiple questions amongst pessimists, was 
amongst the alternatives in addressing the wave of post electoral 
violence. Kingdon (2002) argues that apart from the problems that are on 
the agenda, ‘a set of alternatives for governmental action is seriously 
considered’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.4). The position here is that this set of 
alternatives receives serious attention at different times, and in instances 
becomes crucial in facilitating other agenda items. Thus power-sharing 
was crucial in facilitating security sector reform agenda in the long-term.  
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While the agenda items had been agreed upon, the biggest challenge 
was the environment upon which these could be actualised. The hard-line 
stance taken by representatives of the two sides delayed the process. 
Odinga’s side insisted on Kibaki stepping aside, while Kibaki side 
remained opposed to constitutional amendment that would lead to power-
sharing (Tsuda, 2013). In the section “Half a Million Rwandan Ghosts: 
Crisis in Kenya” in the book “Interventions: A Life in War and Peace,” 
Annan (2012) argues that ‘the PNU side in particular was holding things 
back’ and it was clear in his mind that ‘Kibaki was to blame’ (Annan, 2012, 
p.199) as ‘the Odinga side withdrew its insistence that Kibaki should 
resign’ (Tsuda, 2013 p.7). Miguna Miguna, Raila’s former advisor, in his 
book ‘Peeling back the mask: A quest for Justice in Kenya’, seem to 
confirm Annan’s argument. He writes, ‘President Kibaki took and took 
from Mr Odinga without giving back anything during the negotiations’ 
(Miguna, 2012). 
Despite the hard-line stance, the KNDR committee agreed on statements 
and agreements that led to a number of concrete measures (Brown, 
2011) that would later set the agenda for security sector reform in Kenya. 
KNDR led to the signing of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership 
of the Coalition Government’, which was later actualised through National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008. It also led to other direct outcomes 
for example, the review of 2007 Elections, in which the Independent 
Review Committee (IREC), popularly referred to as the Kriegler 
Commission87 was established as a short term agenda to investigate the 
conduct of the 2007 general elections and the acts of omission or 
commission of the security forces in the elections. The commission was 
mandated to issue recommendations without delay with a view to 
reaching mutual agreement on a comprehensive reform of the electoral 
system (Tsuda, 2013).  
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Also agreed upon was the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) to investigate the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the violence, the conduct of the security agencies and make 
other recommendations.88Other direct outcomes of KNDRP include the 
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission and Constitutional reform 
while the indirect results included the Hybrid Tribunal (which was not 
established) and the International Criminal Court process89. 
3.6 Window of Opportunity: National Accord and Reconciliation Act 
(2008) as a Basis for Long-Term Security Sector Reform Agenda  
The National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008) was a product of 
‘forty–one-day peace process’ (Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009) under the 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process. Core to this peace 
process was the signing of the ‘Agreement on the Principles of 
Partnership of the Coalition Government’, popularly known as The 
National Accord, and its subsequent entrenchment in the Constitution 
through the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008). While there 
had been some limited reform endeavours in the past, ‘the National 
Accord set the agenda for SSR in Kenya, guaranteeing that it would be 
discussed in various forums and monitoring reports that have proliferated 
since 2008’ (Noyes, 2013, p.39). This view is maintained widely across 
the key informants.90 
Describing the Kenyan situation, Annan notes that ‘a crisis presents us 
both with danger and opportunity’ (Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009, p.1). 
The Kenyan case presented danger because the level of ethnic91 
animosity prevailing then threatened the core existence of the nation. The 
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opportunity, on the other hand, was that the crisis could be used to 
address deeply rooted problems (Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009, Tsuda, 
2013) that had been building up over several years yet neglected by 
previous governments. Some of these grievances include repeated ethnic 
migrations, and the cycles of dispossession, disparities in wealth and the 
endemic sense of marginalization amongst others.92 
An analysis of Agenda 4 items suggests that they are a list of challenges 
normal to transitional and developing countries. In the case of Kenya, they 
reflect a host of economic, political and social injustices that had been 
swept under the rug for a long time (Githongo, 2010). A comparative 
analysis of Moi’s ‘lost decades’ (Abdullahi, 2011) and Kibaki’s ‘everything 
is possible without Moi’ (Shilaho, 2013) suggests that the latter provided a 
window of  opportunity to address ‘poverty, the inequitable distribution of 
resources and perceptions of historical injustices and exclusion on the 
part of segments of the Kenyan society’ (see; Appendix xi: Annotated 
Agenda for the KNDRP) that were prevalent during the Moi’s reign. 
However it was somewhat a lost opportunity. Moi’s exit was not a 
panacea to Kenya’s socio-economic and political ills as NARC made the 
people believe during the campaigns. ‘Patronage, corruption, tribalism, 
impunity and arbitrary rule remained hallmarks of Kenya’s politics’ 
(Shilaho, 2013, p.1) and so contributing to the 2007 post-election 
violence.  
Thus, the 2007 postelection violence brought to the fore deep seated 
post-independence challenges that needed to be on top of government 
agenda. This reinforces the argument that ‘a crisis or prominent event’ 
(Kingdon, 2002) signals a problem that may require government attention, 
and Baumgartner and Jones (1991) view that policy may emerge from 
changes from dramatic events or more subtle influence. Suffice it to say, 
Kenya’s case suggests that the government may have ignored subtle 
influences to prioritise police and justice reform in Kenya until a ‘dramatic 
event’ of post-election violence bubbled up onto the scene. 
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Agenda 4 items did not just present a few reform tasks, but multiple 
priorities.93 The newly formed coalition government had ‘too many 
competing priorities: constitutional changes, reform of the disbanded 
electoral commission, a review of constituency boundaries, and ambitious 
judicial, civil-service, land, and parliamentary reforms, to name but a few’ 
(Githongo, 2010, p.8). 
While long-term police and justice reforms were embedded in institutional 
reform under Agenda 4, the urgency to pursue the reform agenda was 
given prominence in the reports of the committees investigating the 
conduct of the elections and that investigating the post-election violence, 
popularly known as Kriegler and Waki commissions respectively. Kriegler 
report for example found out that the outcome of the election was 
fundamentally flawed that it was difficult to determine who actually won 
the election. Waki established that the police was culpable in the ensuing 
violence.94 
In order to effectively address these shortcomings within these 
institutions, there was need to anchor them into the new constitution. For 
example, ‘Agenda four stipulated that an independent police commission 
was to be established in the constitutional review process, while also 
requiring security laws to be updated to reflect democratic norms’ (Noyes, 
2013, p.34).This was with the view to cushioning the police from political 
interference through piecemeal constitutional amendments as had been 
done by Moi and Kenyatta regimes.95 
With the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition 
Government (The National Accord) anchored in the Constitution through 
the National Accord and Reconciliation Act No. 4 of 2008, one would have 
expected that the two sides of the coalition government would pull 
together towards the same direction in the implementation of the reform 
agenda agreed. In fact, the National Accord reiterated that the two parties 
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could not govern without the other and so made a commitment to work 
together.  
The president, political appointees and elected representatives (in this 
case MP’s) invariably reign dominant in the setting of the reform agenda. 
This position is largely supported by Kingdon (2002) finding that senators 
and representatives ‘are among the few actors in the political system who 
have marked impacts on both the agenda and alternatives that are 
seriously considered’ (Kingdon, 2002, p.35).  
To what extent does this apply to the setting of the security sector reform 
agenda in Kenya? While the actions of political leadership in Kenya 
suggest their active role, either facilitating or constraining, in setting the 
reform agenda and largely supports Kingdon’s argument, there are 
perceptions that ‘the ultimate solution to the Kenyan crisis was not 
affected by national leaders but forced on them by external actors’ 
(Githongo, 2010, p.6). In supporting this, Brown (2009, p.6) writes ‘the US 
sought to pressure Kibaki and Odinga to arrive at compromise, widely 
understood to involve some form of power sharing’.  
Perhaps, another contribution in support of this argument is found in a 
study by Noyes (2013). Based on his interviews with stakeholders, he 
observes ‘that demands from the international sphere have been effective 
in pushing reform because the international community wields the kind of 
sword that the government fears…Political as well as economic pressure’ 
(Noyes, 2013, p.39). These views were also dominant amongst some of 
our interviews.96 
Various factors helped determine the SSR content of the National Accord, 
including the disposition of the negotiators, the political elite and external 
pressure. However, security leaders were not major players (Noyes, 
2013). Since the ways agendas are set determine their implementation 
process, how might the deliberate exclusion of the police affect the 
implementation process? This is a question discussed in Chapter 4. In the 
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following section, discussions revolve around the outcomes, both direct 
and indirect, of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008. 
3.6.1 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) 
3.6.1.1 An Overview of Waki Commission 
Apart from the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008), the KNDRP 
established the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV), popularly referred to as the Waki Commission, after Justice 
Philip Waki, a Kenyan Appellate Judge who chaired its proceedings. 97  
The commission was unique with respect to the history of commissions of 
inquiry in Kenya. Whilst there have been numerous commissions of 
inquiry before the Waki Commission, ‘no commission of inquiry in Kenya 
has ever led to anything beyond a report’ (Brown and Sriram, 2012, 
p.250). Some of these include; judicial commission of inquiry into the 
Goldenberg scandal (Bosire Commission), land grabbing (Ndung’u 
Commission), Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission report on Anglo-
Leasing Scandal, political assassinations (Robert Ouko, Odhiambo Mbai), 
electoral violence (the Kiliku and Akiwumi commissions), and Kiruki 
Commission (the Artur Brothers scandal).98 
Against the background of non-implementation of reports of inquiry of 
previous commissions, the Waki Commission was special in terms of how 
it was constituted and how it undertook its mandate. First, its constitution 
was through a political process involving both the PNU and ODM, with 
both parties sympathetic to its hybridity.99 The involvement of the two 
sides to the postelection crisis and its hybrid nature legitimised its work.  
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Secondly, the Commission was very clear that members of the security 
forces did not qualify for any appointment into the commission (Waki 
Commission, 2008). This guaranteed non-partisanship in its work and 
cushioned the Commission against interference from security sector 
actors. 
Thirdly, in executing its mandate, the commission cushioned itself against 
political interference by ‘an ingenious self-enforcing mechanism’ (Brown 
and Sriram, 2012, Kenya Institute of Governance et al., 2008). It is this 
mechanism that eventually led to the Kenyan cases of the most culpable 
for the post-election violence being referred to the ICC. 
However, some scholars have claimed that Waki Commission did not 
establish accountability mechanisms since no key perpetrators have been 
put to account. Noyes (2013) for example argues that the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission and the Waki Commission, which both 
sought to investigate state security involvement in the 2007/08 violence 
‘neither established concrete accountability mechanisms’ (Noyes, 2013, 
p.36). This thesis challenges this position. With the hindsight of possible 
interference in bringing into account those most culpable100 for the 
violence, the commission recommended a hybrid Special Tribunal for 
Kenya to be established by deadline January 30, 2009, with a foreign 
prosecutor and only one Kenyan judge out of three, so that it is insulated 
from political interference, failure to which the ICC would take over 
Kenya’s case. The project to establish a local tribunal was abandoned 
due to failure to pass a bill in parliament on three separate occasions 
(Brown and Sriram, 2012). It is this failure that brought the ICC question in 
the picture and saw Major General Hussein Ali, the Commissioner of 
Police, indicted though charges against him were not confirmed.101 In the 
same vein, the Kenyan political elite is unwilling to implement the TJRC 
report for fear of bringing into account the political elite. 
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The Waki report was presented in five parts.102  For the purpose of this 
thesis; the analysis of the Report is restricted to how it influenced the 
setting of the agenda for police and justice reform after the post-election 
violence. While all the parts are relevant to this thesis, a lot more attention 
is given to Part IV and Part V which dealt with acts and omissions of state 
security agencies and impunity; and recommendations made with a view 
to the prevention of future recurrence of large scale violence respectively. 
3.6.1.2 Acts and Omissions of State Security Agencies and 
Impunity 
The post-election violence, according to the Waki Commission was 
perpetrated by three sets of actors including ODM supporters, PNU 
supporters and the police (Waki Commission, 2008). A detailed account 
giving police involvement is presented in part four of the report. In 
investigating the acts and omissions of the state security actors,103 Waki 
Commission (2008), finds the police as the most culpable security sector 
actor for the post-election violence, in terms of preparations, responses 
and aftermath of the violence. While other security sector actors had their 
share of blame, the accusations against the police stood out, creating an 
impression of an inefficient and ineffective security sector that cannot 
guarantee security to the citizens. 
Notable is the fact that while there exists the Kenya Security and 
Intelligence Machinery (KSIM) through which security issues are 
prioritised at the top and through which delivery agencies interact on the 
ground, the absence of the National Security Policy to guide development 
of strategies to prevent or prepare for events such as postelection 
violence remained a matter of concern (Waki Commission, 2008). As 
such the commission prioritised the rollout of the National Security Policy 
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to enable the relevant sectors to develop their sectoral policies (Waki 
Commission, 2008, p.431).This proposal was important for the police as it 
would help define the areas of priorities in the envisaged reform process.  
3.6.2 Constitutional and Legislative Framework for Reform 
3.6.2.1 Constitutional Reform Process: A Brief History 
One of the greatest achievements of the Kenya National Dialogue 
Process was the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010. It 
was a culmination of many decades of unending debates only realised 
after the 2007 postelection violence. The need to review the Kenyan 
constitution ‘had been high on the public agenda for at least two decades’ 
(Brown, 2011, p.6). While Moi frustrated the process, the shift of power 
from Moi to Kibaki complicated the process. This shift in power was 
accompanied by a shift in attitude by Kibaki who started opposing the 
2002 draft he had fervently supported while in opposition. 
While Kenya’s independence constitution was considered good for 
democracy, human rights, devolution of powers and checks and balances 
(Cottrell and Ghai, 2007), many years of methodical amendments by 
Kenyatta and Moi regimes dismantled provisions for freedoms and 
democracy and replaced them with a highly centralised system with lots of 
power in one person and all the largesse that come with it. These 
machinations were not in synch with the people’s aspirations and set in 
motion agitations for reforms. The agitations reached climax in the 1990’s 
thus forcing Moi to offer some concessions to start the review process 
through the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) process ahead of 
the 1997 general elections. Not much was however achieved during Moi’s 
tenure as the structures supporting Moi’s rule were not changed. 
Whilst constitutional review was high on Kibaki’s campaign agenda, there 
was a deliberate attempt by Kibaki and his political elites to consolidate 
power. As a result, the draft previously proposed was watered down with 
a draft which, in the eyes of the public, sought to entrench imperial 
presidency which Kenyans had fought so hard during president Moi’s 
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reign. For Kenyans, this was an opportunity ‘to reduce the personal power 
that had been accumulated by former President Moi’ (Waki Commission, 
2008, p.29). Because of this, Kibaki’s proposed draft was rejected in the 
2005 referendum.  
The move by Kibaki’s inner circle is characteristic of societies in post-
authoritarian transition, where consolidation of power becomes top of the 
agenda for the ruling elite.104 In this case, with the state resources at their 
disposal, Kibaki’s associates sought to preserve the prerogatives they 
enjoyed and engaged in what Kingdon refers to as ‘blocking the initiatives 
that they believe would reduce those benefits’ (Kingdon, 2002). The 
establishment of a parliamentary system, as informally agreed before the 
2002 general elections (Waki Commission, 2008) would erode the 
benefits that would accrue to Kibaki’s inner circle through a presidential 
system and therefore Kibaki’s loyalists frustrated the constitutional reform 
agenda that sought to establish the position of a prime minister with whom 
Kibaki would share power and devolved units in which presidential power 
would be redistributed. The biggest break in Kenya’s quest for a new 
constitution was realised in 2010. This had a number of ramifications 
especially in relation to the security sector as discussed below. 
3.6.2.2. Constitutional Framework for Police and Justice Reform  
It is argued that the security sector cannot function effectively if the 
administrative and legal framework is fundamentally weak (Hendrickson 
and Karkoszka, 2002). Thus, it was necessary to anchor the reform 
agenda in the constitution so that it is not hijacked or derailed by the ruling 
elite. An analysis of Kenya’s political transitions evidently shows the 
extent to which Kenyan leadership manipulated the security agencies for 
political expediency.  
Beginning with Jomo Kenyatta, the presidency had by the year 1966 
assumed all the control of coercive forces through the Public Security Act 
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of 1966105 and had at its disposal all the various sub-departments of the 
police (Gimode, 2007). Moi followed in Kenyatta’s footsteps. Throughout 
the 1980s to 1990s the security forces, particularly the police, were used 
to suppress any criticism of his regime (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.2), 
while Kibaki’s tenure was characterised by ethnic imbalances especially in 
favour of his tribe (Hornsby, 2012). Such was the dalliance with the 
security sector and so the 2010 constitution sought to protect the security 
and particularly the police and the judiciary against such manipulations. 
The principles governing national security are espoused in Chapter 14 of 
Kenya’s constitution. A critical look at these principles suggests 
democratisation of the security sector. They also for civilian oversight 
mechanism, which is a core normative principle of security sector reform. 
Article 238(2a) states that national security is subject to the authority of 
this Constitution and Parliament, while Article 239(5) makes national 
security organs subordinate to civilian authority (GoK, 2010). In fact, the 
two articles offer ‘the anchorage on where you want to interrogate the 
Kenyan security and more specifically because the two articles give you 
the broad vision, the principles and values of our national security and 
what you find there is that they form security as a bedrock of building a 
democratic state.106 
The 2010 Constitution apart from establishing the framework for which the 
security sector reform is understood also gives powers to parliament to 
legislate the various institutions responsible for police and justice reform. 
These include provisions for establishment of the National Police Service, 
command of the National Police Service, National Police Service 
Commission, and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.107 The 
engagement of these institutions with the reform process is discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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From the interviews conducted, a majority of respondents are of the 
opinion that the constitutional provisions are clear in how the reform 
agenda was constructed. This position was particularly reinforced by key 
informants who are also senior officials of the National Police Service 
Commission and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.108 This 
was a remarkable departure from the past in which the executive initiated 
amendments that gave it undue influence over the security sector. In fact, 
it is on the basis of the Constitution that civil society groups whose focus 
is people’s perspectives draw their agenda. An interviewee from a civil 
society group involved in community policing noted ‘we are looking at how 
we can empower these communities to understand their rights as 
stipulated in the constitution so that it’s hard for the politicians to 
manipulate them’.109 However, as will be seen in Chapter four, there are 
those who point to constitutional lacuna, especially the political class, and 
seek to have the ‘weaknesses’ addressed through amendments of the 
police acts.110 
3.6.3 Review of the 2007 Electoral Process 
As already discussed, Kenya’s electoral history had been wrought with 
violence ostensibly perpetrated by state security agencies and supported 
by state mandarins. However, the magnitude of the problems associated 
with the 2007 elections caused the need to review the country’s electoral 
process. The post-election violence mainly associated with Kenyan 
politics ‘offered society an invaluable chance to renew itself’ (Kenya 
Institute of Governance et al., 2008, p.11), and its conduct of elections. It 
is in this light that the Independent Review Committee (IREC) was 
formed. Like the Waki Commission, there was consensus on the 
nominations of the ten member team to the committee who were 
subsequently appointed by president Kibaki and gazetted through Kenya 
Gazette Notice of 14/03/08 and sworn in on 20/03/08 (Kriegler, 2008). 
Specifically, the mandate of the Commission was to investigate the 
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conduct of the 2007 general elections with respect to structural and 
contextual issues around which the process was conducted.111 
IREC report is critical to this study for a number of reasons. First, it found 
the police, alongside other institutions involved in the electoral process, 
equally culpable for bungling the elections. The report observes thus; 
The Attorney-General certainly didn’t lie awake (sic) at night 
worrying about all those crimes being committed with not a finger 
being lifted to stop them. If the police were concerned about this 
state of affairs, they were certainly very patient. The ECK, with its 
powers under the National Assembly and Presidential Elections 
Act, the Code of Conduct thereto and the Electoral Offences Act 
which include powers to prosecute never really bit anybody. Public 
opinion cheered the impunity on so long as it seemed to benefit the 
side they supported (Kriegler, 2008, p.24). 
In particular, though the commission could not verify media reports it 
considered alarming, the fact that these reports mentioned adversely the 
involvement of the police raises questions about professionalism in the 
police sector. Reports like ‘some 2,500 APs were being trained to 
interfere with tomorrow’s (sic) General Election’ and ‘some police officers 
were allegedly marking ballots at the AP Commandant’s house in 
Embakasi and at the fourth floor of Harambee House’ (Kriegler, 2008, 
p.66)  though not verifiable within the context of this research, raised 
questions about police involvement in the electoral process.  
Secondly, it is on the basis of the report that a number of civil society 
groups and institutions assessed the impact of police reforms with respect 
to their preparedness for the 2013 general elections.112 How did the 
Kriegler report contribute to the setting of the police reform agenda? The 
Kriegler report, like the Waki report, points to massive evidence of police 
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involvement,113 either as agents of one side to the electoral contest, that 
is, PNU and so pointing to political interference in the operations of the 
police, or simply not acting as per the electoral code of conduct hence 
being perceived as biased in favour of PNU. 
The underlying argument here is that the committee made far reaching 
recommendations focussing on the wider of societal change, while at the 
same time narrowing on the police as an institution responsible for law 
and order. This, it was hoped, would bring an end to the cycle of violence 
synonymous with Kenyan electoral process.114 The report notes; 
No! The solution does not merely lie in constitutional and legislative 
changes. The culture of impunity in Kenya needs a fix too. The 
relevant law-enforcement institutions also need to do their jobs 
properly (Kriegler, 2008, p.24). 
Reflecting on this not only reinforces the call to reform the police service 
but also brings to the focus the issue of citizen participation in the reform 
process.115 
3.6.4 Report of the Task-Force On Police Reform (The Ransley 
Report) 
Philip Ransley committee did a marvellous job….it informs the 
need to reform the National Police Service, to move it from a police 
force to police service, a service responsive to those that are 
served…..(sic).116 
The above statement perhaps suggests that one of the most important 
processes in the setting of Kenya’s post 2007 police reform agenda is the 
report of the Task Force of Police Reform, popularly known as the 
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Ransley Report. While the Ransley committee was not a direct outcome 
of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process, it 
nevertheless was constituted as part as agenda four117 and therefore 
directly draws from agenda four in terms of laying the foundation for 
institutional reforms within the police service. 
The report by far remains the most oft referred process in the discourse of 
police reform process in Kenya. Literature on police reform in Kenya 
considers the report as a point of departure from previous attempts at 
reforming the police. Works for example Furuzawa (2011) amongst others 
cite the report as the basis of reforming the police sector in Kenya. This 
position is also reflected in the interviews conducted across Kenya 
including interviews with NPSC, IPOA, Ombudsman and KNCHR. 
In the wake of pressure to kick-start the agenda for reforms, particularly 
police reform, President Kibaki appointed the Ransley Taskforce on May 
8, 2009 with the mandate to examine, among other issues, existing 
policies and institutional structures of the police, and to recommend 
comprehensive reforms that would enhance effectiveness, 
professionalism and accountability in the police services (GoK, 2009, p.ii). 
The taskforce submitted its interim report on August 26, 2009 detailing 
issues that required immediate attention in the short term and the final 
report on November 3, 2009 making recommendations for short, medium 
and long-term reform priorities. 
Like the Waki report, the report was a first in its own right in setting 
agenda for police reforms. For the first time in the history of the republic 
the team went throughout the country and collected views from the police 
themselves and members of the public and other agencies regarding what 
was really required in terms of driving the reform agenda within the police 
sector.118 It also did benchmark studies in order to borrow from the best 
policing practices around the world. The Task Force visited police 
services in Botswana, United Kingdom and Sweden (GoK, 2009, p.vi). 
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These activities culminated into a 200 plus (sic) recommendations that 
were made which also resulted in what we call Police Reforms 
Implementation Committee (PRIC).119 PRIC together with Internal 
Security Ministry and other stakeholders then drafted legislation that 
brought in all the various organs that are now involved in the police 
sector, that is; the National Police Service, the National Police Service 
Commission, and the Independent Oversight Authority. 
It is the Ransley recommendations that form the basis of analysis of the 
police reform process in Kenya. Chapter four analyses the priorities and 
discourses around the reform initiatives in general as proposed by the 
Ransley team. This is further developed in Chapter Six, with a specific 
focus on areas for which reforms are to lead to results for Kenyans as per 
the categorisation Ransley team, that is (i) police image accountability 
and partnerships( ii) professionalism, terms and conditions of service 
(iii)operational preparedness, tooling and logistical capacity, and (iv) 
Institutional, policy and legal reforms.120 While these reform areas were 
overly ambitious and repetitive, the recommendations are reviewed by the 
researcher for analytical and conceptual clarity. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has focussed on agenda setting processes in relation to the 
post 2007 reform agenda in Kenya. The discussions have revolved 
around how issues are prioritised by governments, with the view to 
deepening our understanding on why comprehensive police reform 
agenda was not a priority to the Kenyan government until after the 2007 
post-election violence. In order to achieve this, a number of agenda 
setting theories have been explored. In explaining the Kenyan context 
however, Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory provided a more robust 
theory in explaining the processes in Kenya. 
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Kingdon’s framework has provided the platform on which understanding 
the agenda setting of Kenya police reform process is understood. What is 
important is that the implementation process of the reform agenda is 
largely influenced by how the agendas are set. The chapter concludes by 
exploring key processes that set the tempo for reforms in Kenya. The 
analyses in subsequent chapters draw from these processes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE POLICE REFORM 
PROCESS IN KENYA 2008-2014 
THE POLICE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA 2008-2014 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the implementation of the post 2007/8 police 
reform agenda in Kenya as analysed in chapter three. Specifically, the 
objective of police reform was to review the existing policies, institutional 
structures of the police, and undertake comprehensive reforms that would 
enhance effectiveness, professionalism and accountability in the police 
service. To achieve this objective, the Ransley Report (GoK, 2009) 
considered various proposals and processes and came up with four main 
reform areas, namely; (1) police image, accountability and partnerships; 
(2) professionalism, terms and conditions of service; (3) operational 
preparedness, tooling and logistical capacity; and (4) Institutional, policy 
and legal reforms  that were eventually taken up as the core of the police 
reform process in Kenya. 
Against the backdrop of the reform mandate stated above, this chapter 
discusses the contribution of the Kenyan local actors121 to the process, 
and explores the challenges associated with the process and how 
stakeholders responded to these challenges. These mainly relate to the 
first three secondary questions outlined in chapter one, thus, what were 
the security sector reform priorities in Kenya before and after the 2007-
2008 post-election violence? What is the contribution of local actors to 
police reform and wider SSR processes in Kenya? How have 
stakeholders responded to challenges and deficiencies of SSR in Kenya? 
The aim here is therefore to critically examine and analyse the 
implementation of the police reform process that emerged after the 2007 
post-election violence. The analysis draws largely from personal 
interviews and secondary data sources. 
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To achieve this aim, the chapter adopts multi-level (macro-meso-micro) 
approach (Holland, 2007) as shown on Figure 2 below. The approach not 
only helps clarify multiple activities and the impacts of decisions of various 
stakeholders in the reform process, but also provides an effective 
framework for detailed analysis of the police reform process from the year 
2008. In short, it facilitates process-tracing analysis of the police reform 
within the Kenyan context, while at the same time emphasizing on the 
interrelatedness of the three levels. Previous studies, for example, Police 
Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wisler, 2007) and recently, 
Globalisation, Police Reform and Development (Ellison and Pino, 2012 ) 
have adopted this approach in analysing police reform process. 
Figure 2: Post 2008 Police Implementation Process 
 
Source: Adapted from (Holland, 2007, Ellison and Pino, 2012 ) 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.1 introduces the 
chapter and states the mandate from which the chapter examines the 
Kenyan police reform process. Section 4.2 looks at the macro-analysis 
level, focussing on the reform at the state level with emphasis on 
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decisions, activities and drivers of the reform process and how these 
filtered into the lower levels. It also considers the unique context, political-
institutional culture, in which the police reform process takes place. 
Section 4.3 provides meso-level analysis focusing on stakeholder analysis 
and providing an in-depth institutional analysis of the process. Section 4.4 
presents the micro-analysis, focusing on the impact of reform within the 
police service, analyses the reaction of the police towards the reform 
process handed down to the police from the macro and meso levels. It 
also considers police community relations and sets the stage for the 
analysis of chapter six of the thesis. Section 4.5 draws the main 
conclusions of the chapter. 
4.2 Macro Analysis: Understanding the Country and Police 
Reform Context 
Macro analysis of the police reform process in Kenya is understood from 
both the social and the reform context of the country, with the latter being 
understood as prerequisites for the success of police reform by the Task 
Force on Police Reform (GoK, 2009). The quick response to the Kenyan 
crisis by the international community (Brown, 2009) suggested the will of 
the international community to help Kenya through the difficult moment. 
On the other hand, the domestic enthusiasm that greeted the signing of 
the National Accord demonstrated the desire to which the Kenyan 
population looked forward to the reform process. 
With both domestic and external pressures in 2007/08, the country was 
faced with a situation in which there were competing priorities for reform. 
Constitutional, legal and institutional reform became priority, with police 
reform receiving overwhelming support from the international partners, 
Kenya’s political leadership and the population. The external/donor 
interests in police reform thus meant that the police reform process was 
initiated and controlled externally from the police system. Compared to 
previous police reform process, the strategy for implementation was also 
different. Failures of previous reform efforts provided lessons for 
developing post 2007/08 police reform strategy. To understand this 
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strategy, this section looks at the macro issues critical for the successful 
implementation of the police reform process in Kenya. At this stage, 
decisions are reflected in the overall level of consensus or debate within 
the political elite. This is done with the hindsight of the police reform 
initiative before the 2007 postelection violence to bring the police reform 
context to the fore. 
4.2.1 Political Will 
Existing literature on pre-2007 police reforms in Kenya for example 
(Manby, 2008, BICC, 2005) point out to the fact that these reform 
initiatives did not yield much because of lack of high level political will to 
drive the reform process. This position seems to be confirmed by the 
interviews with many respondents. For example, a senior official of a 
peacebuilding group in Kisumu noted that ‘lack of political goodwill if 
addressed then all other things will happen.’122 It is therefore no doubt that 
the Ransley committee singled out political will as being one of the major 
macro elements critical for the police reform process (GoK, 2009). 
While literature extensively acknowledges the nexus between politics and 
police reform, the impact of political will as a macro element on the police 
reform process in Kenya remains under-researched. Though a 
comprehensive discussion of the same is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, political will simply means a demonstrated credible intent of 
political actors (elected or appointed leaders, stakeholder groups) to 
undertake the reforms with the view to addressing structural problems in 
the police force. For Jackson and Albrecht (2010) political will  is the 
willingness to take on external ideas about best practices. The actors at 
macro level are those who are able to significantly influence the design, 
implementation and outcome of policy reform (Holland, 2007). Without 
political will, the government’s statement of police reform, strengthening of 
transparency and accountability and enhancement of police-community 
relations remain mere rhetoric. The influence of politics discussed at the 
macro level in this section is more on the political drivers of the police 
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reform process, rather than the more specific political power play under 
consociational arrangement which is discussed in Chapter five. How then 
did political will, as a macro element influence the police reform 
implementation process in Kenya? 
The police reform process in this study is situated within a political 
context, where political contestations defined the police reform process. 
Thus, the fact that the political competitors, that is, the Party of National 
Unity and the Orange Democratic Party, agreed to dialogue under the 
auspices of the international community and begun the process of 
reforming the police was an expression of the willingness to undertake 
reforms. Whilst previous attempts to reform the police had proven difficult 
due to lack of political will from the political elite and the fact that it was 
case of ‘police intent on reforming themselves,’123 the post 2007 reform 
process was born out of a political process. Though difficulties at arriving 
at consensus were witnessed at the formative stages of the reform 
process, the fact that the president and the prime minister agreed on the 
way forward was instrumental in whipping up the political elite and the 
bureaucrats, leaving them with little or no options to effect the policy 
decisions supported by the principals to the coalition. 
At the macro level therefore, a number of decisions by the political elite 
significantly impacted on the reform process. Key amongst these was the 
readiness to dialogue with different stakeholders with the view to 
addressing structural problems in the police, establishment of the 
taskforce on police reform, formation of the reforms implementation 
committee and the support and endorsement of the constitution of Kenya 
2010 which institutionalised the reform process. The establishment and 
gazettement of the National Task Force on Police Reform124 on May 08, 
2009 in line with the Agenda Four of the KNDRP, the Waki Commission, 
Kriegler Committee and other police related reports on reform processes 
perhaps remain the greatest expressions of the political will to undertake 
reforms. One year into the coalition government and after intense 
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pressure from stakeholders, the Ransley taskforce provided the 
framework for undertaking the reform process as discussed in Chapter 3. 
The findings and the recommendations of the report remain largely the 
framework upon which police reform process is anchored in Kenya. 
Apart from the Ransley committee, the establishment of the Police 
Reform Implementation Committee (PRIC) does demonstrate 
government’s resolve to reform the police. The committee was tasked 
with the responsibility to identify quick wins and prioritise 
recommendations made by the Ransley committee. Specifically, the 
committee was charged with the mandate to implement, oversee and 
monitor reform of the National Police Service for one year before the 
institutionalisation of the reform process in the constitution and 
subsequent pieces of legislation guiding the established institution. The 
committee, together with Internal Security Ministry then drafted legislation 
that brought in all the various organs that are now involved in the police 
sector, that is; the National Police Service, the National Police Service 
Commission, and the Independent Oversight Authority.125 
The promulgation of the 2010 constitution was a collective national 
endorsement of the political will by a majority of Kenyans. While the 
constitutional review process had been a dividing factor amongst the 
political elite for over a decade, the promulgation of the 2010 constitution 
provided a common ground for the political elite to entrench the police 
reform process in the constitution. The constitution actualised the 
institutionalisation of the police reform process through the Police Service 
Commission; Independent Police Oversight Authority; Policing Policy; and 
National Security Policy’ (GoK, 2009).  
The analysis of the reform processes under the political realm of macro 
decisions suggests two things. First, that that the influence of political will 
interplayed at two phases, the first phase, referred to in this thesis as the 
pre-implementation phase, mainly dealing with the contextual issues and 
the reform environment. This is the formative phase in which political will 
                                            
125
 Interview with K-Int2 
116 
was visible. The Kenya government expressed willingness to ease off 
immense international pressure for reforms, ostensibly to demonstrate the 
need to professionalise the police. This is the immediate post 2007 period 
in which the police reform process was characterised by wide ranging 
political-will across the Kenyan population. Most of the decisions to 
establish the police reform mechanism were by consensus and cascaded 
down from the political elite involved in the 2007 electoral context. While it 
is fair to claim existence of political-will, this was mainly to the extent of 
improving the capacity of the police, rather than enhancing its 
accountability.  
In the second phase however, referred to as the actual implementation 
phase, the political-will was tested when it came into the actual control of 
the process through the established institutions. In cases where political-
will was noticeable, police reform process was seen in the form of 
professionalising the police with the aim of making it effective and 
developing its capability to enforce law and maintain public order, but at 
the same time paying lip service to accountability. Parties to the coalition 
government engaged in push and pull, with both sides either vetoing the 
nominees to the institutions of reforms or delaying the process all 
together. The politics of control of the process also extended to the 
institutions leading to altercations amongst the leadership of the 
institutions.126 It is this kind of will that the Jubilee government continued 
to pursue by providing vehicles to the police and installing integrated 
security surveillance in urban areas beginning with Nairobi and Mombasa 
while at the same time watering down civilian oversight mechanisms by 
amending the laws relating to oversight.127 
Secondly, there appears to be a systematic attempt to maintain the 
institutional memory of the reform process. Police reform process was 
part of the long-term institutional reform process under Agenda Four of 
the KNDRP. As such, the process was also bound to take a longer period 
implementing. In such cases therefore, it is important to maintain ‘a strong 
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core group of leaders of the process’ (Jackson, 2010, p.2) to guarantee 
institutional memory of the process. The Kenya police reform 
implementation process therefore addresses this pitfall which has been 
inevitably lacking in many reform contexts. For example, looking at the 
composition of membership of the Taskforce on Police Reform and the 
Police Reform Implementation Committee, there is similarity in terms of 
membership within the wider security sector in Kenya. At individual level, 
a number of people have been incorporated into the membership of 
subsequent processes. For example, our interviewee K-Int2 was a 
member of the both the Ransley Committee and the Police Reforms 
Implementation Committee and is still associated with the reform 
process.128 
While the actions of the political elite at the macro level in the forgoing 
discussion suggests the presence of political will at the formative stages 
of the implementation of the reform process, interviews with stakeholders 
generated mixed reactions. Some respondents argued that the reform 
process is on course due largely to political will. Notable was the fact that 
amongst those claiming the existence of political will are key informants 
from the National Police Service Commission and the National Police 
Service directly involved in the process,129 while those disappointed by 
the slow pace of reform and claim lack of political-will are mainly from the 
opposition and civil society groups. In this category was a leading 
opposition politician in Kisumu who also doubles as a human rights 
activist and a prominent Nairobi based human rights activist also involved 
in advocating for human rights perspective of police reforms.130 On the 
other hand, others are apprehensive of the government’s commitment to 
reforms. One interviewee noted; ‘political goodwill is still haunting a lot of 
these reforms and you can see it in parliament, read it in the newspaper, 
see it in public (sic).’131 The category of respondents claiming lack of 
political will does not only see lack of commitment to reform emanate from 
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the political establishment, but also from the wider sections of the society 
with political links. A respondent put it thus, ‘there are people who are in 
the system who do not want efficient police because they are thriving in 
this inefficiency.132 These are the people who frustrated earlier reform 
initiative and continue even today to want to use the police for their own 
gain; business people, political people and even the government itself, not 
the government as an institution but individuals who want to do that.133 
Whatever the position regarding the political will, there is strong evidence 
to sustain the argument that political will (or lack of it) is still a major issue 
in Kenya’s police reform process. 
4.2.2 Adequacy of Resourcing 
Closely linked to and reinforcing the political-will is resourcing of the 
reform process. The post 2007/08 police reform had enormous budgetary 
implications for the Kenya. Financing the reform called for commitment 
beyond what the government had been allocating to the police. During the 
financial year 2010-2011 for example, the Police Reform Implementation 
Committee required a total of Ksh. 19,751,500,000 for the reform 
programme, out which the Government committed Ksh.10,681,500,000 
(PRIC, 2010). The remaining Ksh.9,170,000,000 would be mobilised 
through donor funding. For the year 2013-2014, the police was awarded 
Ksh.60 billion out of the Ksh 80 billion that the police requested from the 
treasury- a shortfall of Ksh.20 billion to be bridged by donors.134 In terms 
of budgetary allocation, ‘this is the first since independence where you 
can see that there is a serious attempt to provide huge resources to the 
service.135 
Funding the police reform process was a test measure to the political will 
discussed previously, not only for the Kenyan government, but also for the 
international community that brokered the peace deal that called for 
reforms. Donor support for police reform process is largely undertaken 
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within the framework of democracy and governance assistance with 
attention being given to Agenda Four items under which police reform 
falls (Zeeuw, 2010). Three categories of donors remain active in 
supporting police reform.136 The first group comprises multilateral 
agencies including the UNDP and the Delegation of the European 
Commission. The second category involves bilateral partners, mainly 
comprising four donors and includes mainly Sweden, Britain, USA and 
Netherlands.137 Bilateral support is through basket funding managed by 
the UNDP and the UNODC and focus on different priorities as seen on 
Table 3 below. 138 
Table 3: Donor priority areas of reform
139
 
Donor Priority areas Amount in 
USD 
Agency 
Sweden  Capacity building 
 Ethics and accountability mechanism 
 Community policing 
 transformation of the Judiciary 
 integration of a human-rights-based approach in the 
prisons service, 
 Civic education of citizen rights under the new 
constitution. 
9.9  Million 
USD 
UNODC-
managed 
Joint Donor 
Basket Fund 
United 
States 
 Internal Affairs Unit 
 Model police stations 
 Accountability, 
 professionalism, 
 Transparency in service delivery  
2million 
USD  
Chemonics-
USAID 
Netherlands  Public oversight  
 Accountability initiatives  
 Anti-corruption crusade 
10.9 
million 
USD
140
 
 
Usalama 
Reform 
Forum 
Saferworld 
United 
Kingdom 
 Improved security and accountability 
 Training of senior commanders 
 Drafting of content for the new Police laws and 
advocating reform implementation 
30.6 
Million 
USD
141
  
DfID,UNODC 
Sources: Kingdom of the Netherlands (2014), Open Aid Data (2014), Zeeuw (2010) 
Sweden supports community policing, gender and child protection. It is 
also leading in terms of resources and development support. The United 
States support Internal Affairs Unit which deals with complaints while the 
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United Kingdom supports public order management and training of police 
commanders particularly during the 2013 general elections.142 The 
training provided by the UK however became the subject of debate after it 
emerged that the training provided was used to eliminate Muslim clerics 
believed to be preaching radicalism.143 On its part, Netherlands supports 
police reform process through non-governmental organisations groups, 
notably through Saferworld and Usalama Reform Forum. The police only 
monitor these funds as noted by a key informant ‘they tell us how much 
they have given the civil society and then we are monitoring how they are 
spending’ (sic).144 Recent bilateral support was signed between the 
government of Kenya and Turkey in which the latter would support 
programmes to modernise and upgrade the Kenya police service to tackle 
the threat of terrorism (Adan, 2014)  
Whilst it was not possible to obtain the exact extent of funding for the 
different agencies involved in the reform process, interviews with the key 
stakeholders indicated that adequate funding remains a challenge though 
given government’s commitment, the allocations to these institutions 
remain acceptable. For example, a key informant from IPOA argued that it 
would be practically impossible to get everything they wanted at one once 
and so what is important is to optimise on the resources they get from the 
government.145 Additionally, when the Jubilee government took over, the 
president authorised an additional Ksh.4 billion annually to go towards 
supporting police operations. 
Despite the increased funding for police reform process as compared to 
previous reform attempts, the issue of inadequate resources continues to 
be an inhibiting factor. This finding was not only limited to respondents 
from within the police service, but also from the wider stakeholders 
involved in the process. According to a key informant in the police service, 
the pace of reforms remains slow, ‘the major reason is finances. 
Everything is on paper. Some of the recommendations by the task force 
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headed by Philip Ransley have never been addressed.146 Another 
respondent supporting police-public partnership and who unsuccessfully 
applied for the position of the first Inspector General of Police noted that 
‘one of the handicaps that is facing the police force is equipment and 
facilities particularly, transport.’147 At the same time, it was noted that 
inadequate funding was responsible for the fact that community policing 
started by civil society organisations was not rolled out throughout the 
country and that it also made it hard to push forward the community 
policing agenda.  
While in the eyes of the public the police reform ‘does not respond to the 
needs of the people because they are underfunded,’148 some key 
informants felt otherwise, noting that while inadequate resources is an 
issue, it is not one the greatest challenge facing reforms as the police 
would want Kenyans to believe. They argue there is evidence of ‘massive 
investment of money by certain countries specifically American and British 
governments in Kenya’s security system’ and that ‘the problem is not 
about not about capacity or resources but a system and people who have 
a certain institutional culture and practice which got so engrained and it is 
so privileged that they cannot believe it can go.149 Comparatively, there 
was evidence of increased funding for the police though this was still not 
sufficient to fund the police reform process. 
4.2.3 Motivating Police and Public 
Public confidence in state institutions in the immediate post 2007 was at 
all-time low. Various reports and surveys indicated that Kenyans did not 
have confidence in such institutions. In their second review of the 
progress on implementation of the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation Process, South Consulting assessment of the reform 
process captured the frustration of the public in the institutional structures 
in Kenya thus, ‘From the Executive and the Judiciary to the Legislature, 
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citizens’ confidence in institutions is at an all-time low. Institutions are not 
seen as being competent dispensers of their mandate, but avenues for 
personal aggrandisement, active participants in creating moral decay and 
practising ills such as favouritism and ineptitude’.150 Undertaking reforms 
under this kind of attitude from the public was thus a challenge. Alongside 
demonstrating political will, there was a deliberate need to inspire 
confidence from both the police and the public - the police, because they 
are a critical cog in the reform process, and the public, as the beneficiary 
of a reformed police service.  
Compared with other countries, confidence in Kenya’s police remained 
low at 3.5 out of best 7 in 2009, compared to Botswana, UK and Sweden 
which scored 4.9, 5.4 and 6.2 during the same period respectively (GoK, 
2009). Yet in another public opinion conducted between 4 and 9 July 
2009 by Synovate Research in 2009 amongst some 2,005 respondents, 
only 8% had confidence in the police.  
Where the police and the public do not have confidence in the police 
reform process and amongst each other (the police and the public), there 
are bound to be tensions between the two groups. These tensions have 
ended up in members of the public attacking the police in the course of 
their (the police) duty. Interviews conducted revealed that these tensions 
relate to historical legacies of policing in Kenya.151 Any time you talk about 
engagement between the police and members of the public usually a lot 
of fear especially by members of the public of the police because of the 
atrocities that the police have committed.152 Additionally, the members of 
the public do not trust the police for fear that the police collude with the 
criminals and this could jeopardise their safety in the event they 
cooperate. This feeling is captured succinctly by the following interview; 
‘the police and the citizen- you and me- have no good relationship. 
Because if I see a thug there, I don’t care because if I tell a police, 
a thug will go and buy his way out the police will tell him or her and 
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the police will tell him this is the guy who told me and they will 
come and will kill me(sic).153 
While historical legacies of policing were cited as being responsible for 
this relationship, some police officers interviewed believe that the Kenyan 
public respects and fears the police. A police officer attached to Kilimani 
Police Division noted that public fear of police is such that where 
members of the public beat up a police officer, then in most cases  it is 
about ‘misconduct of the police themselves,’ mostly police officers 
soliciting for bribes from unwilling members of the public.154 There was 
therefore an urgent need to change this situation as a prerequisite for the 
success of the reform process. 
To achieve this objective, the immediate priority was to transform the 
police from ‘force’ to ‘service’ and put the police officer and members of 
the public at the centre of the reform process. The two police forces, the 
Kenya police force and the administration police were then merged into a 
service with the hope that this would both motivate the police and the 
public. The police welfare would be a core element of the planned reform 
process while service delivery and accountability to the public would be 
the driving force for reform. Compared to the country’s intelligence 
service, the transformation of the former Directorate of Security 
Intelligence (DSI) to the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) in 
1999 had a profound impact on the officers compared to their 
counterparts in the police force. 
Again, as a long-term measure, the establishment of the National Police 
Service Commission as ‘a collegiate institution that would now be involved 
in the process of carrying out the human resource function that would give 
stability to the police service’155 was meant to reassure the police that 
their interest was key in the reform process. More still, the establishment 
of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority was to give members of 
the public the confidence of the commitment to managing complaints 
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against the police. It was believed that this would improve police–public 
relations. 
4.2.4 Change in Police Leadership 
Police Commissioner Major General Hussein Ali Mohammed was relieved 
of his duties and appointed chair of the postal corporation on September 
08, 2009, barely two weeks after the Taskforce on Police Reform 
submitted its interim report on August 26, 2009. On the same day the 
‘president extended the mandate of the Task Force up to 30th September 
2009’ (GoK, 2009, p.4). Mathew Iteere, a long serving GSU commandant 
was subsequently appointed the Commissioner of Police.  
While the analysis of police leadership straddles meso-micro levels in this 
thesis, the removal of the police chief was a significant macro decision. 
One of the Ransley committee recommendations was change in police 
leadership (GoK, 2009). Ali’s removal was therefore an immediate 
response to the Ransley Committee recommendation. Ali was appointed 
in the year 2005, due to what is largely believed to be ‘political 
implications of crime and lack of faith in the police leadership’ (Hills, 2007, 
p.410) by president Kibaki. Significant in Ali’s appointment was the fact 
that his predecessor, Edwin Nyaseda was close to Raila Odinga, Kibaki’s 
political opponent and was therefore viewed with lots of suspicion within 
Kibaki’s inner circle (Hornsby, 2012). Why was Major General Hussein Ali 
dismissed? What was the consequence of this dismissal to the police 
reform process?  
Change in police leadership at the recommendation of the Ransley 
committee is significant for two reasons. First, the macro environment had 
significantly changed. While the president still had unlimited authority to 
appoint and remove the commissioners when Ali was appointed (Hills, 
2000), Iteere’s appointment required consultations between the president 
and the prime minister. However, the president still had his way in the 
appointment as the Ransley committee did not make explicit the 
procedure for appointment. The committee only emphasized that ‘that 
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persons with proven leadership and managerial skills, high moral integrity, 
an ability to spearhead reform, be appointed’ (GoK, 2009), it did not 
provide for the procedure to be followed in the appointment prior to the 
institutionalisation of the position of the Inspector General. Thus, the 
process was not competitive and was still largely influenced by 
presidential attitude. This observation is in tandem with Alice Hills 
observation that the police are largely governed according to presidential 
preference (Hills, 2007). Public interest in the appointment of Iteere was 
pushed to the periphery with the appointment being the responsibility of 
the state and denied the public the opportunity to interrogate Iteere’s 
philosophy on police reforms. 
The second significance of change of guard in police leadership is due to 
the fact that the change was meant to instil public confidence that the 
government was keen on police reform. Critics of Ali’s leadership style 
argue that he had presided over a police force that had lost credibility in 
the eyes of the public. It was during Ali’s tenure that the police was at 
loggerheads with human rights activists over special police squads that 
hunted down and killed members of the Mungiki sect 156 (Oluoch, 2013) 
and committed human rights abuses in the fight against Sabaot Defence 
Lands Force (SLDF) in Mt.Elgon (Alston, 2010). Thus Ali’s removal was 
not only expected to demonstrate the political will to reform, but also to 
inject new police leadership that would steer the police reform process in 
the interim period. A further analysis of police leadership at the command 
level is discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
4.2.5 Nyumba Kumi Initiative: A Top–Down Community Policing 
Approach 
In a Government Gazette Notice November 8, 2013, Interior Cabinet 
Secretary Joseph Ole Lenku established and made appointments to the 
National Taskforce on Community Policing, popularly known as ‘Nyumba 
Kumi initiative’. This was a macro decision with impact on the reform 
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process at both meso and micro level. Meso, because the taskforce 
became yet another advisory on reforms alongside the Police Reforms 
Unit which also reported to the cabinet secretary, and micro because 
community policing is a micro issue that involves police and citizens 
interactions at the local levels. 
How does the nyumba kumi initiative filter into the police reform process? 
What are the institutional interests or otherwise conflicts that arise out of 
this taskforce? These questions are answered within the larger framework 
of police reforms in Kenya. Nyumba Kumi initiative was conceived in the 
wake of the Westgate attack, after it emerged that the terrorists had 
rented an apartment near the Mall, from where they planned their attack. 
The initiative is a neighbourhood security (community policing) concept 
borrowed from Tanzania which encourages people clustered around ten 
households (nyumba kumi) to be vigilant and weed out criminals in their 
midst by cooperating with law enforcement agencies.157 
While the Kenya Constitution (GoK, 2010) in Article 244 provides for 
promotion of public partnership with the broader society in handling 
security issues and in essence legitimising police-community 
partnerships, upon which nyumba kumi rests, it bestows the responsibility 
to foster such relationship with the Inspector General, and not the cabinet 
secretary for Internal Affairs. In this light therefore, the government 
assumed the responsibility of the Inspector General under Article 10 
which states that the Inspector General shall ‘issue guidelines on 
community policing and ensure co-operation between the Service and the 
communities it serves in combating crime’ (KCLR, 2011a, p.13). 
While the taskforce mandate was to advise on community policing, (GoK, 
2013), the first major role of the taskforce was its participation in the 
police vetting process. Its chairperson and the vice chairperson were part 
of the vetting committee. The research did not establish the framework 
supporting their involvement in the vetting process which is the 
responsibility of the National Police Service Commission Vetting 
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Committee which is presumably independent. Thus, their participation in 
the process and integrity questions surrounding its chairman raised issues 
regarding the real purpose for which it was formed.  
At another level, the Simiyu Werunga, the vice chairperson of the 
taskforce who was previously a fierce critic of how the reform process was 
being undertaken was nominated by Usalama Reforms Forum to chair the 
forum’s Governing Council. Usalama Reforms Forum is on record 
opposing the formation of the taskforce. The forum had argued that the 
taskforce would spend two hundred million Kenya shillings and come up 
with an obvious report. This was in relation to the fact that some 
committee members (alluding to the vice chairperson) had been 
researching on crime and would come with the same findings (Ombati, 
2013). It would therefore be interesting to understand how these two 
extreme positions; that of sitting in a committee implementing a state 
sponsored community policing project while at the same time serving in 
the governing council of an organisation opposed to the government 
initiative. 
Since NPSC is an independent commission directly answerable to the 
president, the inclusion of the taskforce answerable to the cabinet 
secretary in the operations of NPSC was seen as tantamount to the 
NPSC commission being answerable to the cabinet secretary.158 
According to a member of the police vetting committee, these institutional 
overlaps are not clear and may have been exploited to involve the 
taskforce on community policing in the vetting process.159 This point is 
particularly important as the period preceding the vetting process had 
seen the Executive propose that the NPSC is made answerable to the 
cabinet secretary- a proposal that NPSC challenged in its submissions to 
the parliamentary committee with regards to amendment bills to the 
NPSC and NPS Acts.  
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Whilst the government is keen on pushing nyumba kumi initiative, thus 
denoting a ‘top down’ power decision making process, the concept was 
not received well, particularly by the opposition, with sections of Kenyan 
society criticising the move as illegal and a duplication of efforts. In other 
areas, for example in Uasin Gishu, Nyumba Kumi stakeholders in the 
County raised concerns over lack of commitment from the government to 
the programme.160 The police too seem ill prepared and show little 
understanding of the concept.161 Perhaps the clearest indications came 
during the vetting process of top police officers in which police officers 
demonstrated ineptitude in explaining what the concept entails.  
Has nyumba kumi helped address insecurity? We argue that the initiative 
is one of those many distractions from the urgent challenges facing 
spiralling crime in the country. Rather than establish a taskforce not 
anchored on law, this study argues that channels already exist for which 
community policing could be converted into tangible results. More so, 
community policing presupposes community mobilisation efforts which 
could best be pursued through county policing authorities recognised by 
the constitution. The fact that the executive dismissed those opposed to 
the initiative led to strong opposition to the initiative in opposition 
stronghold. Perhaps, a reconciliatory tone could have been struck with the 
government seeking to understand why opposition and leading civil 
society groups were opposed to the initiative. This could have heightened 
the much needed legitimate accountability of the police to the 
communities they work with. Otherwise, the initiative remains one of those 
initiatives devoid of substantive content and lacking in operational utility. 
4.3 Meso Analysis: The Police Reform Implementation Process  
The previous section explored the macro factors driving the police reform 
process. As demonstrated in the section, Ransley committee mandate 
was wide enough to include far reaching reforms in Kenya police. Of 
significance is the fact that it stated that ‘special focus to be given to 
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recommendations on: Police Service Commission; Independent Police 
Oversight Authority; Policing Policy; and National Security Policy’ (GoK, 
2009, p.3),as institutions that would drive the reform process. As such, the 
establishment of these institutions was significant in moving the police 
reform process forward. 
This section does two things. It presents the role of various stakeholders 
in the police reform implementation process and discusses the role of 
police reform institutions established by the macro level decisions. What 
is the role of local stakeholders in the police reform process? How did the 
process to establish police reform institutions progress and to what extent 
have the institutions been crucial in the police reform process? To 
address these questions, this section is divided into two sub-sections. The 
first section provides a stakeholder analysis at the meso level, focussing 
on the role of civil society as local stakeholders in the reform process, 
while the second section provides an institutional analysis of the police 
reform process. Analysis of this type is essentially a narrative form of 
analysis (Holland, 2007). 
4.3.1 Stakeholder Analysis 
In order to understand the influence of various stakeholders in the 
implementation of police reform, it was necessary to answer the question, 
who are the stakeholders in Kenya’s police reform process? Our 
exploratory interviews revealed that a number of stakeholders, at personal 
and institutional levels, are involved in the reform process and that their 
interests and influence affect decision making and implementation at 
varying degrees and at different levels of the reform process. However, it 
was not possible to establish the roll of the stakeholders based on the fact 
that there is no data at the National Police Service of stakeholders in the 
police reform process. 
For analytical purposes only, this study draws a distinction between state 
and non-state actors. The former is construed to mean government and 
state agencies directly involved in the reform process, while the latter 
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includes donors, the private sector and civil society groups with interests 
in the reform process as shown on the Table 4 below. In terms of policing, 
Baker (2011), considers the non-state to apply to local collectives 
providing everyday policing and may include; customary leaders, religious 
organizations, ethnic associations, youth groups, work-based 
associations, community police forums, conflict resolution non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), the lowest and informal levels of 
local government and entrepreneurs. For him therefore, reform of the 
state police system should also target non-state actors as they are directly 
involved in provision of security. 
The state actors are involved in the process at both macro and meso 
levels of analysis considered here. The president, parliament and 
respective ministries are involved at the macro level in terms of policy 
decisions and providing policy directions, while the other actors, namely; 
the National Police Service, the National Police Service Commission, and 
the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) operate at the 
institutional level and form the bulk of the analysis of the process 
discussed in Section 4.3.2. 
Table 4: Key stakeholders in Kenya police reform by category 
Government and State Agencies Non-state actors  
The President The Private sector 
Parliament Donors 
Ministries (Interior,Finance,Devolution) Civil society groups 
Judiciary Business community 
The Police  The Kenyan Public 
IPOA  
NPSC  
The National Police Service  
While it was obvious to pinpoint the entry point of various stakeholders in 
the reform process, the same was not visible in terms of deliberate 
attempt by either the National Police Service or the National Police 
Service Commission to include external stakeholders in the reform 
process. For example, non-state actors’ participation in the reform 
process seems to be motivated by the inadequacies in the state-led 
process and all the wrong things that have characterised policing in 
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Kenya. This is perhaps illustrated by the entry of the PRWG and IMLU in 
particular through the weaknesses detected in the vetting mechanism and 
the 2011 survey which reported that the police was responsible for 63% of 
state perpetrated torture respectively.162 According to an official of the 
PRWG, ‘If 63% of state violence perpetrators are the police, it means that 
if the police, as an institution, is reformed we can reduce state perpetrated 
torture by 63%.163  
For the purpose of this research, our analysis of non-state actors in the 
reform process is two-fold. First in Section 4.3.1.1, we focus on the role of 
Kenya’s civil society organisations in the police reform process during the 
period 2008-2014. Secondly, we broaden the debate in Chapter Six to 
include other forms of non-state actors to include; the youth, the women, 
community leaders, private security companies and business community 
amongst others. 
4.3.1.1. Civil Society Groups and the Police Reform Process 
The point of departure in the understanding of the role of civil society in 
Kenya’s police reform process is an acknowledgement that civil society as 
a concept is a theoretical rather than an empirical one (Bratton, 1994). 
However, for the purpose of making the concept serviceable, Bratton 
(1994) defines civil society as ‘a sphere of social interaction between the 
household and the state which is manifest in norms of community 
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public 
communication.’ Three characterisations in Bratton’s (1994) definition 
namely; norms of civic community, structures of associational life and 
network of communication interact in different proportions depending on 
context. These interactions make civil society unique in different contexts. 
In the case of Kenya, our consideration of civil society borrows from 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007 p.5) to include non-governmental 
organisations(NGOs), associations of professions, trade unions, social 
movements – such as of women, the disabled, minorities, and youth – 
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and think tanks). This presents diverse spheres of interests. For our 
purpose in this section, we limit ourselves to NGOs that are directly 
involved in the police reform process during the period of covered by this 
thesis. 
An assessment of civil society participation in the police reform process 
indicates that civil societies played a crucial role in the agitation for police 
and wider societal reforms in Kenya’s transitions in the 90’s and post-Moi 
era; including the post-2007 reform. In fact, ‘if it had not been for the 
involvement of civil society in Kenya you would not have had Agenda 
Four’ (sic) (Noyes, 2013, p.36). An assessment of the post-2007 civil 
society participation in the police reform process suggests that there is a 
huge and untapped potential for civil society participation in the police 
reform process. While there is evidence of involvement of these groups, 
this engagement still falls far below the capacity of the civil society 
groups.  
The momentum for the civil society participation in the process picked up 
in the year 2011 with the establishment of Police Vetting Working Group. 
This was a loose coalition of civil society groups that sought to ‘establish a 
framework for the vetting of all police officers as provided for in the 
National Police Service Act’.164 Whilst the Act provided for the vetting of 
all police officers, there were no tools, no mechanism, nor the framework 
for undertaking this process. The National Police Service Commission 
which was charged with the responsibility of vetting had not even been 
formed at the time. As such, the Police Reforms Working Group was 
founded for the purpose of developing guiding tools and guidelines of the 
process so that once the vetting starts then it would guarantee that human 
rights issues are taken on board (sic)’.165 
The Police Reform Vetting Working Group comprised ten civil society 
groups, under the convention of the Independent Medico Legal Unit 
(IMLU). Initially, the group was conceived of as a ‘one-off thing’ to develop 
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the vetting tools and guidelines and present the same to the vetting 
authority, in this case the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) 
after which the group would dissolve. However, since vetting processes 
were taking long to establish, some group members felt that they needed 
to broaden their mandate. It is at this point that the group transformed into 
the Police Reforms Working Group so that it encompasses all aspects of 
police reforms. 166 
Meanwhile, a section of the Police Vetting Working Group mutated into 
Usalama Reforms Forum and established itself as a premier platform for 
citizens’ participation in the reform process. This process thus led to two 
distinct groups involved in the police reform process at the national level. 
Other civil society groups that operate at national level include 
International Centre for Policy and Conflict (ICPC) which sought High 
Court interpretation of the bills that aimed to amend the National Police 
Service Act and the National Police Service Commission Act and the 
Kenya Council of Employment Migration Agency (KCEM) which sought to 
stop all-together the vetting process on the argument of integrity of the 
panellists. The groups were motivated by a common objective of fast-
tracking police reform process, though driven by different civil society 
interests.  
The PRWG and Usalama have at certain times worked together though 
pursuing distinct agendas, while bringing on board various organisations 
as shown on Table 5 below. That the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR) works with the two groups also emphasizes the 
point of convergence for the two groups. However, the interviews did not 
establish at what levels KNCHR involves in with these groups owing to its 
distinct mandate which it undertakes as state entity. Again, controversies 
surrounding the appointment of the commissioners to the KNCHR made it 
difficult for the commission to play its oversight role of the security organs 
as focus was on these appointments which had exceedingly delayed at 
the time of data collection. Civil society participation in the police reform 
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process at the national level has thus been revolving around the two 
groups alongside a host of other individual organisations. 
Table 5: Key civil society groups in Kenya police reform process 
Police Reforms Working Group-Kenya Usalama Reform Forum 
1. Independent Medico-Legal Unit 1. Usalama Reforms Forum-
Executive 
2. Kenya Human Rights Commission 2. The Commission on Equality 
and Human Rights  
3. International Commission of 
Jurists(ICJ) Kenya 
3. PeaceNet Kenya 
4. Federation of Women Lawyers 4. Saferworld 
5. International Centre for Transitional 
Justice 
5. World Vision 
6. National Coalition of Human Rights 
Defenders 
6. Eastern Africa Institute of 
Security Studies 
7. Coalition on Violence Against 
Women 
7. Eastern Peace Institute 
8. Haki Itawale 8. Research Triangle Africa 
9. Rights Promotion and  Protection 
Centre 
9. Kibera Community Policing 
Committee 
10. The Commission on Equality and 
Human Rights  
10. Socio-Economic Rights 
Foundation 
11. Legal Resource Foundation 11. Amani Parliamentary Forum 
12. Centre for Minority Rights 
(CEMIRIDE) 
12. Nairobi Peace Forum 
13. International Commission on Human 
Rights Defenders. 
13. Chemi Chemi Ya Ukweli 
 14. African Policing Civilian 
Oversight Forum 
 15. Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative  
 
The activities of the two lobby groups, that is, Usalama and the PRWG, 
cascade down to the community level with the subsidiary groups involved 
in lots of community safety programmes at grassroots levels. For 
example, Peace-net and Saferworld all working with Usalama have been 
involved in the training of community policing communities in Kibera 
slums in Nairobi and Isiolo to embrace the ‘best practices on community 
based policing so that they would know how to engage in the whole 
process’.167 
Though bound by common agenda of ensuring police reforms, the 
interviews revealed differences between the two groups. A PRWG official 
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noted; ‘I don’t know for what reasons Usalama has been receding from 
the working group and taking initiatives on police reforms as Usalama 
Group, not as the PRWG.’168 Interactions with some officers attached to 
Usalama revealed that there is strong competition for donor funding 
involved the police reform process. This view is also supported by the 
approach the two groups take in handling controversies in the police 
reform. For example, in relation to vetting, Usalama took an advisory 
approach; PRWG was more critical and at times threatened to go to court 
to have their agenda included. 
Usalama has been involved in a number of police reform initiatives, 
particularly focusing on the four areas of reform suggested by the Ransley 
committee. Amongst other things, Usalama has been training 
communities on police accountability, monitoring the recruitment process, 
auditing of police stations, assessment of the curriculum, developing 
service standing orders and helping review police reform processes.169 
These activities are organised under four thematic strands namely; police 
professionalization, decentralisation and community policing, oversight 
mechanisms and legislation and policy.170 
On its part, PRWG focuses on human rights perspective and the 
involvement of members of the public in the police reform process. In fact, 
it has been ‘engaged in public county police reforms initiatives, basically 
to sensitise (our) people on police reforms and making sure that people 
are aware of what is going on so that they can also have their voice.’171 
This initiative has led to positive response from the public in terms of 
engagement with the reform process. In fact, many county forums trained 
by PRWG ‘in different counties actually sent a memorandum to the 
Constitutional Implementation Commission (CIC) and the Parliamentary 
Committee on Administration and National Security’172 with regards to 
June 2014 amendments to the Police Acts. Thus, it is clear that the 
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activities of PRWG, undertaken under four pillars namely; accountability, 
quality service, public participation and police welfare, (IMLU, 2013) are 
yielding results. 
On the contrary, PRWG key informant reported indifference from the 
institutions involved in the reform process, particularly the NPSC and the 
NPS. Despite several attempts by the PRWG to get involved in the police 
reform process, their relationship with these institutions has not been 
cosy. This relationship is captured by extracts from an interview with the 
key informant; ‘we met them (NPSC) and we offered them finances, they 
said they did not need our finances… Concerning the IGP, I wouldn’t say 
we have had that cordial relationship with IGP, but doesn’t mean that we 
have not engaged them. With IPOA, at least they have moved. We were 
involved in the development of the validation of their regulations which we 
think are very progressive.173 These statements risk portraying the fact 
that no attention is given to the PRWG by institutions involved in the 
police reform process. Evidently, after the PRWG had petitioned the 
NPSC to extend days for the public submission of complaints against 
police officers from seven to ten days, the NPSC responded positively 
and extended the period to fourteen days and guaranteed that late 
submissions would also be considered as long as vetting interviews of 
involved officers had not been undertaken. Thus, to make a blanket 
statement of non-cooperation from the police institutions is to be unfair to 
the institutions. 
Despite the invaluable support the two groups make to the reform 
process, Interviews with our key informant from the Directorate of 
Reforms at the National Police Service attested to the fact that Usalama 
remains the most preferred civil society forum for engagement with the 
public in the police reform process by both the National Police Service 
and the National Police Service Commission. In fact, Usalama Reforms 
Forum and Saferworld are the vehicles through which the international 
community, particularly the Dutch Government, sets priorities for police 
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reform in Kenya as described by the respondent; ‘What Netherlands does 
is that they set our priority then they channel the funds through the civil 
society. That is where the Usalama and Saferworld now get their money 
to come and conduct their activities (sic).’174 
But, why would Usalama be the preferred forum for engagement despite 
the two groups doing invaluable role in the police reform process? Whilst 
no formal interview was provided to establish this question from Usalama 
forum, informal interactions with some Usalama field officers revealed that 
there is strong competition for donor funds between the two groups. In 
fact, it emerged that donor funding is channelled to Usalama which then 
accounts it expenditure to the NPS as observed by a key informant; ‘They 
(Netherlands) tell us how much they have given the civil society 
(Usalama) and then we are monitoring how they are spending (sic).’175 
This brings into question the utilisation and accounting for donor funds in 
the police reform process especially where the police service 
accountability mechanism is in doubt, and the civil society groups are left 
to account for the funds. ‘Why would they be spending billions of money 
on a system that they know for a fact does not meet the basic 
requirements of a community?176 
The above situation perhaps explains the difference in approach taken by 
the two groups in the police reform process. Whilst there have been a 
common ground on certain issues, KPRWG takes a more combative 
approach in dealing with sticky issues of reforms. For example, the group 
has on a number of occasions claimed that the vetting process pays less 
attention to human rights component which is critical in the vetting 
process. On the other hand, Usalama Reform Forum takes a non-
combative approach, preferring to address reform challenges through 
forums and publications. This is with the view perhaps not to jeopardise 
the seemingly cosy relationship between Usalama Forum and the 
institutions engaged in the police reform process. 
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Alongside the civil society participation revolving around PRWG and 
Usalama Reforms Forum at the national level as well as grassroots level, 
there are a lot more other groups contributing to the reform process. For 
example, in Kisumu County, groups such as Kisumu Citizens Residents 
Voice (KICIREVO), Communities Initiative Action Group Kenya, Kisumu 
against Crime and Local Capacities for Peace International amongst 
others exist. More significantly, these organisations involve themselves in 
the reform process separately thus presenting a disjointed civil society 
participation in the process. This is partly due to poor structures that 
would define the entry point for the groups into the reform process and 
also the vested interests of the civil society groups themselves. 
Disjointed reform effort notwithstanding, there is evidence that the 
capacities for engaging stakeholders in the police reform process are yet 
to be fully utilised. Most of these organisations have community 
coordinators whose community mobilisation contribution to the reform 
process still falls below capacity due to the absence of defined structures 
of engagement with the police. 
4.3.2 Institutional Analysis 
Institutional analysis of police reform process in this research is 
considered at two levels, namely; process tracing of the reform and static 
mapping of the reform institutions respectively. Process-tracing aims at 
providing a narrative account of the institutionalisation of the reform 
process.177 Static mapping on the other hand seeks to assess the 
organisational context of the reform process with the focus being on the 
capacities and responsibilities of the reform institutions.178 
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4.3.2.1 Process-Tracing the Institutionalisation of the Police 
Reform Process 
As stated in the previous sections, the 2007 post-election violence 
provided an opportunity to provide an audit of the conduct of Kenya’s 
security system in the elections, a move that had never happened in the 
history of the republic - that of putting security chiefs to account for their 
acts and omissions. In fact, it demonstrated that it was no longer tenable 
to trust the police on the one hand to undertake internally driven reforms, 
while at the same time trusting the political elite to champion police reform 
process - the police because attempts by the police to reform themselves 
bore no fruits, and the politicians because the ruling elite had previously 
only been interested in piecemeal reforms targeting police 
professionalism without accountability, while at the same time maintaining 
the status quo. 
Thus, the police reform process that emerged after the 2007/08 post-
election violence to a large extent supports the argument that sometimes 
a dramatic event, often negative, triggers the need to reform (Downs, 
1972) and that long periods of policy stability could be changed 
dramatically through a short period of critical mobilisation (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1991). These debates have already been discussed and 
developed in chapter three. However it is important here to mention that 
while Waki Commission spelt out the acts and commissions of the 
security sector in the 2007/8 post-poll violence, institutional problems 
including the police were largely responsible. This triggered a series of 
processes that sought to address the problems. Reforming the security 
was one such process with the police reform being the basis of the reform 
process. Though the debates in this chapter to a large extent assume 
historical analysis, special focus of process-tracing is significant in the 
institutionalisation of the police reform process. The periods, 2008-2010 
and 2010-2014 provide the basis of this analysis. 
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4.3.2.1.1. Developing the Framework for Reform: 2008-2010 
The first phase of the reform process relates to the agenda setting 
process of the police reform process and establishment of the reform 
framework from which the subsequent reform process would filter.179 The 
Ransley committee marked the first major step to kick-start the process 
and widely the basis from which the reform process flowed. ‘It informs the 
need to reform the National Police Service.’180 Whilst the previous 
attempts were mainly state-centric processes with little or no public 
participation, the Ransley Committee adopted a more comprehensive 
approach. The committee traversed the country collecting views from the 
public and the police thus instilling a sense of ownership of the process.181 
It gave the process a sense of local ownership amongst the police and 
members of the public, and there had the benefit of buy-in from amongst 
various stakeholders. Notable was the political will from the government 
that expressed the readiness to implement the recommendations of the 
report when it presented its interim report by relieving the police chief of 
his duties on the September 08, 2009 and establishing the Police Reform 
Implementation Committee (PRIC) to oversee the reform process on 
January 08, 2010. 
As a direct outcome of the Ransley report, the Police Reform 
Implementation Committee (PRIC) was established through the Kenya 
Gazette Notice No. 169 of January 08, 2010. This was critical step in the 
coordination of the reform process. In the past, the Administration Police 
(AP) and the Kenya Police (KP) undertook reform initiative separately 
thus making it difficult to deliver a coherent reform strategy. It took about 
two months only for the government to agree to the establishment of the 
committee as recommended by the Ransley committee. During this time, 
there were indications of conflicts of power-sharing dynamics within the 
coalition government and policy decisions would take too long to 
implement. That notwithstanding, the fact that the coalition partners 
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agreed to establish the Police Reform Implementation Committee within a 
period of only two months was therefore remarkable by any standards 
and reflected the existence of consensus amongst the political players on 
the reform process. Later on in the process, however, there were delays 
in the implementation of priority areas relating to the institutionalisation of 
the reform process.182 The committee, ‘together with Internal Security 
Ministry then drafted legislation that brought in all the various organs that 
are now involved in the police sector, that is; the National Police Service, 
the National Police Service Commission, and the Independent Oversight 
Authority.’183 
In drafting the bills, namely the National Police Service Bill, and the 
Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, the committee adopted a 
consultative approach. Like the Ransley committee, the Naikuni 
committee sought views of the public on the bills before presenting the 
same to the cabinet for approval. The committee also made submissions 
to the Constitutional Review Committee about the reform provisions in the 
constitution. This made the inclusion of the police reform process less 
controversial compared to other provisions including devolution. 
Once approved by the cabinet, the committee held a consultative meeting 
with the house committees namely the National Security, Administration 
of Justice and Legal Affairs and Constitutional Implementation Oversight 
Committees on November 19, 2010 in Mombasa to seek a common 
ground before presenting the bills to the house. The bills were tabled 
before parliament on August 23, 2011. Since the process of developing 
these bills was participatory amongst different stakeholders and in 
particular amongst legislators, the passing of the bills was thus less 
controversial in the house. 
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4.3.2.1.2. Institutionalising the Reform Process: 2010-2014 
The second Phase of the reform process was the institutionalisation of the 
reform process which is traced to the promulgation of the 2010 
constitution. While evidence suggests that there had been good intentions 
of reforming the police, the framework was not followed through due to 
lack of institutionalisation of the process. The Kenya constitution passed 
on August 4, 2010 was a first in many ways. It echoed the many years of 
struggles in changing Kenya’s governance. In relation to the police; the 
constitution institutionalised the police reform process. Most of the 
recommendations put forward by the Ransley and Naikuni committees 
were included in the constitution thus effectively institutionalising the 
reform process. 
For the first time in the history of the republic, the constitution 
insubordinated security to the will of the authority of the constitution and 
the people through their elected members of parliament and made 
security organs subordinate to civilian authorities.184 The constitution also 
provided the platform for legislating on the laws that would thereafter 
control the reform process through various acts of parliament. It provided 
for the establishment of the office of the Inspector General, the National 
Police Service, the National Police Service Commission and the 
Independent Policing Oversight Authority. The role of these institutions in 
the reform process forms the crust of the police reform debate at the 
meso level. 
While it may have been worthwhile to pass the laws concurrently to 
provide a holistic package for reforms, these were done at separate times. 
The National Police Service Act was published first followed by the 
National Police Service Commission Act and Independent Policing 
Service Authority, while the Private Security Bill and the Coroners Bill are 
still pending. This approach created confusion as to how the Inspector 
General of Police and the two deputies would be appointed. Some 
members of the civil society viewed this as a deliberate attempt to allow 
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for a political deal between the Kibaki and Raila by making such 
appointments through a selection panel rather than as provided for in 
Article 246(3) of the Kenyan constitution, which bestows such a function 
to the National Police Service Commission. Of particular interest is the 
delay in passing the pending bills which makes it difficult to determine the 
entry point of private security providers in the reform process. This has 
presented a challenge as pointed out by a key respondent; ‘Among the 
challenges we have are those pending bills. You know there is a meeting 
point for these. So even if you enact the National Police Service Act, the 
National Police Service Commission Act, there is the role of the private 
security providers. There is that disconnect.’185 
While the police laws provided for distinct role of the various actors in the 
reform process, interpretation of these laws by various actors led to 
confusions amongst the institutions, particularly involving the NPSC and 
the office of the Inspector General. The former was viewed in some 
quotas, particularly within government, to wield immense powers thereby 
weakening the latter’s control of the police service. These developments 
led to the introduction of amendment bills to the National Police Service 
and the National Police Service Commission Bills that strengthened the 
office of the Inspector General by transferring the most crucial functions of 
the NPSC including; transfer and disciplining officers to the Inspector-
General.186 This confusion prompted ICPC to seek judicial interpretation 
of the role of the Inspector General and the NPSC regarding appointment, 
transfers and promotions.187 
On March 28, 2014, the High Court ruling declared unconstitutional and 
illegal the Inspector General’s promotion of officers. The case set 
precedence and formed the basis of contestation between the office of the 
Inspector General and the NPSC. Later on the April 24, 2014, members of 
parliament passed the contentious bills that effectively provided powers to 
the Inspector General while weakening the NPSC and the IPOA. In effect, 
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external accountability that had been a critical issue in the development of 
police reform process was taken aback. The bills were signed into law in 
June 2014. 
The two phases identified in the process tracing of the institutionalisation 
of the police reform process demonstrate stakeholder participation in 
varying proportions. The process of developing the framework for police 
reform was more participatory with the government conceding some 
ground to build consensus. However, despite opposition to amendments 
of the police laws from civil society groups and donors, the government 
remained recalcitrant and insisted on pushing for the amendments to the 
police reforms laws that were earlier developed through consultations. 
Whilst there was the need to address the controversies involving the IG 
office and that of the NPSC, failure of the government to consult broadly 
supported the claims that the government was not keen on genuine police 
reform. In fact, some respondents claimed that of all the institutions 
established to spearhead the police reform process, it was only the office 
of the Inspector General that still remained political.188 
4.3.2.2 Static-mapping the Reform Institutions 
This section provides the organisational context for police reform 
implementation, also known as to ‘static-mapping’ (Holland, 2007) in the 
wider policy reform implementation process. The focus is on analysis of 
the institutions established at the macro level to spearhead police 
reforms, namely; National Security Policy, National Police Service, 
National Police Service Commission and the Independent Policing 
Oversight Authority.  
4.3.2.2.1 National Security Policy 
The Ransley Committee prioritized the finalization and roll-out of the 
National Security Policy which had already been drafted by the National 
Security Intelligence Service (GoK, 2009, p.205). The committee argued 
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that the policy would provide a platform from which sectorial policies, 
including the police reform process would emerge. Beyond this, there was 
the need to develop the National Policing Policy, to guide policing in 
Kenya. However, at the time of writing, there was no evidence that the 
National Security Policy had been rolled out though the development of 
the National Policy on Policing was on course by the National Police 
Service Commission. 
Whilst the Kenyan constitution expressly articulates Kenya’s national 
security vision, conspicuously missing in Kenya’s police reform process is 
the National Security Policy from which the process would derive, and 
which would explain the security environment under which the police 
service operates. Because of this, myriad reform interventions by different 
stakeholders, for example the intervention by the civil society groups 
notably Usalama Reforms Forum and the Police Reforms Working Group 
are in conflict with each other thus contributing to confusion in the reform 
process.189 
This confusion can be explained from different points of view. First, there 
are no clear guidelines for determining the entry point of various 
stakeholders in the reform process. A respondent from the civil society 
groups observed that in the absence of clear policy guiding their role in 
the police reform process, they ‘just engage in any policy that affect peace 
and conflict in the country.190 The same situation obtains amongst the 
donors. For example the DfID informant noted that though they support 
the reform process ‘it’s not been clear how DfID’191 should support the 
process for there are no clear guidelines from the government of Kenya 
on engagement with bilateral partners. 
Secondly, the absence of national security strategy, at least in the public 
domain if it ever exists, also raises questions amongst the Kenyan public 
regarding the framework upon which to judge the performance of the 
police and the Kenyan security in general. As noted by a respondent, 
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‘without such a document then it becomes difficult to interrogate the 
competence and role of oversight on the police and how the police 
coordinate with other agencies to ensure public safety’.192 Response to 
sporadic security problems has been disjointed with the police often found 
on the receiving end. One of these problems was the government’s 
response to the Westgate Shopping Mall terrorist attack on September 
21, 2013.193 Whilst the control of the situation should have been within the 
remit of the Inspector General who was expected to give briefings, ‘he 
was not able to give those briefings. In the end the public was left 
speculating and asking questions’194 about who was in charge of the 
whole process. The confusion witnessed in the rescue efforts perhaps 
underscores the need for the completion of the National Security Policy 
from which the police and other security agencies would demarcate their 
roles. 
Yet another significant development was the ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ 
mounted by Kenya’s security in April 2014. The operation sought to clear 
the country, particularly the Somali dominated district of Eastleigh in 
Nairobi, of illegal immigrants thought to be responsible for terrorist and 
grenade attacks in the country. This was a response to terrorism threat 
the country faced, six months after the Westgate incident. While the 
operation mimicked the emergence of Kenya’s counter terrorism strategy 
(Rawlence, 2014), it failed address the root causes of Kenya’s security 
problems but rather contributed to strained relationship between the 
police and the government on the one hand and human rights groups, the 
opposition, Muslim community and Somali constituencies in Kenya. It also 
further polarised Kenyans along religious lines with the Muslim community 
claiming the operation was in response to a criminal attack in church in 
Likoni, Mombasa. The Inspector General was also accused of re-
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introducing shoot to kill order while the Muslim community condemned 
what they termed systematic profiling of the Kenyan Somali community. 
However, while there was opposition to the operation, no tangible 
alternative was being offered in dealing with the high population of illegal 
immigrants claimed to have infiltrated Eastleigh. Others recommended 
intelligence-led policing in dealing with suspected terrorists but remained 
silent on dealing with aliens. In the end, the government resolved to 
undertake new registration of all Kenyans.195 This situation provides an 
important lesson for police reform process in Kenya. Where no 
comprehensive strategy for dealing with internal security challenges 
during the police reform process is in place, or unknown to the public, 
haphazard interventions roll back the gains made in the reform process, 
particularly with respect to consolidating the legitimacy of the police 
amongst the people. 
4.3.2.2.2 From Force to Service: The National Police Service 
The change of name from a force to a service was an immediate priority 
to signal the break with the past in the police force – a past in which ‘the 
police has continued to be viewed as the most inefficient, the most 
corrupt, the most ineffective among the public sectors.’196 Thus it was 
hoped that change of name would alter the image of the police so that it 
would be responsive to those that are served, that is the public. 
Merging the two forces was however not going to be easy. The two forces 
had different trajectories and cultures. The Administration Police has very 
strong connections with the provincial administration and many of the 
senior officers are not police professionals. Because of this, the Waki 
Commission proposed gradual merger. The Ransley team on the other 
hand reported that Kenyans were opposed to merger (GoK, 2009, p.42-
43) and therefore proposed maintaining the two forces as independent but 
under the Inspector General. Article 239(1) of the Kenya Constitution 
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(GoK, 2010) effectively gave rise to the Kenya Police Service with its 
functions, organisation and administration legislated through the National 
Police Service Act, 2011. The two police forces, the Administration Police 
and the Kenya Police were maintained as independent entities directly 
under the control of the Inspector General. There emerged a two-track 
policing system which was not intended by the drafters of the police 
reform agenda. Though the Ransley team acknowledged the challenge of 
merging the two services, the magnitude of the problem was 
underestimated and remains un-addressed by the police reform process. 
Based on the information gathered from the fieldwork, the process of 
merging the two forces under the command of the Inspector General 
received weak mandate. While it may appear that the merger works at the 
national level, this is not the case at the county and sub-county levels. A 
common theme emerging from personal interviews and focus group 
discussions at the county level is that the merger actually has not worked 
and that the police reform process is yet to deal with this challenge. The 
Kenya Police and the Administration Police still conduct business as they 
previously did. There has never been an attempt to make the units to 
think and act as one service. This arrangement is more problematic at the 
county level with mostly the Kenya Police complaining about their 
Administration Police counterparts. 
‘the police are sometimes complaining that most of the AP’s, they 
are many but see, they are doing other works, but after those 
works,(sic) ‘wakitoka huko kwa banks joini’,197 they want now to go 
on operations, operation that even the OCPD who is actually in 
charge of the police force within the area has no role and they are 
not answerable to. And you can find, AP arresting suspects they 
take them there (police cells), they say police release them 
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because of lack of coordination, lack of understanding, so really 
there is total disconnection between these units of the police.’198 
This situation undermines the command of the police service at the 
county level and opened up opportunities for interference with the running 
of the police while at the same time frustrating efforts towards internal 
accountability. 
Interviews with stakeholders also do suggest that transforming the two 
forces into a service is far from being achieved. The police are ‘still doing 
things the same old ways which has failed.’199 For example, during data 
collection in a divisional police headquarter in Nairobi; a traffic officer who 
thought the researcher had committed a traffic offence demanded the 
researcher’s car keys without knowing first what had taken the researcher 
to the station. This narrative was reinforced in the focus group discussions 
with the youth in Kisumu. Similar to this is the fact that despite the 
researcher’s wishes to have audience with the Inspector General; the IG’s 
orderlies would not allow the researcher audience with the IG on claims 
that IG was busy. From the time research clearance was obtained from 
the National Council of Science and Technology, it took almost one month 
from July 29, 2013 to August 21, 2013 to get permission to interview 
police officers. This was after several visits to the IGs office. This story 
was also replicated in the face to face interviews with many respondents 
giving unpleasant experiences in the hands of the police even in the face 
of on going reforms.200 
4.3.2.2.3 National Police Service Commission 
The establishment of an institution dedicated to human resources issues 
in the police force is not entirely a new phenomenon in Kenya. The 
Independence Constitution of 1963 envisaged a commission ‘responsible 
for determining the terms and conditions of service of the police’ (GoK, 
2009, p.45). This however did not last as the 1964 amendments abolished 
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the Police Service Commission and placed the police under the Public 
Service Commission.201 The Police Strategic Plan 2003 also proposed the 
establishment of a commission that would oversee human resource 
functions in the police (Kenya Police, 2004, p.23), while the Ransley team 
recommended ‘immediate amendment of the Constitution to create the 
Police Service Commission’ (GoK, 2009, p.50). 
Following these recommendations, Article 246 (1) (GoK, 2010, p.150) of 
the Kenya Constitution 2010 and subsequent National Police Service 
Commission Act of 2011 established a commission in charge of 
administrative matters of the National Police Service. Whilst the 
establishment of the institution fairly involved some consensus, the 
controversies around the appointment of the commissioners and the 
complications surrounding its operations are of interest in this study. What 
was the underlying reason for contestation for the appointment of the 
commissioners and why are the operations of the commission dogged 
with controversies? The interviews revealed two main reasons, namely; 
interests of the political elite and resistance from the police and their 
associates that have over the years benefitted from the confusion in the 
police service respectively. However, the informants were not willing to 
divulge much, as their appointment to their offices was subject of 
contestation. Of interest is the fact that these key informants were not 
keen on taking this conversation further, instead claiming the 
controversies were a case of ‘water under the bridge.’202 
Firstly, the complications regarding appointments to the NPSC were due 
to the politics of power-sharing at the time203 and the ‘determination by 
both sides to control on who becomes the Inspector General, who 
becomes the Deputy Inspector General, who becomes the Director of 
Directorate of Criminal Investigations.’204 The process of appointments 
initially looked very straight forward until ‘when it came to forwarding the 
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name of the best candidate that had been agreed upon,205 to the 
president and the prime minister. Whilst the informant absolved the 
principals, the president and the prime minister from blame, he argued the 
vested interests, in this case the political elite and presidential appointees 
may have been responsible for the confusion by deliberately sending to 
parliament ‘another candidate who was not even amongst the top’206 for 
parliamentary approval. 
Secondly, the commission encountered lots of resistance especially from 
the police due to ‘the realization that this commission is very strong 
institution in terms of democratizing policing.207 It is for this reason that 
there has been disquiet within the top police hierarchy that they called 
upon the president to sack the NPSC chairman. However, this was 
impossible as the chair enjoys security of tenure as an independent 
institution in the constitution. The strongest indication of resistance came 
from the withdrawal of the security details of the chairman and 
subsequent dumping of a human head within the precincts of NPSC 
offices with a letter addressed to him. Later, just before the second phase 
of the vetting process, yet another poison laced letter was addressed to 
the NPSC together with another commissioner. Though these were 
treated as normal crime incidents, that the event happened as the 
commission was preparing for police vetting raised lots of queries. Again, 
there have also been public altercations between the chairman and the 
Inspector General, a scenario often referred to as teething problems.208 
Despite these challenges, the commission has moved the police reform 
forward by putting in place a number of priorities. 
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4.3.2.2.4 Institutionalising External Accountability: The 
Independent Policing Oversight Authority 
So who is going to give us answers to these acts? Nobody! That is 
why the hostility between the public and the police will take much 
longer in this area than elsewhere.209 
Police oversight and accountability is at the heart of any police reform 
process. OECD-DAC recognises accountability as a key plank of any 
reform process alongside the establishment of effective governance, 
improved delivery of security and justice services and development of 
local ownership (OECD DAC, 2007). In Kenya, police accountability was a 
major issue in the design of police reform agenda. Three strands of 
accountability suggested by Auerbach (2003) are discernible in the 
Kenyan context. These include; popular accountability, legal 
accountability and transparency. 
Popular accountability is manifested through mechanisms that 
subordinate the police to the people, who exercise their ‘sovereign power 
either directly or through their democratically elected representatives’ 
(GoK, 2010) and through engagement between the police and the 
community. Legal accountability entails police ‘compliance with the law 
and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’ (GoK, 2010) while transparency is manifest in 
the constitutional requirement that the police does not act in a partisan 
manner while discharging its duties. Thus, processes such as recruitment 
and vetting are deemed to be part of envisaged transparency. A closer 
look at these three types of accountability in Kenya points to the fact that 
police accountability has its anchorage not only in the constitution but also 
the pieces of legislation and recommendations that drive police reform 
agenda. 
Whilst these were discernible in terms of how the reform agenda was 
constructed, the interviews revealed that ‘acceptance of that 
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accountability by the National Police Service itself is a challenge’210 and 
members of the public are yet to hold the police into account and gain the 
public trust despite numerous efforts towards the same. For example, in 
one interview, it was obvious the public is still asking questions of over 
one hundred people killed by the police in Kisumu during the 2007 post-
election violence and the recent incident in which ‘people were herded 
into a kiosk and the door of the kiosk was locked from outside with a 
padlock and set the kiosk ablaze’211.  
External accountability ensures that the police are answerable and 
responsible for their acts of omissions and commissions to an entity or 
authority from without the police. As already indicated, the Kenyan 
constitution promulgated in 2010 insubordinates the police to the people 
through their elected representatives thus providing for civilian oversight 
of the police. This oversight is both at the supervisory level and through 
handling of complaints against the police from members of the public. At 
the supervisory level, Articles 10-12 of the National Police Service 
Commission Act (KCLR, 2011b) make the National Police Service 
answerable to the National Police Service Commission, a civilian authority 
legally empowered to exercise authority over the National Police Service 
and ensure that the police maintain acceptable standards of service 
delivery to the citizenry. 
In terms of complaints from members of the public, the Ethics and anti-
Corruption Commission, Kenya National Human Rights and Equality 
Commission, Commission on Administrative Justice, also known as 
ombudsman and parliamentary committees all provide oversight on public 
officials including the police. While ensuring the police act within the law, 
establishing whether these complaints are effectively addressed still 
remains a challenge. For example, interviews with key informants from 
the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission and 
Commission on Administrative Justice revealed different levels of 
engagement in relation to police oversight. While the KNHREC work is 
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mostly tied to civil society organisation, both Usalama Reforms Forum 
and Police Reforms Working Group, the commission on Administrative 
remains more of advisory.212 An overview of police accountability 
mechanism in Kenya is presented in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3: Police accountability mechanisms in Kenya 
 
Adapted from: HRI (2014) 
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While these organisations have existed even at the height of breakdown 
of accountability of the police, they did not leave remarkable impact in 
providing oversight of the police for various reasons including lack of 
independence, lack of support, weak legislative anchorage. It is for this 
reason that there was the recommendation that an independent oversight 
body be established specifically to deal with complaints against the police. 
The Waki commission recommended the establishment of an 
Independent Civilian Oversight Authority (Waki Commission, 2008, p.482) 
while constitutional reform process included strong component of police 
oversight in various drafts and in the promulgated constitution of 2010. 
Furthermore, Philip Alston also put a strong case for police oversight in 
his report `(Alston, 2010). 
With all these under consideration, the Ransley team also did recommend 
the establishment of an independent oversight authority specifically 
dealing with complaints against the police. It is for this reason that the 
Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) was established,213 not 
only to benefit the police but to also develop confidence from members of 
the public that their complaints against the police are being looked into. In 
recommending this authority, the team provided what it considered 
prerequisites for the success of effective oversight in a number of 
jurisdictions. Key amongst these include, independence, adequate 
funding, police cooperation, political support, power to review patterns of 
police behaviour, and power to enforce decisions. Interviews revealed that 
some of these conditions do exist with reference to IPOA. For example, 
asked whether IPOA is sufficiently facilitated in its operations, a key 
informant was quick to respond thus: 
‘‘We are facilitated. We've not had any issues with the government, 
we’ve not had issues with the executive, and we’ve not had any 
issues with parliament. In terms of facilitation, we'd actually be 
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demonising any of the institutions if I were to say we've not been 
facilitated.’’214 
The above response does suggest that a number of pre-requites for 
effective oversight suggested by GoK (2009, p.86-88), for example in this 
case, independence, adequate funding, political support are in place. 
However, whether these translate into actionable recommendations by 
IPOA remain in doubt. 
A typical case is that in which IPOA had previously objected to the 
appointment of certain individuals to key positions in the National Police 
Service based on the evidence they had gathered from the public. 
However, their recommendations against the appointments were 
disregarded thus raising questions about the ability of IPOA to effectively 
provide oversight of the police service. Does IPOA really have powers to 
enforce decisions or at least call for explanations when there is no 
compliance? This question is critical for effective oversight to be achieved. 
Commenting on this, the Ransley committee observed that a strong 
civilian police oversight should have statutory power to follow up on 
recommendations to ensure that they are implemented failing which it 
should have further powers to enforce such implementation in a court of 
law (GoK, 2009). 
The response from a key informant in relation to this question does 
suggest that as currently obtaining, IPOA does not have the ability to 
enforce decisions; neither does it have the ability to call for explanations 
in the case of non-compliance. A classical case is with the recruitment of 
the Director of Criminal Investigations in which IPOA had objected to the 
appointment of Ndegwa Muhoro as the Director. The key informant had 
this to say; 
As to the implementation, for instance now I am sure you are 
referring to the appointment of the Director of the Directorate of 
Criminal Investigations, which was a decision we took as IPOA. We 
                                            
214
 Interview with K-Int2 
158 
passed the mantle to the president and the prime minister then and 
our work ended there it was their responsibility to take it up from 
there if they chose to ignore it as far as we are concerned we have 
finished our work.215 
Apart from the IPOA lacking in the ability to enforce their decision; 
acceptance of that accountability by the National Police Service itself is a 
challenge.216 For example, interview with two senior officers in Kisumu 
revealed that amongst the police officers, IPOA is seen as an impediment 
to the operations of the police.217 The first ever prosecution case against a 
police officer by IPOA was against Pangani Officer Commanding Station 
(OCS). The officer was accused of concealing vital information in favour 
of the police. The Inspector General of Police however while addressing 
County Security Teams Rapid Results Initiative meeting in Nairobi on 
07/04/2014 urged the police not to be distracted by the case and asked 
them to continue using their firearm within the law, something that was 
construed to mean shoot to kill order amongst human rights activists. 
Despite these difficulties, and the fact that police oversight is totally a new 
concept in Kenya, there is evidence to demonstrate that the effort towards 
building an effective external accountability through the Independent 
Policing Oversight Authority is on course. To start with, the institution is 
building its capacity and is currently in the second phase developing a 
‘strategic document that will guide the organisation for the next three to 
five years.’218 The first phase involved putting structures relating to the 
organogram of the organisation, setting up the regulations, setting up the 
policies, the recruitment strategy, the vision and mission of the institution, 
looking for the physical infrastructure and setting up the ICT infrastructure.  
Whilst this has been happening, the impatience of Kenyans wanting to 
see results is also being addressed. To this effect, the authority is carrying 
out various investigations which vary and include; death and serious 
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injury, sexual harassment by members of the police service, members of 
the police also complain against the police themselves, unprofessional 
conduct including rudeness, involvement by the police in crime, 
recklessness and inability to perform. Most of the complaints are ‘against 
the members of the police service. The traffic particularly is the one that 
you receive complaints any particular day.219 The authority has also 
conducted a baseline survey that will help pick indicators to determine if 
there is progress in the National Police Service. This is particularly 
important ‘because the effectiveness or otherwise of Independent Police 
Oversight Authority will be gauged on whether there are changes within 
the National Police Service itself or not.220 If going forward people do not 
see any fundamental change within the police service, it would mean that 
the accountability mechanism is not working. By the time of writing this 
thesis, IPOA had made tremendous efforts in ensuring external 
accountability of the police (IPOA, 2014). 
4.4 Micro Level Elements of Police Reforms 
4.4.1 Police Command 
Two police chiefs presided over police reform during the period 2009-
2014; Mathew Iteere, the last Commissioner of Police, and David 
Kimaiyo, the first ever Inspector General of police. The reform trajectories 
under the two police chiefs have been different. Iteere’s tenure was 
characterised by very little reform due to lots of resistance to reform at 
higher levels of police command. In fact, it was during this period that Eric 
Kiraithe, the then police spokesman announced that the police would be 
unwilling to have a civilian as the Inspector General (Ogemba, 2012). No 
rebuttal was given regarding Kiraithe’s statement, thus suggesting that it 
was the official position of the police command. 
Iteere’s role in the reform process as the police chief elicits mixed 
reactions from stakeholders in the police reform process. Some members 
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of the civil society groups claim it was difficult ‘to work with the former 
commissioner of police Mathew Iteere who seemed to be difficult to even 
just give audience.221 The rigidity in opening up was due to uncertain 
future the top police officers faced if reforms were to be undertaken. 
Reforms meant losing their jobs hence the resistance (ICG, 2013).  
Because Iteere had reached the peak of his career and his stint was 
transitional, there may not have been the motivation to embrace reform. In 
fact, it is during this time that the country witnessed heightened insecurity 
not only targeting the public but also the police. For example, in August 
2012, nine police officers were amongst the thirty eight people killed Tana 
River ethnic conflict between Pokomo and Orma. Three months later on 
November 10, 2012, forty two police officers pursuing Turkana raiders 
were killed in Suguta Valley as they pursued the raiders who had stolen 
livestock from the neighbouring Samburu community. 
Despite the internal security challenges during Iteere’s tenure, the fact 
that Iteere allowed for a comprehensive study by Usalama Reform Forum 
to determine what ails the police in terms of service delivery is 
significant.222 Though little was achieved in reform during Iteere’s tenure, 
his performance was a conflation of both macro interests of the political 
elite and the institutionalised systemic rot in the police. In essence 
demonstrating how the macro decision of replacing the police chief 
impacted on the reform process. Iteere did not apply to retain his job 
under the new title of the Inspector General, which was filled by David 
Kimaiyo through a competitive process. David Kimaiyo was sworn in as 
the first ever inspector general of police on December 24, 2012, only 
three months to the 2013 general elections. Kimaiyo’s immediate role was 
to ensure public confidence in the police is restored and that there is no 
repeat of the cycle of electoral related violence (ICG, 2013).  
Kimaiyo’s appointment drew lots of excitement and expectations. The 
position of the Inspector General was a new phenomenon in Kenya with 
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the successful applicant being the first ever to enjoy security of tenure and 
independence under the new constitution. With this clout, it naturally 
followed that the recruitment process of the office holder would generate 
lots of debate. 
First, the PRWG though lauded the process, opposed the appointment of 
Kimaiyo over claims he needed to be investigated over his role in the 
2007 post-election violence as director of police operations and 
circumstances under which he was transferred to the Ministry of Gender 
(KHRC, 2012). Secondly, a section of the Kenyan society, particularly 
those affiliated to president Kibaki felt the timing for the appointment was 
not ideal as rushing with the appointment would be ‘a threat to national 
security’ ahead of the 2013 general elections.223 However, the newly 
established NPSC was determined to ensure that the country goes to the 
polls under a new inspector general of police despite opposition from 
sections of the civil society groups that such appointment would be a 
threat to national security during electioneering period. Thirdly, resistance 
to a civilian inspector general from the top police command generated a 
lot of debate and still remained alive even after the process was 
completed. Some members of the public claimed that the choice of 
uniformed police officers as the IG was predetermined. For example a 
chief executive officer (CEO) of a private security company who applied 
for the IG position noted the NPSC wanted uniformed officers due to 
resistance to a civilian inspector general by the top police command and 
so did not shortlist civilian applicants.224 
The NPSC however denied this claim, though acknowledged that police 
resistance may have dissuaded qualified civilians from applying for the IG 
position. ‘It’s like those who were really the cream kept away from it so we 
ended up with a police officer.’225 Probed why the commission did not find 
it necessary to re-advertise the vacancy for the inspector general, the key 
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informant noted NPSC was determined to have the inspector general 
oversee security arrangements for the 2013 general elections. This move 
was important as it was the first step to determining police readiness for 
the reform process after the police poor show in the 2007 elections. Apart 
from the inspector general position, the recruitment of the two deputy 
inspector general positions and the director of the criminal investigations 
remained a contested issue from amongst the political elite. The 
controversies mainly relate to the prevailing politics of coalition 
government and are developed in Chapter 5. 
The police command remains a subject of interest for different 
stakeholders in the reform process, the argument being that the slow 
pace of reform is due to the inability of the police command to spearhead 
reforms. For example, a key informant working closely with the police 
observed that ‘these people are not able to get their act together. The 
problem lies with their strategy. They don’t seem to have a strategy’.226 
Yet another respondent noted that police leadership ‘is about instilling 
certain ethos, certain accountability methods in an institution and building 
a completely different institution with a different culture’,227 which it is 
claimed is missing under current police command. Giving examples of the 
reforms in the judiciary and the KWS under Dr.Willy Mutunga and Julius 
Kipng’etich respectively, some respondents argued that recruitment of the 
inspector general from amongst the serving police officers meant a lost 
opportunity in the police reform process as reforms come from without. 
They observed, ‘Mutunga has done what he has done simply because he 
came from outside. If he was one of them, I am sure he would not have 
achieved what he has achieved today,’228 and that within one year of 
office, Kipng’etich transformed KWS into ‘one of the best competent, 
capable agencies.’229 Where there are other institutions for example the 
judiciary and the KWS that have done relatively well in the reform 
process, they become the yardsticks upon which the police reform 
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process is determined. This however ignores unique characteristics of the 
institutions. For example, the level of political interference and the 
institutional culture at the macro and micro levels within the police 
represent divergent trajectories that should be considered in any form of 
comparison.  
Whatever the debates about police command, there was overwhelming 
evidence that stakeholders did not have confidence in police leadership to 
steer the reform process. Though the process of recruitment of police 
leadership was competitive, there were perceptions that it failed to get the 
right people for the jobs. These sentiments perhaps contributed 
significantly to the changing of the law that gave top security chiefs 
security of tenure so that in the event of ineptitude then they could be 
removed easily from office. The Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014 
(GoK, 2014) achieved this, effectively giving back the executive the right 
to hire and fire the Inspector General thus returning the country to where it 
was before the post 2007 police reform. 
4.4.2 Police Welfare 
I feel disgraced that an officer can work for thirty years as a 
constable, and that’s the worst crime you can commit to a police 
officer. Imagine a police officer spending thirty years as a police 
constable.230 
Looking at the situation of the welfare of police officers in Kenya, one has 
the feeling that lots of crimes have been committed to the officers as 
captured by the comments from the above interviewee. Everything 
regarding the police welfare as defined by the Force Standing Orders 
Chapter 53 (1)231 seemed to have broken down yet there has never been 
significant effort to address the situation until the post 2007 reform. 
Experiences from countries that have attempted to professionalise police 
service show that they spend huge resources towards the welfare of the 
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police officers. Countries visited by the Ransley team for benchmark 
studies provided enough lessons about investment in the welfare of the 
police service. 
Housing conditions, salaries and allowances, performance management 
and appraisal, promotions and post-service welfare (GoK, 2009, p.124 - 
158) still remain issues of concern in terms of police welfare. A number of 
initiatives have been undertaken though the process still falls behind 
schedule. For example, the police now have a comprehensive insurance 
cover with effect from July 1, 2014, their allowances have been paid, and 
a programme that seeks to address police welfare has also been put in 
place. After months of heated exchanges in parliament over National 
Police Service representative in the Salary Review Commission, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta in April 2014 appointed James Maina Muhoro, 
a career civil servant to represent the National Police Service in the 
Salaries Review Commission (SRC) to take care of the police welfare. 
The police had been left out in the establishment of the SRC as the NPSC 
had not been established. Additionally, the government provided Ksh.4 
billion to facilitate modernisation of the National Police Service (Wabala, 
2014). 
Prospects for improving police welfare look good based on the 
discussions with key informants. The stakeholders view this as a 
mandatory issue owing to how the reform agenda was built which put 
police welfare at the centre of reforms. A respondent working with the 
police noted that despite challenges facing the reform, the police are glad 
that ‘for the first time this constitution gave us face. We have an 
opportunity today to go back to school (sic) get promotions’.232 While the 
prospects for improving police welfare look positive at least in the long 
run, police reform in the short run seem to focus more on institutions of 
reforms and enhancing police capacity at the expense of police welfare.  
In the 2014/2015 budget estimates for example, out of the Ksh.66 billion 
to the police service, some Ksh.29 billion would be used directly to 
                                            
232
 Interview with CSO2 
165 
enhance security, while Sh6.7 billion would be used for leasing of police 
vehicles and aircraft. Police equipment would be purchased at Sh3.5 
billion while Sh1.8 billion has been set aside for the Command and 
Control Centre while the ongoing security operation dubbed ‘Usalama 
Watch’ had Sh3.3 billion allocation. However, there was no allocation for 
salary increment. This perhaps helps explain why the process of 
addressing welfare issues in the police has been slow. For example, a 
respondent captured this failure to put police welfare at the centre of 
police reform discourse thus;  
‘So far the focus has been on the Inspector General’s office. 
People are just looking at small things; the wrangles that are there, 
which office, should he be wearing a uniform in public or what he 
should be wearing you know.’233 
Alongside the welfare of the police officer is their working condition in the 
police stations. Three police stations visited during data collection; one in 
Nairobi and two in Kisumu, demonstrate that modernising the Kenyan 
police stations is still not possible in the short run. The image of the 
working conditions in Kenya police stations is appalling to say the least. 
Horrendous working conditions of the police in Kenya have been widely 
reported.234 A respondent described the situation in the police stations 
thus: 
‘The kind of police stations we have I mean you will be shocked, 
like the evidence room my God it looks like a store’.235 
Despite this situation, public discourse on police working conditions is not 
given enough prominence in the police reform debate. Why is police 
welfare not prominent in the discourse on police reform? The problem, 
according to one respondent lies with everyone. However, the media and 
civil society take huge blame as they form the agenda for advocacy. The 
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focus of the media and the civil society has so much been on 
irrelevancies including infighting between the office of the Inspector 
General and the National Police Service Commission. Secondly, the 
police also have their share of blame for failure ‘to come out and really try 
to push for whatever their agenda’236 which is lost in the reform discourse. 
Though there are indications that police welfare is receiving attention, this 
attention still falls far short of both public and police expectation.237 
4.4.3 Police Recruitment and Training 
For a long time, nepotism and ethnic discretion have determined 
recruitment into the Administration Police and the Kenya Police. Thus the 
quality of recruits has been wanting with the police force considered a 
dumping ground for those with low academic qualification. The process 
has been riddled with corruption with prospective candidates paying 
bribes of as much as Ksh.100,000 to be recruited (GoK, 2009). It is with 
this in mind that the review of the recruitment process and recruitment of 
more police officers was included as a reform package in the post 2008 
police reform package. The former, because professionalizing the police 
begins with the calibre of officers, their predispositions and qualifications 
and the latter, to bring the police-population ratio closer to the acceptable 
UN standards. 
Thus, the review of the recruitment process started with public 
participation in the recruitment of the inspector general and his deputies. 
This was followed with the recruitment of the constables which was also 
markedly different from the previous recruitment processes. The first 
recruitment of constables under the NPSC was undertaken on November 
22, 2012. Unlike in the past, this process sought to address gender bias 
and ethnic imbalance in the police population.238 It also set new entry 
criteria with a minimum entry level of a mean score of C plain in Kenya 
Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) compared to previous D+ 
entry level, ‘except for areas where this was not possible, C- (C minus) or 
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in extreme cases D plus was accepted’ (Usalama Reforms Forum, 2012). 
The NPSC set up recruitment committees including the local District 
Security Intelligence Committee to oversee the process in 289 centres. 
The Ransley Committee proposed that ‘Recruitment of police officers 
should be done by the Police Service Commission while the District 
Security Intelligence Committees will support the PSC with the vetting of 
the candidates’ (GoK, 2009, p.109).  
Whilst the recruitment process was not perfect, there was remarkable 
improvement from previous processes. Civil society groups monitored the 
process and returned a fair verdict on the process. For example, a report 
by Usalama Reforms Forum concludes that ‘the recruitment process was 
transparent, fair and open to public participation’ (Usalama Reforms 
Forum, 2012, p.7). A few weeks to the pass-out parade in April 2014 
however, the Industrial Court sitting in Nairobi gave orders stopping the 
pass-out parade of the recruits on allegations that the recruitment and 
training were not transparent. A local civil society organization, Kenya 
Council of Employment and Migration Agency (KCEMA) claimed NPSC 
replaced 1,900 recruits who had on January 25, 2013, been sent away 
from Kiganjo and Embakasi police colleges for having fake documents 
and others being pregnant (Kurian and Ombati, 2014). Despite these 
orders, the pass-out parade went on as planned and some 1000 police 
officers were added to the police roll. 
The 2014 recruitment was a complete departure from the 2012. The 
minimum qualification was reduced to D+ (plus). The process was also 
riddled with claims of corruption, nepotism and tribalism. The gains made 
in the reform process were reversed with this single exercise. Civil society 
groups, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the Independent 
Policing Oversight Authority called for cancellation of the process while 
the Parliamentary Committee on Administration and National security 
called for postponement of the reporting day initially scheduled for 3rd 
October 2014. The NPSC acknowledged indeed there were problems and 
formed an Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) committee including 
NPSC, EACC, NIS, and CID to investigate. IPOA opted not to be included 
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in the working group arguing that there would be no fairness as only the 
EACC did not participate in the recruitment and that it lacked 
constitutional and statutory requirement of transparency and 
accountability.  
The committee cancelled the exercise in thirty six centres which affected 
1215 recruits.239 Meanwhile, IPOA, which had called for cancellation of 
the whole exercise, convinced the High Court that the recruitment process 
did not meet the required standards and therefore had the process 
nullified.240 The cancellation drew mixed reactions from all stakeholders. 
Civil society groups and opposition politicians hailed the court’s decision; 
while some Members of Parliament allied to the ruling Jubilee Alliance 
accused the courts of meddling in the reform process and interference 
with the government’s pledge to create jobs.241 
Though the police recruitment in the year 2012 was considered fair across 
the board, 2014 recruitment was largely rejected and reflected inherent 
problems in police enlistment that have existed for many years (see 
Figure 4 below). 
 
Figure 4: Police recruitment exercise 
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Whatever the stakeholder positions, the High Court ruling set the 
precedence that transparency is an essential ingredient in police 
recruitment. It served to make future recruitment exercises more 
transparent. In fact, after the ruling, the Interior Ministry and the NPSC 
moved to publish The National Police Service Commission (Recruitments 
and Appointments) Regulations 2014, which would streamline the 
recruitment process.242  
Post 2008 reform also considered training of the police. Previously, fresh 
recruits were trained for nine months in three police training schools at 
Kenya Police Training school at Kiganjo, General Service Unit (GSU) 
training school and the Administration Police Training School (APTS) at 
Embakasi. The reforms relating too training meant that officers who joined 
the service after completing the fourth form undergo a 15 months training 
and a three month internship. Those who joined the with a university 
degree undergo training for a 21 months including a three month 
internship training. 
The curriculum for training of the police officers has also been 
transformed to incorporate the emerging trends in policing. Alongside the 
review of training period and the curricula, the police also collaborate with 
Kenyatta University Institute of Peace and Security Studies to offer 
degree programmes, diploma and certificate in security management and 
police studies. Most of these courses have attracted huge number of 
police officers who are either self-sponsored of state sponsored. 
4.4.4 Vetting of Police Officers 
‘Vetting is a key crucial aspect of police reform’.243 It entails a formal 
process for the identification and the removal of individuals responsible for 
abuses, especially from police, prison services, the army and the judiciary 
(Finci, 2007, p.24). Most often these are institutions noted to have 
committed human rights violations or allowed the violations to happen. In 
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the context of Kenya, two vetting processes have been undertaken as a 
result of the 2007 post-election violence, namely; the vetting of the judges 
and magistrates and the vetting of the police undertaken by the Judges 
and Magistrates Vetting Board and the National Police Service 
Commission Committee respectively. The two processes have had their 
fair share of problems, particularly with respect to court cases challenging 
the processes. At the time of writing, a section judges found unfit to serve 
had challenged the decisions and the legality of the board at the Supreme 
Court.  
Vetting of police officers sought to exclude from the service police officers 
found to have violated human rights and aimed at ‘infusing 
professionalism and competence in the police force (sic) and making the 
service more accountable to the public’.244 It was a certification process 
where serving police officers were screened to determine their suitability 
for continued service. If on the basis of a defined criteria an officer was 
found fit to serve, s/he would be certified and retained or dismissed if unfit 
to serve.245 The first attempt to vet police officers was in June 2011 where 
1112 officers in the rank of Superintendent and above undertook 
psychometric testing (United Nations, 2012). After complaints from the 
police and members of civil society, the process was stopped to await the 
operationalisation of the National Police Service Commission which is 
mandated to carry out vetting process. 
Vetting of all police officers is provided in Article 246(b) of the constitution, 
and the NPS and NPSC Acts under Articles 7 and 28 of the police acts 
respectively. Under the former, ‘all officers shall undergo vetting by the 
Commission to assess their suitability and competence’ and ‘the 
Commission shall discontinue the service of any police officer who fails in 
the vetting’ (KCLR, 2011a). Despite these provisions, there were fears the 
process would not be done or would be bungled as pointed by an 
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informant, ‘they will not do it, and if they do it they will stage-manage it.’246 
These remarks were informed by the strong resistance from the police 
officers. However, after cabinet approval, the process begun on 
December 17, 2013 and was expected to proceed for eighteen months 
when all police officers will have been vetted.  
While the public welcomed the idea of vetting, there were mixed feelings 
regarding the process. First, the process was criticized as unclear and 
lacking in transparency with regards to the composition of the vetting 
committee. Secondly, during the first phase of vetting, the vetting 
committee allowed for a two week window period for public submission on 
the suitability of senior police officers. The Police Reform Working Group 
considered this inadequate and petitioned the committee for more time. 
Thirdly, there was also the feeling that the Inspector General, his two 
deputies and the Director of Criminal Investigations needed to be vetted. 
The Police Reforms Working Group argued that leaving out the topmost 
officers would undermine the process.247  
Whilst it was the responsibility of the NPSC to undertake the vetting 
process, three members of the ‘nyumba kumi initiative’248 were co-opted 
under unclear circumstances. In particular, the integrity of Joseph Kaguthi 
was a major issue since he was adversely mentioned in the TJRC report 
for complicity in the Wagalla massacre (TJRC, 2013).  
Attempt to establish at what point three members of Nyumba Kumi 
initiative got involved in the vetting process revealed that the taskforce 
had nothing to do with the vetting process and that the three Nyumba 
Kumi members in the vetting committee were appointed in their individual 
capacity by the National Police Service Commission.249 Whether by 
coincidence or design, their absence from the taskforce on community 
policing during the vetting period slowed down the core activities of the 
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taskforce. This revelation further complicates the purpose for which the 
taskforce was formed, suggesting that its mandate was not very clear and 
that it remained so until the members pulled out of the vetting committee. 
In February 2014, just before the third round of the vetting process, 
Nyumba Kumi taskforce members including Francis Sang, Werunga 
Simiyu and Joseph Kaguthi resigned from the vetting committee. 
Conflicting information was given for their resignation. There were claims 
of infighting amongst the members particularly in relation to the vetting of 
three police officers whose vetting decision was postponed to allow for 
further investigation. Simiyu was quoted saying they did not want to spoil 
their reputation in an exercise that lacked transparency, with the media 
mentioning the vetting of three officers250 as being the reason for their 
exit, while Kaguthi cited conflict of interest with Nyumba Kumi initiative. 
Whatever the reason, the resignation sent a negative signal to the 
process and confirmed the fears of the stakeholders that the process 
would be a rubberstamping process. Specifically two police officers 
cleared had lost confidence in the eyes of the public and that they were 
cleared by the vetting committee did not go down well with sections of the 
Kenyan society despite an investigator disclosing that there was no 
evidence to incriminate the officers.251 The question then is, did the 
vetting process meet the expectation of the public while at the same time 
ensuring fairness in the process? 
The manner in which the process was handled suggests lack of proper 
prioritisation of the process despite the strong mandate the process 
received in the constitution and in the police reform laws. That the 
process is being handled by the NPSC makes it difficult for the institution 
to focus entirely on the police reform agenda. Perhaps, the vetting formula 
for the judges and magistrate should have been applied, with the 
independent board vetting the serving police officers within a stipulated 
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period after which the NPSC would be responsible for the vetting of new 
officers. 
Whilst the impact of the vetting process cannot be ascertained in the short 
run, it no doubt established conditions generally considered necessary for 
establishment of an independent and professional police service. The 
process was characterised by lots of interest from the Kenyan public at 
the national level and remained ignored at the lower levels, perhaps 
signalling the disappointment with the process. Fears the process may not 
yield the intended outcome thus remained alive.  
4.4.5 Internal Accountability 
The establishment of IPOA at the macro level was not only meant to 
improve external accountability but also sought to ‘improve the quality of 
internal investigations of the police, reassure members of public that the 
police will investigate complaints thoroughly and fairly, discourage police 
misconduct and improve police policies and procedures’ (GoK, 2009, 
p.90). In this respect, the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) was established to 
investigate complaints against police officers. Despite establishment of 
the Internal Affairs Unit, there was little evidence of progress in the 
development of internal accountability. The system continues to face a lot 
of resistance from within, especially from the higher ranks, and lack of 
coherent accountability strategy. The police ‘don’t seem to have a 
strategy’ for ‘a clear accountability mechanism which has broken down, 
starting from the top going up to the station level.’252 
Where police leadership has been hard pressed to explain crimes 
committed by the police, police leadership has always considered these a 
case of a few rotten apples.253 However, the argument is that if these 
criminals are not identified and weeded out in time, ‘it means there are 
systemic managerial failures because with good management structures 
you will be able to pick out the failures in the police service and rectify in 
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time.’254 At the station level, the point where the common man feels 
policing, the officers commanding station are not able to account for the 
police officers within the station. The system as currently stands is unable 
to make line managers accountable and as such the rank and file are not 
accountable thus systematic failure in the way policing is delivered at the 
community level. 
The vetting process of senior police officers perhaps demonstrates the 
extent to which accountability mechanism in the police service had broken 
down. For example, it emerged that a Deputy Commissioner of Police had 
been earning a salary yet doing nothing for a period of one year, a period 
which he was still waiting for deployment from his seniors, apparently the 
Inspector General and his deputies, who happened to be members of the 
vetting committee. The Inspector General and his deputy could not 
account for what the officers had been doing for one year and were not 
subjected to explain why taxpayers’ money was spent for services not 
rendered by the officer. 
Two factors seem to affect the actualisation of the Internal Affairs Unit. 
These include lack of capacity and the attitude of the police officers. First, 
during the police vetting exercise, it was clear the unit was yet to pick up. 
The head of the unit Leo Nyongesa was hard pressed to explain the 
achievement of the unit eight months down the line. Aside from that, the 
difficulty the head of the unit experienced while explaining the mandate of 
the unit points to some incompetence in initiating internal accountability 
within the wider police reform process and that his office lacked 
equipment and personnel. As for the capacity, the officer noted thus;  
‘Internal affairs unit is a baby. We are in the process of establishing 
the unit and recruiting staff. There are so many complaints but we 
do not have the capacity.’255 
                                            
254
 Interview with K-Int2 
255
 Interview with NPS7  
175 
Despite these challenges, the unit was working with the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission to arrest corrupt officers and was also holding 
sensitisation workshops. By the time of writing this thesis, the unit had 
‘recommended about 20 cases for disciplinary action’.256 
Secondly, there is a hostile attitude towards the establishment of 
accountability amongst the police not only to the IPOA, but also to 
allowing the authority to have oversight role on the operations of the IAU. 
This element of hostility derives from the conversation with the police 
officers involved in the development of the standing orders which was 
being facilitated by Usalama Reforms Forum. It was also obvious that the 
officers participating in the process were jittery about involving IPOA in 
the development of accountability mechanism for the police. An officer 
observed that, ‘we should not bring IPOA too much in the operations of 
Internal Affairs Unit.’257 
The above statement suggests not only resistance towards to IPOA but 
also the wish of the police to remain ‘closed and secretive’. Most 
important, it demonstrates that the distinction between the role of IPOA 
and the IAU is yet to crystallise amongst the officers. More startling is the 
fact that even amongst the police officers participating in the process, 
some did not have confidence in their seniors to get the unit running as 
most of the complaints likely to emanate from the Internal Affairs Unit 
would be against top police officers. Asked why they were engaged in an 
exercise whose success they doubted, an officer retorted, ‘We were 
protecting out jobs.’258 
While the above discussions cast aspersions in the process of actualising 
the Internal Affairs Unit in the police service, there is hope that the unit will 
be up and running given the level of external support the unit is getting 
from external actors. At the time of writing, the UNODC Regional Office 
for Eastern Africa had advertised for the position of a consultant to help 
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with the operationalisation of the IAU with the specific mandate to provide 
technical assistance and advisory services to all stakeholders. Secondly, 
with the hindsight of resistance from the police, and that the issue of 
police oversight and accountability is a new phenomenon in Kenya, the 
IPOA has embraced external support as critical in moving forward 
accountability element in the police. These efforts are captured thus; 
we have technical people that we brought in because we also know 
that there are some areas we know require professional guidance. 
We brought in an investigations consultant from New Zealand who 
is very competent because we know that police oversight authority 
is a new phenomenon in Kenya. We did not want to start making 
mistakes so we brought in somebody of that level. When we were 
setting up the structures we also brought in a consultant from 
Holland, this is somebody who is rated amongst the top ten in the 
whole world in terms of setting up accountability mechanism in the 
police service.259 
Whilst there was evidence that internal accountability is yet to be 
accepted by the police, especially at the higher levels, and that there is 
very strong anti-IPOA and other external accountability mechanisms 
sentiments within the rank and file of the police, the symbiotic relationship 
between external and external accountability mechanisms makes it 
impossible for sustained opposition to accountability. However, given the 
fact that the police service is still in the process of establishing the internal 
accountability mechanism, it is still early to determine the extent to which 
this has been influenced by demands from external accountability.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has focussed on the implementation of the post 2007 police 
reform processes, at three levels namely, macro, meso and micro levels. 
From the analysis, the police reform process in Kenya is progressing at a 
slow pace. The reform process still faces obstacles arising out of the 
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factors identified as pre-requisites for successful reform process by the 
Ransley committee. 
At the macro level, political will and inadequate funding still pose a 
problem. Political will is manifest in the form of either support for or 
resistance to reforms from different stakeholders in different proportions. 
Though the executive and international donors demonstrate political will 
through improved funding and provision of resources, the behaviour of 
political elite and their associates remains a challenge. This incidentally 
runs across the entire spectrum of the levels of analysis. At the macro 
level, the political elite and the legislature influence the reform process by 
providing the reform direction, in this case eroding the gains made by the 
institutionalisation of the reform process.  At the meso level, institutional 
politics involving competition amongst the institutions managing the 
reform process has slowed down the reform, while the indifference to the 
reform process by local leaders has led to strained relationship between 
the public and the police. This has had the net effect of undermining 
public participation in the reform process. 
Meso level analysis focused on the institutions governing the reform 
process. In terms of coherence of the reform process, the absence of the 
National Security Policy from where the police reform strategy should 
derive has created a situation where reform efforts remain fragmented 
and characterised by poor coordination amongst various stakeholders, 
particularly the security actors and the other stakeholders. This challenge 
thus made it difficult for the police to address security challenges facing 
the country including; Al-Shabaab insurgency, proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons, corruption other forms of organised crime. Other 
challenges are related to the wider societal problems for example youth 
unemployment, poor infrastructure that make it impossible for police to 
respond to distress call from the public. 
At the micro level, the institutional culture of the police largely remains an 
obstacle in addressing the structural problems in the police. Whilst the 
vetting exercise was expected to weed out unsuitable crop of officers at 
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this level, it was not clear how the National Police Service would 
dismantle the networks that the officers may have established over the 
years. The culture of secrecy, protectionism and impunity still remained 
dominant even in the face of the police reform process. Also, mistrust still 
abounds between the police and members of the public thus making it 
difficult for the public to win the police confidence and vice versa, 
particularly in relation to community policing.  
Building on this chapter, particularly on the influence on politics discussed 
at the macro level, the next chapter provides a more detailed analysis of 
the influence of power-sharing on the police reform process. This is for 
the purpose of unpacking the political intrigues that shaped the police 
reform process under the power-sharing arrangement. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: POWER-SHARING 
POLITICS AND THE POLICE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA 
POWER-SHARING POLITICS AND THE POLICE REFORM PROCESS 
IN KENYA 
5.1  Introduction 
The discussions in the previous chapter suggest that lack of political-will 
significantly impeded the reform process prior to 2007, and remains one 
of the key obstacles to the post 2007 the police reform process in Kenya. 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of how politics, particularly the 
politics of power-sharing shaped the post-2007 police reform discussed in 
Chapter 4. It addresses the second thematic area in this study which 
explores the linkage between power-sharing politics and police reform 
processes in Kenya. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the fourth 
secondary research question thus; to what extent has power-sharing 
politics influenced police reform and wider SSR in Kenya? 
The chapter is developed broadly around Arendt Lijphart’s consociational 
democracy (Lijphart, 2008) which we introduced and discussed in chapter 
two. The chapter however does not aim to test Lijphart’s theory, but seeks 
to use the overall framework as an organising tool for examining how 
power-sharing politics shaped the post 2007/08 police reform process in 
Kenya.  
Lijphart’s early consociational democracy theory focused on grand 
coalition, in which power is shared among different factions forming the 
coalition government. In the 1990s however, the descriptions developed 
to include three other features namely; cultural autonomy, proportionality 
and minority veto. Lijphart’s notion of cultural autonomy means different 
things to different scholars. Ottmann and Vüllers (2014) consider cultural 
autonomy under territorial power-sharing dimension and further subdivide 
it into devolution and autonomy. In this chapter, as in Kanyinga (2009), 
devolution is used in place of cultural autonomy and involves both aspects 
of Ottmann and Vüllers (2014) dichotomy.  
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Lijphart’s structures have since then been modified into primary and 
secondary characteristics; with the grand coalition and cultural autonomy 
being the most crucial, whereas proportionality and minority veto occupy 
lower position of importance (Lijphart, 2008). In the case of Kenya’s 
power-sharing arrangement, we argue that all the Lijphart’s devices were 
present and influenced the police reform process in varying degrees, 
though the politics of the grand-coalition and devolution remained 
dominant. Hence, to what extent did power-sharing politics influence 
police reform process in Kenya? For the purpose of investigating this 
question, grand-coalition and devolution are used as pillars around which 
the discussions revolve.  
The chapter is organised into four sections. The present section (Section 
5.1) includes a brief introduction to Lijphart’s power-sharing theory and 
provides the organization of the chapter. Section 5.2 examines Kenya’s 
grand-coalition politics and its interrelationships with the police reform 
process. Section 5.3 discusses the Kenyan experience with devolution 
and how it interlinks with the police reform process at both national and 
county levels. In illustrating how politics impacted on police reform 
process and devolution, power-sharing arrangements before the 2013 
general elections in Marsabit County are analyzed. Section 5.4 concludes 
the chapter by highlighting key findings in the chapter. 
5.2 Grand - Coalition Politics and the Police Reform Process 
The analogy of ‘nusu mkate’ (Kiswahili for half a loaf)260 in Kenya’s politics 
remains alive even after the term of the coalition government in Kenya 
came to an end. The phrase has become the popular political reference 
point for the intricacies in the politics of power-sharing in Kenya. It justifies 
close proximity to power by the opposition elite and the ceding of some 
ground by the ruling party for the sake of stability. Of interest in this 
section is the interrelationship between power-sharing politics under the 
grand coalition government and the police reform process. How did the 
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politics of power-sharing shape, facilitate or constrain the police reform 
process under Kenya’s grand coalition? We argue that under the nusu-
mkate phenomenon, Kenya’s grand-coalition was indeed instrumental in 
shaping Kenya’s post 2007 police reform process though vested political 
interests threatened to derail the process and were largely to blame for 
the slow pace of the process. 
The grand coalition facilitated the setting up of reform agenda and policy 
for reform. This support is not however only unique to the Kenyan 
situation but applies in most cases to the discussions on merits of a grand 
coalition as a consociational solution to deeply divided societies. First, the 
grand coalition provided mechanisms, for example, the Waki Commission, 
the Ransley Committee and the 2010 constitution that provided the 
framework for undertaking police reforms. These mechanisms sought to 
investigate the 2007 post-election violence and isolated police culpability 
in the violence and recommended reforms. The political players driving 
the process were unanimous on the need to get these processes move 
forward.261 The formation of the grand coalition therefore formed a crucial 
entry point for police reform. It helped revitalise the police reform that had 
earlier stalled, due to little or no political-will from Kenya’s leadership. In 
fact, beginning the police reform process was one of the legacies of the 
grand coalition as observed by this interviewee; ‘I think they tried because 
they started of course with the implementation of the new constitution and 
they started this whole reform process, I mean the police reform 
process.’262  
Apart from initiating the process, the grand-coalition provided the platform 
for citizen participation in the reform process. The grand-coalition is 
credited with ‘creating the environment where members of the public for 
example would give their views to the National Taskforce on Police 
Reform.’263 This was the first major engagement with the public in the 
history of the republic on the kind of police service they needed. However, 
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this was only exercised to the extent that the National Task Force on 
Police reform moved around the country soliciting views from various 
stakeholders. Subsequent initiatives however remained under complete 
control of the state with very little or no input in the police reform by the 
non-state domestic constituencies. 
Additionally, the grand-coalition created the environment for the 
institutionalization of the reform process. The National Police Service 
Commission and the Independent Oversight Authority were created - the 
institutions under which police reform process depended even after the 
expiry of the grand-coalition government. Whilst politics of grand-coalition 
threatened to derail the reform process, the institutions provided 
guarantees to the process. The politics of grand-coalition occasionally 
filtered into the institutions and delayed the police process; the institutions 
to a large extent cushioned the process from stalling even after the 
lifespan of the coalition government. 
Whilst the constitutional review process had been contentious for over two 
decades, divergent interests that had been the stumbling block found 
convergence on the need to reform Kenya’s constitution under the grand-
coalition politics.264 This is not to say that the process was not adversely 
affected by the politics of grand-coalition. The PNU side appeared 
hesitant to support the draft constitution, with PNU-allied political elite 
insisting on the presidential system for fear of losing power. Post-
independence Kenya had used the presidency to perpetuate patron-client 
networks through which state resources would benefit individuals with 
direct links to the presidency.265 ODM side insisted on a parliamentary 
and devolved system that would guarantee equitable distribution of 
resources and ensure enough safeguards against imperial presidency. In 
the end, the parties agreed to adopt a presidential system with devolved 
structures in the form of counties.266 Overall, power-sharing was closely 
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associated with agenda setting and policy making of post-2007 police 
reform, but the implementation of the police reform was a different issue 
and which we now proceed to analyze. 
Under the power-sharing arrangement, both parties wanted to control the 
implementation of police reform process. Critical to this claim is the desire 
by both parties to control key ministries through which power and 
resources could be distributed to various elites representing different 
ethnic cleavages that supported the political parties in the 2007 elections. 
With the PNU controlling the Finance and Security dockets, there was the 
perception that the party had the control of the police reform process. This 
perception is illustrated by a statement of a key informant involved in the 
implementation of the police reform process; ‘they shared the ministries 
and Raila did not have the police. There were ministries under ODM, 
there were ministries under PNU and the police were under the Office of 
the President, not the Prime Minister. So he did not have a say (sic).267 
And indeed, the ministries were in a number of times accused of 
interfering with the reform process. Treasury was accused of withholding 
funds meant for reform while the Interior Ministry was accused of 
frustrating the work of the National Police Service Commission.268 
Since the prime minister was responsible for coordination of government, 
the delays relating to implementing police reform process were all blamed 
on the PM’s Office as the coordinator of government business. This is 
despite the fact that line ministries responsible for police reform process 
were directly under the presidency. In the wider political scheme, the idea 
of the PNU elite was to prove that the prime minister’s office was anti-
reform contrary to what the ODM claimed to be the champion of reform. 
And this scheme filtered into the population with Odinga supporters 
expressing doubt on the power-sharing agreement.269  
The tensions witnessed during the establishment of the grand-coalition 
government were construed by some respondents, particularly those 
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allied to ODM to imply that president Kibaki was unwilling to share power. 
This perception reinforced arguments that Kibaki was a stumbling block at 
the initial stages of negotiations for power-sharing arrangement (Miguna, 
2012, Annan, 2012). For this reason, these respondents argued that the 
grand-coalition was forced on the Kenyan political elite.270 Under this 
circumstance, undercurrents and tensions were a common phenomenon 
in the power-sharing arrangement. Kibaki purportedly appointed Raila to 
the position of Prime Minister and outlined the duties assigned to him. 
This was later followed by a statement from the Head of the Public 
Service which put Odinga third in the pecking order after the President 
and his the Vice President (Odinga, 2013). Raila consistently complained 
of a deliberate scheme by the PNU allied civil servants to undermine his 
authority. In particular, there emerged even a stronger provincial 
administration that consolidated power in the presidency contrary to the 
proposals to disband the provincial administration in constitutional review 
debates.  
Whilst power-sharing sought to promote accountability to the citizenry by 
dispersing powers previously exercised by the President in the oversight 
of the security forces to the independent commissions, appointments to 
such commissions remained contested. Political and tribal elites from both 
sides of the coalition primarily defined the compositions of these 
commissions.271 In the process, the independence and calibre of some of 
the commissions were watered down, with the view to having individuals 
loyal to each side of the coalition in the commissions. This jostling for 
control of police reform commissions under the grand-coalition though a 
problem, was however better compared to the context of single party 
government. The institutionalisation of separation of power among 
different government organs, or power-dividing institutions,272 reduced the 
chances of a single majority making decisions regarding police reform. 
Though the PNU had its way in key appointments, a different majority in 
parliament including both PNU and ODM parties would have a final say 
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on who was nominated by the president. An example here is the case in 
which the Parliamentary Select Committee rejected the presidential 
nominee for the position of the National Police Service Commission 
chairperson.273 
The political elite sought to install individuals sympathetic to either side of 
the coalition into the institutions driving the reform agenda. There were 
differences amongst members of the selection panel leading to 
altercations in the media. Ahmednasir Abdullahi, himself a member of the 
recruitment panel, disclosed that PNU side of the coalition took a laid 
back position in the process, thus their preferred candidate was not 
nominated for the chair of the commission (Abdullahi, 2012). Gachoya 
(2012), also a panellist disagreed that political interests, those that would 
enhance the power of the executive, as argued by Abdullahi (2012), seem 
to be driving the process and attributed the impasse to the failure of the 
panel to ‘uphold the duty bestowed upon the panel by the citizens of 
Kenya’ (Gachoya, 2012). This public spat between the two panellists 
responsible for nominating NPSC candidates, seemingly representing the 
interests of the two coalition partners, suggested the intrigues of political 
control of the police force and the police reform process - both sides of 
the political divide sought to have their preferred candidate nominated. 
Three names were nominated to the president and the prime minister for 
consideration of chair to the NPSC. However, the office of the president 
forwarded to the Parliamentary Committee on National Security the name 
of Jean Kamau, who was perceived by the ODM side as the PNU 
preferred candidate for the NPSC chair. The prime minister rejected this 
nomination arguing that his office was not consulted, a move that threw 
into disarray the police reform process. Eventually after immense 
pressure from the international community, members of the civil society 
and other veto players, the nomination was withdrawn and the best 
candidate in the interview was nominated for vetting by the parliamentary 
committee. The committee settled on Johnstone Kavuludi as a 
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compromise candidate.274 To sum up this impasse, a member of the 
select committee on national security described the entire process as a 
mockery, claiming that political interests superseded merit.275 This 
phenomenon is not strange to the Kenyan context. It finds favour in the 
literature critical to power-sharing - particularly the fact that power-sharing 
leads to immobilism thus leading to gridlock in decision making especially 
where those wielding veto powers do not agree (Rothchild and Roeder, 
2005). 
Kenya’s National Accord provided for consultations between the two 
principals, the Prime Minister and the President, without which vetoes 
were exercised. This resulted in brinkmanship in which each side 
threatened to force a deadlock in government decision making until the 
other side grunted further concessions. Raila’s rejection of the NPSC 
nominees is a clear case of use of veto in a grand coalition. Other veto 
players including the Law Society of Kenya, the Women and the 
Parliamentary Select Committee Administration and National Security 
amongst others followed suit using judicial and parliamentary veto. While 
veto power was supposed to increase inclusiveness in the reform 
process, it created a situation in which such vetoes were used to demand 
concessions. 
As the country approached the 2013 elections, there was lack of shared 
understanding on the police reform process in the grand coalition 
government, particularly in relation to the appointment of the Inspector 
General. Kibaki, having served his two terms was not active in the police 
reform debates while Raila, who was expected to run in the 2013 
presidential elections, was actively involved in the process. PNU affiliated 
political elite was happy with the then Commissioner of Police and 
supported postponing the appointment of the Inspector General citing little 
time for preparation for elections.276 Others, mainly allied to ODM, argued 
that elections under the then Commissioner of Police would mean the 
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police approaching the 2013 elections with the same attitudes as it did in 
2007.  
The fact that divisions over the appointment of the Inspector General 
existed along party and ethnic affiliations inform the relationship between 
the police chief and the ruling regime, where the regime depended on the 
security forces, particularly the police for survival. Thus, the perception 
among the PNU elite could have been motivated by mutual police-regime 
survival relationship, while the ODM insistence of the Inspector General 
was significantly motivated by the party’s distaste for the then 
commissioner of police and the desire to leverage control of the police 
service against the PNU.277 In the end, the National Police Service 
Commission (NPSC) insisted on the appointment before the general 
elections and the Inspector General was subsequently sworn in on 
December 24, 2012, barely three months to elections.  
The tensions witnessed in the implementation of the police reform 
process were attributed to a number of issues. Though there was little 
difference in the manifestos of political parties, synchronizing the 
manifestos within the coalition was identified as one of those challenges 
the politics of power-sharing posed to the police reform process.278 Whilst 
both ODM and PNU emphasized police reform in their manifestos, the 
difference was how this process would proceed both in terms of content 
and priorities. Finding a common ground on implementation was the 
problem.279 
For others, Kenya’s grand-coalition was not well thought out. A 
respondent observed that ‘it was something that was rushed into to 
ensure that Kenya became a peaceful nation.’280 For this respondent, the 
single most achievement of the power-sharing agreement was negative 
peace, implying the cessation of violence. In his opinion, the grand 
coalition failed to resolve deep-seated issues that caused the violence, 
                                            
277
 Interview with MP2 
278
 Interview with MP2 
279
 Interview with MP1 
280
 Interview with CSO3 
188 
and considered it an elite vehicle for perpetuating themselves in power 
and being in close proximity to power. This is however debatable, for such 
a discussion fails to offer what could have been a better option for Kenya 
given the circumstances. Yet for others, there was no power-sharing as 
one side of the coalition did not have a say on critical issues, including 
key appointments. 
Many times you would see that they would sit, discuss something 
but when now decision is being taken, you see a partisan decision 
which only caters for one side of the coalition (sic).281 
The nature of the debates around Kenya’s grand-coalition - its successes 
and/or failures makes the process of investigating the interactions 
between politics and police reform process such a daunting task. It 
presented a number of challenges; first, whilst police reform process was 
in the public domain, getting the state actors managing the process to 
comment on the influence of power-sharing politics was difficult. They 
either dismissed it as having been overtaken by events, or outrightly 
objected to commenting by virtue of the positions they held.282 
Instructively, most of these interviewees were officers whose 
appointments were controversial and did not wish to escalate the 
controversies and therefore mainly focused on the positive aspects of the 
grand-coalition government.283 
On the other hand, members of the civil society groups were at ease and 
happy to comment on power-sharing politics and police reform process. 
Their arguments centred on the negative impacts the grand-coalition had 
on police reform and believed that political interferences witnessed in the 
implementation of the police reform was an extension of politics of grand-
coalition. Since the civil society groups represent people perspectives in 
the implementation of police reform, they were inclined to talk about 
political interference.  
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Personal interviews with the political elite and general public also 
demonstrated deep-seated differences amongst Kenyan public. 
Interviews with political elite linked to the ruling Jubilee Alliance, and this 
includes those who were previously allied to ODM but defected to Jubilee 
Alliance, credit former president Kibaki and President Uhuru Kenyatta for 
implementation of police reform, while those allied to CORD credit Raila 
Odinga, the former PM for progress in the police reform and blame the 
Jubilee Alliance for interfering with the reform process. In terms of ethnic 
affiliations, the overall non-responsiveness of the police reform amongst 
major ethnic blocs in Kenya remained high at Kikuyu (88.9%), Luo 
(83.8%), Kalenjin (70.0%), and Luhyia (72.7%) amongst others.284 On the 
whole, public discourse on the politics of grand-coalition and police reform 
process was influenced by ethnic affiliation and this tended to influence 
the kind of feedback obtained from our respondents but had very little 
impact on the overall perceptions about the responsiveness of the reform 
process. 
The above discussions on the interrelationship between grand-coalition 
politics and police reform show two things. First, power-sharing politics 
aided in the agenda setting and policy formulation of the post-2007 police 
reform process. Secondly, power-sharing politics also stood on the way of 
in the implementation due to deep-seated differences amongst the 
political elite and threatened to derail the implementation. 
5.3 Devolution and Police Reform: The Kenyan Experience 
Decentralisation has in the recent past been a dominant theme in many 
countries in transition after conflict or political crisis. In the last two 
decades, about 80% of all developing and transition countries have 
attempted decentralisation (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). Some 
existing corpus of decentralisation literature (Dickovick, 2014, Ongaro, 
2006, Crawford and Hartmann, 2008) identify three forms of 
decentralisation namely; devolution, de-concentration and fiscal 
decentralisation. For the purpose of this study, the conceptualisation of 
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these forms of decentralisation is drawn from Crawford and Hartmann 
(2008). 
In devolution, power and resources are transferred from the central 
government to relatively independent sub-national authorities headed by 
democratically elected representatives. In the case of Kenya, the sub-
national authorities are the county governments which are headed by 
governors. De-concentration on the other hand transfers authority from 
the central government to representatives of the national government at 
the sub-national branches of the central states. These are represented by 
the county commissioners in the context of Kenya. Fiscal decentralisation 
transfers budgetary authority to de-concentrated officials and/or unelected 
appointees or to elected politicians (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). 
How did devolution debate evolve in Kenya? The demands for devolution 
as a form of decentralisation pre-date Kenya’s independence. To begin 
with, the white settlers who feared loss of their property and land under 
post-independence majoritarian system, advocated for power-dividing 
institutions that would help to guarantee their interests (Horowitz, 2008). 
At the same time, the minority ethnic groups in the Kenya African 
Democratic Union (KADU) which feared Kikuyu and Luo elite majoritarian 
rule under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) advocated for a 
federalist ‘majimboism’ constitution during the pre-independence period 
1960-1963.285 
Whilst the independence constitution provided for a federal constitution, 
devolution was never realised in Kenya. KANU turned the federalist goal 
of majimboism286 into a slur: majimboists were derided as tribalists who 
opposed the broader goal of nationalism (Anderson, 2005). Between 1963 
-1966 parliament undertook amendments that increasingly granted the 
presidency more powers and broke down checks and balances enshrined 
in the independence constitution (Gimode, 2007). The amendments 
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replaced devolution of powers by a highly centralised administration, 
modified the parliamentary system by a presidential system with 
enormous powers on one person. What followed in Kenya’s governance 
structure was a highly centralised national government system spanning 
nearly five decades.  
Centralisation of power therefore meant that whoever controlled politics at 
the national level had immense control of security and other state 
agencies at the regional and local levels. Jomo Kenyatta and Moi regimes 
thrived on these structures for state survival. A former political detainee 
interviewed noted; 
‘During the era of Moi, the civil service and the police that was 
supposed to work for the people, the entire civil service was 
supporting Moi. The PC (Provincial Commissioner), the DC (District 
Commissioner) and even the DO (District Officer), these are people 
who had a lot of power during that particular time. The police and 
all the provincial administration were supporting Moi (sic)’.287 
Though devolution and police reform were ‘high on the agenda’ during 
president Kibaki’s election in 2002, the hopes were short-lived as the 
political elite around Kibaki frustrated constitutional reform process that 
was to usher devolution. There was never complete break with the past 
which it was hoped would be achieved under Kibaki’s leadership. The 
hopes were however rekindled with the formation of a power-sharing 
government after the tragic 2007 elections. Were things done differently 
after the 2007 general elections? This is the subject of the next sub-
sections. The discussions focus on the politics of devolution and police 
reform after the 2007 post-election violence at the national and the county 
levels respectively. 
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5.3.1. National Politics of Devolution and the Post 2007 Police 
Reform Process 
This sub-section focuses on the linkage between the national politics of 
devolution and police reform process in the post-2007 context. Thus, to 
what extent was the devolution agenda and police reform at the national 
level interlinked after the year 2007? We locate the ensuing debates 
within three phases of elite behaviour. These include: the period before 
the promulgation of the constitution (2008-2010); the period after the 
promulgation of the constitution (2010-2013) and the period after the 2013 
general elections (2013 and beyond). The three phases impacted on 
devolution and police reform process disproportionately as discussed 
below. 
5.3.1.1. The Period before the Promulgation of the New 
Constitution 
The grand-coalition government of 2008 introduced new political 
dynamics in Kenya. It provided hope that devolution and police reform 
processes that had been elusive for many years would be undertaken. 
The parties that opposed each other, ODM and PNU, in the 2007 deeply 
contested elections pulled together to support revision of the constitution 
in 2010 referendum which would later be the fulcrum point for both 
devolution and the police reform process. As a priority, the coalition 
parliament quickly enacted the Kenya Constitutional Review Act in 
November 2008 which gave rise to establishment of the Committee of 
Experts (CoE) on the Constitutional Review with the purpose of finalising 
the constitutional review process. The CoE released its first draft to the 
public for debate on November 17, 2009.  
Whilst the two processes, police reform and devolution, were equally 
significant in addressing the structural causes to Kenya’s post-election 
violence, police reform was prioritised as opposed to devolution in the 
immediate post-signing of the 2008 power-sharing agreement. This 
prioritisation was due to two factors. First, the police culpability in the 
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post-election violence of 2007 (Waki Commission, 2008) meant that 
police reform needed immediate attention. Thus, the formation of the 
Ransley Committee was to identify the reform priorities for police reform in 
2009 while devolution process had to wait until the promulgation of the 
new constitution.  
Secondly, implementation of devolution often involves constitutional re-
engineering. Review of devolution structure, for example as in the case of 
Nigeria, is often associated with constitutional amendments (Horowitz, 
1999). The case of Kenya was no exception and concluding the 
constitutional review process became a prerequisite towards effective 
devolution in Kenya. Thus, the debate on devolution got traction towards 
the end of the year 2010 as interest on the form Kenya’s devolution 
became dominant. This therefore meant that during this period, police 
reform was core at the formative stages while the politics of devolution 
was peripheral. Police reform was high on agenda in the immediate post-
election violence due to the adverse mention in Waki Commission (2008). 
This however changed just before the promulgation of the KCLR (2010) 
constitution with devolution becoming more dominant as opposed to 
police reform debate. The debates on the two processes however 
remained divorced from each other at the formative stages. 
Though the police reform process at the national level started almost 
immediately after the signing of the National Accord, devolution seemed 
to be gradually forming part of the power-games amongst the coalition 
partners with respect to implementation of police reform process towards 
2010. Control of the police reform process amongst the coalition partners 
already discussed in Section 5.2 seemed to find convergence with the 
politics of devolution, this time round in terms of the governance structure 
upon which devolution would be implemented. The emergence of 
devolution debate seemed to overshadow commitment to police reform 
implementation after the CoE released its first draft constitution to the 
public for discussion. Political focus shifted to devolution with little 
attention to the implementation process of the police reform. This slowed 
down, albeit temporarily, the implementation of police reform. 
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Three categories of the political elite emerged with respect to devolution 
in the proposed new constitution during the period. The first category of 
the political elite, what we refer here to as ‘Raila diehards’, involved those 
who were very passionate about devolution and mainly involved the ODM 
wing of the coalition government. 
The second category involved those who were unsure of what impacts 
devolution would have on their positions of power at the national level and 
often adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. This category of the political 
elite depended on president Kibaki to provide political direction and did 
not wish to antagonise Kibaki in the power-sharing arrangement. Vice 
President Kalonzo Musyoka was perceived to be the face of this category, 
and in fact, earned the nickname ‘water-melon’ - green on the outside and 
red in the inside.288 Notably, this category of political elite was invited to 
join PNU to neutralise the ODM numbers in parliament and bolster PNU 
strength after the 2007 general elections. 
Finally, there was a caucus of Kibaki’s strong allies, revolving around 
‘Mount Kenya Mafia’ whose political choices were perceived to hold sway 
on the country’s politics and were believed to have the ears of Kibaki. 
Kibaki characteristically remained non-committal and kept the public 
guessing whether he supported devolution or not. Yet, Kibaki’s position 
would significantly determine the direction devolution took. The political 
posturing adopted by Kibaki’s men and Kibaki himself had an impact on 
public perceptions towards the government’s commitment to devolution 
and police reform. Those who held sway to Kibaki’s political choices 
formed the bulwark of the political elite in control of the security sector and 
their buy-in for devolution and police reform was significant yet they were 
perceived to oppose the processes. 
One such politician singled out for his opposition for devolution in one of 
the interviews was John Michuki, a one-time Minister for Internal Security 
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and Provincial Administration and one of the strongest allies of Kibaki.289 
Michuki vehemently opposed the discourse of decentralisation of power in 
the proposed new constitution.  While addressing a church gathering in 
his constituency, Michuki, in the company of Kalonzo Musyoka, the Vice 
President, argued that the draft was not locally-owned claiming the 
Committee of Experts (CoE) sought to institutionalise Western liberalism 
that may not work in Kenya. Michuki dismissed the CoE as puppets of the 
West, particularly USA and Britain, whose intention was to please their 
masters by drafting a constitution with two centres of power (NTV, 2010). 
Michuki’s stand on the proposed constitution may have been influenced 
by his professional and political background. He enjoyed the trappings of 
power as a district officer under the colonial regime and as Internal 
Security Minister under Kibaki. Michuki was mentioned adversely in a 
number of scandalous activities involving the Police. He was accused of 
sanctioning the police raid on the East African Standard, shutting down 
the KTN TV station, and also supporting and condoning the illegal 
activities of the Artur Brothers (Osewe, 2010).290 As a District Officer, 
Michuki was the face of the colonial government at the local levels and 
exercised immense power as was with the Kenyan Provincial 
Administration in pre-independence and post-independence Kenya, and 
as Minister for Internal Security presided over a police force accused of 
human rights violations.291 Any form of devolution was therefore an 
attempt to dis-empower Michuki and many other elites close to Kibaki. In 
Michuki’s opinion, the clamour for new constitution was to remove Moi 
from power and there was no need for further agitation now that one of 
their own was in power.292 Clearly, Michuki’s arguments represented the 
fears within Kibaki’s inner-circle of losing grip onto power through 
devolution and police reform process.  
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Despite the fears within Kibaki’s inner circle, devolution remained a key 
agenda in the plebiscite campaigns for the new constitution. Grand 
coalition politics was organised around ethnic interests that focused on 
reducing tensions amongst various groups in Kenya. Proponents of the 
constitution change hailed the provisions of the devolved system in the 
constitution as a guarantee that would ensure resources and power are 
decentralised closer to the communities while the public mood supported 
devolution and police reforms processes. 
Kibaki declared his support for the new constitution during the opening of 
the Agricultural Society of Kenya show in Eldoret on March 11, 2010 
(Citizen TV, 2010). The announcement in Eldoret was symbolic as it was 
the political hotbed of the region that had voted against Kibaki in the 2007 
general elections and remained one of the regions advocating for 
devolution. This support opened a new chapter in the drive towards 
devolution. The Kikuyu elite who had been hesitant joined Kibaki in 
drumming up support for the constitution. In fact, in July 2010 while in 
Murang’a, John Michuki declared he had been friends with Kibaki for fifty 
years and therefore had no choice but to support the draft. 
Though the announcement of Kibaki’s support for the constitution in 
Eldoret was symbolic, it may have been intended to counter Raila’s 
preponderance in devolution and police reform debate. The choice of 
Eldoret venue may have been to prop up William Ruto, who had started 
fomenting trouble in ODM from within and was cosy with Kibaki. William 
Ruto-led faction contradicted ODM party demands in the coalition 
government and often sided with PNU. Coincidentally, Ruto mobilised the 
Rift Valley region to oppose the constitution. The constitution was 
subjected to a referendum on August 4, 2010 and subsequently passed 
with a 67% majority and promulgated on August 27, 2010. The 
promulgated constitution established two levels of governance; the 
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national and 47 county governments (GoK, 2010). It also provided for the 
institutionalization of the police reform process.293 
The above discussion echoes three characteristics of power-sharing 
dynamics at play within the Kenyan context. First after the power-sharing 
agreement, the immediate priority of the PNU was to maintain power. The 
party was never in a hurry to implement devolution and undertake security 
sector reform as it would amount to losing grip on political power. 
Michuki’s attitude epitomizes this character of dominant parties in the 
ruling coalition within a power-sharing arrangement. On the flip side, ODM 
was keen on getting a share of political power, endearing itself as the 
champion of devolution, as it geared up for possible total control after the 
lifetime of the power-sharing arrangement.294 
Secondly, the compromises that led to a presidential system but with 
devolved system demonstrate the behavior of the political elite. While 
ODM had consistently vouched for a parliamentary system, their change 
of tune to a presidential system could have been influenced by post-
coalition government politics. Thus, this brings to question whether the 
quest for a devolved structure was temporal to the party that felt did not 
have a fair share of the national cake. Though the party was facing 
internal wrangles precipitated by the ambitions of William Ruto, there was 
still hope it could capture power after 2013 election with the promise to 
implement the devolved system which resonated well with the Kenyan 
polity.  
Thirdly, Ruto’s fall-out with ODM was a case of an ambitious politician 
trying to outflank other politicians in ODM. Under such circumstance, 
maintaining pressure on PNU to fast-track police reform and devolution 
got a set-back. ODM focused on in-house keeping rather than forging a 
common front to push for devolution and reforms the party so fervently 
fought for. Ruto felt Raila was playing power games with the politics of 
devolution and in a thinly veiled attack on Raila during Kibaki’s meeting at 
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the Eldoret  ASK Show said there was no time for empty political rhetoric 
and political power games (Citizen TV, 2010). 
The linkage between the politics of devolution and police reform process 
during the period 2008-2010, appears very thin. Devolution had not taken 
root, while the police reform had started with the establishment of the 
Ransley committee. Police reform was affected more by the politics of the 
grand coalition that revolved around control of the state instruments of 
power and by extension control of the police reform process. In both, 
resistance and power games involving the coalition partners suggested 
elite obsession with power, either in the form of retaining it or acquiring it 
altogether. However, the entrenchment of the processes in the 
constitution provided compulsion towards undertaking the processes. 
5.3.1.2. The Period after the Promulgation of the Constitution (2010-
2013) 
After the promulgation of the new constitution in August 2010, the politics 
of devolution within the coalition subsided in the immediate post 
promulgation period. Focus at the national level shifted onto police reform 
process which had started immediately after the 2007 post-election 
violence, but had slowed down due to heightened politics of devolution 
just before the constitution was promulgated. The political pressures of 
devolution eased to allow for the processes that gave realisation to 
devolution to emerge. 
Meanwhile, the national politics of police reform took two forms. At the 
macro level, the parties to the coalition jostled for control of police reform 
process at the national level. The politics of control, specifically relating to 
the grand coalition discussed in section 5.2 took centre stage. Secondly at 
institutional level, the police reform institutions, particularly the National 
Police Service, the National Police Service and the Independent 
Oversight Authority, which had barely settled were engaged in supremacy 
battles due to what police sources called overlapping mandate. These 
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struggles were however a reflection of the wider political differences in the 
coalition.295 
The perception amongst the top police chiefs was that the NPSC was 
usurping the role of the National Police Service with reference to 
transfers, thus making it impossible to respond to security challenges,296 
while the latter maintained that it was within its remit to play supervisory 
and oversight role of the National Police Service. For this reason, an 
observer termed Inspector General David Kimaiyo as the ‘the biggest 
threat to police reform’ (Dolan, 2013). A key informant downplayed these 
differences as part of the teething problems in institutionalising police 
reforms, though suggested that the Inspector General, as the head of the 
NPS did not wish to be accountable to civilian authority as envisaged in 
the constitution and had allowed the political elite to interfere with the 
police reform process.297 
Whilst allegations against the Inspector General could not be verified, 
most respondents considered the office of the Inspector General to be 
incompetent298 and the most politicised of all institutions.299 The overlaps 
in mandates of both the NPSC and NPS may have been genuine and 
needed clarification. However, the perceived political posturing of the 
office of the Inspector General fed into the public mood that indeed the 
Inspector General was opposed to civilian oversight of the police service. 
In the end, parliament, despite resistance from opposition and civil society 
groups, had to intervene and clarify these roles through the amendments 
to the police acts in June 2014. 
The latter part of the period saw devolution attract lots of attention. The 
Republic of Kenya Constitution 2010 had redistributed some powers from 
national to the county level and gave the counties a stronger basis for 
exercising their new powers. Given Kenya’s history in which programmes 
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not entrenched in the constitution have ended up being abandoned,300 the 
promulgation of the 2010 constitution was a turning point for both police 
reform process and the implementation of devolution. Chapters 14 and 11 
respectively of the constitution entrenched these processes in the 
constitution, effectively shielding them from political interference. Former 
president Moi used the IPPG process to ward-off domestic and 
international pressure for reforms in the 1990’s, while GJLOs under 
president Kibaki collapsed due to lack of political-will to pursue reforms 
within the justice sector (Manby, 2008). There were no statutes upon 
which these processes were anchored hence were conducted at the 
whims of the political elite. According to a member of the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on National Security, the drafters had in mind the 
recommendations relating to strong foundation for police reform and thus 
entrenched police reform in the constitution.301 
Whilst the actual implementation of devolution did not begin immediately 
after the new constitution was promulgated, this phase marked the 
process of preparation for the new government structure whose 
implementation would begin after the 2013 elections. Institutionalising 
devolution through policy and legislative processes started in October 
2010, when the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Local Government 
appointed a Task Force on Devolved Government (TFDG) to advise the 
government on Devolution. The taskforce chaired by Professor Mutaha 
Kangu submitted its report, the Report on Implementation of Devolved 
Government of Kenya, in September 2011. The report spelt out various 
policies, legislative and administrative measures that the government 
needed to implement for effective operationalisation of the devolved 
governments as envisaged in the constitution. 
In total there were eleven bills relating to devolution (ICPC, 2014) that 
were to provide the basis upon which devolution would work in Kenya.302 
                                            
300
 Some of these reform processes include GJLOs under Kibaki and the IPPG process 
under MOI. See Section 3.6.2. 
301
 Interview with MP2 
302
 These included; The County Government Act No17 of 2012; The Public Finance 
Management Act, 2012, The County Governments Public Finance Management 
201 
The first step towards devolution however became effective in March 
2012 when the president accented the Transition to Devolved 
Government Act, 2012 (No. 1 of 2012). This was later followed by the 
establishment of the Transitional Authority in June 2012 to co-ordinate the 
transition process. 
There were renewed tensions in the coalition in the implementation of 
devolution. In May 2012, president Kibaki unilaterally appointed 47 
County Commissioners to head the newly established county units. Raila 
opposed the move, claiming he was not consulted with many 
stakeholders including civil society groups and parliament faulting the 
president. The Commission on Implementation of the Constitution also 
voiced concern noting that this was tantamount to retaining the Provincial 
Administration to run parallel to the structures under county governments 
(Kimaru, 2014). Kibaki’s decision on devolution had an impact on the 
police reform process particularly with respect to the administration police 
which was directly linked to the former provincial administration. How 
would the administration police be delinked from the reformed 
administration? The police reform sought to merge the administration 
police and the regular police under the command of the Inspector 
General. This failed to happen. The administration police remained under 
the control of their respective county commissioners. Kibaki’s 
appointments created a situation where the administration police 
remained divided between being answerable to the county commissioners 
or to the Inspector General as envisaged in the constitution. 
Reasons for public furore over Kibaki’s appointments were varied; from 
not having any legal basis and being unconstitutional as they did not 
reflect the gender and ethnic diversity of Kenya. The appointments were 
petitioned in Court by the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness 
(CREAW) which sought the constitutionality of the appointments. The 
                                                                                                                      
Transition Act No.8 of 2013, The Transition to Devolved Government Act, 2012;The 
Urban Areas and Cities Act No.13 of 2011;The Intergovernmental Relations Act No.2 of 
2012; The Basic Education No.14 of 2013,The Transition County Allocation of Revenue 
Act No.6 of 2013, The Transition County Appropriation Act No.6 of 2013, The Public 
Finance Management Act Amendment Bill 2014,The County Industrial Development Bill, 
2013. 
202 
High Court overturned the appointments but the Office of the President 
urged the officers to remain in office. The Court of Appeal put aside the 
High Court ruling effectively confirming Kibaki’s appointments on June 14, 
2013. 
The narrative from many interviewees was that the political struggles in 
the implementation of the constitution, particularly devolution and police 
reform would significantly determine the outcome of the 2013 election 
after the lifespan of the power-sharing arrangement. This thinking found 
confluence with many other sources. For example, WikiLeaks cables 
(Ranneberger, 2009) reported that Raila Odinga hoped he could use 
devolution debate to propel him to 2013 election victory by using his 
traditional community alliances of the Luo, Luhyia, Kalenjin, Coast 
and Muslim communities disregarding the fact that the unity of 
purpose in ODM had broken down due to power struggles within the 
party. 
Odinga underestimated PNU political strategy going by the political 
alliances that emerged ahead of the 2013 general elections. PNU mutated 
into Jubilee Alliance, what Lynch (2014) refers to as ‘the alliance of the 
accused’, while ODM mutated into Coalition for Reforms and Democracy 
(CORD). Though devolution would still form a key plank of Odinga’s 
campaign, the new alliances neutralised the effectiveness of devolution as 
a campaign platform. Reconciliation between the communities, 
particularly Kalenjin and the Kikuyu, which fought in the 2007 elections, 
generation gap and a vote against the International Criminal Court 
process, emerged as critical issues in the campaign process.303 
Both the Jubilee Alliance and CORD were determined to demonstrate 
commitment to devolution and police reform agenda. The combination of 
the political elites in both camps made it difficult to single out strictly which 
side was best suited to implement devolution and police reforms agenda. 
Uhuru Kenyatta formed the Jubilee Alliance with William Ruto, while Raila 
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Odinga formed CORD Coalition with Kalonzo Musyoka. In both cases, the 
two coalitions had running-mates who either rejected or half-heartedly 
supported the draft constitution respectively. The Jubilee Alliance won the 
elections, but the perception that it was not committed devolution and 
police reform persisted. This perception became one of the greatest 
challenges to Jubilee administration after the first year in office. 
5.3.1.3. The Period after the Elections (2013 and Beyond) 
After the 2013 national elections, the power-sharing between PNU and 
ODM ended. The Jubilee Alliance of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto 
assumed the country’s leadership, while CORD of Raila Odinga and 
Kalonzo Musyoka’s took the opposition benches. Devolution become a 
central issue as it was the first time political decentralisation was being 
implemented and more still, by the new administration. Meanwhile, police 
reform debates became peripheral as much attention was on devolution. 
CORD continued with its onslaught that the Jubilee Alliance was opposed 
to devolution. The narrative was fanned by the fact that the new 
administration faced myriad transitional challenges in the implementation 
of devolution. Whilst it was expected that transition to a devolved system 
would pose challenges, and this is not unique to Kenya, the jubilee 
administration handling of these challenges gave opposition the arsenal to 
label the government as anti-devolution, leading to tensions amongst the 
political elite. The government did not communicate effectively the 
challenges to the public, but focused on countering the political score 
against CORD thus giving the latter an opportunity to keep government on 
the defensive. 
Actualisation of the devolved functions remained controversial with the 
two levels, national and county, governments engaged in political 
competition. The Council of Governors accused the Transitional Authority 
of delaying of transfer of functions to the counties. These delays created 
tensions between the national and the county governments which led the 
governors to support the disbandment of the Authority on account of 
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incompetence. The transfer of functions was however gazetted by the 
Transitional Authority in August 2013.304 This transfer opened another 
feuding chapter between the national and the county governments over 
funding of the expanded county roles. There were delays in releasing of 
funds to support these expanded functions and the resources were 
equally very limited thus feeding to calls for increase of funding to the 
county governments from the 15% to 45% of government revenue 
through a referendum. 
Yet another area of tension between the national and county governments 
was in the management of security function including policing. It was not 
clear how the system worked especially when many counties complained 
of insecurity. The constitution created a system which made it difficult to 
manage security at the county level at three fronts. First, it attracted  
sabotage by the county governments to demonstrate that the national 
government was incompetent in the delivery of security (Orina-
Nyamwamu, 2010). The insecurity in some counties namely; Mandera, 
Tana River, Mombasa, Marsabit and Lamu inter alia pointed towards 
sabotage.305 In fact, Lamu governor, Issa Timamy was arrested over 
Mpeketoni attacks in Lamu in June 2014 but was later released since the 
state did not prefer charges against him. Secondly, it isolated the public 
from participating in the provision of security at the county level. The 
establishment of the county policing authorities was delayed due to 
unwillingness of the national government to ‘surrender’ part of security 
function to the counties for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the national government did not prioritise police reform at the 
county level, but was keen on strengthening the old provincial 
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administration structures, which had been a key plank in the constitutional 
reform debate.306 According to Ghai (2008), the disbandment of the 
provincial administration had dominated the constitutional review 
conference at Bomas of Kenya. However, there seemed to be 
unwillingness within government to implement this break with the past. 
Secondly, Kibaki and Uhuru continued to frame devolution and policing 
structures along the old provincial administration structure. Thirdly, it 
created a contradiction by maintaining policing as a national government 
function while at the same time providing for citizen participation through 
the County Policing Authorities.  
Problems of aligning the police functions with devolved county-level units 
during the period under consideration started when in June 2013, the 
Inspector General unilaterally appointed the County Police Commanders. 
At the time, no structures existed in the police command for the County 
Police Commanders and the IGs decision led to tensions with the 
NPSC.307 The appointments created confusions as there were two officers 
of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) within the counties 
thereby creating two centres of power in the delivery of service at the 
county level. Interviews with police officers in Kisumu revealed that this 
affected police accountability as there were no clear guidelines on who 
was senior.308 
Like his predecessor, the new President Uhuru Kenyatta delegated 
national government functions to the county commissioners in May 2014. 
He launched a new structure known as National Government 
Administration Officers to be in charge of national government functions at 
the county level (Kimaru, 2014). This was in line with the National 
Government Coordination Act 2013 which provided for the restructuring of 
the provincial administration. Given that the Court of Appeal had put aside 
the High Court ruling declaring President Kibaki’s appointment of county 
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commissioners as illegal, there was now legal basis for appointment of 
the county commissioners. 309 
The opposition interpreted Uhuru’s move as a ploy to rebrand the former 
provincial administration and a further consolidation of central government 
power away from the elected governors in the counties. The government 
was undertaking deconcentration alongside devolution. No governor 
attended the ceremony despite receiving invitations; further confirming 
fears earlier expressed when Kibaki unilaterally appointed the county 
commissioners. The former provincial commissioners were redeployed as 
regional coordinators in charge of clusters of counties similar to what 
existed under the former provincial administration. Police structure also 
took the same format with the former provincial police officers becoming 
regional police coordinators.  
The governors argued this move was meant to undermine the role of the 
County Policing Authorities. Central to their argument was that the 
directive by the president to maintain the status quo with the county 
commissioners chairing the security committee and making the county 
police chiefs answerable to the county commissioners was inconsistent 
with the Article 243 of the constitution. Whilst the governors and CORD 
opposed the presidential order, the Commission of Implementation of the 
Constitution (CIC) maintained the president had the powers to transform 
the provincial administration into a system adapted to devolution. This 
was a sharp contrast to CIC position when Kibaki appointed the County 
Commissioners. CIC had previously vehemently opposed Kibaki’s 
appointment of the County Commissioners and declared them 
unconstitutional. 
The disquiet amongst the governors about the deconcentration of the 
national government to the county level through appointment of the 
county commissioners prompted the cabinet secretary to meet the 
governors. The meeting resolved that the county policing authorities, 
chaired by the governor as per the constitution would work with the county 
                                            
309
 See Section 5.2 
207 
security committees, which are chaired by county commissioners. Though 
this was expected to be fast-tracked, the guidelines were gazetted in 
September 26, 2014 with the governors’ role in security management 
being peripheral.  
In July 2014, the Cabinet Secretary in charge of Devolution, the CIC and 
the Governors’ Council had proposed an amendment to repeal the 
Transition to Devolved Government Act 2012 and replace it with Inter-
Governmental Relations Act that would see the Inter-Governmental 
Relations Committee take over from the Transitional Authority. Governors 
and Members of County Assemblies (MCAs) supported this initiative. 
However, both Senate and the National Assembly opposed this move 
arguing that it was the means by which the executive wanted to control 
the counties. The bill was defeated in the National Assembly thus giving 
the Transitional Authority a lifeline. 
The period after the 2013 elections was the most active in terms of the 
politics of devolution. The politics was attributed to the fact that devolution 
was a new phenomenon that had never been tried in Kenya. Thus, the 
process was characterised by lots of bargaining for power. On the one 
hand, the opposition saw this as an opportunity to remain relevant with 
2017 general elections in sight. Raila’s return from a three month tour in 
the US in May 2014 opened up active politics of devolution and security 
sector reform, including police reform, debate. The period also witnessed 
security failure in the country due to the threat posed by Somalia’s Al 
Shabaab militia incursions into Kenya. Raila demanded for national 
dialogue on matters devolution and security and gave a one month 
window of opportunity to the government to dialogue or face unspecified 
consequences. The Jubilee Alliance rejected calls for dialogue. 
Thus on Saba-Saba310 the July 7, 2014 declaration by CORD for ‘Okoa 
Kenya’ (Kiswahili for Salvage Kenya) referendum was to be a game 
changer in the politics of devolution and security. The initiative sought to 
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fix the allocation of revenue to County governments to a minimum of 45%, 
strengthening of the Senate and involvement of the county governments 
in the management of security at the local level. The council of governors 
also pushed similar agenda under the banner ‘Pesa Mashinani’ 
(resources to the grassroots) initiative.  
The debates and political struggles over devolution in the post 2013 
elections had major impacts on the police reform process. The police 
reform process was thrown into the peripheries as the focus was on 
redistribution of resources to the counties. While the police reform 
process lagged behind due to inadequate resources, the government, in 
an attempt to ward off pressure showed willingness to avail resources to 
the members of county assemblies (MCAs) to scuttle the referendum. The 
government offered the MCAs benefits including car grants, construction 
of ward offices amongst other goodies to have the MCAs scuttle CORD 
and Governors referendum. These however remained promises as there 
were no guidelines on how these were to be implemented. 
The analysis of the linkage between devolution and police reform process 
at the national level across the three phases discussed above does 
suggest a definite pattern. The course of devolution and police reform was 
largely determined by the macro political developments in the country. 
These included the tragic events of the post-election violence of 2007, the 
2010 promulgation of the new constitution and finally the post power-
sharing elections of 2013. In the first phase, police reform formed the core 
of national debate at the formative stages of the period. This however 
changed towards the end of the period when the debates about 
devolution picked up in anticipation of the 2010 constitution. The two 
processes however remained peripheral to each other. In the second 
phase, devolution politics subsided as the political elites allowed for the 
setting up of the devolution framework. Focus shifted onto police reform 
process as coalition partners fought over control of police reform process. 
There was confluence of the two processes due to the perceived 
significance of the two processes in control of power at both national and 
county levels. Finally, the post-2013 election period was characterised by 
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lots of emphasis on devolution. This was however more complicated as it 
also involved locating police reform process, which was largely a national 
agenda, within the devolved system. This relationship is represented in 
Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: Linkage between post 2008 police reform and devolution  
 
Source: Author 2015 
 
5.3.2. Police Reform at the Counties 
Having examined the national power-sharing and devolution that took 
place in Kenya after 2008, we now focus on how these filtered into police 
institutions and reform processes in the counties. How did the national 
politics of power-sharing and devolution filter into the police institution and 
the overall police reform process at the county level? While political power 
distribution at the national level was through an internationally mediated 
power-sharing arrangement, distribution of political power at the county 
level was through local elite political settlements.311 These settlements 
were in the form of informal agreements governing the distribution of 
goods, rights and responsibilities within the county level 
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Similarly, while the police reform process was a nationally driven agenda 
from the top, reform at the counties was limited and took different 
trajectories and was significantly influenced by the balance of power at 
the local level. There was very little police reform visible in many counties 
thus suggesting that the police reform process had not trickled down to 
the counties.312 Though there were mixed reactions in terms of visibility of 
the reform process at the counties, the general thread was that indeed 
there was fair awareness of the reform process at the national level but 
these were insignificant if not invisible at the county level. For example, in 
one of the focus group discussions with women in Kisumu, a participant 
pointed out that ‘we hear there are reforms but these reforms have not 
reached down to us wananchi (citizens). We just hear it in the media 
(sic).’313 
Some counties supported the national police reform agenda. Counties for 
example Mombasa, Machakos, Uasin Gishu and Nyeri, inter alia, 
provided support in the form of vehicles to the local police to facilitate their 
operations. The support to the police reform process from the county 
governments for police reform largely depended on the relationships 
between the county governments and the national government and the 
dispositions of the respective governors. Mombasa and Machakos for 
example were probably the very first counties to acquire vehicles for 
police operations in the country. Whilst Machakos continued to enjoy 
cordial relationship with the national government, the county government 
of Mombasa fell out with the local police and the national government 
over heightened insecurity and referendum debate respectively and thus 
the county authorities threatened to withdraw support for the police. 
However, other counties for example Mandera, Turkana and Kisumu 
considered policing and security a function of the national government 
and therefore did little if nothing to support the police reform process. 
Kisumu for example did not even have any budgetary allocation for 
policing and security. At the time of data collection, that is August 2013, 
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this county government was considering transferring funds from other 
sources to the security vote as an afterthought.314 Six months after data 
collection, there was no evidence that Kisumu County was supporting the 
police. Kisumu Deputy Governor was quoted, “How then are we to 
provide fuel and other needs to a department that is not under us? 
(sic).”315 Two explanations can be attributed to this state of affairs. First, 
the nature of national politics influenced support for police reform at the 
county level. Most of those counties in support of the process were 
elected on the Jubilee platform, while most of those that did not support 
police reform were affiliated to CORD. Secondly, county governments 
were a new phenomenon in Kenya and therefore lacked technical 
expertise in many areas. Therefore, many counties had not envisaged the 
need to include security component in their budgeting since security and 
policing were national functions. 
Though devolution was to give leverage to regions that had been 
traditionally marginalised, especially those from northern Kenya, there 
was still a sense of exclusion even after devolved system came into 
existence. In the aftermath of double Al –Shabaab attack in Mandera 
County that killed 64 Kenyans, on a Nairobi bound bus on 22/11/2014 and 
Koromeh quarry attack on 2/12/14 respectively; Mandera Senator Billow 
Kerrow disclosed that the region was still excluded going by the number 
of officers deployed in conflict areas, response to intelligence reports and 
facilitation of security agencies. For example, he argued that the national 
government allocates Mandera County only Ksh 57, 000 (about £400) for 
fuel in three months.316 Whilst we could not verify this claim, the 
impression is that areas that have traditionally been marginalised in 
Kenya still miss out in improved funding for the police. 
Overall, there is little evidence of structured involvement of the county 
governments in the police reform process. If anything, the overall police 
reform process did not consider how the political process at the county 
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level would affect the police reform process within the devolved units. 
There was lack of technical expertise at the counties to translate the 
national police reform agenda to fit into the local security and policing 
priorities in the counties. Interview with police officers in Nairobi and 
Kisumu revealed that they had not been trained on police reform. In fact, 
most police officers largely perceive police reform to be about 
improvement of police welfare. In Kisumu for example, no effort had been 
made to train the local police chiefs on the paradigm shift in policing, 
neither was there deliberate recruitment of experts on police reform 
process at the county level.317 
Whilst the politics of devolution remained alive at both the national level 
and county levels due to demands for more resources to the latter, police 
reform was enveloped within the wider devolution debate. The opposition 
CORD and county governments called for transfer of policing functions to 
the county level. The national government however argued it would be 
untenable to place policing and security in the hands of local political elite 
arguing that governors are likely to misuse security officers and instead 
preferred strengthening of the Provincial Administration.318 By far this 
remains one of the most challenging problems that the 2010 constitution 
did not expressly resolve-providing for policing as a national function while 
at the same time providing for citizens participation. It provided an avenue 
for interpretations depending of political interests.  
The gubernatorial elections in 2013 in the devolved units were expected 
in 2012 to be very competitive throughout the country. This is because the 
governors would be the chief executive officers of the units and would 
therefore control huge resources from the national government. 
Additionally, the governors would chair the County policing authorities, 
thus providing the governor with immense influence at the county level. 
The possibility of controlling both resources and security at the county 
level therefore made the elections competitive. In a study of conflict and 
politics of Tana Delta, a respondent captured the significance with which 
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the governors’ role was understood; ‘The Governor will be the President 
of the county and can decide what happens with the land’ (Kirchner, 
2013). The intended introduction of county policing authorities at the 
county level therefore remained one of the push factors that made the 
elections competitive at the counties. Thus, prior to the elections, there 
were lots of activities in the form of alliance-building at the county level in 
the same way alliances were being built at the national level. The 
alliances were largely based on ethnic and clan affiliations and involved 
the local security systems. 
In Tana River for example, the alliances revolved around three ethnic 
communities namely; Pokomo, Orma and Wardei communities. The 
dominant group, the Pokomo remained more divided on choice of 
candidates to present for elections. The community presented three 
candidates, namely; Danson Mungatana (Lower Pokomo), Mandara 
Badiribu and Adam Dhidha (both from Upper Pokomo) while Orma 
presented two candidates namely; Hussein Dado and Molu Shamboru. 
Just as the politics at the national level was a two-horse race between 
Jubilee and CORD, elections in Tana River reflected this pattern. The 
minority communities, the Orma and the Wardei through local political 
settlement formed an alliance to challenge the dominant Pokomo 
community, and indeed the Pokomo lost (Kirchner, 2013). With the 
support of Wardei community, Hussein Dado (Orma) garnered 42.4% 
while Mungatana (Pokomo) got 31.1% of the votes cast (Kirchner, 2013).  
The involvement of the security sector and the police featured prominently 
in the alliance building in Tana River. The Pokomo tribe, the dominant 
group blamed Yusuf Haji319 of siding with Hussain Dado and claimed the 
two, who had a history working in the government, planned skirmishes 
using the state security apparatus. By virtue of Haji’s position, as Interior 
Minister, the Pokomo claimed he was using the police to unleash terror, 
while the Orma also blamed the police of being corrupt for failing to 
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disarm the Pokomo (Kirchner, 2013). The result was fear and 
despondency amongst the locals resulting in low voter turnout in the 2013 
general elections. The police were unable to halt unfolding violence 
between the ethnic Orma and Pokomo and lost confidence amongst the 
two communities. Undertaking police reform under this context of 
suspicion became impossible. 
The same story was replicated in other counties especially those 
characterised by deep ethnic cleavages including Mandera, Wajir Garissa 
and Marsabit amongst others. Significant to these political settlements is 
the motivation of local network means of violence and economic rewards 
in reproducing power (Kirchner, 2013). The local security mechanisms 
including the police became part of this network, as will be shortly 
examined in the case of Marsabit County, yet the police reform agenda 
seem not to have factored these dynamics. In order to understand how 
these local political settlements impacted on devolution and police reform 
processes, the remaining part of this section now focuses the politics of 
devolution and police reform process in Marsabit County.  
Marsabit County provides a good case for exploring the politics of power-
sharing at the county level and its impact on police reform process. It 
remains one of those areas that violence is normal (Scott-Villiers  et al., 
2014) despite police reform process in Kenya. Marsabit is located some 
200km south of Kenya-Ethiopia border in Kenya’s arid north (see Figure 
6: Marsabit County map). Its proximity to Ethiopia makes it the 
commercial hub between Kenya and Ethiopia. The county represents 
situations of divisions along ethnic and religious cleavages. About 40% of 
the population are Christians, 32% Muslims and 28% believe in traditional 
religions and others (Jilaa, 2014). 
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In order to understand the 
politics of devolution and 
police reform process, it is 
important to understand the 
county’s demographics in 
terms of ethnic grouping as 
shown on Table 6. Marsabit 
is divided into four sub-
counties. Ethnic groups in the 
county include; Rendille, 
Turkana, Gabbra, Burji and 
the Borana. The Borana are 
the most dominant group and 
live in Saku and Moyale 
which are the economic 
strongholds of the county. 
Table 6: Marsabit county demographics 
 
Adapted from Marsabit County Government: http://marsabit.go.ke/population/ 
The period preceding the 2013 elections was characterised by ethnic 
concerns on how to dominate the new political structures with the view to 
controlling the rents and patronage that would come with decentralisation. 
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The assumption then was that the dominant group, the Borana would be 
the major beneficiary of the devolution.  
In the run up to the 2013 elections however, the Borana were deeply 
divided on how to share power in the county amongst the various groups. 
There were a total of three alliances, two among them dominated by the 
Borana. For fear of being dominated by the Borana in the new 
dispensation, the Rendille, Gabbra and Burji reached a political settlement 
to form an alliance in which key posts, namely; Governor, Senator Deputy 
Governor, Women representatives, established by the new devolved 
structures would be shared equitably. They revived REGABU (Rendille, 
Gabbra, and Burji), an old alliance that had been previously initiated to 
challenge the Borana dominance in in the powerful teachers union, the 
Kenya National Teachers Union (KNUT) (Scott-Villiers  et al., 2014). 
Critical to the victory of the camps was Godana Hargura (Rendille) who 
was the most influential opinion leader (Jilaa, 2014) and whose support 
would significantly tilt the election outcome. Hargura insisted that he 
would only team up with the Borana’s if they went to the election as a 
united front through an all-inclusive political settlement.  There was no 
settlement amongst the Borana and Hargura joined REGABU that won 
the elections.  
Whilst all the alliances were initially associated with the Jubilee Alliance at 
the national level, REGABU decamped to CORD and left the two Borana 
camps to split the Jubilee Alliance vote. Meanwhile, REGABU was busy 
consolidating power base and transferring voters en-masse during the 
registration of voters exercise. REGABU had a head-start and went on to 
win the elections as seen on Table 7 below. Borana politicians, finding 
themselves out of power for first time in decades, cried foul (Scott-Villiers  
et al., 2014). 
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Table 7: Marsabit County 2013 Election Results 
POSITION NAME GROUP VOTES 
Governor Ukur Yattani Gabra 48,491 
Deputy 
Governor 
Mohammed Ali Burji 
Senator Godana Hargura Rendille 54,213 
Women Rep Nasra Ibrahim Garree 42,906 
Source: Adapted from IEBC Marsabit County Election Results 
The election results introduced a shift in power dynamics in the county. 
Though Marsabit has a history of inter-ethnic tensions, the outcome of the 
elections triggered fresh violence. There was violence from 1994-6 
between Burji and Borana, in 1996/7 between Rendille and Borana, and 
from 2003-8 between Gabra and Borana. In the post 2013 elections, the 
Borana felt left out in key appointments in the county further heightening 
tensions that have existed amongst the Borana and the other 
communities.  
Members of the local communities and the police are culpable in the 
violence. As noted by one of the respondents, ‘the people are not willing 
to share information or report criminals to the police because they are 
their kinsmen’ (Scott-Villiers  et al., 2014) while the police also take sides 
and therefore cannot help restore order despite the ongoing police reform 
process. This led to confidence in the public in police being at its lowest 
ebb as opined by a respondent; 
‘It gets to a point where people no longer go to the police, but 
instead they take revenge. If the help from the government was 
reliable, where the killers would be arrested, then the communities 
would be satisfied and such revenge would not be common’ (Scott-
Villiers  et al., 2014). 
To prevent the conflict from escalating, the Deputy President threatened 
that the national government would move to suspend Marsabit County if 
the leadership did not intervene to stop the violence. Article 192 of the 
Kenya constitution (GoK, 2010) provides for suspension of county 
governments in the event of emergency out of internal conflicts or any 
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other exceptional circumstances. With this in mind, some respondents 
quoted by Scott-Villiers  et al. (2014) noted that the Borana preferred to 
make the county ungovernable, with the intention of reverting Marsabit 
County to the national government. In the end, parliament approved the 
deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to help restore peace 
(The Star, 2013). This deployment did not stop the violence as attacks 
continued even with the presence of the military.  
Failure of the local leaders to dialogue forced the president to summon 
Marsabit county leaders on February 5, 2014 and urged them to take 
leadership in restoring peace and threatened to send the military yet 
again (Scott-Villiers  et al., 2014). This is despite the fact that previous 
military deployment did not lead to cessation of violence. Subsequently, a 
locally driven peace process took place on 21st – 22nd February 2014 in 
Nairobi with the support of the national government and facilitated by the 
Kenya Red Cross. This led to the signing of "The Boma Peace Agreement 
(The Boma Declaration)" in which local leaders promised to work for, build 
and "support the peace process to bring lasting peace to Marsabit. 
The politics of power-sharing in Marsabit County was not only localised to 
Marsabit as the politicians at the macro level joined in the fray. The 
opposition CORD argued that the Jubilee government had objected to the 
governors chairing the County Security Committee as envisaged in the 
Constitution and therefore exonerated the Marsabit governor from any 
wrong doing. The coalition accused the national government of hiding 
under security to frustrate devolution (Karanja, 2014). 
The Marsabit case raises a number of questions about the design of 
Kenya’s police reform process under the devolved system. Whilst the 
constitution envisaged that the elected representatives would chair the 
county policing authorities in this case the governor, implementing this in 
a county that is deeply divided would present yet another challenge of 
local ownership especially where the local leadership has problems with 
the governor. It would amount to institutionalised politicisation of security 
at the county level. This would provide the elected representative with the 
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means to pursue a personal rather than a people agenda using the 
instruments of power available at the county level. At the same time, 
whilst the national government administration has been the custodian of 
security to the local people, ethnic alliances defied this through the 
actions of the administrators and the police at the village level. The local 
chiefs and police were part of the network to frustrate peace efforts. 
The political settlement in Marsabit was among the local elites, including 
political, religious, ethnic and business elites. It however excluded the 
majoritarian community, the Borana and the national government 
representatives at the county. The result was a power struggle pitting 
three actors. REGABU was keen to stamp authority while the Borana 
sought to undermine this authority. The National government through the 
County Commissioner also sought to protect the interests of the national 
government through the old order as captured by a respondent;  
‘There is a lot of tension between the county commissioner and the 
governor over power. It is not clear to many people who, between 
the governor and commissioner, is in charge of the county. But 
because the commissioner controls the security apparatus he has 
more power but he is misusing the security officers’ (Scott-Villiers  
et al., 2014). 
Surprisingly, at the very village levels, the chiefs and their assistants 
subscribe to their community interests and mobilise against the national 
government and other warring community as noted - ‘these chiefs and 
sub-chiefs are the ones used to mobilise people and pass messages to 
villagers, to block the administration from knowing what is happening and 
organising the attacks’ (Scott-Villiers  et al., 2014). 
Political settlements are normally determined by the political organisation 
in the country. Devolution thus determined the kind of political settlements 
in Marsabit County. Political settlements may result from compulsion of an 
authoritarian regime, where local political elites are forced to work 
together; the outcome of compromises between previously warring 
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parties; or the result of a more pluralist bargaining arrangements 
(Globalr2p, 2013).The settlements in Marsabit ahead of the 2013 
elections were a result of the pluralist bargaining, while the settlement 
after the Boma Declaration was forced by the national government, but 
found favour amongst the previously warring groups.  
Thus, the pre-2013 political settlement in Marsabit was not all inclusive, 
while the post Boma Declaration was inclusive. This echoes the argument 
that imposed political settlements which involve the warring parties often 
end up more inclusive than settlements involving pluralist bargaining. The 
relevance of the challenges of implementing police reform and devolution 
in Marsabit County demonstrate that institutional reform is not only a 
technical issue, but one which must consider politics as central to reform 
debates. Kenya’s police reform process seemed to have underestimated 
the emergence of new political power elite at the county level and how to 
deal with the challenges these elites would pose to the implementation of 
police reform process. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to analyze the interrelationships between power-
sharing politics and police reform process in Kenya. As discussed in the 
chapter, the power-sharing agreement that took place at the macro level 
after the 2007 postelection violence had profound effect on the country’s 
governance structure and policing. It triggered mechanisms that led to 
renewed effort to reform the police and review the constitution that 
eventually led to the establishment of the county governments. 
The chapter has considered the politics of grand-coalition and devolution 
and their interrelationship with police reform at both the national and 
county levels. The study reveals that struggle for political power 
determined the scope and breadth of police reform process. The political 
elite wielding power before the power-sharing arrangement at the national 
level ceded ground to facilitate police reform only to the extent that it 
allowed them to ease-off pressure from both internal and external 
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stakeholders interested in Kenya’s stability. Thus, police reform 
proceeded depending on the pressure exerted on the political 
establishment. 
The establishment of the county governments became the next frontier of 
the power-sharing struggle. As argued by Cornell and D'Arcy (2014), the 
gubernatorial elections led to the entrenchment of existing elites and 
patronage networks with most of those elected having held public offices 
before. There was also the emergence of a local powerful political elite 
that challenged the national elites as demonstrated by the governors’ 
quest for control of more resources and the security function at the county 
level. These dynamics impacted on police reform process, threatening to 
scuttle the reform process altogether. They raised questions about 
whether the design of the police reform agenda discussed in chapter 
three had envisaged that the politics of power-sharing would impact on 
the police reform process. 
Overall, though quest for power determined the pace of police reform 
process and implementation of devolution in Kenya, none of  the 
protagonists denounced the need for reform, thus suggesting some level 
of agreement and future prospects in Kenya’s reform process. However, 
raw power politics seem to be the point of divergence amongst the 
political elites. Amidst all the politics, to what extent was the police reform 
process responsive to policing and public security needs? This is the main 
question that the next chapter addresses.. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RESPONSIVENESS OF 
POLICE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA 
RESPONSIVENESS OF POLICE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter assesses the extent to which police reforms in Kenya have 
resulted in changes related to improved policing and responding to 
policing and public security needs. Responsiveness here refers to a 
measure of how the police reform processes address security concerns in 
a manner consistent with the demands of the population. It is a function of 
how the citizenry articulates its preferences and the capability of the 
reforms to meet the demands equitably (Bastian and Hendrickson, 2008). 
The chapter therefore examines progress in implementation, as much as 
impacts, of police reform process in relation to improving people’s sense 
of security, taking into account the context upon which the populations 
live. The chapter revolves around the efficacy of security sector reform 
processes to policing and community security needs, which is the third 
thematic area of this study. Specifically, it responds to the fifth secondary 
research question thus; to what extent is national police reform process in 
Kenya responsive to policing and security needs of the Kenyan 
population? 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The present section (Section 6.1) 
introduces the chapter. Section 6.2 outlines the methodological approach 
used in analysing data and addressing the questions specific to this 
chapter. Section 6.3 explores peoples’ understanding of security in 
Kenya; particularly their priorities in terms of security and safety at the 
community level, level of awareness of police reforms and who they 
perceive to provide their security. Section 6.4 is an examination of the 
perceptions of responsiveness of reforms with respect to the four officially 
stated priority areas of police reform process, namely; Police image, 
accountability and partnerships; Professionalism, terms and conditions of 
service; Operational preparedness, tooling and logistical capacity and 
Institutional, policy and legal reforms. The aim here is to explore how the 
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national police reform priorities cascaded down to match the priorities of 
populations at the community level. Section 6.5 focuses on the 
perceptions towards responsiveness of the overall police reform process. 
The section is an integrative examination of perceptions towards 
responsiveness in each of the sub-sections in Section 6.4 and integrates 
quantitative aspects of our questionnaire in each of the areas. Section 6.6 
concludes the chapter with a brief presentation of the key findings of the 
chapter. 
6.2 Approach to Chapter Analysis 
The approach to the analysis of this chapter was informed by priority and 
sequence decisions in combining qualitative and quantitative research in 
mixed methods (Bryman, 2012). Priority decisions related to how far 
qualitative or quantitative methods were the principal data gathering tools, 
while sequence decisions related to which methods - qualitative or 
quantitative - preceded the other.320 Bryman’s categorisation yields three 
priority approaches, namely; Quantitative, Qualitative and Equal-weight 
(both qualitative and quantitative).These in turn yield a total of three 
sequence combinations each. Though in broad terms Bryman’s 
classification was intended for an entire research project, we adopt his 
approach in the specific analysis of data available for this chapter. We 
prioritise qualitative methods since they were the main data collection 
methods, with quantitative methods being supplementary. 
Three possible sequence combinations namely; quan→QUAL, 
QUAL→quan and QUAL+quan (Bryman, 2012) were possible choices for 
this chapter.321 While our analysis proceeds with presentation of 
qualitative interviewing data involving both key informants and focus 
group discussions followed by quantitative data derived from our 
questionnaire, thus adopting an overall QUAL→quan approach, we are 
not constrained by this sequence and let the analysis develop iteratively 
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from full range of the data available at our disposal. Thus it would be 
reasonable to argue that though the analysis assumes a QUAL→quan 
approach, it also has elements of QUAL+quan where emphasis is on 
qualitative aspects while also fusing in subsidiary quantitative analysis. 
The choice of the approach, which integrates both QUAL-quant approach 
and QUAL+quan approaches, was for various reasons. First, it provided 
opportunity to compare and iteratively develop and analyse the range of 
available data according to requirements rather than be over-constricted 
by a definitive structure. Secondly, it provided an opportunity to analyse 
quantitative data in instances where qualitative data was missing and vice 
versa and also allowed us to integrate our primary quantitative data into 
the existing national surveys. In short, the approach allowed the analysis 
to develop iteratively and organically within the broad framework 
described above. 
The analysis of qualitative data draws from three main sources namely; a 
variety of available secondary sources, qualitative interviewing (key 
informant and personal interviews) and three focus group discussions 
(FGDs) (which were conducted in Kisumu). For quantitative data, we used 
existing surveys as important secondary literature sources and a semi-
structured questionnaire as a primary data source. The latter was a, 
Questionnaire for Members of the Public (QMP)322 to collect primary 
quantitative data on public perceptions on responsiveness of police 
reforms towards policing and public security needs.  
A caveat on the use of the questionnaire at this point is however 
necessary. The primary data derived from the questionnaire was not 
intended to authoritatively represent the public perceptions of the entire 
Kenyan population, but meant to triangulate and deepen our 
understanding of the perceptions derived from qualitative interviewing and 
other secondary sources including existing surveys. With this in mind, the 
use of the questionnaire was limited to only eighty-six cases drawn from 
Kisumu and Nairobi and limited to sixteen Likert-type quantitative items. 
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Where reference is made to the Kenyan public, then this is in relation to 
national surveys derived from other secondary sources. 
The analysis of data was done in two phases. In Phase I, the focus was 
on overall understanding of security and police reform priorities amongst 
the respondents. The aim here was to establish whether the reform 
priorities at the national level matched the understandings and 
expectations of the local populations and also to provide the basis upon 
which perceptions towards responsiveness of the reform process was 
understood by respondents. For this purpose, respondents were asked 
three specific questions which were also represented by the first three 
open-ended questions in the questionnaire.323 These included; what the 
respondents considered as the most important security issue(s) in their 
neighborhood; whether they were aware of government efforts in 
guaranteeing their security; and who they thought provided security in 
their neighborhood. 
Phase II focused on our questions in relation to the four officially stated 
priority areas of police reform. Qualitative analysis in this phase was 
based on what the respondents perceived to be the progress in each of 
the main reform areas. The quantitative element was structured around 
the analysis of responses to our Likert – type items developed from the 
four officially stated priority areas of reforms, namely; Police image, 
accountability and partnerships; Professionalism, terms and conditions of 
service; Operational preparedness, tooling and logistical capacity; and 
Institutional, policy and legal reforms. In terms of presentation of the 
analysis in this chapter, in this Phase, we first present the qualitative data 
followed by our questionnaire data. 
Analysis of primary qualitative data in this chapter was done using Nvivo 
which is a Computer - Aided Qualitative Data Analysis System (CAQDAS) 
described in Section 1.8. Whilst all the interviews were transcribed and 
themes categorised as nodes in Nvivo, audio recordings for the focus 
group discussions were exported into Nvivo as audio files and selections 
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coded into themes which were predetermined to four officially stated 
reform priorities at the national level. The focus group discussions were 
not fully transcribed owing to the length of the discussions. Rather, they 
were recording in the form of detailed notes on each FGD. 
Processing and analysis of our primary quantitative data derived using 
QMP was done both manually and electronically using the statistical 
package for social sciences (SPSS). The research assistant helped with 
the data entry into codes identified by the researcher. Analysis of data 
generated using SPSS was only limited to the descriptive level using the 
frequency distributions and cross tabulations.  
The questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first section included 
respondents’ background for the purpose of providing a detailed analysis 
of security needs and perceptions across gender, age and level of 
education. Section B of the questionnaire was divided into two parts. Part 
1 sought to gather data relating overall understanding of security and 
police reform process and relate mainly to analysis in Phase I. Part 2 
contained Likert-type statements with both positive and negative items 
used to obtain the public perceptions with respect to four main areas of 
police reform and relates to Phase II of our analysis.  
The responses to each individual item on the questionnaire were re-coded 
by assigning them numerical values. A score of 5 was assigned to 
strongly agree option and 1 for strongly-disagree option for positive items. 
The scores were however reversed for negative items with a score of 1 
assigned to strongly agree option and 5 for strongly-disagree option as 
shown indicated in Table 8 below. 
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Table 8: Re-coded response options  
Response option Positive item score Negative item score 
Strongly agree 5 1 
Agree 4 2 
Neutral 3 3 
Disagree 2 4 
Strongly disagree 1 4 
The scores were then aggregated to obtain the total score in each reform 
area. The expected mean score for each of the five attitude areas were 
used to determine whether the respondents had favourable or 
unfavourable perceptions. A score above the expected mean score was 
construed to mean favourable perception while scores below the 
expected mean were construed to mean unfavourable perceptions. Since 
there were equal numbers of items in each reform area (4), each area of 
reform had an expected score of 15, obtained by getting the average of 
the sum of marginal scores in each area. The overall public perception 
towards the entire police reform process was done by using the same 
process, this time aggregating the scores for each of the reform areas. 
The choice of the strategy described above was due to a number of 
reasons. First, it allowed for triangulation of the data derived from various 
sources. Secondly, it provided an opportunity to offset the inherent 
weaknesses associated with both quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Bryman, 2012). It also provided an opportunity to provide empirical 
grounding of the qualitative data thus giving us the opportunity to develop 
a more robust analysis of the progress as much as impact of police reform 
process in Kenya since 2007.324 
6.3 Public Security Needs, Priorities and the Police Reform 
Process 
Understanding ordinary peoples’ security needs alongside their priorities 
for security sector reform (police reform in Kenya in this case), was 
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significant in determining progress as much as impacts of the police 
reform process on the Kenyan public. This presumes a Community-Based 
Approach to Criminal Justice Assessment that grounds reforms decisions 
on the needs of communities and ensures service orientation (ISSAT, 
2014). Thus, an understanding of community security priorities was 
important in determining progress in police reform process in Kenya. 
What was the understanding of security and police reform process 
amongst the Kenyan population? Responses to this category of questions 
were according to three areas, namely: the most important security 
issue(s), awareness of government efforts to guarantee security and 
justice and identification of actors perceived to provide security amongst 
the local populations. 
6.3.1. The most important security issue(s) in the neighborhood 
We sought to determine the extent to which police reform priorities set at 
the national level matched with community safety and security priorities by 
asking the question; ‘What do you consider to be the most important 
security issue in your neighborhood? This was included in both the 
questionnaire and focus group discussions. Responses to the 
questionnaire largely emphasized insecurity related to crime in the 
neighborhood. These included; robbery with violence, theft, carjacking, 
witchcraft, homicides, presence of illegal guns, and alcoholism amongst 
others. 
We further probed our questionnaire respondents to determine whether 
these crimes affected them at personal level or community level. Majority 
of our questionnaire respondents (84.1%) considered these as general 
insecurity affecting the community, while a minority (15.9%) also 
considered them as direct personal insecurity. This perception was high 
amongst both sexes with men (81.8%) and women (88.0%). This outcome 
can be reliably be interpreted to mean that community safety and security 
was a priority amongst our questionnaire respondents. This finding is 
reinforced by its consistency with IPSOS (2014) national survey, in which 
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respondents (67%) perceived general insecurity, as the most serious 
problem facing Kenya as at December 2014. 
Given the inherent weaknesses in the questionnaire method,325 the 
responses obtained using our questionnaire however did not yield 
sufficient data in terms of community security priorities. Whilst these 
responses suggested that respondents prioritized community safety and 
security, they did not provide us with answers as to what these community 
safety priorities were. The focus group discussions provided a more 
nuanced exploration of community security priorities and expectations in 
police reform process compared to our questionnaire. The FGD 
participants listed their insecurities caused by issues like tribalism, 
unemployment, high cost of living, drug abuse, illiteracy and poverty 
amongst others. A respondent in the youth group considered security to 
be broad to include issues like feeling of comfort, living in an environment 
where dignity is upheld and the rule of law adhered.326 There was 
consensus amongst focus group participants that any reform process 
should be geared towards limiting the adverse effects caused by factors 
that contribute to community insecurity.327 
The objective of police reform process designed at the national level was 
to make the police professional, effective and efficient in the provision of 
security and accountable to civilian authorities.328 In the context of post-
election violence of 2007, the police reform process was meant to reduce 
recurrence of violence and create conducive environment for political, 
social and economic development, which sit well with the normative 
claims of OECD DAC (2007). 
We sampled some of the issues the focus group discussion participants 
wished the police reform to address. These included; addressing 
corruption in the police service, tribalism, improving police image and 
courtesy in dealing with members of the public amongst others. As for 
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corruption, a participant in the female only group observed that, police 
corruption is the source of insecurity and it would be fair if it can be 
reduced.329 This perception found favour in the wider literature in 
corruption in Kenya330 and also in the debates amongst Kenyan public 
particularly in response to Al Shabaab’s terrorist attack in Mandera which 
was attributed largely to the police and immigration officials fraudulently 
facilitating entry of Al Shabaab militants into Kenya.331 Against the above 
backdrop, focus group discussions suggested that community security 
priorities did not differ greatly from the national agenda for reform, as for 
example, corruption was one of the key issues police reform sought to 
address at the national level and remained so amongst the local 
populations. 
The process of designing the police reform agenda, as has already been 
discussed in Chapter three, was a deliberate effort that involved public 
participation in terms of asking them the kind of policing they sought.332 
These priorities have not changed and still remain important to the Kenya 
population given the responses generated from some existing surveys, for 
example IPSOS (2014) and Usalama Reforms Forum (2014b),and 
reinforced by our focus group discussions. 
The implementation of reform priorities however showed divergences 
between the public expectation and the national priorities. A narrative 
account of a participant in our community leaders’ focus group illuminates 
this point. The participant had reported a robbery case and was asked to 
raise the police when he saw the suspected robbers. He went ahead and 
did as requested only to be told that there was no vehicle that could be 
used to apprehend the suspect.333 A similar experience was shared by a 
female respondent who gave an account in which the police asked her to 
get the people who had threatened her through text messages, yet she 
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did not have the capacity to investigate.334 Nuanced in these narratives 
are the un-met expectations from members of the public who are aware of 
what they required from the police reform process. The members of the 
public expect the police to be at the forefront in investigating their 
concerns yet narratives from the field demonstrate that this was yet to be 
achieved. 
Our focus group discussions also revealed that youth unemployment is 
widely perceived to be a major driver of insecurity amongst the 
communities where we conducted the research. For example, a 
participant in the focus group discussion quipped that the biggest problem 
in the communities is that of the youth going wild to the extent that they no 
longer see crime as abnormal.335 This finding is consistent with IPSOS 
Survey which rated youth unemployment amongst priority issues 
alongside the rising cost of living and insecurity.336 The women in the 
FGD on their part gave experiences they undergo in the course of their 
business particularly in Kibuye market and Bus-park citing harassments 
from the youths well known to the police yet no arrests are ever made.337 
The researcher’s experiences during data collection also presented the 
awareness of unemployed youth as a major public security concern. A 
respondent advised us to be careful while conducting research in the 
Nyayo Estate of Nairobi as we could easily lose our laptops to many 
unemployed youths in the neighborhood.338  
The perception of youth unemployment being a security concern was also 
shared with the youths who participated in the focus group discussion.339 
Thus, unemployed youths are perceived to be a major source of insecurity 
in the communities despite the efforts beyond the police reform to 
constructively engage the youth. This presents an interesting find 
considering that the youth in our questionnaire appear to be more 
informed about what the government is doing to guarantee security and 
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justice (see Table 10) and even have a fairly positive perception towards 
the overall responsiveness of the police reform process to public security 
needs (see Table 31).340 
Apart from widely shared concerns in terms of important security issues in 
the neighborhood, women respondents in our focus group discussions 
were particular on their personal security, which many perceived was not 
adequately addressed in the police reform.341 For example, a woman 
participant faulted her local clan elders for impeding women’s access to 
justice, accusing them of discouraging women against reporting abuses 
against women to the police..342 This finding perhaps helps to explain the 
fact that very few women report their cases to the police or other 
established judicial systems. An example in this case is the finding by 
IPOA which noted that during the period January 2014-June 2014, it only 
received 13% complaints from women compared to complaints by men 
which stood at 60%.343 
At another level, the women in the FGD also noted their inability to 
articulate their issues due to police harassment. For example, a 
participant noted that the number of times she has had encounters with 
the police, she left without explaining her problem due to police 
harassment, and they are hardly allowed to explain themselves. She 
observed, ‘wasikilize ujielezee shida zako. Watuelewe sisi kina mama’ 
(they need to listen to your problems. They need to understand us as 
women).344From the foregoing, the focus group discussion with women 
suggests that police reform in Kenya was not widely perceived by local 
women to have strong agenda for the women. 
6.3.2. Delivering Security and Justice to the People 
Having examined what was considered important by the local 
communities in terms of their security and policing needs, we now explore 
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what the respondents considered the government was doing to deliver 
security and justice within the context of post-2007 police reform process. 
In this area, we sought to better understand the respondents’ awareness 
of the government efforts in improving ordinary people’s sense of security 
and justice. In this way, we considered awareness of the police reform 
process to be sufficient reason to validate the responses to our 
questionnaires in terms of perceptions. The argument here was that if the 
respondents were not or were less aware of the police reform process 
then it would be difficult to determine on what basis their perceptions 
derived. Thus, we considered that the higher the number of respondents 
aware of the efforts, the more valid the responses regarding the 
perceptions were presumed and vice versa. 
Since this question category in the questionnaire was not adequate to 
reliably elicit responses on awareness of police reform programme, we 
corroborated the findings from our questionnaires with the data obtained 
from focus group discussions. The finding from our questionnaire 
revealed that majority of our respondents (73.3%) was aware of police 
reform process, while only 26.7% was less aware. Awareness of police 
reform process was not determined by the respondents’ demonstration of 
competence of the police reform process, but by the researcher’s 
inference of indicators that suggested improved provision of security that 
fit the frame of police reform process. 
These indicators included issues like mentioning of police reform, 
recruitment of more police officers, enhanced community policing and 
patrol in the neighborhood, reintroduction of the rapid response call centre 
popularly known as 999 amongst many others. Where these elements 
featured, we construed them to mean awareness and vice-versa. One 
weakness with this approach however, was that it was not possible to 
explicitly determine the extent to which the respondents understood the 
reform process. With this in mind, it was therefore reasonable to make 
references to public perception as the responses derived from our 
questionnaires were based on awareness of the police reform. 
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We cross-tabulated results to this questionnaire item across county, 
gender and age to get the picture of level of awareness of police reform 
across these factors and compared these with the data obtained from our 
focus group discussions. In terms of locality, 73.9% (Nairobi) and 72.5 %( 
Kisumu) of the respondents were aware of the police reform. We 
interpreted this to mean that there were no major variations in terms of 
awareness of police reform based on the two locations (Nairobi and 
Kisumu) from which questionnaire respondents were drawn. Some 
significant variations at the descriptive level were however noted with 
respect to gender amongst our questionnaire respondents. More females 
(80%) than men (69.6%) were aware of the government efforts to 
guarantee security and justice through police reform. This is illustrated in 
Table 9 below. 
Table 9: Delivery of Security and Justice to the People: cross-tabulation by gender 
Sex of the respondent * What the government is doing to guarantee security 
and justice  Gender Crosstabulation 
 Aware Not aware  
Sex of the 
respondent 
Male % within Sex of the 
respondent 
68.6% 31.4% 100.0% 
Female % within Sex of the 
respondent 
80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total % within Sex of the 
respondent 
73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
The above finding however presents a different picture from the focus 
group discussions and existent literature. Whilst the participants in all our 
focus group discussions demonstrated awareness of police reform 
process, the women participants did not appear more aware of the police 
reform process than their male counterparts and the youth. Additionally, 
the evidence that a smaller proportion of women(13%) compared to 
men(60%) during the period June 2014-December 2014 (IPOA, 2014) 
presented complaints to IPOA is indicative that many women may not 
have been exposed to the role of IPOA amongst other reform initiatives, 
or alternatively that IPOA’s awareness programmes had not had 
significant impact on women amongst other factors. Thus, the 
divergences in our questionnaire to IPOA (2014) could have been due to 
235 
small number of women in our questionnaire respondents345 though it 
nevertheless raised the need to further interrogate access to improved 
police service to women. 
We had mixed responses to qualitative elements in our questionnaire. 
Some respondents took a moderate position in assessing what the 
government had done while others remained extremely critical. An 
example of a moderate assessment from Kisumu was that ‘what they (the 
government) are doing is not good enough’ (sic),346 while another 
respondent from Nairobi noted that ‘we feel the government is not doing 
enough.’347More critical of government effort included responses like ‘the 
government is doing nothing, nothing completely. I cannot lie’ (sic)348 
while another critic introduced ethnic undertone noting that ‘as long as 
Kikuyu’s are in power nothing will change.’349 These responses suggested 
some form of awareness of the police reform though there was little faith 
in its delivery. Notable was the fact that more critical responses came 
largely from opposition zone of Kisumu in which most respondents were 
diametrically opposed to most government initiatives.  
An interesting finding in the questionnaire was with regard to age. 
Younger respondents (18-24) (85.7%) were more aware of government 
effort in improving security compared to the middle aged (25-34) (72.2%) 
and mature adults (35 and above) (66.7%). This may have been due to 
heightened government initiated youth activities at the time of data 
collection. There was a sustained campaign by the Jubilee administration 
targeting the youth through the establishment of the Youth Fund and the 
revamping of the National Youth Service to provide training for the youth 
with the view to reducing youth involvement in crime. This could have led 
to higher level of awareness amongst the youth as indicated in Table 10 
below. 
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Table 10: Delivery of Security and Justice to the People: cross-tabulation by  age  
Respondents' age * What the government is doing to guarantee security and 
justice  Crosstabulation 
 Aware Not 
aware 
 
 
Respondents' 
age 
 
18-24 
years 
% within 
Respondents' age 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
 
25-34 
years 
% within 
Respondents' age 
72.2% 27.8% 100.0% 
35 and 
above 
% within 
Respondents' age 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Total % within 
Respondents' age 
73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
A comparison between the level of awareness and the perceptions of 
responsiveness of police reform process towards public security 
suggested some kind of association. Based on our quantitative data 
above, there appears to be some form of association between age of 
respondents and their level of awareness of police reform process. The 
younger generation respondents were more aware of the police reform 
process compared to older respondents. When we compared this with 
perceptions towards responsiveness to police reform, younger 
respondents considered police reform to be more responsive. This could 
have been due to the fact that at the time, the government had 
announced that it would recruit about ten thousand youths into the police 
service thus raising prospects for employment amongst the youth. Though 
the recruitment exercise was nullified (Ogemba, 2014), it nevertheless 
may have generated lots of interest in the police reform process amongst 
youth. 
Focus group discussants demonstrated some form of awareness of police 
reform process for example community policing. Whilst it was not our 
intention to explore the form of community policing pursued at this point, 
the fact that respondents in the focus group discussions identified with 
community policing was an indicator of reform awareness. For example, a 
male participant noted; ‘they are at least trying, they have even brought 
about community policing.’350 Overall, responses in our questionnaire and 
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focus group discussions were indicative that indeed a majority of our 
respondents were aware of what was being done to improve their security 
through police reform though these efforts still fell below their expectation. 
6.3.1. Provision of Security: The Actors  
In order to improve our understanding of which actors are perceived to be 
important in the provision of security, we asked questionnaire 
respondents and focus group participants the question; who provides your 
security? The question was inspired by two reasons. First is the argument 
that an audit of who is providing policing is the starting point to 
understanding effective provision of security and the fact that it also helps 
determine whether any support can be given to improve and strengthen 
them (Baker, 2011). Secondly, police reform literature is dominated by 
‘local ownership’ or ‘people-centred’ priorities which to a large extent are 
based on the donor–recipient dichotomy lens. Thus, it is necessary to 
understand how local ownership debate is manifest in the Kenyan 
context, particularly with regard to state and non-state actors, in terms of 
security provision to local populations. 
The immediate response to this questionnaire item was recorded as first 
mentioned while others were recorded as spontaneous.351  First mentions 
were those responses produced without probing, while spontaneous 
responses were those produced when the interviewer probed the 
respondents and allowed them time to reflect on provision of security. 
First mention was considered to be the most preponderant actor in the 
production of security and public order at the local level, while 
spontaneous responses were based on the order in which they appeared. 
The state security agencies including the police ranked poorly in terms of 
provision of security to the locals. Majority of our questionnaire 
respondents indicated ‘other’ (47.1%) as providers of security followed by 
private security actors (23.5%).  Responses under ‘other’ category 
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included ‘God’ ‘self’ ‘neighbors’ and ‘private guard’ inter alia. The police 
ranked third with (21.2%) while vigilante groups were fourth with 7.1%. 
This is shown in Table 11 below.  
Table 11: Provision of Security - The Actors 
Who provides your security-First mention 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Other 40 46.5 47.1 47.1 
Private Security 
Company 
20 23.3 23.5 70.6 
Kenya police 18 20.9 21.2 91.8 
Vigilantes 6 7.0 7.1 98.8 
National Intelligence 
Service 
1 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 85 98.8 100.0  
Missing Non-response 1 1.2   
Total 86 100.0   
The results indicate that nearly 80% of security provision for the 
participants is in the hands of the non-state actors (neighbours, self, 
vigilantes, private guards inter alia) indicating the pluralist nature of public 
ordering and security. The state’s monopoly over coercive force in public 
ordering is only limited to nearly 20%. This representation is the case not 
only for the respondents as an overall cohort, but also cuts across both 
gender and location. For example, in terms of gender, state provision of 
security was females (25.8%), men (20.0%) while in terms of location 
Nairobi (22.2%) and Kisumu (21.7%).  
A similar finding was also witnessed in our qualitative elements of the 
questionnaire and also focus group discussions. Take two questionnaire 
responses from Nairobi’s Nyayo Highrise estate for example, one noted, 
‘at the estate level I haven’t seen what role the government is playing’352 
while another reported that ‘we have no option but to erect a wall and get 
a guard.353 These responses are indicative of an absence of either the 
government in provision security, an alternative to which respondents 
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either ensure their own security or employing guards, as noted by another 
respondent, ‘It is an individual to provide his/her own security’354 
Limited visibility of government in provision of security also featured 
dominantly in focus group discussions.  Whilst the participants were able 
to mention state institutions responsible for provision of public security 
and justice including the police, the judiciary, office of the prosecutor 
amongst others, and indeed explained their role, most respondents did 
not regard them highly in terms of provision of security and justice to 
ordinary people. A participant noted that provision of security and justice 
is what ‘they should provide but “bado wameshindwa” (they are 
unable).’355 The assertion from the above participant indicates that though 
the existence of these state institutions and their roles are known to the 
people, the state institutions are weak and cannot fulfill their mandate. 
The findings in our questionnaire responses and focus group discussions 
are not strange as they confirm existent research and survey literature. 
Evidence suggests that not only in Kenya but also across sub-Saharan 
Africa, at least 80% of justice services are delivered by non-state 
providers (OECD DAC, 2007, Podder, 2014). Baker (2011) reported that 
in two of four federal states of Nigeria, non-state policing systems were 
the preferred choice of security delivery 88.9% and 62.5% of the time. 
The state security institutions are not considered by the populations as 
the first choice in making communities secure. 
Kenya is therefore no exception in terms of public preference for non-
state actors to provide security. This is largely due to a relative absence of 
the state and its agencies in certain spaces. Researcher experiences in 
Obunga slums in Kisumu during the re-launch of community policing 
amplify this point. A police officer disclosed that apart from that particular 
day, they hardly get into the slum as it is dangerous for them.356 Further, a 
key informant also noted that the slum harbours dangerous youth groups 
that remain in hiding, and the police cannot reach them, ‘kuma gin tiereno 
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be polis ok nyal chopo’ (and wherever they are the police cannot 
access).357 
The finding about non-state actors’ dominance in provision of security in 
Kenya could be as a result of two factors. First, security in Kenya, 
particularly policing was never constructed with the local people’s 
concerns at the centre of security. Like elsewhere in postcolonial Africa, 
policing was constructed purely to do with property and ownership of 
property and how to secure them and make sure that the natives were 
taken care of in terms of mobilising them for labour and containing 
them.358 This did not change at independence and so amongst a huge 
percentage of the Kenyan polity, the police continue to be perceived as 
illegitimate.359 
Secondly the design of modern policing in Kenya was based on a foreign 
model. It borrows heavily from the first Indian Police Act. The Police Act 
that was repealed in August 2012 is the original Indian Police Act of 1861 
which British brought Kenya in 1926. The procedure, operational policies 
of the police, institutional architecture of the police as they were and even 
as they are now, are the same the philosophy and the vision of the police 
as we have it today.360 Thus, protection of the regime through the police 
force still remains the basis upon which reform process is understood.  
As part of our thesis analysis, we consider the question; ‘was the post 
2007 police reform process the appropriate model for Kenya especially 
where 80% of the public security provision is control by the private sector? 
The question invites us to re-examine the discourses and processes 
undertaken in the process. These have concentrated on improvement of 
the capacity of police through training and equipping the police361 and 
developing the institutional framework for policing thus suggesting a state-
building approach which assumed that building capacity of the police 
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would automatically lead to efficient service delivery and legitimacy. This 
position is illustrated by a focus group participant thus; ‘I feel they placed 
the cart before the horse. They tended to reform the administration of the 
force rather than reforming the police themselves.’362 
In the preceding section, we sought to examine public understanding of 
security and police reform based on three parameters, namely; most 
important security issues in the community, awareness of police reform 
and determination of actors in provision of security to local populations. 
We have established that the priorities of the respondents did not differ 
from the priorities set at the national level though the implementation of 
the police process was yet to meet these expectations. The respondents 
have also demonstrated awareness of the police reform process and 
suggested that nearly 80% provision of security is under the non-state 
actors. Based on these findings, we now have sufficient grounds to 
explore the progress and responsiveness of police reform to policing and 
public security needs in perception terms. 
6.4 Priority Areas of Reform and Results for the Public 
This section aims to analyse public perceptions on progress on specific 
areas of post-2007 police reform. It represents the second analytic phase 
of this chapter and focuses on specific reform areas within the four priority 
areas of police reform (see Table 12 below) as articulated by the Ransley 
Committee (GoK, 2009). The analysis assumes a QUAL→quan approach 
described in Section 6.2, beginning with analysis of a range of available 
secondary sources and primary qualitative data followed by quantitative 
data from our survey questionnaire. 
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Table 12: Linking police reforms to results for Kenyans 
 
Source:(GoK, 2009, p.218-219) 
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6.4.1. Institutional, Legal and Policy Reforms 
Kenya’s post 2007 police reform involved a number of institutional legal 
and police reforms. The new constitution was passed, and police acts (the 
National Police Service Act, 2011, The National Police Service 
Commission Act 2011 and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority 
Act 2011) and a raft of policies and regulations operationalizing the police 
reform process were put in place.363 
These had an impact on the policy direction on the police reform process 
already discussed in Chapter 4. However, the extent to which these 
institutional, legal and policy framework shaped police reform process and 
how they responded to local security and policing needs remain unclear. 
1. Public perception towards the police corruption 
The establishment of a transparent and accountable system has been 
one of the most difficult challenges affecting Kenya’s transformation 
agenda. The recent Transparency Corruption Index considers Kenya as 
very corrupt with a Corruption Index of 27 and ranks 136/177 in the 2013 
ranking.364 The wider societal corruption has filtered into the police with 
the statistics indicating that the police lead amongst government 
departments perceived to be most corrupt with 48.1% followed by traffic 
police at 18.7% (EACC, 2013). Similar findings were also reported in 
Kenya’s AfroBarometer survey for December 2014 amongst 2397 adult 
Kenyans in which three-fourths (75%) of respondents reported that  
“most” or “all” of the police are corrupt, followed by government officials 
(46%) and members of Parliament (45%) (IDS, 2015). 
Corruption therefore remains one of the biggest challenges in making 
policing responsive to public security needs, and it was a priority area for 
the government and for local communities. Corruption has been 
institutionalised right from recruitment, promotion, deployment amongst 
others. On average, each Kenyan had been forced to bribe the police 4.5 
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times a month, paying them on average US$16 per month (Baker and 
Scheye, 2007). 
The national police reform was to address corruption in the police service 
through the establishment of institutions, both internally and externally 
that would fight the vice. The Internal Affairs Unit and other external 
agencies including IPOA, EACC, and Commission on Administrative 
Justice amongst others were all empowered to help fight corruption not 
only in the police but across the Kenyan society. To what extent have 
these new police reform institutions helped change public perceptions 
about police corruption?  
We explored this question in our focus group discussions and 
questionnaire and compared this primary data with existing secondary 
data. Most of our focus group participants stated that corruption is a major 
problem in the police service. As with the findings in our semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, there was scepticism that the 
establishment of these institutions had not addressed the problem of 
corruption.365 The many institutions fighting corruption in Kenya made it 
difficult to coordinate the fight against corruption in the police service.366 
Most participants in all our focus group discussions largely perceived that 
police in Kenya are corrupt,367 and that there has not been departure even 
with the establishment of reform institutions to fight corruption. 
However, some participants did not blame the police in total for 
corruption, and argued that corruption in the police service is a reflection 
of the society. Others argued that priority in the implementation of police 
reform did not focus on individual change in the police service, but on the 
establishment of institutions.368 Thus, attempts to fight corruption should 
not only be limited to the police, but must also target wider societal 
transformation as captured by the comments of a participant; ‘the entire 
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society requires transformation.’369 
The proposal for wider societal transformation is however hampered by 
lack of wider opportunity for the public in the implementation of police 
reform as noted by one participant; ‘We do not get platform where we can 
adequately air out what we feel the government should do.’370 Yet another 
respondent argued that the laws in the country make it easy for the public 
and the police to abet corruption. The respondent cited the Traffic Act, for 
which one would rather bribe the police than be subjected to cumbersome 
court process.371 Women participants were even more succinct about 
corruption in the police. ‘Corruption is the key. Police most of them are 
corrupt, if it can be reduced it can be fair’ (sic).372  
The findings in the questionnaire results also point to similar direction as 
our focus group discussions. Table 13 below shows that perception 
towards corruption in the police has not positively changed. Our 
questionnaire respondents perceive that corruption in the police service 
continues to thrive despite the efforts to change the state of affairs. About 
85% of all the respondents disagreed that there is reduced corruption in 
the police service compared to only 11.6% that feels there is reduced 
corruption in the service. 
Table 13: Perception towards corruption in the police service 
There is reduced corruption in the police service 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Agree 7 8.1 8.1 11.6 
Neutral 3 3.5 3.5 15.1 
Disagree 51 59.3 59.3 74.4 
Strongly 
disagree 
22 25.6 25.6 100.0 
Total 86 100.0 100.0   
This state of affairs affects negatively the delivery of police service to the 
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public. It also affects the relationship the police and members of the 
public. Nearly all the participants had in one way or the other witnessed 
corruption in the police service, either as active participants or witnessed 
the police engaged in corruption.373 In overall, compared to perceptions 
about police corruption before 2009 when police reform begun, the 
institutions responsible for the fight against corruption in the police are 
perceived not to have improved respondents perception about police 
corruption. 
2. Perception towards police oversight 
At the core of post-2007 national police reform agenda was the issue of 
police oversight. Ransley committee recommended the establishment of 
oversight mechanism that will not only benefit the police themselves, but 
give public confidence that their complaints are being dealt with (GoK, 
2009). An elaborate oversight mechanism was developed involving the 
three arms of government (Judiciary, Executive and Legislature), Internal 
Affairs Unit and oversight exercised by independent bodies.374 As before, 
our analysis of perceptions towards police oversight draws from our 
primary data sources alongside secondary sources. 
Key informant interviews revealed that oversight of police was yet to be 
embraced by the public and the police. For example, interviews with 
police officers during a workshop for the establishment of the Internal 
Affairs Unit showed police indifference to both internal and external 
oversight, while interview with a key informant from NPSC also suggested 
that the tensions between the National Police Service Commission and 
the IG’s office was due to the IG’s office indifference to civilian 
oversight.375 Acceptability of oversight mechanism was still a challenge. 
At the time of our Interview with IPOA representative, it was established 
that as a relatively new institution, IPOA was yet to begin to deliver on its 
mandate. 
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IPOA (2014) however reported substantial improvement of police 
oversight between its formation and 2014. For example, the report noted 
remarkable improvement in terms of awareness by members of the 
public. It noted that during the period June 2014 –December 2014, it had 
registered a markedly high number of complaints at 610 compared to the 
previous period at 250 (an increase of 144%). Sixty six percent (66%) of 
the 610 complaints received were within IPOA’s mandate compared to 
46% during the previous period. This is indicative that the awareness on 
the kind of complaints handled by the Authority is gradually increasing in 
amongst the Kenyan public. 
Though IPOA reported marked improvement in awareness by the public 
on the complaints it handles, public response to IPOA activities raise 
doubts about public understanding of IPOA mandate. For example, in 
September 2014, residents of Githurai Estate in Nairobi blocked the Thika 
Road for three days in protest against IPOA over the arrest of a police 
officer who had allegedly shot dead two brothers suspected to be robbers. 
The residents claimed IPOA was interfering with the police fight against 
crime in the area.376 The incident perhaps suggests that though the 
existence of IPOA may be known to the public, its mandate may not have 
been fully understood by the public.  
The participants in our focus group discussions in Kisumu indicated that 
there was awareness of the oversight mechanisms though engagement 
with these institutions with the public still remained low. Most participants 
had not thought of submitting complaints to IPOA yet they had grievances 
against the police. Thus, whilst IPOA (2014) reported gradual increase in 
cases that fall directly under their mandate, the complaints raised by the 
focus group discussants and Usalama Reforms Forum (2014b) are 
indicative that many complaints against the police from the public are still 
unreported. 
Most of the participants in the focus group discussions, especially women, 
were not aware how and where to channel complaints against the 
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police.377 This could be attributed to the fact that most independent 
oversight bodies are yet to decentralise their operations to the grassroots. 
The County Policing Authorities and Community Safety Committees had 
not been established at the time of data collection and writing of this 
thesis. 
Responses to our questionnaire however raise optimism amongst 
respondents in relation to police oversight as shown on Table 14 below. 
Public oversight of the police was the only area where respondents have 
positive perception that police reform is responsive to public security 
needs. Of all the questionnaire respondents, 77.4% perceived that public 
oversight of the police has improved through the police reforms. The 
challenges IPOA had faced at the formative stages notwithstanding, 
perception amongst our respondents is high that public oversight has 
improved through police reform. These findings are consistent with IPOA 
(2014) which paints a positive picture of police oversight amongst the 
Kenyan population. 
Table 14: Perceptions towards police oversight 
Public oversight of the police has improved through the ongoing reforms 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 15 17.4 17.9 17.9 
Agree 50 58.1 59.5 77.4 
Neutral 10 11.6 11.9 89.3 
Disagree 7 8.1 8.3 97.6 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 2.3 2.4 100.0 
Total 84 97.7 100.0   
Missing Non-response 2 2.3     
Total 86 100.0     
The finding regarding perception towards police oversight in the 
questionnaire however raises some fundamental questions. Despite the 
enactment of the 2010 Constitution that provided enough guarantees 
through the Bill of Rights, human rights abuses in the police are still very 
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high (see Table 22).378 While we do not claim that positive perception 
towards oversight is the result of the oversight bodies, the outcome of this 
item suggests the item may have been understood by the respondents to 
mean that public oversight mechanisms of the police should be 
strengthened. Overall, the fact that this response turned out as it did, did 
not however substantially affect the overall outcome in perceptions 
towards institutional reform. 
3. Perception towards political interference 
The literature on security sector reform process and the findings in 
Chapter 4 and 5 highlight that implementation of police reform is a highly 
political process. This is manifest in terms of either lack of political will to 
support the process or resistance to police reform from the wider political 
elites and amongst actors within the police sub-system. The manner in 
which political interests have so far influenced the reform process, for 
example the political interests in the vetting process, recruitment and the 
amendment of the police laws to suit the interests of the executive have 
fed into the public perception that indeed political interference is still rife in 
the police reform process. This perception cuts across key informants, the 
focus group discussions and our questionnaire respondents. 
According to an MP allied to the ruling Jubilee Alliance, the institutions 
charged with police reform in Kenya are political creations and must 
therefore do business with the political leaders.379These sentiments 
appear not just to reflect the opinion of a single politician but probably 
embrace the thinking amongst a substantial fraction of the members of 
the parliamentary committee of National Security and Administration. 
Political posturing in the committee during crucial bills touching on 
security amplifies this point. For example, the government side in the 
committee outnumbered their opposition colleagues in pushing for 
amendment of police acts to give the executive more control of the police. 
It is this perception from the political class that makes them interfere with 
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the reform process. On the other hand, those opposed to the political elite 
interfering with the reform process see political interference as the single 
most problem affecting the implementation of police reform as noted by a 
respondent, ‘The problem we are faced with is not a technical problem or 
a legal problem, it is a political problem’.380 
Whereas some key informants from the police reform institutions denied 
being subjected to pressure from the political elite, they indicated that 
political interference was a common phenomenon. For example, while our 
interviewee reported that the NPSC had not received any undue influence 
on their operations from the executive, he reported that the amendments 
to the police reform laws in June 2014 were due to political 
interference.381 The comments by other key informants were similarly 
contradictory. A key-informant from IPOA claimed that there was no 
political interference, yet on the other hand suggested that political 
interference was one of the challenges facing police reform.382 Most 
respondents viewed the office of the Inspector General to be more 
politicised.  
The findings from the focus group discussions further reinforce the fact 
that though police reform process envisaged a depoliticised service, the 
perception that the political elite interfere in the police was still dominant. 
In Kisumu for example, the discussants claimed that most police officers 
were from Central and Rift Valley and were posted to the region to contain 
possible violence in 2013 general elections.383 These claims could not be 
factually verified though they are indicative of the politicised nature of the 
Kenyan police. 
Both qualitative and quantitative elements of our questionnaire pointed to 
political interference in the police. Some of the qualitative responses 
singled out decision making and appointments in the police as areas 
where the political elite interfere with the police. A respondent noted that 
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‘some politicians influence the police decisions’384 while another noted 
that ‘when it comes to senior appointments, politicians interfere.’385 These 
sentiments find credence given the jostling by the political elite when it 
came to the appointment of new Inspector General. The political elite from 
Marakwet County lobbied for the appointment of ‘one of their own’ to 
replace Inspector General Kimaiyo who was forced to resign after 
Mandera attacks (Wanga, 2015). And indeed, Joseph Boinett, a Marakwet 
was nominated by President Uhuru Kenyatta to replace Kimaiyo, perhaps 
suggesting that the president’s decision was meant to stem the disquiet 
amongst Marakwet politicians. 
This is a case in which the political elite use political support to demand 
concessions from the executive. The qualitative perceptions of political 
interference in our questionnaire quantitatively translated into majority 
respondents (86.2%) perceiving that politics still interferes with the police 
and the reform process while only 11.6% perceiving  there is no political 
interference. These views are confirmed by the findings in Table 15 
below. 
Table 15: Public perceptions towards political interference 
There exists political interference in the police 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 35 40.7 41.7 41.7 
Agree 36 41.9 42.9 84.5 
Neutral 3 3.5 3.6 88.1 
Disagree 8 9.3 9.5 97.6 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 2.3 2.4 100.0 
Total 84 97.7 100.0   
Missing Non-response 2 2.3     
Total 86 100.0     
Whilst it was not enough to claim politics interfere with the police reform 
process, it was significant to note how the interferences impact on the 
police reform process. For example, the decision to nominate Boinett 
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though meant to streamline police operations and intelligence gathering, 
sparked off disquiet amongst police officers who were Boinett’s seniors 
while he was still in the police service and also generated debate about 
the president playing politics with security.386 
4. Level of dissatisfaction amongst police officers 
The welfare of Kenya police was a priority issue even before the post-
2007 police reform. Previous reform documents for example (Kenya 
Police, 2004) identified police welfare as one of the areas that needed to 
be reviewed. Police welfare was not only a matter of the police but also a 
priority issue amongst the Kenyan public as well as civil society groups. 
The Kenya Police Reforms Working Group (KPRWG) for example has 
police welfare as one of the pillars upon which it is founded to push for 
improved welfare of the police.387 
Mixed reactions were generated from interviews with police officers. 
Interviews with top police officers suggested that police welfare had 
improved. Improved housing, medical scheme salary increment are 
amongst issues credited to the reform process.388 Junior officers on the 
other hand considered reforms to be too little and had not improved their 
welfare.389 The divergence in perceptions in welfare, for example housing, 
amongst the officers was due to the fact that senior officers at the national 
level had better housing facilities compared to their junior counterparts 
and police stations in far flung regions. A female police officer noted; 
‘people are still living under funny conditions.’390 The understanding of the 
police officers is that police reform should be about their welfare to enable 
them execute their function. This understanding largely contributes to 
police dissatisfaction.391 In terms of working conditions, a member of the 
civil society working on police reform described evidence room in a 
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Kenyan police station as; ‘looks like a store’392to mean the appalling 
conditions under which the police officers operate.  
It emerged in our focus group discussions that the members of the public 
are of the opinion that police reform was yet to address the welfare of 
police officers hence their level of dissatisfaction remain high. As a result, 
the participants noted that the focus of the police on a daily basis is ‘what 
can I take home every day,’ to mean fraudulently collecting as much 
money as possible from unsuspecting members of the public. 393 
Our questionnaire responses also pointed to public perception that the 
level of dissatisfaction amongst police officer is high. Qualitative 
responses to the questionnaire by members of the public were indicative 
that the police are not satisfied. For example, statements like’ very few 
are satisfied’394 and ‘I don’t think they are satisfied with their job’395 were 
dominant. The pay does not match their job specification as noted by a 
respondent ‘they work like donkeys, yet earn little money.’396 Because of 
the perception that the police are dissatisfied, one respondent described 
the police service as ‘the last job anybody would aspire to do.’397 
Quantitatively, 85.7% of the respondents were of the opinion that the 
levels of dissatisfaction amongst the police officers remain high. This 
finding is illustrated in Table 16 below. 
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Table 16: Public perceptions towards police level of satisfaction 
The level of dissatisfaction amongst police officers remains high 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 27 31.4 32.1 32.1 
Agree 45 52.3 53.6 85.7 
Neutral 5 5.8 6.0 91.7 
Disagree 5 5.8 6.0 97.6 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 2.3 2.4 100.0 
Total 84 97.7 100.0   
Missing Non-response 2 2.3     
Total 86 100.0     
The findings from our qualitative interviewing and the questionnaire were 
corroborated by IPOA (2014). None of the 40 stations they visited met the 
acceptable housing standards (IPOA, 2014). Our observation in the police 
stations also confirmed the sorry state of police stations in Kenya.398 
Whilst there have been considerable efforts after 2009 to improve police 
welfare, the wider perception amongst the police officers and the public 
was that these efforts were still below public and police expectations. This 
has in turn affected police morale thus adversely affecting their service 
delivery. 
6.4.2. Professionalism in the Police Service  
The discourse on police professionalism gained prominence in Kenya 
particularly due to questions raised about the conduct of the police in 
Kenya’s post-election violence of 2007. Issues regarding the reliability of 
the police, their level of professionalism, the influence of ethnicity and 
tribalism in the police and whether the police was managed in an open 
and transparent manner amongst other issues emerged under the rubric 
of professionalizing the police service. These issues form the result areas 
for police reform in terms of professionalization of the police and are 
presented below. 
1. Perceptions towards police reliability 
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Police reliability was defined by the confidence levels of respondents in 
the police to provide an ordinary day-to-day policing service. We asked 
our respondents in both focus group discussions and questionnaire 
whether they thought the police were more reliable after 2008 than before 
2007. Our focus group discussions generated mixed responses. Those 
arguing that the police are relatively reliable gave instances where they 
have had the police address their problems. For example, a lady 
participant in the youth focus group discussion noted, ‘I had something to 
do in their offices. I noticed they have changed. I was given proper 
treatment.’399 
Others however insisted that there is nothing positive about the police 
being reliable, while a few had not interacted with the police and therefore 
did not know whether the police were reliable or not. More important was 
the fact that perceptions regarding police reliability amongst the focus 
group participants were influenced by  the relationship between members 
of the public and the police as observed by a respondent; ‘these people 
are all biased and given time and opportunity they will talk bad about the 
police.’400 
Qualitative responses to our questionnaire also generated mixed 
responses. Some respondents noted that the police are only reliable to 
the extent that a crime has been committed, and never in time to help 
stop crime. For example, a respondent observed; ‘they are reliable but 
they are doing nothing.’401 Others were however outright that the police 
are not reliable; ‘they are still the same-no change.’402 
For quantitative responses, only 30% of the entire questionnaire 
respondents perceive that the police are more reliable while the majority, 
about 70% (disagree 48.8%, strongly disagree 10.5%) disagreed that 
police are more reliable. The results are presented in Table 17 below. 
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Table 17: Public perceptions towards police reliability 
Police are more reliable these days than before 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Agree 24 27.9 27.9 29.1 
Neutral 10 11.6 11.6 40.7 
Disagree 42 48.8 48.8 89.5 
Strongly 
disagree 
9 10.5 10.5 100.0 
Total 86 100.0 100.0   
The findings in our focus group discussions are consistent with existing 
surveys about police reliability. Usalama Reforms Forum (2014a) for 
example noted that confidence amongst the Kenyan public in the police to 
provide day-to-day policing service has declined since 2012. Whilst the 
confidence level was 34% in 2012, this had declined to only 28% in 2014. 
Cumulatively, therefore, the results from the focus group discussions, 
questionnaire and secondary survey are indicative that police reform has 
not translated into improved reliability of the police. 
2. Public perception towards police professionalism 
Our focus in perceptions towards police professionalism was aimed at 
determining from our respondents how they perceive the police to strike a 
balance to reconcile varying conditions in their work and consistent with 
the Bill of Rights (GoK, 2010). Interviews with most key informants 
showed that they perceived little progress. For example, our key informant 
from IPOA noted that the police have not changed the way they do 
things.403 This position was supported by interviewees particularly from 
civil society organizations who perceived that the mind-set in the police is 
yet to change.404 
Some focus groups participants pointed out some progress in terms of 
police professionalism. However, most of the participants argued that lack 
of professionalism is still a major challenge in the police service. In 
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particular, several women indicated that whenever they report to the 
police, their concerns were not taken seriously.405 A discussant narrated 
how the police asked her to identify whoever had broken into her house 
and later asked her to provide fuel to enable the police undertake 
investigations. The discussant noted that she got tired of the police and 
had to give up on her quest for justice. 
Others noted that the police often want to establish their clients’ socio-
economic status before they begin investigations, with those perceived to 
be of high social status given preferential treatment.406 Underlying this is 
the issue of equity, irrespective of one’s belief, ethnicity and gender, in the 
provision of services by the police which FGD participants felt was still 
wanting. It is noteworthy that equity was one of the areas members of the 
public indicated the police reform process should address. 
The responses to the questionnaire confirmed public disappointments 
with the police professionalism witnessed amongst the focus group 
discussants. Only 17% of the questionnaire respondents perceive that the 
police are more professional in dealing with the public. The majority, 
73.3% disagreed with the statement that the police are more professional 
as shown in Table 18 below. Where this feeling remains dominant, the 
willingness of the respondents to support the police reform process was 
also limited as evident in Kisumu where the public still remains indifferent 
to the police.407  
This finding is consistent with the national survey conducted by IPSOS 
(2014). For example, asked how satisfied respondents who reported 
various crimes to the police, a majority (60%) reported they were not 
satisfied, 23% somewhat satisfied, while only 17% was completely 
satisfied with how they were treated by the police. This is important as this 
rate was lower before the post-2007 police reform process at 41% in 
October 2006 and 60% in September 2014 (See Figure 9: Rate of crime: 
Trend analysis). 
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Table 18: Perceptions towards police professionalism 
The police are more professional in dealing with the public 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 15 17.4 17.4 17.4 
Neutral 8 9.3 9.3 26.7 
Disagree 52 60.5 60.5 87.2 
Strongly 
disagree 
11 12.8 12.8 100.0 
Total 86 100.0 100.0   
3. Perception towards ethnicity and tribalism in the police 
service 
During the period preceding 2007, the security sector was allegedly highly 
ethnicised with President Kibaki’s Kikuyu community dominating 
leadership of the sector including the police (Katumanga, 2010). This did 
not change even after the signing of the power-sharing agreement 
between President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Thus, the 
strong anti-Kikuyu sentiments that pervaded the political scene filtered 
into the police.408 Whilst there were deliberate efforts to reconcile the 
communities at the national and local level through national and local 
peace committees,409 there were no initiatives or systematic attempts to 
bridge the ethnic gaps in the police force.410 Thus, though the gaps may 
have been latent over time, the possibility of re-emergence ethnic 
undertones in the police still exists.411 
Interviews with key informants suggested ethnicity and tribalism are still 
dominant in Kenya’s security sector including the police.412 Our key 
informants in Kisumu indicated that ethnicity is still a problem and cited 
the case of Kisumu where they claimed that most police officers in 
Kisumu County were from Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities.413 Whilst two 
                                            
408
 See; Chege (2008); Murunga (2011) 
409
 Interview with CSO1 
410
 Interview with Police officer attached to Kilimani Police station 
411
 Interview with Police Officer, Kilimani 
412
 Interview with CSO2 
413
 This research did not establish from police records the claim that most police officers 
were from Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. 
259 
of the interviewees in Kisumu noted that this had affected police-public 
relations in Kisumu where the latter feels the police were sent to 
deliberately deal with them,414 in the event of electoral related violence in 
2013 general elections, another did not see anything fundamentally wrong 
so long as police perform their function to the satisfaction of members of 
the public.415 
The findings from our focus group discussions were also indicative of the 
fact that the respondents perceived that ethnicity and tribalism are still 
dominant in the police service. In Kisumu for example, the feeling of the 
majority of all our focus group participants is that police officers from the 
Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities dominate the police stations in the area. 
Whilst posting of the officers to Kisumu may have had nothing to do with 
their ethnic affiliation, the dominant perception amongst our focus group 
discussants that the 2013 elections were rigged in favour Jubilee Alliance 
feed into perceptions of police ethnicity in Kisumu.416 
The findings from the questionnaire reinforce these sentiments. 
Qualitative responses showed that ethnicity is deep rooted and still hard 
to deal with. Comments suggested that ethnicity is not only limited to the 
police service but in the entire government where some sections of the 
country feel isolated. A respondent noted thus; ‘one tribe has dominated 
in the government making things difficult.’417  
Quantitative responses in the questionnaires reflected the perceptions 
expressed qualitatively. Nearly 75% of all our respondents to the 
questionnaire perceive that indeed there are increased incidences of 
ethnicity and tribalism in the police service while slightly over 10% 
disagreed with the statement that there is increased level of ethnicity and 
tribalism in the police service. These findings are shown on Table 19 
below. 
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Table 19: Perceptions towards ethnicity and tribalism in the police  
There are increased incidences of ethnicity and tribalism in the police service 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 25 29.1 29.1 29.1 
Agree 39 45.3 45.3 74.4 
Neutral 11 12.8 12.8 87.2 
Disagree 9 10.5 10.5 97.7 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 86 100.0 100.0   
It was not feasible to distribute limited sample of 86 respondents amongst 
all the tribes in Kenya. We therefore did a cross-tabulation of counties 
against perceptions towards ethnicity in the police service. This was with 
the view to determining how political affiliations may have had an impact 
on perception in this area of reform. The finding in Table 20 revealed that 
a majority of the questionnaire respondents in Kisumu (strongly agree 
37.5%; agree 42.5%) perceives increased incidences of ethnicity 
compared to respondents from Nairobi (strongly agree 27.1%; agree 
47.8%).This could be due to the multi-ethnic composition of respondents 
in Nairobi compared to Kisumu which is dominated by the Luo community 
and which identifies more to the opposition. 
Table 20: Perception towards ethnicity in the police by counties 
County * There is increased incidences of ethnicity and tribalism in the police 
service Crosstabulation 
 There is increased incidences of ethnicity and 
tribalism in the police service 
Total 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Nairobi % 
within 
County 
21.7% 47.8% 15.2% 10.9% 4.3% 100.0
% 
Kisumu % 
within 
County 
37.5% 42.5% 10.0% 10.0% .0% 100.0
% 
The findings in relation to our primary data seem to reflect secondary 
sources. This is not only limited to the police, but also in the wider civil 
service in Kenya. A survey by NCIC (2011) found that some communities 
have greater share of civil service jobs than their population. For example, 
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Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Meru were the top three in the civil service with a 
representation of 22.3%, 16.7% and 5.9% respectively. This represented 
a variance in population of 4.7%, 3.5% and 1.5% respectively based on 
2009 population census. More recently, a survey by the Public Service 
Commission revealed that Kikuyu (22.3%), Kalenjin (15.3%), Kisii and 
Embu have a fairly large representation relative to their population (PSC, 
2014). This was an over-representation of 5.5%, 1.57%, 1.28% and 
1.04% based on the 2009 population census. 
While releasing the report, the Public Commission Chairperson Margaret 
Kobia attributed the disparity to tribalism and historical reasons and noted 
that since 2011 there have been deliberate attempts to rectify the 
problem. Going by the two studies however, there is no suggestion that 
there is progress as there appears to be no significant variation with the 
2011 data. The two surveys are important to police and the entire security 
sector as they represent sectors with ethnic disparities. Kenyan politics is 
organized around ethnic mobilization (Hornsby, 2012) and as such, the 
overrepresentation of certain ethnic communities in the police and the 
security sector and in the entire civil service could be due to political 
domination of the ethnic groups. The report by the National Cohesion and 
Integration (NCIC) lends credence to this view. It observes; ‘The Kikuyu 
and the Kalenjin have a disproportionate share of civil service posts 
compared to their population. Their proportion in the Civil Service exceeds 
the size of their share in the national population.’ (NCIC, 2011, p.6). In 
terms of politics in Kenya, the two communities have dominated national 
politics the longest compared to other communities.418 
4. Perception towards transparency in the police service 
Police transparency closely links with oversight of the police. It was hoped 
that the institutionalization of civilian oversight would open up the police 
and increase transparency and allow the public to have a say in how the 
police institutions are managed. As already discussed in the previous 
sections in this study, police operations have typically been clouded in 
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relative secrecy. For example, the propping up of the administration police 
towards the 2007 election and their subsequent alleged involvement in 
the 2007 general elections raised questions on the goings on in the 
police. It opened up speculations that former President Kibaki converted 
the Administration Police into a political force (Hills, 2007).  
Thus, merging the administration police and the Kenya police under one 
command alongside the establishment of civilian oversight authorities like 
IPOA and the NPSC were meant to enhance transparency in ways that 
would contribute to accountability. At the county level, proposals to have 
an elected representative chair the county policing authorities was also a 
step forward towards making police transparent and accountable to the 
people through the elected representatives. Have these efforts changed 
public perceptions towards transparency in the police? 
While the focus group discussions expressed some confidence in the 
civilian oversight, there were limited responses regarding the 
transparency in the police service. This could have been due to the fact 
that we did not explicitly link civilian oversight and transparency for the 
respondents during the data collection process. However, a relatively 
exposed participant gave an account of what he expected in terms of 
what he considers in the police thus; ‘What you can do to a community is 
openness. That openness, when my son is recruited correctly, trained by 
correct people and comes out with correct knowledge (sic)’.419 Underlying 
these sentiments is the need for openness of the police to the public on 
matters regarding recruitment and training. 
Though we did not generate substantial primary qualitative data on this 
area, we did marshal evidence that transparency remains a major issue 
amongst the police officers. For instance, lack of transparency in 
promotions and trainings remains one of the key concerns to the police for 
which IPOA recommends that ‘NPSC in consultation with the NPS should 
ensure that promotions and training are based on merit and clear set 
regulations’ (IPOA, 2014, p.29). 
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The qualitative responses in the questionnaire equally did not yield 
substantial results on this issue. However, in quantitative terms, the 
finding on perceptions of the public towards transparency in Table 21 
suggests that the respondents perceive that the police is not managed in 
a transparent manner. Some 80.2% of our sample disagreed that the 
police is managed in a transparent manner while only about 12% of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that the police is managed in a 
transparent manner. Notable was also the fact that only 3.6% of the 
respondents were unsure of their responses thus indicating that the 
perception that the police is not managed in a transparent manner is 
dominant. 
Table 21: Perceptions towards transparency in the police service 
Police service is managed in a transparent manner 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Agree 10 11.6 12.0 13.3 
Neutral 3 3.5 3.6 16.9 
Disagree 42 48.8 50.6 67.5 
Strongly 
disagree 
27 31.4 32.5 100.0 
Total 83 96.5 100.0   
Missing Non-response 3 3.5     
Total 86 100.0     
A number of events and actions of the police could help explain this 
perception. For example, the outcome of the vetting of police officers did 
not meet public expectations.420 A number of prominent police officers 
that the members of the public expected to be retired through the vetting 
process survived the process.421 An example in this case is a former 
Provincial Police Officer widely believed to be working with and protecting 
drug traffickers and accused of human rights violation survived the vetting 
process contrary to the expectation of the public.422While there may have 
been no evidence to incriminate the officer, the fact that the vetting 
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committee provided him an opportunity to reappear before the same 
committee may have provided an avenue for the public to speculate that 
the officer had the protection of the state. Our interview with a Vetting 
committee investigator however suggested that there was no evidence to 
link the officer with all manner of public accusations.423 
The 2014 new police recruitment process also reinforced the public 
perception that the police service is not managed in a transparent 
manner. The fact that the recruitment process was discredited by the civil 
society groups and the IPOA over allegations of corruption, tribalism, 
nepotism amongst other malpractices reinforced the perception of lack of 
transparency in the police.424  
6.4.3. Police Image Accountability and Partnerships 
Given the history of the Kenya police, the service to a large extent 
remained less legitimate in the eyes of the Kenyan public. Thus, police 
reform process sought to change this inadequate legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public. The reforms targeted to rebrand the police and give it a 
positive image. How far has this endeavour been achieved? This sub-
section focuses on police image, accountability and partnership and uses 
four items. The findings largely present a picture of a police service that 
has not changed in the eyes of the public. These findings are presented 
below. 
1. Public perception towards human rights abuses 
Human rights abuses by the police have been documented and 
thoroughly investigated by civil society organisations including the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights and the IMLU just to mention a 
few. The UN Rapporteur for Human Rights (Alston, 2010) also 
documented systematic human rights abuses by the police in addressing 
Mungiki menace. Police reform process was to address these 
shortcomings.  
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Though human rights violations by the police formed the basis of civil 
society, particularly the Police Reforms Working Group, participation in 
the reform process,425 interviews with stakeholders are indicative that 
there has not been improvement in this area of reform. Interviews with 
officers from IMLU and KNCHR suggested that despite human rights 
abuses being one of those areas targeted by police reform, the actions of 
the police and investigations by the institutions involved in human rights 
violation still point accusing fingers at the police. For example, interview 
with IPOA key informant revealed that most of the complaints against 
police officers revolve around human rights violations,426 while interview 
with IMLU disclosed that 63% of torture perpetrated by state officers is 
perpetrated by the police.427 This figure had risen to 67% in August 
2014.428 
Focus group discussions revealed that though cases of human rights 
violations by the police are documented, most of them go unreported 
because members of the public do not know their rights when dealing with 
the police.429 Thus, the participants called for deliberate civic education of 
members of the public with the view to holding the police to account in 
cases of human rights violations. 
IPOA (2014) singles out two police operations, namely; Usalama Watch 
and response to Mpeketoni attacks in Lamu during the year 2014. In both 
cases, there were violations of human rights. The report notes; 
The NPS led ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ as observed by IPOA 
was characterized by poor coordination and supervision; poor 
record keeping in the holding stations; allegations of police bribery; 
congested and dirty detention facilities; gross violation of the 24 
hours rule within which arraignment in court should be done for 
persons under arrest, violation of the rights of children to be 
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detained separately from adults pursuant to Article 53 (1) (f) (ii) of 
the Constitution (IPOA, 2014, p.26). 
Additionally, high profile murders of Muslim clerics believed to be 
promoting radicalisation of the youth continue to feed into public suspicion 
of human rights abuses in the police. Investigations into these murders 
are hardly resolved leading to suspicions of police complicity.430 Al 
Jazeera’s Investigative Unit elaborated on these allegations in their 
investigative report ‘Inside Kenya’s death squad’ and which implicated the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and police formations; Anti-Terrorism 
Police Unit and the Recce Unit of the General Service Unit (GSU). Their 
interview with alleged members of the ‘squad’ disclosed existence of an 
Elimination Programme sanctioned by the National Security Council.431 
The interviewees implicated Britain which they claimed was aware of the 
programme (Jepson, 2014). This development complicated the police 
reform process and raised questions about the international support to the 
police reform programme. 
Quantitative responses to our questionnaire largely confirmed our primary 
qualitative and secondary data. The findings in Table 22 suggest that 
police reforms have not yielded any significant progress in terms of 
addressing human rights violations. Nearly 70% of our questionnaire 
respondents perceive that human rights abuses are still prevalent in the 
police service. 
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Table 22: Public perceptions towards human rights abuses 
Human rights abuse is still prevalent in the police service 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 10 11.6 11.8 11.8 
Agree 49 57.0 57.6 69.4 
Neutral 15 17.4 17.6 87.1 
Disagree 9 10.5 10.6 97.6 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 2.3 2.4 100.0 
Total 85 98.8 100.0   
Missing Non-response 1 1.2     
Total 86 100.0     
2. Perceptions towards police relations with members of the 
public 
Police-public relation was a dominant theme in our in interviews and focus 
group discussions. Critical to this was the fact that respondents indicated 
that the relation between the police and the members of the public is not 
so cordial and therefore impacting negatively to policing. As will be 
examined in subsequent sections, this relationship is due mainly to 
mistrust between the police and the public. 
Our interviews highlighted that poor police–public relation in Kenya is not 
a recent phenomenon. This according to an interviewee cannot be turned 
around in the short-run and will take long before progress is achieved.432 
To him, historical legacies of policing in Kenya are responsible for this 
relationship, where the police have reigned on the public at the whims of 
the executive. Surprisingly, a police officer blamed the police officers for 
this relationship and attributed it to the police soliciting bribes from 
unwilling members of the public.433 
There was evidence, albeit limited, of commercial organisations 
involvement in community policing for example Nairobi Central Business 
Association (NCBA) in Nairobi and Kisumu against Crime (an association 
                                            
432
 Interview with CSO2 
433
 Interview with a Kilimani based police officer 
268 
of private security companies, Kenya Association of Manufacturers, 
United Business Association, the Hindu Council, and the Aga Khan 
Council) in Kisumu.434 However, these are mostly limited to urban areas 
where there is police presence. In rural areas, the commercial 
organisations are absent and the police presence is limited thus need for 
integration of informal traditional security and justice mechanisms. 
Collaboration with non-governmental organisation is concentrated at the 
policy level at the national level with little impact at the local level though 
local CBO’s offer great and untapped potential for community policing.435 
Whilst there was unanimity in our focus group discussions about the not-
so-cordial police-public relations, there were differences in terms of who is 
responsible for this relationship. Some participants blamed the police 
while others blamed the public. For example, a participant concurred with 
the view that the police are responsible for sour relationship with the 
public and was of the opinion that we have to equip our policemen with 
public relation skills.436 Women participants were more concerned about 
how the police relate with them as they are often scared to explain their 
problems to the police.437  
When the questionnaire respondents were asked about police relations 
with members of the public, most agreed that the relationship is not 
cordial due to the police treating members of the public as second class 
citizens.438 They argued that members of the public do not provide 
evidence to the police for fear of being implicated. In quantitative terms, 
74.4% of our questionnaire respondents indicated they do not agree that 
the police reform process has improved the relation between the police 
and members of the public (see Table 23 below). 
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Table 23: Relationship with members of the public 
There is strained relationship between police and members of the public 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 17 19.8 19.8 19.8 
Agree 47 54.7 54.7 74.4 
Neutral 10 11.6 11.6 86.0 
Disagree 11 12.8 12.8 98.8 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 86 100.0 100.0   
Our primary quantitative data was also consistent with larger surveys on 
police-public relation. According to a survey by Usalama Reforms Forum, 
many members of the public still feel that the police are not committed to 
the welfare of the public, with only 23% of their survey respondents 
indicating that the police are committed to the welfare of the public 
(Usalama Reforms Forum, 2014b). From the foregoing, there is evidence 
that the post 2007 police reform in Kenya has not led to improved police-
public relationship. 
3. Public trust and confidence towards the police 
As a precondition towards building confidence and trust, Waki 
Commission (2008) and GoK (2009) recommended change in police 
leadership. This was executed to demonstrate commitment towards the 
police reform process. However, it remained unclear how subsequent 
processes inspired confidence from members of the public.  
Our interviews suggested perceptions towards the trust and confidence 
levels in the police are still low. In the words of a key informant, ‘You see 
a police officer, and he does not elicit that trust in a Kenyan.’439 A number 
of activities including vetting were supposed to develop confidence and 
trust of the police amongst members of the public. However, the manner 
in which the exercise was conducted failed to win the support of the 
public.440 Despite little trust and confidence from the public, there was 
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evidence of initiatives to improve police–public relationship. In Kisumu, an 
interviewee outlined a number of activities being undertaken by the public 
to develop trust including sports and cleaning up exercise: he noted; 
I would say that we are really trying to first of all ensure that there 
is trust, there is mutual understanding, there is good connection 
between the public and the police. We are focusing on that. For the 
last two months I had a meeting called Kisumu Peace Festival. 
Kisumu Peace Festival which I am a member, we brought in the 
police to play football as part of the activity that we had.441 
Focus group discussions also pointed to lack of public trust in the police. 
This was due to several reasons key being lack of honesty on the part of 
the police.442 Most participants argued that it was difficult to trust the 
police on allegations that police officers associate with criminals. A 
participant observed that ‘the police themselves are not honest-you report 
a problem then all over a sudden the police will turn around and tell the 
criminal that so and so reported’ (sic).443 The issue here is that the public 
is not confident enough in the police being protective of their sources of 
information. The police jeopardise the lives of informants. Other reasons 
given for the low confidence of the public in the police also included 
asking for bribes, unfair treatment of members of the public and also 
police involvement in crime. 
Two respondents expressed their perceptions in ways that probably 
capture the dominant public perception about lack of confidence and trust 
in the police. One respondent said ‘it is not even there’444 while another 
observed that; ‘polisi sio mtu wa kuaminika’ (a policeman is not someone 
to be trusted).445 In our quantitative results in Table 24 below, only 12% of 
the respondents are of the opinion that the police reform process has 
resulted into trust and confidence compared to 77.1% that believe that the 
reforms have not led to increased trust and confidence. 
                                            
441
 Interview with CSO3 
442
 FGD1 
443
 FGD1 
444
 QMP57 
445
 QMP85 
271 
Table 24: Public trust and confidence in the police 
There is increased public trust and confidence in the police service 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Agree 9 10.5 10.8 12.0 
Neutral 9 10.5 10.8 22.9 
Disagree 44 51.2 53.0 75.9 
Strongly 
disagree 
20 23.3 24.1 100.0 
Total 83 96.5 100.0   
Missing Non-response 3 3.5     
Total 86 100.0     
These results compared positively to other studies. In the case of survey 
by IPSOS (2014), only 19% and 18% of their respondents had a lot of 
confidence in the Inspector General and the Police respectively (See 
Figure 7 below), while in the case of Usalama Reforms Forum (2014b), 
only 32% and 36% of the respondents had confidence in the police at the 
community level and believed the police are doing a good job 
respectively.  The findings are also consistent with AfroBarometer survey 
in which a majority (63%) reported they did “Not at all/just a little” trust the 
police while 36% “somewhat trusted” the police (IJR, 2015). 
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Figure 7: Levels of confidence in the security services 
 
4. Public sense of security compared to period before 2007 
general elections 
Whilst responses to different areas of public perception towards police 
image, accountability and partnership pointed towards the fact that the 
police reform process had achieved little in this area of reform, we will 
show in these sub-section findings in relation to whether the respondents 
were secure showed some positive progress.  
There was a general feeling of safety amongst most of our participants in 
focus group discussions. Coming only a few months after the 2013 
general elections, most participants we interviewed reported improved 
sense of security largely in comparison to the two electoral processes in 
2007 and 2013 general elections respectively. 
Qualitative responses to our questionnaire however yielded mixed results, 
though improved sense of security was more prominent. A respondent 
noted that even before post-election violence of 2007, he felt insecure and 
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argued that ‘insecurity has very little to do with post-election violence446 as 
he has always felt insecure due to crime in his neighbourhood, while 
another was categorical that ‘I don’t think anything has changed.’447 
Another respondent however had a different view, arguing that things had 
changed due to the Kenyan cases in the ICC. ‘Ukifanya kitu mbaya (you 
do something wrong) there is another step.’448 Significant to this argument 
is the fact that the analysis of the 2013 general elections established that 
the Kenyan case in the ICC also contributed to the peace that existed 
during and after the 2013 elections.449 Yet a few had a more positive 
perception and one noted that ‘I feel more secure today than before and 
during the 2007 postelection violence’450 
Quantitative responses to our questionnaire however suggested improved 
sense of security compared to during the post-election violence. As 
indicated in Table 25 below, about three quarters of our respondents 
(75.3%) are of the opinion that there is an improved sense of security with 
the on going reform process while only 11.7% disagreed with the 
statement.  
Table 25: Public sense of security compared to period during the post-2007 
election violence 
I feel more secure today than during the post-election violence 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 6 7.0 7.1 7.1 
Agree 58 67.4 68.2 75.3 
Neutral 11 12.8 12.9 88.2 
Disagree 7 8.1 8.2 96.5 
Strongly 
disagree 
3 3.5 3.5 100.0 
Total 85 98.8 100.0   
Missing Non-response 1 1.2     
Total 86 100.0     
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The perception of improved sense of security in this item could be 
understood in the context of the electoral processes of 2007 and 2013 
general elections. Whilst it is reasonable to argue that 2007 presented a 
real security and policing threat to the Kenyan population, the conduct of 
the 2013 general elections was fairly peaceful with insignificant incidents 
of violence (Cheeseman et al., 2014). The fact that data collection was 
done after a period of relatively peaceful elections could have contributed 
to this sense of security. The responses did not depart from the dominant 
narrative of peace during and after the 2013 elections. Thus, we could 
then argue that the response was mainly influenced by the existing 
political climate at the time. 
IPSOS (2014) national survey perhaps emphasises our position regarding 
quantitative response to this item. In the formative stages of the 
implementation of post-2007 police reform, insecurity was not perceived 
as a serious challenge to the Kenyan population. The public did not 
perceive insecurity as a major problem until after November 2014. In June 
2013, also coinciding with data collection, only 7% of the population 
considered insecurity as a serious challenge facing the county. This 
however shot to about 67% at the time of writing this study (see Figure 8 
below). 
Figure 8: Sense of insecurity: Trend analysis 
 
Source: IPSOS (2014) 
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6.4.4. Operational Preparedness and Logistical Capacity 
Chapter three discussions revealed that operational and logistical 
preparedness in practice formed the bulk of post-2007 police reform 
process at the expense of building accountability mechanisms. In fact, 
discourses on police reform by the Kenyan government to a large extent 
emphasize provision of logistical and tooling facilities as one of the areas 
in which the government has reformed the police. Capacity building 
(equipment, recruitment and the number of vehicles purchased for the 
police) remains dominant whenever police reform surfaces in public 
discourse. However, what these discourses fail to provide are evidence 
on whether these reform efforts have led to improved capacities and 
efficiency of the police to undertake their responsibility of providing 
security to members of the public. 
This sub-section sought the opinion of members of the public based on 
four items within the rubric of operational preparedness and logistical 
capacities. The findings of this research reveal that reform in this area has 
not led to improved security and safety amongst the population based on 
four parameters discussed below. 
1. Perceptions towards police responses to distress calls 
Poor responses to distress calls from the public calls was one of the areas 
that the reform process sought to address. The government substantially 
increased the number of vehicles to the police and reactivated the hitherto 
moribund police rapid response initiative, popularly known as 999. 
Despite these efforts, the perception amongst our respondents was that 
these efforts had not led to better response to distress calls from the 
public. 
Though our interview with a top police officer suggested there is improved 
response given improved allocation by the government and leasing of 
private vehicle for the police,451 the benefit is not reflected at the station 
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level. Interviews with some police officers attached to Kilimani and 
Kisumu police stations indicated that transport remains a major 
impediment in their response to public distress calls. This position was 
also confirmed by a key informant interview in Kisumu who reported that 
they sometimes fuel police vehicles in Kisumu.452 Incidentally, since the 
interviewee runs a private security company in Kisumu, therefore the 
gesture is to the extent that it enables police to respond to calls from 
clients who can afford private security services. 
Focus group discussions demonstrated the perceived helplessness of the 
ordinary citizen in cases of distress. Lack of vehicles was mentioned as a 
major problem. Where vehicles were present, there was sometimes lack 
of fuel. Perhaps the example given by a participant from a female-only 
focus group discussion who sought police help clarifies this point- ‘They 
told me I produce money for petrol and I did not have money. Such things 
fail us and I gave up (sic).’453 Whilst lack of fuel could be a genuine 
problem affecting police response to public distress, there is a possibility 
some police officers take advantage not to respond to members of the 
public and use it as means to fleece the public. 
Qualitative responses to our questionnaire did not show considerable 
progress in response towards distress call. A respondent reported that the 
police often ask the public to fuel the police car for them to attend to the 
public,454while another respondent noted that sometimes the police 
respond late while other time they respond faster. When we probed 
further to establish circumstances for differential response to calls, socio 
economic issues identified in the focus group emerged. These included 
ones tribe, gender and economic status.  
These findings are consistent with the findings by IPOA (2014). Whilst the 
report notes the role of mobility of the police in responding to distress 
calls, it reports that all six patrol bases visited did not have vehicles, or 
where vehicles were present there was no fuel and therefore officers were 
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‘occasionally forced to fuel police vehicles using their own resources or 
from clients’. Police officers are therefore forced to seek ingenious 
methods of undertaking policing functions. 
Quantitative responses to questionnaire largely confirmed the qualitative 
responses. As indicated in Table 26, majority of our respondents perceive 
that the police take too long to respond to distress calls by members of 
the public.  
Table 26: Police response to distress call by the public 
The police take too long to respond to distress call by the public 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 28 32.6 32.6 32.6 
Agree 48 55.8 55.8 88.4 
Neutral 4 4.7 4.7 93.0 
Disagree 5 5.8 5.8 98.8 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 86 100.0 100.0   
A majority, strongly agree (32.6%) and Agree (55.8%) are of the opinion 
that the police take too long to respond to their distress calls. Notably, this 
finding still falls far below the target of 65% public satisfaction with police 
response rate set by the Ransley committee (GoK, 2009). This is not a 
new phenomenon in Kenya. Previously, slow lethargic response by the 
police had been attributed to lack of tooling facilities. However, whilst the 
government has purchased more vehicles and leased private vehicles to 
the police,455 most of these vehicles are not operational due to lack of 
fuel. 
The slow pace with which the police responded to recent insecurity 
incidents further supports the findings from our primary data. Police 
unpreparedness to respond to Kapedo massacres in Turkana,456 Al-
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Shabaab attacks at Westgate, Lamu, and Mandera all point to a service 
that is reactive and with limited capacity to deter and investigate crime.457 
2. Public perceptions on the rate of crime levels 
The extent to which security sector reform is able to address security 
provision in an effective and efficient manner to both the state and its 
people are benchmarks in measuring the quality of security provision and 
include measures of perceived and actual crime levels as well as 
measure of the state of fundamental rights in a country (Schroeder, 2010). 
Thus, public perception of crime levels is important in determining the 
progress of public confidence in police reform. 
Our qualitative interviewing drew mainly from the focus group discussions 
and qualitative components of our questionnaire. The focus group 
discussion revealed that crime levels are still high in Kisumu, which was 
our location for the discussions. The participants mainly attributed the 
increased crime levels to high rate of unemployment of the youth in the 
region.458 Qualitative responses also showed increased crime levels 
‘because of no proper security’459 especially during the month of 
December.460 
Beyond our primary qualitative data, conflicting figures exists on rate of 
crime in Kenya. According to Usalama Reform Forum, the rate of crime 
increased from 245,808 in 2008 to 432,394 by December 2013, an 
increase of about 75% during the period (Usalama Reforms Forum, 
2014c). This is however markedly different from the Annual Crime Report 
released by the National Police Service in December 2013, which 
indicated that overall crime rate had gone down by 8% with a total of 
66,188 cases reported compared to 72, 091 in the year 2012. This brings 
into question the reliability of the police data. Usalama Report notes that 
National Police Service crime data is underreported with only less than 
                                            
457
 See; Khalil & Zeuthen (2014) 
458
 FGD1,2 and 3 
459
 QMP84 
460
 QMP85 
279 
40% of crime victims reporting to the police and estimate that the true 
figure of crime could be roughly five times the level reported by the police 
(Usalama Reforms Forum, 2014c).This is also consistent with IPSOS 
(2014) which reported that 55% of their respondents who have been 
victims of crime did not report to the police, while only 42% reported. 
In our primary quantitative data, nearly 70% of the respondents perceived 
that the rate of crime is still high in their neighbourhood (see Table 27). 
This finding is more or less consistent with Usalama Reforms Forum 
(2014c) report on crime levels in Kenya and below the Ransley committee 
set target to reduce the crime rate from 143 per 100,000 people in 2009 to 
80 per 100000 people by 2013. Usalama Reforms Forum (2014c) 
reported that there has been no change in crime detection framework 
over the last 70 years. The police reform process has not led to novel 
ideas for the police to detect crime beforehand. 
Table 27: Perceptions towards rate of crime 
The rate of crime still remains high in my neighbourhood 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 8 9.3 9.6 9.6 
Agree 50 58.1 60.2 69.9 
Neutral 10 11.6 12.0 81.9 
Disagree 14 16.3 16.9 98.8 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 83 96.5 100.0   
Missing Non-response 3 3.5     
Total 86 100.0     
The above finding is also consistent with IPSOS (2014) which suggests 
an increasing trend in the rate of crime. As shown on Figure 9 below, 
there has not been a reduction in the percentage of number of people 
who have been victims of crime despite the on going police reform 
process, with 89% reporting having been victims in 2006 and 90% in 
September 2014 when one would have expected a reduction due to the 
reform process.  What is more worrying is the fact that there is an 
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increase in the level of dissatisfaction amongst those who report to the 
police, from 43% in November 2013 to 60% in September 2014. 
Figure 9: Rate of crime: Trend analysis 
 
Source: IPSOS (2014, p.56) 
3. Perceptions towards police presence in enhancing peace and 
stability 
This item sought to establish whether the presence of the police in 
communities and increased police patrols in the neighbourhood had 
contributed to peace and stability. Interviews in Kisumu revealed that 
though the relationship between the police and the public had deteriorated 
to the lowest ebb during the 2007 post-election violence, attempts at 
improving police-public partnerships had seen the police gradually 
renewing relationship with the community.461 Though still at a formative 
stage, this development has had the effect of enhancing peace and 
stability amongst the residents of Obunga Slum in Kisumu. Our focus 
group discussions confirmed our interviewees’ position. The participants 
noted that the presence of police deters would-be criminals. However rate 
of crime still remain high though there was potential for this coming down 
due to police presence.  
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Qualitative responses also pointed to improved sense of security through 
police presence and patrols. Majority of the respondents felt that in the 
presence of the police, ‘no one will take law into their hands.’462 The 
police presence ‘instils fear which discourages people from engaging in 
crime.’463 However, there was also a more radical perception. One 
respondent argued that the he does not think that peace and stability are 
a function of the presence of the police, but a function of the absence of 
factors that instigate insecurity and instability; ‘I don’t think it’s the police, 
the instigating factors are not there.’464 This sentiment points to the 
existence of structural issues which only need a trigger like the post-
election violence and the police will not be able to manage. 
Whilst our primary sources of data emphasised that the presence of 
police has enhanced peace and stability, secondary sources presented 
conflicting results. IPOA (2014) noted that the presence of the police in 
cases of demonstrations led to violence and chaos. Of the four incidents 
monitored by IPOA, those that did not have police presence, that is, 
demonstrations by by the Solidarity Movement for Society and Rights 
Protection & Promotion in Nairobi and that of civil society groups under 
the banner of Fuata Sheria in Nairobi County were peaceful compared to 
Operation Usalama Watch’ in April 2014; and Police response to 
Mpeketoni attacks in Lamu County in June 2014. However, we consider 
these events isolated cases that do not justify conclusions that police 
presence in demonstrations leads to violence. 
Our quantitative findings from the questionnaire (see Table 28) showed 
that a slight majority of our respondents (59.5%) believes that the 
presence of the police has greatly enhanced peace and security. 
Favourable perceptions about police presence in quantitative response 
are consistent with the public perception about police presence in survey 
by IPSOS (2014). When the respondents were asked, “What do you think 
can/should be done to improve security within your locality,” a majority 
                                            
462
 QMP84 
463
 QMP66 
464
 QMP54 
282 
(52%) of the respondents noted that the government needed to increase 
police presence.  
A sizeable proportion (22.1%) of our questionnaire respondents was 
however not sure about this response. Probed further, most of those who 
indicated they were not sure attributed their response to the fact that they 
hardly see the police in their neighbourhood and are therefore not in a 
position to explicitly determine if their presence or absence enhanced 
security and stability. Perhaps this finding relates more to Usalama 
Reforms Forum (2014b) which established that only 26% of respondents 
expressed that they were satisfied with the number of police officer and 
police patrols. 
Table 28: Presence of police and their role in peace and security 
The presence of police has greatly enhanced peace and stability 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 5 5.8 6.0 6.0 
Agree 45 52.3 53.6 59.5 
Neutral 19 22.1 22.6 82.1 
Disagree 10 11.6 11.9 94.0 
Strongly 
disagree 
5 5.8 6.0 100.0 
Total 84 97.7 100.0   
Missing Non-response 2 2.3     
Total 86 100.0     
4. Public perception towards offences brought to justice 
One of the major challenges in Kenya’s criminal justice system is judicial 
gridlock.465 Judicial gridlock as used in this context refers to an 
unprecedented increase in the number of cases that undermines the 
ability of the judicial system to effectively administer justice. The long 
bureaucracy within the system and shoddy police investigations amongst 
other things are cited as being responsible for the gridlock.466  
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Reforms in the police and the judiciary were meant to address this 
problem. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was 
strengthened, the Criminal Intelligence Unit established in the police and 
more officers trained in public prosecution alongside deliberate effort to 
fast-tracking of cases pending in courts. Has there been progress in 
addressing the gridlock and to what extent has the progress contributed to 
overall better performance in the criminal justice system? This area of 
questioning sought to explore perceptions towards the entire criminal 
justice system for which police exist and operate. 
Most interviewees argued that the police act as the key to the entire 
criminal justice system. Police act as the gate-keepers in a criminal justice 
system.467 People even say that “afadhali tusiwe na koti, lakini” (we had 
better not have courts, but) wherever we go to sleep we know we are safe 
and secure.468 Thus, higher number of offences brought to justice would 
be indicative of the progress made not only on the police reform but also 
within the entire criminal justice system if the holistic approach to SSR is 
to hold.  
Despite reforms targeting the entire criminal justice system, the judicial 
gridlock is yet to be unlocked. Claims of delayed cases still abound and 
the police continue to be accused of deliberately compromising 
investigations. A human rights activist observed; 
I have had a case which is still pending where a 60 year old man 
raped a class six. I have followed the case for one year. You follow 
“mpaka” (until) if you don’t have much strength in your heart, you 
can die before having justice because of the system.469 
A prominent human rights lawyer in Nairobi noted, ‘If you look at police 
files and outcome, if you study some of the files from the Director of 
Public Prosecution, there is a bottom line, case cannot proceed because 
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of shoddy investigation’.470 In this instance too, the interviewee blames 
the delayed cases on the poor police investigations. 
Overall, most of our interviewees perceived that the judiciary had done 
well compared to other sectors within the entire criminal justice system in 
relation to progress of reforms. The relative progress of the judiciary 
compared to the police was attributed to the fact that the judiciary is an 
independent arm of the government unlike the police which directly falls 
under the executive. The judiciary enjoys independence, while what goes 
on in the police attracts attention of both the executive and parliament 
hence prone to interference.471 
Similar findings also emerged from our focus group discussions and the 
qualitative responses to our questionnaires. The participants perceived 
that the though judicial system has made progress in reforms, there is still 
a backlog of cases.472 A questionnaire respondent estimated that only 
20% or below of offences are brought to justice.473 Most of the cases are 
manipulated in favour of those who can afford to buy their way out. ‘If you 
are wealthy they will consider your wealth. A rich man ‘akifika’ (arrives in) 
court ‘atawatengeneza na pesa’ (bribes his way out.)474 Whilst some of 
these comments could not be substantiated by our respondents, they are 
however indicative of the perceptions of the respondents towards what 
goes in administering justice to the Kenyan population. Compared to other 
secondary sources, these findings reflect similar views expressed by the 
Kenyan public in larger surveys. An example in this case is in Figure 7 
(Page 272) which established low levels of public confidence in the 
institutions within the criminal justice system. 
Quantitative responses to questionnaires however established a near 
balanced perception to the respondents’ perception of offences brought 
justice. As indicated in Table 29 below, there was a nearly equal 
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distribution between those who agreed (Strongly agree16.7%, agree 
29.5%) and those who disagreed (disagreed 30.8%, agree 12.8%) that 
the police reform process had led to an increase of offences brought to 
justice. 
Table 29: Perceptions towards offences brought to justice 
The proportion of offences brought to justice remains high 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 13 15.1 16.7 16.7 
Agree 23 26.7 29.5 46.2 
Neutral 8 9.3 10.3 56.4 
Disagree 24 27.9 30.8 87.2 
Strongly 
disagree 
10 11.6 12.8 100.0 
Total 78 90.7 100.0   
Missing Non-response 8 9.3     
Total 86 100.0     
The findings above could have been due to the fact that this item did not 
just focus on the police alone but extended to the entire criminal justice 
system. It however opens up avenue for the need for a larger comparative 
study of both qualitative and quantitative responses. 
6.5 Overall Perception Towards Progress in Police Reforms 
Earlier sections of this chapter established that majority of our 
respondents were aware of the ongoing police reform and demonstrated 
some level of competence on security and safety issues they considered 
priority in their neighborhood. It also established that there has been 
considerable progress in the implementation of police reform process. In 
fact, studies for example Usalama Reforms Forum (2014b) record about 
60% progress in the implementation of post-2007 police reform process. 
However, this progress has not commensurately translated into improved 
policing and community safety amongst the local populations. This finding 
is significant as it reiterates findings of little progress in police reform from 
national surveys (IPSOS, 2014, IPOA, 2014) and other forms of survey 
including AfroBarometer surveys (IDS, 2015, IJR, 2015).  
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There were varying degrees in perceptions towards progress in each of 
the four areas of post-2007 police reform. The varying degrees in each 
reform area reflected the course and emphasis in the implementation of 
the police reform process has taken since 2009. Though all areas showed 
unfavourable perceptions, the perceptions towards operational 
preparedness suggests that the respondents perceive more progress in 
this area compared to others. This outcome largely reflects the trajectory 
police reform in Kenya has taken. 
First, the political discourse around police reform has to a large extent 
centered on modernizing the police including; purchase of vehicles and 
equipment. This narrative to a large extent forms the Jubilee Alliance 
response to critics over its handling of (in)security in Kenya. There is 
however a contradiction to the effect that despite intense government 
campaign to make visible police modernization and the respondents 
noting progress in operational preparedness, the police have in most 
cases failed to address insecurity. 
Secondly, the positive public perception that the presence of police is 
likely to improve peace and security in the locality also seemed to be 
critical (see Table 28) to perceptions about operational preparedness. 
These two factors may have had impacts on public perceptions and so 
making perception towards operational preparedness to be seen as fairly 
responsive. This translated to about 35% of questionnaire respondents 
viewing this area more responsive. 
Perceptions regarding police image and accountability showed that the 
respondents did not consider police reform to have improved 
considerably. We asked our respondents to close their eyes and assumed 
they walked in a police station. The imagery created was unfortunate for 
police reform process in which 60% implementation has been undertaken. 
A description by one respondent summarizes this; 
I see a person; the kind of language he speaks; a police officer 
looks at you and concludes this is a bad person. Their kind of 
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language; they lack manners; who are you, where are you from, 
what do you want? They are dressed in a blue kind of a threatening 
top, most of the policemen you would never like to associate with 
given their trousers (sic).’475 
In short, the image of the police is not very encouraging amongst the 
respondents even though there was an improvement in the sense of 
security as at the time of data collection.476 The sense of security has 
however since then fluctuated due to different attacks on the Kenyan 
populations.477 Our questionnaire results established that in overall, only 
27.9% of our respondents perceived this area of reform to be responsive. 
In terms of institutional, policy and legal reforms, key institutions and 
structures have been established at the national level and are yet to be 
decentralized. Notable in this area was the perception that oversight has 
improved through police reform (see Table 14). This suggested the 
growing confidence amongst the public towards the strengthening of the 
public oversight mechanisms. However, this did not translate to overall 
positive perception in institutional, policy and legal reforms as the 
perception in this area was overshadowed by unfavourable perceptions 
within this area of reform. Our questionnaire respondents indicated that 
only 17.4 % consider this area to be responsive. 
Perception towards professionalism was the area least considered to be 
responding to policing and safety needs. Most respondents considered 
police unreliable, ethnicised and still opaque despite accountability 
mechanisms having been established. This translated into only 14% of 
respondents considering this area to be responsive. 
Significantly, the results show that in overall, the public perceive the entire 
reform process as not being responsive to their needs. Overall, our 
questionnaire responses indicate that only 19.8% of respondents perceive 
the entire reform process to be responsive while the remaining 80.2% 
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consider the entire process as not being responsive as seen in Table 30 
below. 
Table 30: Overall perception towards responsiveness of police reform process 
Reform area Responsive 
% 
Not 
Responsive % 
Operational preparedness, tooling and logistical 
capacity 
34.9 65.1 
Image, accountability and partnerships 27.9 72.1 
Institutional, policy and legal reforms 17.4 82.6 
Professionalism, terms and conditions of work 14 86.0 
Overall perceptions 19.8 80.2 
The findings from our quantitative data about perception towards 
responsiveness of overall police reform is more or less similar to Usalama 
Reforms Forum (2014b) which established that though 60% of police 
reform priorities had been implemented as at December 2014, only 15% 
have had some significant impact on the communities, a difference of 
about only 5% with our quantitative questionnaire results.  
To further establish how our overall findings were manifest across socio 
economic variables, we cross-tabulated perceptions towards overall 
responsiveness of police reforms against some socio-economic 
characteristics. The findings demonstrated consistent results. 
Respondents based in Kisumu considered police reform process to be 
less responsive with 82.5% indicating not responsive, and 17.5% 
responsive, compared to Nairobi’s 78.3% not responsive and 21.7% 
responsive. This finding was also replicated in the focus group 
discussions with the participants giving generally negative feedback about 
the ability of the police reform to address their security needs.478 Kisumu 
is predominantly an opposition zone and is in most cases diametrically 
opposed to government initiatives. 
In terms of gender, more females (82.9%) perceive police reform process 
not to be responsive, compared to males (78.4%). Our discussion with 
women revealed perceptions that police reform did not take into account 
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special needs of women.479 Provision of security and justice is skewed in 
favour of men and the powerful while the women, particularly the rural 
women, continue to be disadvantaged. Women participants in the FGD 
reported that the society expects them to seek permission from men or 
the local clan elder before reporting to the police.480 In such instances, the 
women are usually prevailed upon by the society not to pursue their cases 
and hence their issues remain unresolved. The police reform process 
does not have the mechanism for addressing the production of security 
for the women at the informal spaces thus explaining the unfavourable 
perception of women towards the responsiveness of the police reform 
process.  
In terms of age, there appears to be a positive association between age 
and perception towards the responsiveness of police reform in our 
questionnaire responses. There was a near normal distribution amongst 
the youth, 18-24, with 57.1% and 42.9% recording not responsive and 
responsive respectively. This seemed proportional to other age categories 
with the middle aged 25-34 years and 35 and above posting that the 
reforms are not responsive at 83.3% and 88.9% respectively. This is 
shown in Table 31 below. 
Table 31: Overall perception towards responsiveness of police reform by age 
Crosstab 
% within Respondents' age   
 Overall perception recoded Total 
Not responsive Responsive 
Respondents' 
age 
18-24 years 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 
25-34 years 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
35 and above 88.9% 11.1% 100.0% 
Total 80.2% 19.8% 100.0% 
The findings regarding the overall perception towards progress in police 
reform process is not only unique to this thesis. These have been 
documented in other surveys. However, these were not in-depth and only 
focused on specific aspects of police reform in Kenya. For example, Kabia 
(2013) and (Chtalu, 2014) focused on perceptions of police officers to 
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police reforms and challenges of police reform respectively. The former 
established that the police perceived that the reform process had not 
adequately addressed their concerns, while the later argued that the 
reform process was yet to address public concerns due to inherent 
challenges in the implementation. Karanja (2013) established that based 
on an average of 2.04, the perception index of the public on police is far 
too low’ and that the police reform process was slow. While Kenya 
National Reconciliation Process established that just before the 2013 
general elections, about 47% of Kenyans did not have confidence in the 
police (South Consulting, 2013, p.37) while Amnesty International (2013) 
summarized Kenya’s  police reform process just before the 2013 elections 
as ‘as a drop in the ocean’. These findings obviously provide harsh 
judgment in perception terms to the police reform process in Kenya and 
may need to be considered by the policy makers. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the responsiveness of Kenya’s police reform 
process to policing and community safety needs. The findings have 
revealed that though there was convergence of priorities between the 
government and public of what police reform process intended to achieve, 
divergences emerged in the implementation largely due to the state-
building approach adopted by the government. The implementation of 
police reform excluded a critical mass of security and justice providers 
who represent about 80% of provision of security.481 The implementation 
strategy not only alienated non–state providers of security but also 
ignored the contribution of the local populations who were to benefit from 
community policing.  
To broaden the scope of public participation in the police reform process, 
we propose a multi-layered policing that integrates three layers namely 
commercial, non-governmental organisations and informal sector security 
and justice providers in the SSR process. Multi-layered community 
policing offers both hope and potential challenges for community policing 
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in Kenya. In the words of Luckham and Kirk (2013), this form of hybridity 
‘brings together a supply–side approach to the determination of security 
by a variety of actors, with the demand side emphasis on inclusive 
security based upon the agency of end users’ (Luckham and Kirk, 2013, 
p.10). Through this framework, the end users would be able to voice their 
displeasure while at the same time will provide opportunity to identify 
networks that threaten local security.  
Two incidents explain the dividends likely to be derived in emphasising 
the local systems. First, on November 2, 2014, Pokot bandits attacked a 
contingent of 22 police officers in Kapedo482 and secondly the Al-Shabaab 
attack that killed 28 passengers travelling to Nairobi from Mandera on 
November 22, 2014.483 Although the president visited Kapedo and gave 
an ultimatum to the locals to surrender all the firearms from the slain 
police officers and deployed KDF to conduct forced disarmament, most of 
the guns were recovered through the initiatives of the local clan elders 
and not through the military operation. In the case of Mandera bus attack, 
the local governor was reported to have received intelligence from the 
local community that Al-Shabaab insurgent group from Somalia had 
heightened its activities and was planning an attack only three days to the 
attack. This intelligence was reportedly shared with the local police who 
allegedly dismissed the governor’s comments as politics.484 The attack 
resulted into low public confidence in the police thus precipitating calls for 
resignation of the Inspector General. 
The two incidents illustrate state response to local security needs. First, 
the response of the security agencies including the police was lethargic 
and lacking in proactive policing. Secondly, the presence of the state 
agencies was episodic and destructive thus further heightening tensions 
between the locals and the state security agencies. In Kapedo for 
instance, there were reports of human rights violations and the local 
leadership was at loggerheads with the national government. In the eyes 
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of the locals, KDF and the police remain illegitimate. A Pokot clan elder 
was quoted saying ‘we will never work with the police.’485 While in the 
case of Mandera the locals considered the ability of the government to 
provide security in doubt even after the government claimed that it had 
killed the Al-Shabaab militants who had killed the civilians.  
Thus, the role of the local mechanisms cannot be ignored, either in the 
form of security intelligence or in terms of mobilising the locals to support 
government initiatives. The local leadership is more trusted than the state 
system and more resilient in territories that remain state ungoverned and 
fulfil decentralisation of decision making that informal Kenya’s governance 
structure. They are also adaptable to the security needs of the locals that 
are incomprehensible by the state agents. In short, the reform success of 
state-building is subject to the willingness and cooperation of non-state 
and informal actors and networks (Podder, 2014). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings and conclusions in relation to the 
overall research questions, and also highlights the thesis’ contribution to 
knowledge. It links the substantive research chapters with methodology 
(Chapter one) and the wider literature on security sector reform (Chapter 
two). It begins by presenting the key findings and conclusions, drawing 
from the analysis and evidence presented in the previous chapters. It then 
proceeds to discuss the significance and contributions of these findings in 
the wider debates about SSR, and particularly police reform process in 
transitional developing countries, within the context of the three academic 
literatures stated in chapter one and reviewed in chapter two. The 
following section presents some of its priorities for future research. 
7.2 Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Police Reform 
Process in Kenya 
The overall aim of this research was to examine the security sector reform 
processes in countries emerging from crises, with a particular focus on 
the police reform process in Kenya after the 2007 post-election violence. 
The primary research question guiding this study was; ‘How have security 
sector reforms, particularly police reforms, in Kenya developed since 2007 
and how, and to what extent, have they been shaped by Kenya’s wider 
political transitions and SSR process during this period?’  
To answer the question, the study begun by positing that Kenya’s police 
reform process faces some very difficult challenges due to the complex 
nature of the object and context of study. These complexities and 
pluralities have been examined thus contributing to the overall 
achievement of the intended objective; that of deepening our 
understanding of security sector reform process in societies emerging 
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from crisis within the context of Kenya’s police reform after the 2007/8 
post-election violence.  
The research revealed that the police reform process in Kenya is a 
complex one and faces some serious challenges as posited in Section 
1.1. We argue that though the construction of police reform agenda was 
done through a consultative process, interests of the political elite and 
implementation strategy narrowed the scope of reform dividends to local 
policing and security needs of ordinary Kenyans. In this section, we 
present this argument in relation to agenda setting for police reform, the 
implementation process and the perception/impacts of police reform 
process to local communities. 
7.2.1 Agenda Setting for Police Reform  
Agenda setting process for police reform related to the theme of police 
reform priorities and linked with first secondary research question we 
sought to examine. After the post-election violence of 2007/08, wide 
consensus for police reform provided a fertile ground to set the reform 
agenda. Thus, though tragic, the post-election violence of 2007 opened a 
window of opportunity (Kingdon, 2002) for police reform. It helped set the 
agenda for wider political and institutional reforms. Police reform was 
prioritized though there were a number of competing priorities including 
electoral reforms, judicial reform, land reforms and above all constitutional 
reforms.  
Though there was consensus (whether this consensus was genuine 
across the board remained unclear) to reform the police, there were 
contestations on how the process would proceed. The contestations were 
so intense that observers had started casting aspersions on the 
commitments to setting of the reform agenda.486 These were due to the 
vested political interests with regards to control of the process. These 
contestations were however resolved through the mechanisms set by the 
Kenya National Dialogue Reconciliation Process. Subsequent reform 
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processes, including police reform derived from the agenda developed by 
the KNDRP. 
The KNDR prioritised human security component as opposed to 
measures to address long-term structural issues that had significantly led 
to the violence, at least in the short run. This prioritisation was reflected in 
the way the KNDR agendas for discussion were structured. Agendas I 
and 2 sought to restore individual liberties and address humanitarian 
crisis respectively. Agenda 3 sought to establish a suitable political 
atmosphere through which short term liberal guarantees would be 
assured and long-term structural issues, including police reform, would be 
addressed in agenda 4. In our view, this prioritisation significantly helped 
in avoiding the pitfalls of reforms witnessed in the period preceding the 
year 2008. 
The post-2008 police reform agenda was therefore founded through a 
structured KNDR process and also involved wide social negotiations 
including the international community and the national stakeholders.487 
The reform priorities were crystallized by the Philip Ransley Committee 
(GoK, 2009) which set the proper agenda for reform. The committee 
involved public participation by asking the Kenyan polity what kind of 
policing they needed. The committee then narrowed to four key reform 
areas that we have investigated in this thesis.488 To cushion the reform 
agenda from interference, it was anchored in law, including the 2010 
Constitution (KCLR, 2010) and various pieces of legislation including 
(KCLR, 2011a, KCLR, 2011b). 
Control of the police reform process and the police service was a core 
concern during the agenda setting process for the national police reform. 
Each side of the political divide, ODM and PNU, sought dominance.489 
Compromises were made with the political elites ceding ground for the 
process to move forward. However, as demonstrated by our findings 
relating to the implementation process, which we discuss shortly, the 
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priorities of the political elite may not have significantly changed after all. 
We conclude that whilst existing literature suggests linkage between 
agenda-setting and reform implementation, the Kenyan case 
demonstrates that this linkage is quite complex. The implementation 
processes usually do not follow a definite pattern envisaged in the agenda 
setting. This we attribute to two things, namely the intervening variables 
that may not have been considered during the agenda setting process 
and the unpredictable behaviour of the political elite.490 
Our review of literature on agenda setting for police reform in Kenya 
revealed that though studies have examined agenda setting processes 
under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process, these 
relate to wider implementation of agenda 4 items.491 Little effort is made to 
explore how the agenda for police reform was developed; neither do the 
studies examine how the agenda that emerged after the 2007 post-
election violence impacted on police reform. This research therefore is the 
first of its kind to examine agenda setting for police reform in Kenya and 
relate how this impacted on the implementation process. 
7.2.2 The Implementation Process 
In order to understand the post 2008 police reform priorities, we first 
explored the state of security and particularly the nexus between the 
police and the political elite in Kenya before 2007/8. This helped us 
determine the police reform priorities before 2007 and also formed the 
basis of assessing post 2007/08 priorities, thus helping us justify why 
Kenya needed police reform. 
To a large extent our findings support the arguments that piecemeal 
constitutional amendments since independence made the police more 
repressive as the ruling regime used the force to quell dissent.492 Whilst 
the independence constitution envisaged a more liberal structure of 
governance, the constitutional amendments led to centralization of power 
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in the presidency.493 This meant that the president controlled the entire 
security system, including the police, from the centre to the peripheries. 
Policing was geared toward protecting the interests of the regime, with 
Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes invariably using the police for their 
political survival. 
The year 2003 provided perhaps the best opportunity to break with the 
negative past in the police and the entire security sector. Through GJLOS, 
the Administration Police embarked on a modernization programme with 
the support of the presidency (Onsarigo, 2009), while the Kenya Police 
embarked on developing a five-year strategic plan (Kenya Police, 2004). 
Community policing also formed part of the police reform component 
(Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). These reform processes included the 
ideals of police reforms; efficient and effective service delivery all set 
within a democratic oversight.494 However, these reform initiatives lacked 
cohesive implementation strategy and therefore failed to make impact on 
policing. The reforms did not address structural problems in the both the 
regular and administration police. The reforms were externally driven and 
lost momentum after donor funding was withdrawn. 
The period leading to the 2007 general elections was still characterised by 
strong executive influence and high politicization of the security forces 
particularly the police. This was believed to have significantly contributed 
to the post-election violence (Kriegler, 2008, Waki Commission, 2008). It 
is the vilification of the police by the two commissions of inquiry that 
stimulated impetus for police reform.  
Under the post-2008 implementation process, we examined how the 
reform process was managed including response to various challenges 
and deficiencies. With regard to prioritisation, the strategy to address 
human security and subsequent establishment of suitable political context 
for reform though promising, underrated the fluid and complex nature of 
the Kenyan politics, a factor which was also emphasised by Cheeseman; 
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‘Kenya’s politics at the top is remarkably fluid, perhaps more fluid than 
any other country in the world and could change any time.’495 The 
prioritisation strategy seemed to overlook the elite behaviour - that of 
shifting positions on the reform process, thus leading to delays in the 
implementation. 
The implementation was mainly state-driven at macro and meso levels. 
Macro issues considered pre-requisites for successful police reform 
process still remained the dominant issues around which police reform 
discourse revolved at all three levels of analysis. The contestations 
witnessed in the agenda setting process still plagued the implementation. 
The will to reform was in doubt as demonstrated by the behaviour of the 
political elite in control of the process, funding was still inadequate though 
there was increased budget to the police and the public remained 
unmotivated and the competence of police leadership to deliver the 
reform was in doubt.  
At the meso level, competition amongst the institutions responsible for 
police reform resulted into a disjointed implementation approach. For 
example, though there were wrangles between the Office of the Inspector 
General and the NPSC, the IPOA had more problems with the two 
institutions due to what it perceived as ‘incompetent leadership.’ The 
impacts of these differences were two-fold. First, there was loss of 
confidence in the National Police Service amongst the Kenyan public and 
amongst the police. Secondly there were delays in the reform process as 
the institutions fought their battles in court and in the media. 
For the purposes of space in the police reform process, various 
stakeholders adopted different strategies to have their way. The courts 
provided a platform through which some reform processes were either 
challenged or reviewed. The focus group discussants believed that this 
research would shed light and help the government review its reform 
strategy to make reform responsive to their needs. In short, there were 
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numerous ways through which stakeholders’ responded to challenges and 
deficiencies of reform and this research is one of those many avenues to 
address some of the challenges by making recommendations to the 
police reform policy community. 
At the micro level, some reform processes were strong in priority 
statements but did not yield the intended impact within the police service. 
For example, the merger between the Administration Police and the 
Kenya Police only existed on paper and strong in statement. Yet, the two 
services under the Inspector General worked at cross purposes. They 
were more divided. There was no deliberate attempt to strike a common 
ground on the two police services that had different policing philosophies 
and trajectories. This finding is consistent with Furuzawa (2011) who 
argued that merger would be difficult due to the different histories of the 
two police services. The presence of the Kenya police was historically 
mainly felt in the urban areas, the railway routes and areas dominated by 
white settlers, while the administration police focused on the rural 
areas.496 The merger of the two services was even more complicated by 
the fact that there existed parallel leadership structures at the county 
level; one under the County Policing Commanders, another under the 
OCPDs and the other under County Administration Police Commander. 
With this arrangement, exercising accountability of the police at the 
county level was difficult and delivery of service to the local populations 
was poor.  
In the vetting of police, resistance to the process by the police and the 
negative start of the process meant that it did not achieve its intended 
objective, but nevertheless was a positive step towards professionalizing 
the police. Public opinion suggested that the manner in which the process 
was undertaken did not satisfy the public expectation and some police 
officers whose human rights abuse records were known to the public were 
not removed from the service.  
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Overall, the findings regarding police reform implementation suggest that 
after about five years, a solid implementation strategy was yet to form, 
suggesting that the long-term planning that define security sector reform 
implementation process of countries emerging from crisis. Despite 
international support at the national level, there were no experts to 
translate national police reform priorities into tangible results at the county 
level.  
7.2.3 Power-Sharing 
Kenya’s power-sharing after the post-election violence of 2007/08 
provided the political context of the police reform process under 
examination. This related to the second thematic concern of this study. 
Our analysis focused on the politics of power-sharing and police reform in 
the grandcoalition and also the devolution politics and police reforms. 
In our analysis, we argue that the politics of grand-coalition invariably 
impacted on the police reform process. On the one hand, we support the 
thesis that despite the contested nature of Kenya’s grand-coalition, it was 
worth the effort. It formed the ‘basis for undertaking far reaching reforms’ 
(Kanyinga, 2009, p.12) including police reforms. The grand-coalition 
government established in 2008 was instrumental in setting the reform 
agenda. It was a watershed. It helped re-ignite the reform process that 
had stalled or was otherwise cosmetic prior to the post-election violence. 
On the other hand, the politics of grand coalition, characterised by elite 
competition, slowed down the reform process. After existence for three 
years, the promulgation of the new constitution remained the greatest 
achievement of the grand coalition government though very little had been 
done on police reforms (Brown, 2011). Even as late as 2013 just before 
the elections, the police reform process was considered ‘a drop in the 
ocean’ (Amnesty International, 2013), due to the competition for power in 
the grand coalition. In fact, a cloud of uncertainty hung ahead of the 2013 
elections since police reform had been inadequate. There were fears 
Kenya could relapse into another wave of violence (ICG, 2013). In our 
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opinion, these claims were alarmist considering that the outcome of the 
2013 election was peaceful and the police reform process under the 
grand-coalition, though inadequate, had impacted positively on the 
conduct of police in the 2013 elections (AU Commission, 2013).  
Police reform did not solve the ethnic arithmetic in Kenya’s security 
sector. Kibaki’s loyalists mainly form Mount Kenya region, continued to be 
perceived to dominate the leadership of the security sector, and this 
remained one on the stickiest points of contestation under the power-
sharing arrangement, as key appointments in the security sector including 
the police remained as they were during Kibaki’s first term (Hornsby, 
2012).497 
There was the perception, especially from general public and civil society 
groups, that political elite in PNU backpedalled on the reform process, 
while those in ODM who were not satisfied with the power arrangement 
mobilised against the party’s leadership and gravitated towards PNU. This 
resulted in even a more complex environment for police reform that may 
not have been considered at the very initial stages. As seen in the macro-
meso-micro relationship framework in Chapter four, the nature of national 
politics had a direct influence on the local grassroots politics, meaning 
complex local politics for police reforms. 
Police reform process was undertaken with the 2013 general elections in 
mind. It was a cautious process with both sides of the coalition supporting 
reforms only to the extent that it did not favour political opponents after 
the 2013 elections. Indeed Kibaki’s side of the coalition, which was 
perceived to have transformed into Jubilee Alliance, won the elections. 
There was the perception from Coalition for Restoration of Democracy 
(CORD) that the Jubilee Alliance had the state security machinery on its 
side, and supported the Jubilee Alliance though this could not be verified 
by observer mission reports. 
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The implementation of devolution, which was a product of power-sharing 
arrangement, invariably impacted on the implementation of police reform. 
Whilst the two processes were independent and expected to progress 
separately, this was not the case in practice. There were no clear 
guidelines on dual implementation of the two processes. The pace of 
implementation depended on the prevailing political circumstances during 
and after the expiry of the coalition government. Under the grand-coalition 
government, police reform received traction as implementation of 
devolution would begin after the 2013 general elections. Upon the expiry 
of the term of the coalition government, the  devolution debate became 
top of government agenda thus pushing police reform to the periphery. 
Post-2013 period was characterized by heightened debate on the sharing 
of power and resources between the national and county governments 
through devolution. CORD positioned itself as the champion of devolution. 
This posturing forced Jubilee to focus more on devolution with little 
attention on police reform. The impact was run-away insecurity.  The 
fluctuation in ‘devolution-police reform’ implementation prioritization was 
to a large extent determined by the politics of the day. The Jubilee 
administration focused on devolution that gave political mileage, but 
refused to cede security function to the counties, as demanded by CORD 
and the council of governors. Though governors had different political 
inclinations, they found consensus in demanding for devolution of some 
security functions to address insecurity in their respective regions.  
Despite the constitution providing for involvement of civilian authorities in 
policing at the local level, the emergence of new elites at the county level 
(in the form governors) prevented the Jubilee administration from ceding 
some policing functions to the county level as demanded by CORD and 
the governors. With policing powers, the narrative was that the governors 
would challenge the authority of the national government. These however 
remained conjectures as no study had empirically determined the kind of 
relationship that would emerge if some policing functions were to be 
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devolved. However, the little literature on Kenya’s devolution498 remains 
divorced from police reform implementation.499 Though narrow in scope, 
this PhD has attempted to fill this gap in chapter five and six. 
7.2.4 Police Reform Impacts on Policing and Security for Local 
Communities 
Efficacy of SSR and police reform in transitional and post-conflict settings 
was our third thematic area. The aim here was to examine the extent to 
which police reform process responded to policing and security needs of 
the Kenyan population. Our analysis was based on the four key areas of 
reform namely; institutional reforms, professionalism in the police service, 
police image and operational preparedness of the police (GoK, 2009). 
For analytic purposes, we examined public perceptions on 
responsiveness of reform towards policing and public safety needs based 
priority reform areas of Ransley Committee (GoK, 2009). However, at this 
point, restricting these outcomes to specific reform areas would be to 
suggest a causal link within the areas of reform. These outcomes were a 
result of complex interactions that cannot be locked to particular priority 
areas.  
Our aim is to demonstrate that indeed these outcomes are the result of 
multiple interactions in the areas of reform and also to argue that the 
reform process, as currently implemented, still remains less responsive to 
policing and local security needs. This view is also held by recent studies 
that have investigated police reform in Kenya.500 Of all the four key areas 
of reform, no reform priority was perceived, in the eyes of the public, to 
capture the spirit of reform as developed during the agenda setting stage.  
There was dominant perception that the institutions established to reform 
the police were still sluggish in fulfilling the mandate for which they were 
established (Usalama Reforms Forum, 2014b). Police corruption still 
remained high (EACC, 2013, Transparency International, 2014) and both 
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internal and oversight accountability mechanisms had not been fully 
operational (IPOA, 2014).  
The failure of the institutions to deliver on their mandate was largely 
attributed to institutional politics. The institutions, in most cases, failed to 
have a shared understanding of police reform agenda.501 The findings 
supported the thesis that there was a systemic attempt to put the office of 
the Inspector General under the control of the executive through the 
omnibus Security Laws Amendment Act (GoK, 2014). 
The finding that the reform was less responsive to policing and local 
security also emanates from the police understanding of the reform 
process. Most police officers had a narrow focus of police reform. 
According to them, it was about their welfare and improving their 
operational preparedness. Missing in the dominant understanding of 
police reform is the ordinary public who should be beneficiaries of a 
reformed police. To make up for the ‘unfulfilled promise of reforms’ the 
police turned to the citizens as a source of extra income, thus aggravating 
the old practices-corruption and human rights abuses and which 
heightened tensions between members of the public and the police. The 
reform process did not solve this puzzle. 
Though the perception within the police rank and file was that the reform 
was too little too late, some senior police officers at the national level 
perceived the police reform process to be tremendous. This disparity, 
demonstrated a contradiction of some sort given the overwhelming 
evidence that police welfare, though under consideration, was still below 
the police and public expectation. This illustrates the divide between the 
national and the local. Police officials at the national level are out of touch 
with the realities on the ground and apply a top-down approach to the 
reform implementation process that characterizes state-led process. 
The executive mobilised concepts such as ‘reforms, ‘capacity building’, 
and ‘professionalization of the police’ which dominated police reform 
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discourse. These were prioritized without analysing their compliance with 
the elite behaviour and how these would impact on security for local 
populations. The process paid less attention to informal systems despite 
findings amongst our questionnaire respondents that 80% respondents 
depended on informal systems as principal providers of security. Civilian 
oversight of the police also suffered frustrations from both the police and 
the public. 
Whilst the study establishes that majority of the Kenyan population is 
aware of the police reform process and also aware of the priorities set at 
the national level, it also argues that the implementation was 
characterized by less public participation, hence the wider perception that 
police reform is not responsive to public security and safety needs. The 
end result was that the reform failed to meet public expectation and had a 
little impact on communities at the local level. 
The public frustrations with the police reform at both the macro and the 
meso levels were expressed by the local populations at the micro level. 
The national government did not devolve policing to the county level 
despite pressure from the governors and the local populations. The 
unwillingness of the national government to devolve some security 
functions through county policing authorities complicated security in the 
light of heightened banditry and Al-Shabaab activities in northern Kenya 
and coastal region. These dynamics demonstrate how a nationally 
negotiated police reform project could end up a floundering  project due to 
faulty implementation strategy which favours strengthening of the state at 
the expense of the local capacities.  
Our examination of police reform process also established that in the 
recent past, a number of studies examining Kenya’s police reform process 
from diverse perspectives have begun to emerge.502 To the best of our 
knowledge, none of these studies has so far offered a detailed analysis of 
Kenya’s police reform process. The studies barely scratch the surface; 
only examining limited aspects of the police reform process in Kenya. We 
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consider this study as the first ever detailed analysis of post-2007 police 
reform process in Kenya; beginning with the agenda setting, the 
implementation process, the politics of power-sharing through to the 
outcomes and impacts on the local populations. It therefore sets 
precedence as a major contribution to the analysis of police reform 
process in Kenya during the period 2008-2014. 
7.3 Linking Findings about Kenya’s Police Reform Process with 
wider SSR and Police Reform Literature 
We now reflect on the findings and conclusions relating to police reform in 
Kenya and link them with the wider literature areas for which we 
contribute knowledge. The section is divided into three sub-sections under 
which this study directly contributes to knowledge.  
7.3.1. Relationship with Literature on SSR and Police Reform in 
Transitional and Post-conflict Societies 
Here, we focus on implications of our findings for wider SSR and police 
reform literature. Our emphasis is on two areas, namely; police reform 
agenda-setting and the implementation process within the wider SSR and 
police reform processes.  
7.3.1.1 Agenda-Setting 
Our analysis of the setting of Kenya’s post-2007 police reform agenda to 
a large extent confirms existent literature.503 As Baumgartner and Jones 
(1991), would argue in their Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, critical 
periods of mobilisation sometimes lead to dramatic change in policy. And 
indeed, the post-election violence of 2007/08 provided that critical period 
of mobilisation for police reform process. According to Rauch and Van der 
Spuy (2006), the need for police reform in Kenya had been recognised 
since the return of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. Various 
documents and processes including; Economic Recovery and Wealth 
Creation Strategy for 2003-2007,GJLOS reform process, (Kenya Police, 
                                            
503
 See Section 3.2. 
307 
 
2004) and Kenya Police Strategic Plan 2003-2007 and Vision 2030 (GoK, 
2007), all captured the desire for police reform. However, the police 
reform that emerged out of these processes was haphazardly addressed 
and failed to achieve the intended objectives. 
Police reform and wider institutional reform had been in abeyance for 
many years in Kenya and where police reform appeared on top of 
government agenda, its purpose was for political expediency. We saw this 
through the ‘reform’ in the administration police, for the partisan role it 
played in the infamous 2007 elections (Waki Commission, 2008, 
Onsarigo, 2009). The post-election violence provided the opportunity to 
review these earlier reform processes. 
Whilst the dramatic change in the prioritisation of police reform agenda 
was visible, the actual implementation may not have been in tandem with 
police reform policy shift. Complex agenda setting processes lead to 
contested implementation of those agendas (Eustis, 2000). Our findings 
underscore these complexities of agenda setting processes and 
particularly emphasise the role of the president as an actor, either in the 
form of breaking hardliners’ obstinacy for policy change, or being held 
captive by his handlers opposed to reform policy (Kingdon, 2002). This 
was the case for president Kibaki’s attitude in police reform process in 
Kenya. As a key actor in agenda setting process, his predisposition 
determined the pace of agenda setting and the implementation 
process.504 
Our finding about the role of the president in agenda setting for police 
reform within the context of neo-patrimonial context stimulates interesting 
debate between Hills (2007) and Francis (2012). Though their debate was 
in terms of governance of policing in Africa, our finding on the role of the 
president in agenda setting for police reform nevertheless clarifies their 
points of divergence. The two scholars have a convergence of opinion 
that indeed the president wields influence over the police in fairly stable 
transition societies, which our finding indeed supports. However, Francis 
                                            
504
 See Kingdon (2002). 
308 
 
(2012) disputes the argument by Hills (2007) that ‘Africa’s police are 
accountable to their presidents alone, and any reference to democratic 
forms of accountability are rarely more than tactical concessions or 
gestures to donors on the part of political elites’ (Hills, 2007, p.403-404). 
We also find the assertion too strong. But we maintain that indeed the 
setting of police reform agenda in Kenya was to a large extent a gesture 
to ease of political pressure for president Kibaki.  
In Kenya, the agenda was set such that the president would have minimal 
role in the appointment of the Inspector General. This was however short-
lived there were legislative amendments to accommodate presidential 
preferences in the appointment.505 With the ‘tyranny of numbers’ that 
dominate politics in Kenya, the president in most of the cases has his 
way, which seem to emphasise that despite other competing centres of 
control, the president still has his way when it comes to policing and 
police reform. 
Some SSR literature remains ambivalent in the relationship between 
agenda setting and implementation. Hutchful (2009) for example sees a 
less meaningful relationship between security sector reform agenda and 
implementation particularly in power-sharing context.506 Others show that 
security sector reform agenda which is not strong in statement and not 
anchored in law is unlikely to be pursued to the letter, as in the case of 
Zimbabwe as argued by Noyes (2013). 
In Kenya, previous commissions of enquiry were never implemented as 
they were not anchored in law.507 Post 2007/8 police reform process 
avoided this pitfall through an ingenuous self-enforcing mechanism. The 
process that set the reform agenda, for example Waki Commission was 
self-enforcing and also anchored in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) thus 
protecting the reform process from rogue political elite. 
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Though agenda setting literature gained dominance in the 1960’s,508 the 
emergence in the 1990’s of SSR and in particular police reform literature 
is yet to significantly explore this linkage despite evidence about the 
relationship between agenda setting and implementation process (Eustis, 
2000). Focus has been on the reform processes independently, with less 
visible studies on police reform agenda setting processes or those linking 
police reform agenda-setting to the implementation process. Most studies 
on agenda setting process in Africa have focused on other sectors for 
example telecommunications (Thakur and Best, 2008), electoral reform 
(Norris, 2012), mass media (McCombs, 2013) amongst others. Literatures 
on police reform, where they exist, are short on agenda setting, but long 
on reform implementation.509 
This thesis makes two-fold significant contributions to wider security 
sector reform agenda setting processes. First, we fill the gap in the in 
agenda setting literature for police reform process in transitional countries 
particularly those emerging from political crises. This we achieved within 
the wider context of existing agenda setting theories (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1991, Kingdon, 2002) and examination of the dynamics of agenda 
setting processes in other sectors (Eustis, 2000, Thakur and Best, 2008). 
Secondly, we linked the agenda setting process with the implementation 
process and established that the way agendas are set determines the 
implementation process, which emphases existent literature. 
7.3.1.2 Police Reform Implementation 
Having explored the controversies and the debates of implementation of 
police reform the in Kenyan context in Section 7.2, we now relate these 
with the wider literature. How relevant was the implementation process of 
the Kenya police reform within the wider police security sector reform 
literature? We examine these in two phases. In Phase One; we assess 
the implications of our findings regarding the status of police before the 
2007 post-election violence which was the locus around which this 
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research revolved. In the second phase, we focus on implications of 
actual implementation on the wider literature on the implementation of 
SSR and police reform in countries emerging from crisis. 
Pre-2007 Police in Kenya 
Our analysis of pre-2007 police suggest that the state of police in Kenya 
before 2007 to a large extent is an embodiment of what the literature 
considers as ‘crisis of policing and security sector reform’ (US Justice 
Department, 1994, Francis, 2012).These crises include: crisis of 
legitimacy; crisis of identity (whose police is it and what type of police?); 
crisis of purpose (what primary function in relation to the people and 
state?); and crisis of capacity (can the police carry out its basis 
functions?) (Francis, 2012). 
These crises are a function of the interactions of factors that have over 
the years shaped policing in societies in transition, and of which the 
trajectory of policing in Kenya fit. We find that four factors, including: 
colonial legacy; pursuit of national building objectives; wars and their 
impact on policing and impact of neo-liberal globalisation identified by 
Hills (2000), Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006) and further elaborated by 
Francis (2012) variedly influenced the police in Kenya. Whilst Kenya has 
not experienced large scale wars as is with post-conflict contexts, for 
example Rwanda and Burundi, the confluence of the other three factors 
define the crisis that was Kenyan policing before 2007.  
Policing in Kenya has its roots in colonial legacy of repressive policing 
whose aim was to subdue Africans and mobilise them for labour. This did 
not change at independence. Constitutional amendments immediately 
after independence led to centralization of power under the imperial 
presidency that used the police to silence any form of dissent (Gimode, 
2007, Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). Put differently, policing in Kenya 
was about regime policing (Neild, 2006, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006), the 
focus of which was to serve the interests of the powerful political elite, 
rather than guarantee public security. In such cases, policing is 
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repressive, corrupt and do not have regard human rights. To-date, most of 
our respondents constructed policing based on these adversarial 
relationships between the state and the public.   
Whilst the police had been used in electoral malfeasance in Kenya in the 
past, (Nowrojee and Manby, 1993, Kagwanja, 1998, Anderson and 
Lochery, 2008), 2007 was a turning point as it registered the highest 
deaths presumably caused by police in any elections. The police was 
more of a source of insecurity rather than security. The events had a 
profound negative impact on Kenya’s economy. Kenya’s economy 
suffered massive losses. The GDP nosedived from 5.4% (Kitiabi, 2011) to 
-0.4% (Global Finance, 2015). Trade, tourism and agriculture were 
hardest hit.510 These were losses that would have been avoided had the 
police acted responsibly in 2007 general elections and therefore confirm 
the stated position at the beginning of the SSR debates, and even now, 
that of the security agencies being a source of insecurity and creating 
conditions not suitable for development to take place.511 The inexorable 
link between security and development cannot be overemphasised. 
As Francis (2012, p.10) would put it, the period preceding 2007/08 could 
still be classified as state policing. Police reform process that had begun 
before the year 2007 had failed to address the crisis of policing and 
security sector reform during the period. These needed to be reviewed 
and the post-election violence provided the opportunity. Though Kenya 
had been undertaking reforms particularly after the 2002 elections, there 
was still a dearth of in-depth analyses of the implementation, successes 
of or failures of these reform initiatives. Available literatures were either 
for policy consumption or commentaries and to a large extent were not 
specific on the police. The 2007 post-election violence provided the need 
to focus on the police, particularly after the implication of the police in the 
post-election violence and the recommendations that reforms in the sector 
would likely lead to stability. This study filled this gap. 
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Post-2007 police reform implementation 
Despite competing priorities in the post 2007/8 period, the KNDRP 
prioritised stopping the violence, restoring human dignity and establishing 
favourable environment as prerequisites for long-term police reform. This 
reflects the attendant views in the wider post-conflict reconstruction 
literature. For example, Luckham (2009) argues that when states fail or 
fracture, ‘the first priority of state reconstruction is ending political violence 
and restoring minimum conditions of security’ (Luckham, 2009, p.2). As 
such, Kenya was on the verge of collapse and stopping the violence was 
more immediate. 
Police reform implementation was not done in isolation. It was done 
alongside implementation of reform in other key institutions. The reforms 
were state-driven and targeted statutory institutions responsible for 
security and their governance thereof (Hänggi, 2004).512 Preference was 
for a narrow or minimalist approach to the security sector. Within this 
approach, reform of the police and the judiciary were more dominant, 
while reforms in other statutory institutions remained mute. The 
dominance of the police reform and judicial reform however is significant 
because of the complementarity of the two institutions, either good or bad. 
As argued by (Neild, 2006), ‘It is now clearly recognised that police reform 
requires parallel judicial reform and that it is frequently hampered, even 
endangered, by the slow pace or lack of judicial transformation’ (Neild, 
2006, p.31).To put her argument in context, we single out delays in the 
dispensation of justice which had been previously blamed on the police. 
The deliberate reform initiative to strengthen the Department of Public 
Prosecution (DPP) relieved the police of the prosecutorial function and so 
enhancing delivery of justice to the Kenyan population.  
Within the wider literature, the implementation of police reform in Kenya 
did not assume a holistic approach (OECD DAC, 2007) often advocated 
for in the literature. This meant that critical constituencies in the process 
were ignored in the implementation process. For example, whilst 
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governors emerged as key players in the police reform process at the 
county level after the 2013 elections, there was no definite framework for 
their participation. It is this lack of framework that put the governors on 
collision course with the national government in relation to police reform. 
Attempts by governors to be involved through the constitutional County 
Policing Authorities were rejected as the government failed to 
operationalise the authorities.  
Far from targeting state institutions, the implementation excluded critical 
segments of the stakeholders, thus motivating the local ownership 
debate.513 Whereas much of the existent literature on ownership is framed 
on donor-recipient dichotomy lens,514 the debate in the context of Kenya 
had more to do with domestic ownership of the process across political 
elite, civil society groups, police rank-and-file, contestation between the 
national and county governments and the involvement of the local 
populations. Contestations witnessed across all the levels of analysis 
were about ownership of the process and each stakeholder staking a 
claim to the process.  
Most contestations in terms of the implementation occurred at the meso 
level pitying the state institutions involved in the process, and in particular 
the National Police Service Commission, the Office of the Inspector 
General and the Independent Police Oversight. These contestations have 
been discussed in Section 4.3.2. Divergence of opinion amongst 
implementing agencies staking their claim in the police reform process is 
not a new phenomenon. From donor perspectives Brzoska (2006) 
attributes the ‘turf wars’ in the implementation of security sector reform 
process in transitional contexts to duplication, parallel chains of 
command, and fights over allocation of funds. These also apply in the 
context of national actors. First, there was lack of shared understanding 
on the mandate of the institutions, and in some cases judicial 
interpretations had to be sought. Secondly, the influence of political 
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motivations meant that the parochial interests of the political elite were 
driving the agenda of the institutions. In such instances, the contestations 
have a noticeable toll on efficiency and effectiveness of the reform 
process (Brzoska, 2006). 
Closely related to the contestations in the implementation is the fact that 
there were instances that reform priorities were not fully implemented 
either because they were not explicit in statement or a case of poor  
implementation strategy. We exemplify this with two reform processes; 
merger of the two forces and vetting processes. In the case of  merger of 
the two police forces, the Kenya Police and administration police into the 
National Police Service, the Ransley committee proposed the 
independence of the two police forces as separate entities, while  the 
2010 Constitution maintained the distinction of the two forces under the 
command of the Inspector General of the National Police Service in  
Article 243 of the Constitution (KCLR, 2010). This did not help clarify the 
divergences in the two forces. In a study that sought to determine the 
success factors of reform initiative of merging police force and fire 
services, Stinchcomb and Ordaz (2007) argued that despite grandiose 
ambitions, mergers of policing services have not always been met with 
unequivocal success. They singled out merger administrators for paying 
little attention to organisational culture. This was the case for Kenya. The 
Administration Police and Regular Police draw from parallel cultures.515 
While the merger exists on paper at the national level, the reform 
statement did not clarify how the process would be undertaken. The end 
result - policing at lower levels is an epitome of a deeply divided police 
system.  
The priority to vet police officers was strong in statement. Article 7.2 of 
National Police Service Act (2011) states; ‘All officers shall undergo 
vetting by the Commission to assess their suitability and competence’ 
(KCLR, 2011a). However, the implementation was convoluted and failed 
to meet both public and police expectation, thus defeating the very 
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purpose for which it was done. Some police officers found unsuitable to 
serve sought protection of the courts while some civic society groups 
challenged the process altogether, citing vetting procedure and lack of 
transparency. The police resisted the process thus precipitating 
presidential intervention to kick-start the process (Kwayera, 2013). 
The vetting lessons from Kenya demonstrate similar experiences with 
other transitional contexts. In Bosnia and Hesgovina (BiH), two 
experiences stand out: the removal of abusive police officers, and the 
hiring or re-appointment of judges and prosecutors (Finci, 2007, Moratti 
and Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009). Though these processes were conducted in 
post-conflict contexts;516 they fit into Kenya’s police and 
judges/magistrates vetting process. In fact the Kenyan process was 
designed by Alexander Mayer, a lead expert in BiH vetting process. 
Though the Kenyan process was still ongoing as at the time of writing, the 
challenges the process faced at the formative stages reduced the 
prospects of it achieving its objectives. Though the BiH was considered 
generally successful (Finci, 2007), the two contexts offer lessons that 
vetting of police in transitional contexts is a difficult process and which 
requires meticulous planning. 
Though we established huge potential for non-state actors’ participation in 
Kenya’s police reform, their role was peripheral. This therefore meant that 
the implementation process ended up isolating the informal sector and the 
local populations in whose interest reforms were being undertaken. 
Interestingly, the Kenyan case reflected the pattern in transitional settings, 
where the informal actors remain the dominant security providers to 
nearly 80% of the population. Evidence suggests that in sub-Saharan 
Africa ,at least 80% of justice services are delivered by non-state 
providers (OECD DAC, 2007, Podder, 2014). Baker (2011) reported that 
in two of four federal states of Nigeria, non-state policing systems were 
the preferred choice of security delivery 88.9% and 62.5% of the time. 
These compare with our findings in which nearly 80% of our questionnaire 
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respondents perceived that non-state actors provide them with security.517 
This finding reflects interesting debate with regards to responsiveness of 
police reform and is further developed in Section 7.3.3. 
An analysis of the reform priorities spelt out by Ransley committee (GoK, 
2009) suggested that the objective of post-2007 police reform was to 
addresses what we previously referred to as crisis in police and security 
sector reform.518 Have these crises been addressed? Our findings 
suggest varied responses. On the one hand, the implementation 
addressed some of the crises, while at the same time continued to 
deepen the crises. The fact that the process was entrenched in law 
provides hope that though benefits are yet to be realised, the process is 
on course. 
In terms of legitimacy, the police reform implementation did not lead to 
wider appeal in the eyes of the majority of the people. The service still 
grapples with the identity crisis of forming a unified law enforcement 
agency that guarantees public security and safety. The merger process 
caused even more confusion in terms of identity. The capacity of the 
police to deal with security problems still remains in question given myriad 
security problems in Kenya. The fact that these four crises; crisis of 
legitimacy; crisis of identity, crisis of purpose and crisis of capacity 
(Francis, 2012) have not been fully addressed emphasized the fact the 
police reform implementation is a complex process in transitional 
contexts. To expect quick fix solutions is to be overambitious especially 
given the fact that the process has been in existence for only five years 
compared to other more problematic contexts that have been undergoing 
for more years. 
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7.3.2. Relationship with wider Debates on SSR and Police Reform in 
Power-Sharing Contexts 
The analysis and findings about the interrelationship between police 
reform process in Kenya raised a number of issues with regard to wider 
literature. Does the Kenyan case fit into what is known about politics of 
power-sharing and police reform process in other contexts? Does it 
challenge what we know about this relationship (and if yes in ways) and 
what study lessons are derived from Kenya’s power-sharing politics and 
police reform process? In order to understand these questions, the point 
of departure is to understand the promise and practice519 of police reform 
in Kenya, or security sector reform provisions (SSRPs) in the words of 
(Hutchful, 2009). Though the National Accord which led to Kenya’s grand-
coalition government made a strong pitch for institutional reforms, it was 
not explicit on police reform. It however created room for subsequent 
processes to expand and specify police reform priorities envisaged by the 
power-sharing agreement. In short, Kenya’s power-sharing agreement 
was flexible enough to allow subsequent processes arising out of the 
agreement make considerable reference to the police, thereby making the 
police reform process the dominant subject of Kenya’s security sector 
reform process. 
The relationship between SSRPs in power-sharing agreements and 
practice thus presents a very intricate relationship with the security sector 
reform process. Hutchful (2009) reported significant variation in nature, 
scope and level of specificity of security sector reform provisions, 
suggesting less meaningful relationships between SSRPs in peace 
agreements with implementation of the reform initiatives. For example 
agreements with robust SSRPs e.g. El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia and 
Liberia have not translated into robust implementations, while others with 
no provisions e.g. Timor-Leste have had significant reform attempts. 
Sierra Leone had relatively weak SSRP yet followed by comprehensive 
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reform, while the Mozambique’s Rome Agreement did not even mention 
police reform but subsequent SSR focused exclusively on the police while 
the military attracted much attention (Hutchful, 2009). These less 
meaningful association between SSRPs are also reported by Ottmann 
and Vüllers (2014) whose focus was on post-conflict situations. 
Yet in another study, Noyes (2013) reported a positive correlation 
between scope and depth of SSRPs and implementation in the cases of 
Kenya and Zimbabwe. This departs from Hutchful (2009) and Ottmann 
and Vüllers (2014) probably due to the fact that the Zimbabwe and Kenya 
cases arose out of electoral dispute. He attributes Kenya’s relative 
success (and this study questions this claim) to the strong content of 
SSRP in Kenya’s power-sharing agreement while also notes that 
Zimbabwe did not have strong SSRP in the agreement hence non 
implementation of security sector reform. It is in the latter point about 
Kenya that the findings in this research depart from Noyes (2013). Whilst 
the promise of police reform in Kenya’s power-sharing agreement was 
general, in fact there is no mention of police reform in Kenya’s power-
sharing agreement, the practices that emerged were sector specific and 
strong on police reform process. In these divergent studies, how does 
police reform process in Kenya fit within the wider debates on the 
interrelationship between power-sharing politics and security sector 
reform? 
The aforementioned studies thus cause a dilemma in concluding about 
the relationship between power-sharing and security sector reform 
processes. The Kenyan case discussed in this thesis however seem to 
clarify this dilemma. It establishes that indeed there exists relationship 
between power-sharing and police reform process. On the one hand 
power-sharing does facilitate the process when the political elite close 
ranks to work together to push the reform agenda. On the other hand, the 
politics of power-sharing does inhibit the police reform process particularly 
when the reform agenda agreed on by the political elite seem to dis-
empower those who held power before power-sharing arrangement came 
into place. This is particularly so demonstrated by the politics of 
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devolution in the Kenyan context. The national government would not 
have the county governments have their way easily in relation to control of 
security at the local level.  
The study challenges the assertion by Noyes (2013) that there was a 
strong security sector component in Kenya’s power-sharing arrangement. 
It does argue that the security sector reform agenda was generic within 
the framework of institutional reform which then crystallised into the police 
reform agenda. It is this framework that allowed for strong and 
institutionalized police reform process to emerge. Had the police reform 
process been strong in the power-sharing agreement, it would probably 
not have led to strong and broad based police reform process considering 
the rush with which power-sharing agreements are signed ostensibly to 
stop the escalation of violence. 
Finally, the discussions reinforce the notion that police reform is a deeply 
contested and highly political process and requires compromises amongst 
stakeholders. It does also confirm the notion that police reform process is 
a long term process whose dividends may not be tangible when the life of 
the power-sharing agreement comes to an end, but may provide a basis 
for which future reform endeavors would flourish. Planning for police 
reform process must therefore stretch beyond the life of power-sharing 
arrangement as the Kenyan case demonstrates. 
7.3.3. Responsiveness of Police Reforms to Policing and 
Community Safety and Security Needs 
This sub-section connects with our third thematic area and contributes to 
the literature on the efficacy of police and SSR in transitional and post-
conflict settings. The findings here revealed the perceptions that the 
police reform process has not led to improved policing for most of the 
ordinary Kenyans. 
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Whilst studies have labelled police reform in some transitional contexts as 
successful and others failures,520 we hesitate to adjudge the Kenyan 
police reform process using this dichotomy. Loh (2010) for example 
considers police reform in Sierra-Leone a success story while that of DR 
Congo a failure. He identifies the ‘success factors’ present in the former 
and missing in the latter.521 In assessing the Kenya context based on 
these factors, one gets the impression that the police reform process is far 
from being considered a success story. However, we argue that the 
success factors take long to imbue in the reform processes. The Kenyan 
process, which is hardly a decade, however derives prospects of 
‘success’ in the entrenchment of the process in the constitution. 
Ebo (2006) however takes a more cautious approach on the ‘success’ of 
Sierra-Leone, noting that while there is progress and positive 
achievements, there are some operational and governance deficits. He 
argues that SSR can only be largely as successful as the broader post-
conflict reconstruction framework. What does this mean for Kenya? The 
post-2007 police reform was pegged on Agenda 4 items for long term 
solutions to Kenya’s progress. This implies that for police reform to be 
seen as successful, it must be understood within the context of wider 
institutional reforms and enabling political context. Progress in the wider 
implementation of Agenda 4 items would therefore suggest progress in 
the police reform process.  
The findings regarding perceptions about responsiveness of police reform 
to public security needs raise two major issues regarding the contribution 
this study makes to literature; the local ownership of the police reform 
process and the role of the (in)formal institutions in the reform process. 
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How does the Kenya police reform process fit within the dominant realm 
of local ownership debates, and to what extent do these findings relate to 
the (in)formal sector role in the police reform process? 
First we highlighted that donor-recipient dichotomy dominate local 
ownership debate in security sector reform processes.522 This study, 
albeit contributing to these debates, departs from this dominant foreign-
local discourse and emphasises inherent local stakeholder tensions 
regarding control of the police reform process. These tensions straddle all 
the levels of analysis considered in this thesis.  
Rather than be defined by ‘foreigner’ and ‘locals’ dichotomy, police reform 
ownership discourse in Kenya is dominated by competition amongst 
Kenyans themselves in different capacities. At the national level, the 
political elite battled for control of the process, while at the meso level 
different reform institutions sought to canvas their decisions on the overall 
reform process. The involvement of civil society groups in the police 
reform process reflected some elements of donor-recipient dichotomy, 
this time less in terms of donors determining the course of reform, but civil 
society groups competing for donor resources for the reform process at 
the national level. In this way, civil society agendas for reform were 
skewed towards the interests of the donor community. At the local level 
however, the indigenous civil society groups remained undervalued and 
marginalised in the police reform process. This reflected the trend in 
which SSR initiatives focus on state-centric approaches (Caparini, 2010). 
Within the police file-and-rank, the dominant feeling that the reform was 
generated from without fuelled anti-reform perception especially with 
regards to police oversight and vetting. Most police officers, despite being 
aware of the police reform process, demonstrated little competence in the 
implementation of the national police reform agenda. It is this feeling of 
exclusion amongst the police officers that Albrecht and Buur (2009) 
identify as prohibitive factor to success in police reform process. 
                                            
522
 See Section 2.5.1.2. 
322 
 
The characteristic of ownership of police reform process in Kenya makes 
significant contribution to security sector reform ownership debate, looking 
inwards towards internal dynamics of ownership debates alongside the 
traditional donor perspectives of the police reform processes in countries 
emerging from crises. 
Linking with the ownership debate is the extent to which informal actors 
play a role in the police reform process. Despite the burgeoning literature 
on the role of the informal non-state actors in the delivery of security,523 
the implementation of the Kenya police reform process remained 
predominantly state-centric. The informal actors had limited space to 
participate in the process despite being actively involved in the setting of 
the police reform agenda. Key implementation decisions were passed 
down from the national government to implementing agencies and the 
local populations.  
The role of non-state actors is not new in police and security sector reform 
literature. From donor point of view, the non-state is especially in the rural 
and poor urban areas where there is minimal access to formal state 
justice (Albrecht and Buur, 2009). Substantial literature also emphasise 
linkages between the state and the non-state (Jarstad, 2013, Schroeder 
and Chappuis, 2014, Boege et al., 2008, Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2006). These however remain at the theoretical level, for the inclusion of 
the informal in the police reform implementation process remains a 
challenge. State-centric approaches favoured by factors such as external 
pressure, political environment, turf wars involving advisors, legal 
frameworks, limited conceptual clarity, capacity and reliance on ‘outside’ 
expertise remain dominant (Albrecht and Buur, 2009). These, as in the 
case of Kenya, feed into the perceptions of the ordinary populations that 
police reform is not responsive to public security needs. 
Our findings suggested that nearly 80% of security provision is under the 
informal and quasi-formal sector, a finding characteristic of hybrid political 
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orders.524 In a hybrid governance context, most policing is delivered by 
non-state actors. The state certainly cannot claim monopoly of provision 
of security to the entire Kenyan population. If, as argued by Baker (2011), 
policing that places a focus exclusively on either state or non-state 
institutions is unlikely to be effective, then the  police reform process in 
Kenya is less likely to respond to policing and public security needs. 
Though the reform agenda for police provided for the inclusion of informal 
non-state actors in the process through the county policing authorities, the 
government, (both the grand coalition and the post-coalition) was 
reluctant to actualise county policing authorities that were the basis for 
citizen participation in security management at the local levels 
The role of non-state actors however does not find favour amongst some 
scholars. Francis (2012) for example argues that though some countries 
are likely to benefit from diversity of policing (this includes non-state 
actors in policing), ‘it no doubt undermines the state monopoly over the 
use of force as well as sovereignty of the state.’ This, he adds ‘is 
generally bad for peace, development and human security’. Whilst he 
raises valid questions on the inclusion and indeed value of non-state 
actors in the police reform process, he does not provide a roadmap on 
how the state can provide security to nearly 80% of the population, as our 
study and other studies establish, that depends on the non-state for 
security. This research establishes huge potential for the role of non-state 
in Kenya’s police reform.  
7.3.4. Reflections on Reliability of Findings in Relation to Kenya 
The task of examining the implementation of an on going project under a 
highly contested political context presents one of the most difficult 
challenges for any researcher. This was the case with this research. A 
number of questions emerged. How do we conduct research in a 
dynamic, deeply contested political environment where the objects of 
research change faster than the research process? At what point does the 
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object of research get a closure if the research object is the 
implementation of an ongoing project? How do you deal with biases 
relating to experiences based on the researcher’s professional career? 
Though these are questions normal to any research process, and often 
emerge in ethics approval process, their manifestations in this research 
were present and adequately addressed through the use of mixed 
methods approach. 
First, the pragmatic approach, leaning more towards social constructivism 
enabled us to analyse from multiple points of views the contested concept 
of security and what it meant to different stakeholders. As a politically 
laden concept, the pragmatic approach helped us locate the priorities for 
police reform process in Kenya. 
Secondly, triangulating different theories helped us analyse the complex 
phenomenon under investigation. For example, agenda setting theories, 
in particular Kingdon’s Multiple-Streams theory proved useful in explaining 
how the agenda-setting process for police reform in Kenya was 
developed. Macro-meso-micro analysis framework proved very useful in 
analysing interactions and impacts of decision across all levels in policy 
formulation process, while Arend Lijphart’s consociational democracy 
provided a useful platform for analysing interrelationships between 
political power dynamics and police reform process in countries emerging 
from political crisis, and under a grand-coalition governments. In short, 
multiple theoretical frameworks provided the means to explaining the 
complex processes involved in police reform process in Kenya. 
Finally, mixed methods provided opportunity to gather data that would 
otherwise not have been gathered. A combination of different methods, 
including secondary data and primary data (key informant interviews, 
focus group discussions and questionnaire survey) helped generate rich 
data not possible under a single method. It also helped mitigate the 
inherent weaknesses associated with specific data collection methods. 
Thus, the mixed approach we used was useful in helping us 
comprehensively answer the research questions in this research. 
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Reflecting on the achievement made, we contend that mixed-methods 
approach remains an effective approach for analysing complex 
phenomenon. 
7.4 Priorities for Future Research 
This research focused on an on going police reform implementation 
process within the broader SSR agenda and debates. As an ongoing 
process, the implementation of the reform was affected by different 
influences that may not have been factored in the agenda-setting process. 
As we have argued in Chapter three, the agenda for reform was framed 
within the context of Kenya’s 2007 political crisis. However, regional 
dynamics intervened to influence the police reform process in ways not 
anticipated during agenda-setting. The entry of Kenya Defence Forces 
into Somalia in October 2011 changed the security dynamics in Kenya 
with the Al-Shabaab ‘bringing the battle home’ to Kenya. Al-Shabaab 
attacks, both in urban and rural Kenya, have become one of the greatest 
security threats in Kenya that the reform process is yet to address. There 
is therefore potential for research on the effects of Kenya’s role in regional 
and international security on the internal security sector reform process. 
This should stimulate further debates in other agenda setting for security 
sector reform contexts. 
Secondly, state response to heightened insecurity, notably banditry, cattle 
rustling and threat posed by Al- Shabaab and demands for the Jubilee 
government to review its security priorities led to the resignation of the 
Inspector General and the sacking of the Interior Cabinet Secretary. It 
also led to the passing of Security Laws Amendment Act (2014) that 
sought to address legal and administrative bottlenecks in the fight against 
terrorism and other security challenges. How have these developments 
impacted on Kenya’s police reform process and what lessons are drawn 
in police reform processes in contexts similar to Kenya? Though this 
thesis has highlighted some of the issues resulting from this development, 
the fact that this move opened another chapter in the police reform 
process needs to be investigated. 
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The research established that merger of the Kenya Police and 
Administration Police remains one of the stickiest issue in post-2008 
police reform process in Kenya. While we have discussed the challenges 
of merger of the two services in Chapter 4, their trajectories seem to have 
a huge impact on the merger debate. There is therefore the need to 
investigate the extent to which the histories of the two services influence 
the process of merging the two services. 
Whilst literature supportive of the inclusion of the informal actors in 
security sector reform processes is ubiquitous, no such study exists in 
Kenya within the context of post-2007 police reform. This is despite huge 
potential for the informal in enhancing police-community relations as we 
have established in Chapter six of this study. There is therefore need to 
explore, more elaborately, the role of the informal in the context of the 
wider community policing debate in Kenya.  
Finally, whilst we have examined the relationship between 
decentralisation and police reform, the time period between the formal 
decentralisation (2013) and the period of closure for this research (2014) 
may not have been sufficient time-span to examine the impacts of 
devolution on the police reform process. Devolution was a new concept 
and had not been fully implemented. There is therefore scope for further 
research on the impacts of devolution on police reform process. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix i: Participant Consent Form 
Title: The Police Reform Process in Kenya, 2008-2014: A Case Study 
of Security Sector Reform in Societies Emerging from Crisis 
I wish to participate in the above named project.  
The researcher has explained to me the purpose of the above research 
project and I understand the following:  
1. That taking part in this study will include being interviewed and 
audio recorded____________ 
 
 
2. That I am free to withdraw at any time and I will not be asked 
questions about why I no longer want to take part_________ 
 
3. That I may not withdraw once the thesis has been submitted for 
examination__________  
 
4. That all information I provide will be dealt with in a confidential 
manner._____ 
 
5. I agree that the researcher may contact me on my 
preferred_________   
 
  
Signed___________________________________     
Address_____________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
    
Telephone Number__________________________     
Date______________________________________     
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Appendix ii: Participant Information Sheet 
Title: The Police Reform Process in Kenya, 2008-2014: A Case Study 
of Security Sector Reform in Societies Emerging from Crisis 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. This information sheet 
explains what the study is all about to help you make informed consent 
about participation. 
This research aims at investigating the police reform process in Kenya in 
relation to the underlying processes, examines the contribution of local 
actors to the reform process and investigates the challenges and 
responses to deficiencies associated with Kenya’s police reform process. 
It also explores the influence of power sharing politics on Kenya’s police 
reform and determines the responsiveness of the reform process to 
policing and security needs of the Kenyan population. 
The information provided by you will be used for research purpose only. It 
will not be used in a manner that will allow identification of your individual 
responses. 
The study has been considered by the University of Bradford (UK) Ethics 
Approval Committee and has been given favourable review and also 
received approval from the National Commission on Science, Technology 
and Innovation which is legally mandated to authorise all research 
undertaken in Kenya. 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this Study. If you have any 
questions about this research at any stage do not hesitate to ask the 
researcher. 
Nicholas Otieno Ondoro, +254721285514, +447465066062, 
Email: noondoro@bradford.ac.uk 
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Appendix iii: Interview Guide 
STUDY TITLE The Police Reform Process in Kenya, 2008-
2014: A Case Study of Security Sector 
Reform in Societies Emerging from Crisis 
Specific Research 
Questions 
i. What were the security sector reform 
priorities in Kenya before and after the 2007-
2008 post-election violence? 
ii. What is the contribution of local actors to 
police reform and wider SSR processes in 
Kenya? 
iii. How have stakeholders responded to 
challenges and deficiencies of SSR in 
Kenya? 
iv. To what extent has power-sharing politics 
influenced police reform and wider SSR in 
Kenya? 
v. To what extent is SSR in Kenya 
responsive to policing and security needs of 
the Kenyan population? 
Introduction  Thank  respondent for grunting an 
interview 
 Assure respondent of confidentiality and 
anonymity 
 Seek to know respondent role in the 
organization 
SSR and police 
reform process 
 Please give me the overall picture of 
security in Kenya before  and after 2008 
 What do you make of the on-going police 
and justice reform?(Probe for how the reform 
agenda was set, attitudes, expectations, 
whether the reforms on course etc) 
 How does/has your organization 
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contribute (d) to the police reform and SSR in 
general? 
 What are the obstacles to police reform in 
your own opinion? 
 How does your organization respond to 
the challenges/obstacles you have mentioned 
above? 
Power-sharing and 
police reform 
 To what extent do you think political 
interests(both players and processes) have 
influenced the police and justice reform process 
 Do you consider the Kenya Police to be 
an independent outfit? 
 What were the political competitions 
between ODM and PNU regarding police and 
justice reform? 
 Devolution: What challenges exist in 
devolving policing to the counties? 
 
SSR and efficacy and 
responsiveness to 
policing 
 Do you think the ongoing police and 
justice reform respond effectively to local 
community needs? 
 What do you consider to be the most 
important achievements of police reform, if 
any?(Probe respondent for reason) 
For Police Officers 
 What is your understanding of police 
reform? 
 What are your contributions towards 
reforming the police? 
 Do you think the current police reform 
address your needs as a police officer? 
 (Probe for areas of reform –
accountability, professionalism, oversight and 
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administrative reform? 
 
Winding up  Thank respondent and close the interview  
 Ask for opportunity for further clarification 
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Appendix iv: Questionnaire for Members of the Public (QMP) 
Serial no........ 
PUBLIC PERCEPTION TOWARDS SECURITY AND SSR 
SECTION A:  
INTRODUCTION 
Interview Date: ___________________________________ 
Time Interview: _______ Began: _________ Ended: ____________ 
Interview length: ___________ 
Physical address: 
__________________________________________________________
__________________  
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening. 
My name is--------------------------------. I am conducting a study in relation to 
your security and safety in this neighbourhood. I am asking people for 
their views and opinions on security. I would be very grateful if you could 
answer a few questions for me. Your participation in this study is 
voluntary. The information you provide will remain confidential and the 
report will only have summary information. 
Do you mind answering a few questions? YES       NO  
SCREENER 
1. What is the respondent’s gender? 
Male      Female  
[Do not read out] Interviewer: 
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2. Let’s start with questions about you. Do you or anyone in your 
immediate household work for any of the following organizations? READ 
OUT 
Police........................................ >TERMINATE 
Kenya Army........................................... >TERMINATE 
Administration Police ............................................................................ 
>TERMINATE 
Provincial Administration............................................................................ 
>TERMINATE 
None of the above......................................................................... 
>CONTINUE 
3. How old did you turn at your last birthday? 
18≤24yrs     CONTINUE 
25≤34 yrs     CONTINUE 
35 and above    CONTINUE 
4. 1. In what grade did you leave school? 
1. Primary 
2. Secondary 
3. College 
4. University 
5. [Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know 
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SECTION B 
Part 1 
1. What do you consider to be the most important security issue in your 
neighbourhood?----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------ 
2. What do you think the government is doing to guarantee your security 
and justice (Interviewer probe for responsiveness of police and justice 
reform to need of respondent)----------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------- 
3. Who provides your security? 
 (interviewer; do not read, record first mention, then record other 
mentions as spontaneous, finally read out those not mentioned and 
record those respondent recognizes as prompted) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------- 
 Kenya police   General Service Unit  
Intelligence Service 
  Criminal Investigation 
Department 
 
 Kenya Army     
 Administration 
police 
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Part 2 
1. I am now going to read a few statements about the police and I’d like 
you to tell me whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), neutral (N), 
disagree(D) or strongly disagree(SD) 
STATEMENTS SA A N D SD 
1. There is reduced corruption in the police 
service. 
     
2. Police are more reliable these days than 
before 
     
3. Human rights abuse is still prevalent in the 
police service. 
     
4. There is strained relationship between the 
police and members of the public. 
     
5. The police are more professional in dealing 
with the public. 
     
6. The police take too long to respond to 
distress call by the public. 
     
7. There is increased public trust and 
confidence in police service. 
     
8. There are increased incidences of ethnicity 
and tribalism in police service. 
     
9. I feel more secure today than during the 
post-election violence. 
     
10. The rate of crime still remains high in my 
neighbourhood. 
     
11. The presence of the police has greatly 
enhanced peace and stability. 
     
12. The proportion of offences brought to justice 
still remains high. 
     
13. Police service is managed in a transparent 
manner. 
     
14. Public oversight of the police will improve 
through the ongoing reforms. 
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15. There exists political interference in the 
police 
     
16. The level of dissatisfaction amongst police 
officers remains high 
     
END OF INTERVIEW 
THANK RESPONDENT AND CLOSE INTERVIEW. 
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Appendix v: Focus Group Discussion Guide 
STUDY TITLE Security Sector Reform in Transitional 
Post-conflict Societies: Police Reform 
in Kenya after the 2007 Post-Election 
Violence 
 
(15 minutes) 
Introduction 
(To help create a 
conducive atmosphere for 
the discussion. 
Clarify any doubts 
discussants might have) 
 Ice Breaking 
 Outline purpose of research 
 Reassure participants of 
confidentiality 
Construction of 
security/SSR 
(15 MINUTES) 
 What is security and justice all 
about? 
 What do you consider to be your 
priority in terms of security and justice? 
 Mapping of various local actors 
that are involved in security and SSR 
Awareness of SSR 
(15 MINUTES) 
 
 Tell me any state security 
institutions you are aware of? 
 Which security institution do you 
associate reforms with? PROBE ON 
SECURITY SECTOR INSTITUTIONS: 
 Within each, probe on reform they 
are aware of.  
 Looking at the institutions we have 
listed here, I want us to rank them ;where 
the best institution comes first and so on 
(let participants do their own ranking) 
 Why have you ranked this as the 
first one? Probe for all. 
(15 minutes) 
Attitudes towards police 
and police reform 
I would like us to discuss further some of 
the institutions you have mentioned 
previously 
 What do you like about them? 
 What, if anything, do you dislike 
about the current state of security? 
 What unique thing about the police 
and the judiciary would you want to share 
with us? POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE 
 What do think is missing in the 
current police reform? 
 What would you like to see done 
to make policing effective? 
 Do the current changes in policing 
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satisfy your needs? How? 
 What do you think the police 
should do to respond to your needs?  
(15 minutes) 
Perceptions and 
awareness of community 
policing 
Moving on, I would now want us to focus 
more on the police. I would like you to tell 
me what comes first to your mind when I 
mention a word (mention attributes of the 
police) what comes to your mind? 
 When I mention the word 
community policing? 
I want us to get in to an activity. Imagine 
you were to walk into and out of a police 
station, what would you see, smell, taste, 
touch? Probe fully for the kind of officers 
they meet. Let them explain what they 
are dressed in ,the language they speak, 
the atmosphere, buildings etc 
15 minutes 
Wrapping up 
Do you have any other comments or 
suggestions or comments you would like 
to share with me regarding what we have 
been discussing? 
Thank participants. 
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Appendix vi: Research Permit National Council for Science and 
Technology 
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Appendix vii: Research Clearance-Office of the Inspector General 
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Appendix viii: Research Clearance-Kisumu County 
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21:33 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:28 
Internals\\CSO7 Document noondoro 20/01/2014 
22:34 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:29 
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Hierarchical Name Item Type Created 
By 
Username 
Created On Modified 
By 
Username 
Modified On 
Internals\\FGD1 Audio noondoro 14/08/2014 
18:26 
noondoro 21/03/2015 
14:50 
Internals\\FGD2 Audio noondoro 15/08/2014 
13:58 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:26 
Internals\\FGD3 Audio noondoro 15/08/2014 
16:45 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:27 
Internals\\K-Int1 Document noondoro 27/12/2013 
14:39 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:47 
Internals\\K-Int2 Document noondoro 18/12/2013 
00:16 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:47 
Internals\\K-Int6 Document admin 22/12/2013 
12:32 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:45 
Internals\\MP1 Document noondoro 20/02/2014 
15:13 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:46 
Internals\\MP2 Audio noondoro 14/08/2014 
13:44 
noondoro 19/03/2015 
14:49 
Internals\\Twitter ~ Search - 
#policevetting 
Dataset noondoro 20/02/2014 
16:05 
noondoro 20/02/2014 
16:05 
Models 
Models\\New Models 
Models\\New Models\\Post 2008 
Reform Process 
Model noondoro 20/04/2014 
14:34 
PhD Stuff 04/03/2015 
07:05 
Node Classifications 
Nodes 
Nodes\\Agenda setting process Node noondoro 25/11/2013 
21:38 
noondoro 14/08/2014 
16:37 
Nodes\\Agenda setting 
process\Post-2007 reform 
priorities 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:41 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
23:03 
Nodes\\Agenda setting 
process\Pre-2007 police reform 
priorities 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:40 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
22:58 
Nodes\\Amongst the public Node noondoro 12/12/2013 
23:03 
noondoro 02/05/2014 
20:50 
Nodes\\Community policing Node noondoro 26/11/2013 
21:02 
noondoro 04/11/2014 
14:40 
Nodes\\Contribution of local 
actors to police reform and wider 
SSR  processes in Kenya 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:42 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
17:53 
Nodes\\Impacts on policing and 
local communities 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:48 
noondoro 04/11/2014 
19:06 
Nodes\\Macro level analysis Node noondoro 27/04/2014 
02:36 
noondoro 27/04/2014 
02:36 
Nodes\\Macro level 
analysis\Nyumba Kumi 
Node noondoro 23/01/2014 
13:14 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
20:38 
Nodes\\Meso level analysis Node noondoro 27/04/2014 
02:39 
noondoro 02/05/2014 
20:50 
Nodes\\Meso level analysis\Civil 
societies and police reform 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:49 
noondoro 25/01/2014 
22:03 
Nodes\\Meso level 
analysis\Justice reform 
Node noondoro 12/12/2013 
22:48 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
12:58 
Nodes\\Meso level 
analysis\National Police Service 
Node noondoro 27/12/2013 
15:28 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
13:22 
Nodes\\Meso level 
analysis\National Police Service 
Commission 
Node noondoro 13/01/2014 
19:56 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
12:58 
Nodes\\Meso level 
analysis\National security policy 
Node noondoro 13/12/2013 
21:56 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
12:58 
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Nodes\\Meso level 
analysis\Police oversight 
Node noondoro 25/11/2013 
19:51 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
12:58 
Nodes\\Meso level analysis\The 
amendments 
Node noondoro 25/11/2013 
19:52 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
12:58 
Nodes\\Micro level analysis Node noondoro 27/04/2014 
02:40 
noondoro 02/05/2014 
20:50 
Nodes\\Micro level 
analysis\Devolving security 
policing  functions 
Node noondoro 13/12/2013 
00:14 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
19:48 
Nodes\\Micro level 
analysis\Police recruitment 
Node noondoro 23/01/2014 
13:10 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
13:10 
Nodes\\Micro level 
analysis\Police welfare 
Node noondoro 12/12/2013 
23:50 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
14:27 
Nodes\\Micro level analysis\The 
police command and the 
ensuing debates 
Node noondoro 25/11/2013 
19:50 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
14:34 
Nodes\\Micro level analysis\The 
vetting process 
Node noondoro 25/11/2013 
19:49 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
13:53 
Nodes\\Politics and reform Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:50 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
17:54 
Nodes\\Politics and 
reform\Devolution 
Node noondoro 05/08/2014 
23:05 
noondoro 06/08/2014 
00:08 
Nodes\\Politics and 
reform\Devolution\Devolution at 
national level 
Node noondoro 08/09/2014 
14:13 
noondoro 08/09/2014 
15:37 
Nodes\\Politics and 
reform\Devolution\Devolution 
politics at County level 
Node noondoro 08/09/2014 
14:14 
noondoro 08/09/2014 
14:14 
Nodes\\Politics and 
reform\Grand Coalition 
Node noondoro 05/08/2014 
23:04 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
22:58 
Nodes\\Public participation Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:50 
noondoro 02/05/2014 
20:50 
Nodes\\Reform priorities Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:40 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:08 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:45 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
20:03 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Absence of 
National Security Policy 
Node noondoro 14/12/2013 
18:20 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
23:16 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Absence of 
National Security Policy\Lack of 
operating standarsd procedure 
Node noondoro 14/12/2013 
19:46 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:09 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Civil society 
response 
Node noondoro 12/12/2013 
23:57 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
23:16 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Corruption 
Node noondoro 13/12/2013 
00:09 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:09 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Institutional 
bottlenecks 
Node noondoro 26/01/2014 
20:24 
noondoro 26/01/2014 
20:25 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Insufficient 
resources 
Node noondoro 12/12/2013 
23:02 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:09 
 Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Interpretation 
problem 
Node noondoro 14/12/2013 
19:49 
noondoro 26/01/2014 
20:24 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Police 
community tensions 
Node noondoro 12/12/2013 
23:05 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
20:39 
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Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Police culture 
Node noondoro 13/12/2013 
00:04 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
23:16 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Political goodwill 
Node noondoro 23/01/2014 
14:22 
noondoro 11/05/2015 
23:15 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Political 
goodwill\Merger challenges 
Node noondoro 23/01/2014 
13:58 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
19:52 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Problem of 
transition 
Node noondoro 13/12/2013 
00:07 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:07 
Nodes\\Reform 
priorities\Challenges to the 
reform process\Youth crisis 
Node noondoro 23/01/2014 
14:19 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
20:43 
Nodes\\Responding to the 
challenges 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:45 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:08 
Nodes\\Responding to the 
challenges\Civil society 
response 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:52 
noondoro 23/01/2014 
13:18 
Nodes\\Responding to the 
challenges\Institutional response 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:52 
noondoro 18/12/2013 
17:55 
Nodes\\Responding to the 
challenges\Public response 
Node noondoro 24/11/2013 
13:53 
noondoro 21/01/2014 
15:08 
Queries 
Queries\\Trust Query admin 21/01/2015 
08:09 
admin 21/01/2015 
08:09 
Queries\\TRust and Confidence Query admin 21/01/2015 
08:11 
admin 21/01/2015 
08:11 
Relationship Types 
Relationship Types\\Associated Relationship 
Type 
noondoro 22/11/2013 
21:34 
noondoro 22/11/2013 
21:34 
Relationships 
Reports 
Reports\\Coding Summary By 
Node Report 
Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Coding Summary By 
Source Report 
Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Node Classification 
Summary Report 
Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Node Structure Report Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Node Summary Report Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Project Summary 
Report 
Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Source Classification 
Summary Report 
Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Reports\\Source Summary 
Report 
Report noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
noondoro 22/12/2013 
12:20 
Results 
Results\\Trust and confidence Results 
Node 
admin 21/01/2015 
08:11 
admin 21/01/2015 
08:11 
Search Folders 
Search Folders\\All Nodes Search 
Folder 
noondoro 22/11/2013 
21:34 
noondoro 22/11/2013 
21:34 
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Appendix x: Obunga Police Post 
 
Source: Researcher 2013 
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Appendix xi: Annotated Agenda for the KNDRP 
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